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Does Qualitative Data Gathering Enlighten a Legal Pluralist<br />
Study of Law?<br />
Abstract<br />
Amy Jackson<br />
For decades, scholars have posed the question ‘what is law?’ Legal pluralists<br />
provide a variety of definitions and contexts for the study of law as a multi-sited<br />
social phenomenon. Kleinhans and Macdonald’s radical critique of legal pluralism<br />
(what they call ‘critical legal pluralism’) shifts analytical focus from the traditional<br />
legal pluralist acknowledgment of the operation, interaction and conflicts between<br />
multiple homogenous normative orders, to the heterogeneous imaginations and<br />
creative capacities of legal subjects. What is law, in a particular situation is found<br />
by questioning the narrative account of legal subjects.<br />
This chapter assesses the methodology used in an empirical study undertaken<br />
by the author. Theoretically, the study draws on Kleinhans and Macdonald’s<br />
approach to law. Practically, the study examines whether Muslim women who live<br />
in Britain experience the practice of veiling as having normative quality. The<br />
practice of veiling refers to the various ways Muslim women continuously conceal<br />
their heads, bodies, and faces by wearing a hijab, a jilbab, a niqab, or a burqa in<br />
public. During four focus group discussions, a sample of Muslim women living in<br />
Britain (between 18 to 36 years of age and from a range of socio-economic<br />
backgrounds) was asked a variety of questions relating to their experience of the<br />
practice of veiling and the ideas of identity, normativity, autonomy, and rights. This<br />
chapter considers the question: does qualitative data gathering enlighten a legal<br />
pluralist study of law?<br />
Key words: Legal Pluralism; qualitative data gathering; the practice of veiling.<br />
*****<br />
Qualitative methods enable researcher’s to interpret of the views and<br />
experiences of study participants. 1 There is difficulty in creating a generalizable<br />
definition of legal pluralism as legal pluralists provide a variety of definitions,<br />
contexts and methods for the study of law as a multi-sited social phenomenon. 2<br />
This chapter considers the question: does qualitative data gathering enlighten a<br />
legal pluralist study of law?<br />
In order to provide an answer, I concentrate on one situation of Muslim legal<br />
pluralism. In Britain, hypotheses of Muslim legal pluralism have been the subject<br />
1
2 Amy Jackson<br />
of much discussion, 3 and controversy. 4 The practice of veiling is particularly<br />
controversial. 5 For example, public bodies and places of employment have<br />
prohibited Muslim women from wearing veils. 6 Previous studies conducted on the<br />
practice of veiling in Britain capture a variety of meanings and reasons Muslim<br />
women follow the practice. 7 One question, not previously researched is: do Muslim<br />
women who live in Britain view the practice of veiling as law?<br />
I have conducted an empirical study to investigate the question. 8 The study was<br />
influenced by Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick Macdonald’s pluralistic<br />
approach to law and society (what they call ‘critical legal pluralism’). 9 This chapter<br />
assesses the methodology of my study. It is structured in two parts. The first part<br />
asks, theoretically, why should legal pluralists use qualitative data gathering<br />
methods in studies of law and society? The second part of the chapter explores how<br />
legal pluralists could use qualitative methods in studies on the relationship between<br />
law and society.<br />
1. Why Should Legal Pluralists use Qualitative Data Gathering Methods?<br />
As stated at the outset of the chapter, legal pluralists provide a variety of<br />
definitions, contexts and methods for the study of law as a multi-sited social<br />
phenomenon. This part of the chapter considers why legal pluralists should use<br />
qualitative data gathering methods.<br />
Kleinhans and Macdonald argue that law is created in the human imagination.<br />
They argue that traditional studies of legal pluralism essentialise the experiences of<br />
people subject to the rules of normative orders (legal subjects). 10 For legal<br />
pluralists, such as John Griffiths, the ontology of law is the self-regulation of<br />
normative orders. 11 A school is a normative order because it consists of the<br />
decision-making and law-enforcing processes comparable to those of the modern<br />
