Cause Principle Unity

Fourth dialogue
genus, so the forms must be of two kinds: some are transcendent, that is,
higher than genus, and are called principles, such as ‘entity’, ‘unity’, ‘one’,
‘thing’, ‘something’, and their like; other forms belong to a given insofar as
it is distinct from another genus, such as ‘substantiality’ and ‘accidentality’.
The forms of the first sort do not distinguish matter or make of matter here
one thing, there another, but, as absolutely universal terms embracing corporeal
as well as incorporeal substances, they signify the absolutely universal,
absolutely common and undivided matter of both. Moreover, as
Avicebron has said, ‘Just as we identify the matter of the substantial form
(matter which is part of the composite), before we identify the matter of
the accidental forms (that is, the composite), what prevents us, before
recognizing the matter that is contracted under corporeal forms, from recognizing
a single potency, which is distinguishable through the form of
corporeal nature and that of incorporeal nature, the one dissoluble, the
other indissoluble?’ Again, if everything that exists (beginning with the
supreme and sovereign being) possesses a certain order and constitutes a
hierarchy, a ladder where one climbs from the composite to the simple
things, and from those to the most simple and absolute things, by means of
proportional and copulative middle terms which participate in the nature
of the one and the other extreme, yet possess their own, independent value,
there is no order which does not involve a certain participation, nor participation
which does not involve a certain union, nor union which does not
involve a certain participation. It is therefore necessary that there be a single
principle of subsistence for all existing things. Add to this the fact that
reason, itself, cannot help presupposing, for anything which can be
differentiated, something undifferentiated (I speak of things that exist, for
I do not think the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ is real, but
merely verbal and nominal). This undifferentiated thing is a common
nature to which the difference, the distinctive form, is joined. And surely
one cannot deny that, since everything sensible presupposes a substratum
of sensible matter, everything intelligible presupposes a substratum of
intelligible matter. Therefore, something must exist which corresponds to
the common nature of the one and the other substratum, for every essence
is necessarily founded on some being, except for the first essence, which
is identical with its being, since its potency is its act, and since it is all it
can be, as we said yesterday. What is more, if matter is not a body (in the
opinion of our adversaries, themselves), but by its nature precedes the corporeal
being, why, then, would it be so inimical to the substances called
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