Cause Principle Unity

Cause, principle and unity
TEOFILO. Without the slightest doubt or dispute.
DICSONO. Do you believe, then, that whoever knows the things caused
and principled, may know the cause and principle?
TEOFILO. It is not easy concerning the proximate cause and principle;
and it is extremely arduous, even by way of traces, when dealing with the
first cause and first principle.
DICSONO. So how do you conceive that things which have both a first
and proximate cause and principle can be truly known if, as far as the
efficient cause is concerned (which is one of the causes that contribute to
the authentic knowledge of things), they remain hidden?
TEOFILO. I confess that it is an easy thing to set out a demonstrative
doctrine, but the demonstration itself is hard. It is very easy to organize
the causes, modes and methods of doctrines, but our method-makers and
analysts then apply their instruments, the principles of their methods and
art of arts poorly.
GERVASIO. Like men who know how to forge fine swords, but not to
wield them.
POLIINNIO. Ferme [Certainly].
GERVASIO. Would that one could firmly shut your eyes and keep you
from ever opening them again! 1
TEOFILO. That is why I say that the natural philosopher is not required
to produce all causes and all principles, but merely the physical ones, and
among them, only those that are principal or pertinent. Therefore,
although their dependence on the first cause and first principle attributes
them to that cause or that principle, there is not such a necessary relation
that, from the knowledge of one, we can infer a knowledge of the other, and
that is why we do not require that they be discussed within a single system.
DICSONO. How is that?
TEOFILO. Because from the knowledge of all dependent things, we
cannot infer any cognition of the first principle or of the first cause, other
than by the less effectual method of vestiges; seeing that everything derives
from its will or goodness, which is the principle of its operation, whence
proceeds the universal effect. The same can be said of artistic products,
insofar as whoever sees the statue does not behold the sculptor, and the man
who sees the portrait of Helen does not see Apelles, but only the result
of an operation deriving from the excellence of Apelles’ talent. The
representation is wholly the effect of accidents and circumstances of the
1 The latin ferme is taken jokingly by Gervasio as a term related to the Italian fermare, ‘to shut’.
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