political state. The question legal pluralists, such as Griffiths, tend to pose is which<br />
normative order: ‘has jurisdiction over a given legal subject in a given situation at a<br />
given time?’ 12 This is the type of question that the Archbishop of Canterbury poses<br />
to determine that shari’a councils to have jurisdiction over British Muslims, as<br />
well as English law, related to matters of family law. 13 By investigating this<br />
question legal pluralists perpetuate an institutional notion of law.<br />
In order to ascertain to which normative order(s) legal subjects feel that they<br />
belong to, a complementary question is asked: ‘[w]ithin which [normative] order<br />
does the particular legal subject perceive himself or herself to be acting?’ 14 Samia<br />
Bano, for example, captures the narrative accounts of British Pakistani Muslim<br />
women to document what they make of the claims of shari’a councils (in relation<br />
to divorce proceedings) in their own lives and her research highlights the<br />
heterogeneity of British Muslim identity. 15 Bano argues that:<br />
2
Does Qualitative Data Gathering Enlighten a Legal Pluralist Study of Law? 3<br />
there is a sense of belonging to a Muslim community,<br />
which the women in this study expressed. Yet these<br />
descriptions of belonging and community were<br />
articulated in different ways. Some women had been<br />
marginalised, others occupied a closer position to the<br />
acceptable dictates of community expectations and<br />
such discussions must therefore recognise the complex<br />
lived reality that Muslim identity entails. 16<br />
Bano selected her study participants because they belong to a clearly defined<br />
community. Kleinhans and Macdonald affirm that even by adding the latter<br />
question ‘[l]egal subjects are…subsumed under one (or even several)<br />
homogeneous labels [such as, ‘Muslim’] instead of being allowed to persist as<br />
heterogeneous, multiple creatures’. 17 Discussion of a legal subject’s ‘being’ is<br />
required. A person’s subjective beliefs do not need to be upheld by objective<br />
standards in order to legitimate his or her values because law is ‘meaning and not<br />
machinery’. 18 Kleinhans and Macdonald’s approach is inspired by hermeneutic and<br />
narrative analysis. 19 Legal subjects are best placed to decide what law is for them in<br />
a particular social situation, as a result law is autobiographical. In subsequent<br />
work, Macdonald provides an autobiographical account of his experiences of<br />
Canadian Public Law. 20<br />
Kleinhans and Macdonald contend that any attempt to capture what law is will<br />
fail, because law has no independent existence outside the imagination. In order to<br />
overcome the critique that legal pluralists essentialise people’s experiences of<br />
normative orders and cultural communities, the questions they should be posing<br />
are: how are legal subjects constructed by law and what laws do legal subjects<br />
construct? By using qualitative methods of data gathering legal pluralists can<br />
capture a subjective meaning of law(s).<br />
2. How Could Legal Pluralists use Qualitative Data Gathering Methods?<br />
The previous part of the chapter concluded that legal pluralists should use<br />
qualitative data gathering methods in order to capture how legal subjects construct<br />
and are constructed by law(s). In this part, I compare and contrast the qualitative<br />
3
4 Amy Jackson<br />
methods used by Bano with those of my own in order to describe how legal<br />
pluralists could use qualitative methods.<br />
In my study, by drawing on Kleinhans and Macdonald’s legal pluralist<br />
approach, what is law, in a particular situation, is found by questioning the<br />
narrative accounts of people. I asked a total of seventeen Muslim women, between<br />
18 to 36 years of age and from a range of socio-economic backgrounds, a variety<br />
of questions relating to their experiences of the practice of veiling and the ideas of<br />
identity, normativity, autonomy, and rights. 21 The four focus group discussions,<br />
approximately one hour in length, were conducted at three locations in England. 22<br />
The participants were asked a variety of questions relating to their experience of<br />
the practice of veiling and the ideas of identity, normativity, autonomy, and rights.<br />
In her research, Bano captures the narrative accounts of twenty-five British<br />
Pakistani Muslim womens’ experiences of the rulings of shari’a councils. 23 Her<br />
