Appellant Brief - Turtle Talk

of these items renders the stipulation void as it does not satisfy the requirements of
25 C.F.R. § 256.7 (1951) JA0069.
2. The District Court Incorrectly and Without Authority Held
That the Right-of-Way Drafting Requirements as Set out by
the Applicable Regulations Were Unimportant, and That
the Incomplete Application Satisfied All of the
Requirements.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts declares that “an interpretation
which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no
effect[.]” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 (1981). No part of an
agreement is superfluous and no interpretation should be employed that renders
certain terms superfluous. Id. cmt. b; see Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials
Corp., 239 FRD 523, 530 (W.D.Wisc. 2006) (“the parties intended the language
used by them to have some effect.” (citations omitted)); Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc.
v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 1998) ("we are to interpret a
contract in such a way as to give meaning to all of its provisions"). Additionally, if
an agreement uses both specific and general terms, which appear to conflict, “the
specific or exact term is more likely to express the meaning of the parties with
respect to the situation than the general language.” Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 203 cmt. e; see W. Oil Field, Inc. v. Pennzoil United, Inc., 421 F.2d
50