Cause Principle Unity

Cause, principle and unity
nature, which is the substratum of art, is a board and receives the being of
board from what was a tree, and from the matter which was a board it
receives the being of a door and is door.
GERVASIO. Now I understand it well. But it seems to me that this substratum
of nature cannot be a body, nor have a definite quality. For,
passing sometimes into such and such a form and natural being, sometimes
into another form and being, it does not manifest itself corporally, like
wood or stone, which always show through as they are, even if considered
as material or substratum, no matter what the form.
TEOFILO. Well said.
GERVASIO. What shall I do, then, when I happen to be discussing this
thought with some stubborn person who refuses to believe that there is
only one matter underneath all nature’s forms, just as there is only one
beneath all the forms of each art? For we cannot deny what we see with our
own eyes, but what we see solely through reason may be denied.
TEOFILO. Send him away or do not answer.
GERVASIO. But what if this stubborn individual demands evidence of
this matter and is a respectable person, more liable to send me away than I
am him, and takes my refusal to answer as an insult?
TEOFILO. What would you do if a blind demigod, worthy of every honour
and respect, were so insistent, importunate and stubborn as to demand
knowledge of and evidence for colours, or even for the external shapes of
natural things? What if he asked, for example: What is the form of a tree?
What is the form of mountains? of stars? Or again: What is the form of a
statue, of a robe, or other artificial things, which are so plain to our eyes?
GERVASIO. I would tell him that if he had eyes, he would not ask for evidence
of these things, since he could see them for himself, but since he is
blind, it is impossible for others to show them to him.
TEOFILO. Likewise, you could say to your other people that if they had
an intellect, they would not demand evidence of that natural matter, but
could see it for themselves.
GERVASIO. Some would be humiliated by that answer, and others
would see it as too cynical.
TEOFILO. Then, you can speak in less open fashion, as following: ‘Most
illustrious sir,’ or ‘Sacred Majesty, just as some things cannot be evident
but for the hands and by the sense of touch, others only through hearing,
others by taste, so this matter of natural things cannot be brought to light
except through the intellect.’
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