research is important because she details the process she followed in order to<br />
document these accounts. 24<br />
The two studies are comparable because they capture narrative accounts of<br />
people in relation to law and highlight the existence of intersecting (or hybrid)<br />
identities. First, Bano argues that ‘as primary users of sharia councils’ the<br />
narratives of British Pakistani Muslim women ‘must underpin any such debates’. 25<br />
In my study, it is also important that the narrative accounts of Muslim women who<br />
veil in Britain underpin debates. Currently these accounts are excluded from<br />
discussions by those who are against the practise. 26<br />
Second, in her research, Bano highlights her study participants’ experiences of<br />
intersecting identities. For example, on participant stated:<br />
I do identify myself as both British and Muslim, so I<br />
don't want to support initiatives that mean that I have to<br />
choose between one kind of legal system and, you<br />
know, choose whether I'm British or not and then which<br />
legal system to go to. It's just not feasible and anyway<br />
it's not right. Reality is a lot more difficult than<br />
choosing between one or the other! (Parveen,<br />
Birmingham).<br />
Qualitative data gathering methods enable researcher’s to capture the way in which<br />
legal subjects explore a variety of possible worlds and selves that they can reflect<br />
and project. Also in discussions during my study, participants described themselves<br />
as British Muslims. Lamaya, for example, described her identity in the following<br />
way:<br />
4
Does Qualitative Data Gathering Enlighten a Legal Pluralist Study of Law? 5<br />
we were born or raised here, or raised here [at least];<br />
we’re out of that culture [of our parents] and we’ve got<br />
a fresh look at everything - Pakistani culture, the<br />
religion, the British culture, we can actually look into all<br />
three.<br />
The findings of both Bano’s and my study call for more intense scrutiny of legal<br />
subjects conceived as carrying a multiplicity of identities. However, both studies<br />
diverge on their underlying concept of law. Bano points to the need for people to<br />
belong to a normative order or cultural community, whereas, in my study I<br />
consider the idea that people construct and are constructed by law. Consequently<br />
the studies diverge on their methods of qualitative data gathering. Ian Dey asserts<br />
that ‘[j]ust as Eskimos distinguish varieties of white, so researchers distinguish<br />
varieties of qualitative [analyses]’. 27 The methods Bano employed for her study<br />
were conducting ethnographic work at shari’a councils and one-to-one interviews<br />
with British Pakistani Muslim women. First, Bano observes the divorce<br />
proceedings of shari’a councils in order to explore the gendered nature of these<br />
normative orders. As my study is not influenced by an institutional notion of law<br />
ethnographic research is an inappropriate method of data gathering.<br />
Second, Bano conducted twenty-five one-to-one interviews. Bano contacted her<br />
participants during a difficult period in their lives as these women were going<br />
through divorce proceedings at the time her study was conducted. A disadvantage<br />
of one-to-one interviews is that the number of views and opinions available to the<br />
research is limited. In comparison, David Morgan states that focus group members:<br />
share their experiences and thoughts, while also<br />
comparing their own contributions to what others have<br />
said. This process…[is] useful for hearing…a range of<br />
responses to the topic….[and] provide data on what the<br />
participants think but also why they think the way they<br />
do. 28<br />
Bano used one-to-one interviews in her study due to the private nature of the issues<br />
her participants discussed. In my study, the focus group method is appropriate<br />
because the study participants are encouraged to discuss and debate the topic.<br />
In her research, Bano selected the participants for her study who shared her<br />
own heritage. 29 Anne Oakley argues that ‘the goal of interviewing is best achieved<br />
when the relationship of interviewer and interviewee is non-heirarchical and when<br />
the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her own personal identity in the<br />
relationship’. 30 In my study, the participants and I have different cultural<br />
heritages. 31 However, the participants and I live in Britain. On the one hand, Bano<br />
