Cause Principle Unity

Cause, principle and unity
mixed, the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellective, we do not, however,
understand form in the vulgar sense, for that distinction is valid from
the point of view of the operations which appear in the subjects and
proceed from them, but not from the point of view of the primordial and
fundamental essence of that form and spiritual life that fills all things,
which it does in different ways.
DICSONO. I understand. Inasmuch as this form that you posit as principle
is a substantial form, it makes up a perfect species, is to itself its own
genus, and is not, like the Peripatetic form, part of a species.
TEOFILO. Exactly.
DICSONO. The distinction of forms in matter is not a function of the
accidental dispositions which depend on material form.
TEOFILO. Correct.
DICSONO. From which it follows that this separated form cannot be
multiplied in the numerical sense, since all numerical multiplication
depends on matter.
TEOFILO. Yes.
DICSONO. Further, it is invariable in itself, but varies because of the
subjects and the diversity of matter. And such form, although it
differentiates the part from the whole in the subject, is not, however, itself
different in the part and in the whole, even if the definition we use for it
differs according to whether it is considered as substantial by itself, or considered
in so far as it is the act and perfection of some subject – and in that
case, it is considered according to that specification and that individuation
which it has assumed in this or that subject.
TEOFILO. Exactly.
DICSONO. You do not conceive of this form as being accidental, not as
accidental form, not as mingled with matter or inherent in it, but as existing
in it, associating itself with and assisting it.
TEOFILO. That is just what I say.
DICSONO. Moreover, this form is defined and determined by matter,
since, on the one hand, possessing in itself the faculty of constituting the
particulars of innumerable species, it happens to restrict itself in order
to constitute an individual, and, on the other hand, the potency of indeterminate
matter, which can receive any form whatsoever, finds itself
limited to a single species. Thus, one is the cause of the definition and
determination of the other.
TEOFILO. Very good.
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