Cause Principle Unity

Second dialogue
that exists only in matter and is fixed to it according to its being, and does
not depend on the body or matter for its existence?
TEOFILO. Indeed. What is more, I leave open the possibility of a form
existing without matter, though I firmly assert that no part of matter exists
without form, except when it is considered logically, as it is by Aristotle, who
never tires of dividing by reason what in nature and in truth is indivisible.
DICSONO. Do you not admit any other form than this eternal associate
of matter?
TEOFILO. Yes, and a still more natural form than the material form, of
which we shall treat later. For now, note this distinction of forms: first,
there is a sort of form which informs, and which is extended and dependent.
Since it informs everything, it is in everything; since it is extended,
it communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; since it is dependent
and has no operation through itself, it communicates the operation of
the whole to the parts; similarly it communicates the name and the being
to them. Such is the material form, like that of fire: because every part of
fire warms, is called fire, and is fire. Secondly, there is another sort of form,
which informs and is dependent, but which is not extended. Since it perfects
and activates the whole, it is in the whole and in each of its parts. Since
it is not extended, the result is that it cannot attribute the action of the
whole to the parts. Since it is dependent, it communicates the action of the
whole to the parts. Such is the vegetative and sensitive soul, since no part
of the animal is animal, yet each part nonetheless lives and feels. Thirdly,
there is another kind of form, which actuates and makes perfect the whole
but is not extended nor dependent as regards its operation. Since it perfects
and actuates, it is in the whole, in its totality and in each of its parts.
Since it is not extended, it does not attribute the perfection of the whole to
the parts. Since it is not dependent, it does not communicate its action to
them. Such is the soul, in so far as it can exercise intellectual power, and it
is called intellective: it does not cause any part of man to be called man, or
to be man, nor to be described as intelligent. Of these three kinds, the first
is material, for it cannot be conceived, nor can it exist, without matter. The
two other kinds (which, in fact, come together as one, according to their
substance and being, and are distinguished in the fashion we have indicated
above) express the formal principle, as distinct from the material principle.
DICSONO. I understand.
TEOFILO. Furthermore, I would like to point out that if, using common
terms, we say there are five grades of form, namely, the elemental, the
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