5
6 Amy Jackson<br />
argues it is difficult to class their interpretation of white researcher as authoritative<br />
because ‘interviewee’s view them with distrust, hostility and exclusion’. 32 On the<br />
other hand, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, for example, has affirmed that women from<br />
minority backgrounds:<br />
never gave the white women the right to feel free<br />
enough to comment and have a proper exchange with<br />
us about the choice we were making and the ways in<br />
which are communities worked. 33<br />
It is worth noting my study participants’ attitude towards the questions I posed.<br />
Generally the participants provided helpful and informative responses. For a visual<br />
illustration of the types of covering Muslim women wear Ansia, for example,<br />
suggested that I look at ‘Islamic clothing web-sites’. 34 Raani argued that ‘even the<br />
picture of Mary, yeah you know (looks at me), she’s wearing a veil on her hair’.<br />
Humera stated ‘[y]ou don’t have to be a Muslim to dress modestly…look at what<br />
you’re (looks at me) wearing today’. One problem with the approach in the present<br />
study is that the role of a researcher is reduced to interpreting people’s normative<br />
interpretations: it provides an objective study of subjective law(s), rather than<br />
producing an autobiographical account.<br />
3. Conclusion<br />
This chapter explored why and how qualitative data gathering methods<br />
enlighten a legal pluralist study of law and society. In the first part, I considered the<br />
theoretical advantages. Legal pluralists, traditionally, question which normative<br />
order has jurisdiction over a given legal subject over a given legal subject in a<br />
given situation at a given time. By investigating this question they perpetuate an<br />
institutional perspective of law. In questioning which normative order a legal<br />
subject perceive himself or herself to be acting, focuses on how they perpetuate of<br />
institutional norms. Kleinhans and Macdonald argue that the questions legal<br />
pluralists should be posing are how are legal subjects constructed by and construct<br />
law(s)? They shift analytical focus from the traditional legal pluralist<br />
acknowledgment of the operation, interaction and conflicts between multiple<br />
homogenous normative orders, to the heterogeneous imaginations and creative<br />
capacities of legal subjects. As qualitative data gathering deals with ‘meanings’<br />
these methods are appropriate for legal pluralist studies which question whether<br />
certain practises adopted by people have a normative (or legal) meaning.<br />
In the second part of the chapter I compared and contrasted Bano’s study with<br />
my own. Both studies capture the narrative accounts of study participants and point<br />
to the existence of hybrid identities. However, the studies use different qualitative<br />
methods of data gathering which leads to different results. Rather than locating law<br />
in institutional normative orders, my research provides a non-essentialist<br />
6
Does Qualitative Data Gathering Enlighten a Legal Pluralist Study of Law? 7<br />
perspective of law. I contend that qualitative data gathering enlightens a legal<br />
pluralist study in the area of cultural and religious diversity by opening a<br />
constructive dialogue between study participants and researchers who are<br />
representative of the majority of liberal society.<br />
Notes<br />
7
1 Jonathan Grix. The Foundations of Social Research, New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004, p. 32.<br />
2 Pluralistic images of law and society include: a definition of law as the self-regulation of semi-autonomous<br />
social fields (see, John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ Journal of Legal Pluralism 24 (1986), 1–55.<br />
Griffiths theorises the plurality of normative orders following Sally Faulk Moore’s notion of the semiautonomous<br />
social field, see Sally Faulk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous Field as the<br />
Appropriate Subject of Study’, Law and Society Review 7(4) (1973), 719–746); and a three-level system of law<br />
that consists of official, unofficial law and legal postulates (see Masaji Chiba, M. ed., Asian Indigenous Law in<br />
<strong>Inter</strong>action with Received Law, London: KPI. Ltd, 1986).<br />
3 For example, by Werner Menski in terms of the development of a hybrid laws, such as, ‘Angrezi Shari’a’ law.<br />
