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JUNE 2011<br />

INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 3, NO 2<br />

principal for its financial well-being. They further state that there are three factors that determine<br />

this tightness, financial viability, operational viability, and the macro-political climate.<br />

Financial viability means that the agent will be highly receptive to the demands of the principal<br />

from which it derives its funding. Operational viability signifies the agent’s need for specialized<br />

expertise. As stated previously, in most cases the private agent’s authority stems from its high<br />

level of specialized expertise which it brings to the accreditation process. The source of this<br />

expertise is often the industry itself. In fact, accrediting bodies perform periodic quality reviews<br />

of themselves to ensure that they are competent enough to be able to handle the requirements of<br />

their job. The third variable, the ‘macro-political’ climate, refers to the “cycles of broad public<br />

attitudes towards regulatory matters” (Mattli and Buthe, 2005:406). If we relate this to the<br />

accreditation of Jeddah Community College, financial viability does have applicability in the<br />

sense that JCC had to pay the COE an accreditation fee. In terms of operational viability the<br />

COE has its own specialized expertise in which to carry out the tasks of accreditation. In the<br />

case of the ‘macro-political climate’, it can be safely assumed that most of the broader public in<br />

Saudi Arabia would be favorable to accreditation of a Saudi institution by an accrediting<br />

association from the USA.<br />

The Mattli and Buthe model outlined above suggests that the relationship between the agent<br />

(accrediting body) and the principals (the institutions and federal government) is often filled with<br />

a complex interplay of power dynamics. This power <strong>differential</strong> is all the more profound since<br />

the history of accreditation in the USA is punctuated with conflictual relations between and<br />

among the various roleplayers /stakeholders (Weissburg, 2008:89-155). This complex interplay<br />

of power dynamics is captured in the following statement by Trivett (1976:8):<br />

“The study of accreditation and institutional eligibility is only to a small degree<br />

an educational issue; it is more a political issue, a study of how the power to<br />

distribute benefits is generated, channeled, and regulated.”<br />

This point is underscored when we realize that accreditation in the US takes place at different<br />

levels. At the highest level, governmental and other agencies govern and recognize the<br />

accrediting bodies. For example, the US Department of Education, the Council for Higher<br />

Education Association (CHEA) and the Association of Specialized and Professional Accreditors<br />

(ASPA) confer power to associations that oversee accreditation at the regional, institutional or<br />

program level.<br />

The authors have already alluded to the concept of accrediting bodies being private and selfregulatory.<br />

The literature reveals ample debate as to whether government regulation or selfregulation<br />

is more effective. Up to this point there are no easy answers to this question.<br />

Governments around the world generally find it more expedient to rely on privately run selfregulatory<br />

bodies. However, self-regulation is not without its problems. Gunningham and Rees<br />

(1997:366-370) are of the view that standards set by self-regulatory industries, or professions,<br />

may be weak and/or poorly monitored. They also argue that self-regulation can lead to a lack of<br />

transparency and accountability.<br />

It is the authors’ view that if the Mattli and Buthe hypothesis is applied to accreditation, then<br />

accreditation itself becomes a sort of business enterprise, an adaptation of a business franchise<br />

model characteristic of the private sector. In other words, the accrediting body becomes the<br />

“franchisor” while the institution/program becomes the “franchisee”. The three variables<br />

mentioned by Mattli and Buthe i.e. financial viability, operational viability, and the macropolitical<br />

climate all support this business analogy. The COE is currently embarking on a project<br />

to accredit many other colleges in Saudi Arabia.<br />

COPY RIGHT © 2011 Institute of Interdisciplinary Business Research 699

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