WINDOWS 10 VIRTUALIZATION-BASED SECURITY
us-16-Wojtczuk-Analysis-Of-The-Attack-Surface-Of-Windows-10-Virtualization-Based-Security-wp us-16-Wojtczuk-Analysis-Of-The-Attack-Surface-Of-Windows-10-Virtualization-Based-Security-wp
[rs1] Robert Święcki, AMD newest ucode 0x06000832 for Piledriver-based CPUs seems to behave in a problematic way, http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/450
- Page 1 and 2: ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK SURFACE OF W
- Page 3 and 4: The workflow is as follows: 1) On s
- Page 5 and 6: execute rights in EPT tables of the
- Page 7 and 8: attacker does not have ability to l
- Page 9 and 10: The topic of hypervisor security ha
- Page 11 and 12: Utilizing the availability of the a
- Page 13 and 14: In order to prevent this, both the
- Page 15 and 16: The author used a runtime vulnerabi
- Page 17 and 18: The most interesting cases were CVE
- Page 19: Documentation/raw/master/tlfs/Hyper
[rs1] Robert Święcki, AMD newest ucode 0x06000832 for Piledriver-based CPUs seems to behave in a<br />
problematic way, http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/450