Werner Menski and David Pearl, Muslim Family Law, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998.<br />
4 Particularly following the comments made by the Archbishop of Canterbury (Rowan Williams) on the<br />
‘transformative accommodation’ of shari’a councils into the English legal system. See Rowan Williams, ‘Civil<br />
and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective’, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10 (2008), 262–282.<br />
5 For the purposes of the paper, the phrase the ‘practice of veiling’ refers to the various ways Muslim women<br />
conceal their heads, bodies, and faces in public by wearing garments such as, a hijab, a niqab, a jilbab or a<br />
burqa.<br />
6 For cases on the prohibitions of veils in schools, see R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and<br />
Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 A.C. 100; [2006] U.K.H.L. 15; [2006] 2 W.L.R. 719; [2006]<br />
H.R.L.R. 21 (HL); and R (on the application of X) v Headteachers and Governors of Y School [2007] E.W.H.C.<br />
298; [2007] All. E.R. (D) 267 (HL). For cases on the prohibitions of veils in places of employment, see, Azmi v<br />
Kirkless Metropolitian Borough Council, Employment Appeal Tribunal, Appeal No.UKEAT/009/07/MAA<br />
(2007); and Bushra Noah v Sara Desrosiers (Trading as Wedge), ET 2201867/ 2007.<br />
7 For example, see Saied R. Ameli and Arzu Merali, British Muslims’ Expectations of the Government: Hijab,<br />
Meaning, Identity, Otherization and Politics: British Muslim Women. London: Islamic Human Rights<br />
Commission, 2006; and Claire Dwyer, ‘Veiled Meanings: Young British Muslim Women and the Negotiation of<br />
Differences’, Gender, Place and Culture 6(1) (1999), 5–26.
8 I further discuss the findings of the study in a forthcoming paper entitled ‘A Subjective Legal Pluralist Study<br />
on Muslim women and the Veil in Britain’.<br />
9 Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick Macdonald, ‘What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?’ Canadian Journal of<br />
<strong>Inter</strong>national Law and Society 12(2) (1997), 25-46.<br />
10 The term ‘normative order’ describes the law-like quality of social associations. Examples of normative<br />
orders are: the political state (state-law) and public institutions (such as, schools or Universities).<br />
11 Griffiths, op. cit. n 2.<br />
12 Kleinhans and Macdonald, op. cit. n 9, p. 36.<br />
13 Williams, op. cit. n 4. In his comments the Archbishop of Canterbury was influenced by Ayelet Shachar<br />
notion of ‘transformative accommodation’ whereby two legal systems (such as, the English legal system and<br />
shari’a councils) mutually accommodate one another. See Ayelet Shachar, A. Multicultural Jurisdictions:<br />
Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.<br />
14 Kleinhans and Macdonald, op. cit. n 9, p. 36.<br />
15 Samia Bano, ‘In Pursuit of Religious and Legal Diversity: A Response to the Archbishop of Canterbury and<br />
the ‘Sharia Debate’ in Britain’, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10 (2008), 282–309.<br />
16 Ibid., p. 306.
17 Kleinhans and Macdonald, op. cit. n 9, p. 36.<br />
18 Ibid., p. 42.<br />
19 See further, Catherine K. Reissman, Narrative Analysis (Qualitative Research Methods), Newbury Park: Sage<br />
Publications, 1993. Reissman discusses how researchers can find examples of the language of obligation in<br />
peoples narrative accounts.<br />
20 Roderick A. Macdonald, Lessons of Everyday Law. Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2002.<br />
21 All the participants wore a hijab (with two exceptions: one participant wore a niqab; and another no longer<br />
wore a hijab).<br />
22The pilot study and a second study were conducted with students at the University of Reading; another study<br />
was conducted in the wider South East area, at an Islamic Cultural Centre in Bracknell; and finally, a session was<br />
conducted in another part of England, at a Muslim Woman’s Organisation in Manchester.<br />
23 Samia Bano, “‘Standpoint’, ‘Difference’ and Feminist Research’, in Reza Banakar, and Max Travers, eds.,<br />
Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005, 91–111, p. 98.<br />
24 Anne Oakley, ‘<strong>Inter</strong>viewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms’, in Helen Roberts, ed., Doing Feminist<br />
Research, New York: Routledge, 1981, 30–61, p. 31 ‘few sociologists who employ interview data actually bother<br />
to describe in detail the process of interviewing itself’.<br />
25Bano (2008), op. cit. n 15, p. 286.
26 Such as, liberal feminists, see Susan Moller Okin, ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ in Susuan Moller<br />
Okin et al. eds., Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Susan Okin Miller With Respondents, Princeton: Princeton<br />
University Press, 1999, 7-47.<br />
27 Ian Dey, Qualitative Data Analysis; A User-friendly Guide for Social Sciences. London: Routledge, 1998, p.<br />
1.<br />
28 David Morgan, ‘Focus Group’, in Victor Jupp ed., The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods, London:<br />
Sage, 2006, 121-123, p. 121.<br />
29 Bano (2005), op. cit. n 23, p. 109 ‘[m]y being British Pakistani also brought up issues of commonality and<br />
difference’.<br />
30 Oakley, op. Cit. n 24, p. 41.<br />
31 The participants were from a variety of family origins, such as: the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,<br />
Bangladesh, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Mauritius, Somalia and Algeria.<br />
32 Bano (2005), op. Cit. n 23, p. 103.<br />
33 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Who Do We Think We Are?: Imagining the New Britain, London: Penguin, 2001, p.<br />
210.<br />
34 In order to preserve the participants’ anonymity, pseudonyms replace their real names.<br />
Bibliography
Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Who Do We Think We Are?: Imagining the New Britain, London: Penguin, 2001.<br />
Samia Bano, ‘In Pursuit of Religious and Legal Diversity: A Response to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the<br />
‘Sharia Debate’ in Britain’, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10 (2008), 282–309.<br />
Samia Bano, “‘Standpoint’, ‘Difference’ and Feminist Research’, in Reza Banakar, and Max Travers, eds.,<br />
Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005.<br />
Masaji Chiba, M. ed., Asian Indigenous Law in <strong>Inter</strong>action with Received Law, London: KPI. Ltd, 1986.<br />
Ian Dey, Qualitative Data Analysis; A User-friendly Guide for Social Sciences. London: Routledge, 1998.<br />
Claire Dwyer, ‘Veiled Meanings: Young British Muslim Women and the Negotiation of Differences’, Gender,<br />
Place and Culture 6(1) (1999), 5–26.<br />
John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ Journal of Legal Pluralism 24 (1986), 1–55.<br />
Jonathan Grix. The Foundations of Social Research, New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004.<br />
Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick Macdonald, ‘What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?’ Canadian Journal of<br />
<strong>Inter</strong>national Law and Society 12(2) (1997), 25-46.<br />
Roderick A. Macdonald, Lessons of Everyday Law. Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2002.<br />
Werner Menski and David Pearl, Muslim Family Law, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998.<br />
Sally Faulk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous Field as the Appropriate Subject of Study’,<br />
Law and Society Review 7(4) (1973), 719–746.<br />
David Morgan, ‘Focus Group’, in Victor Jupp ed., The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods, London:<br />
Sage, 2006.
Anne Oakley, ‘<strong>Inter</strong>viewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms’, in Helen Roberts, ed., Doing Feminist<br />
Research, New York: Routledge, 1981, 30–61.<br />
Susan Moller Okin, ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ in Susuan Moller Okin et al. eds., Is Multiculturalism<br />
Bad for Women? Susan Okin Miller With Respondents, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, 7-47.<br />
Catherine K. Reissman, Narrative Analysis (Qualitative Research Methods), Newbury Park: Sage Publications,<br />
1993.<br />
Ayelet Shachar, A. Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press, 2001.<br />
Rowan Williams, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective’, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10<br />
(2008), 262–282.<br />
Reports<br />
Saied R. Ameli and Arzu Merali, British Muslims’ Expectations of the Government: Hijab, Meaning, Identity,<br />
Otherization and Politics: British Muslim Women. London: Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2006.<br />
Amy Jackson, PhD candidate at the School of Law, University of Reading.