The Malayan Communist Party as Recorded in the Comintern Files

was founded in early 1928, 11 the Malayan AIL in 1928, 12 and in 1932, 13 and the MCL in 1932. 14 In
other words, these must have been the same organization, under different names, that was led by
Boo. But, according to C. C. Chin, who is well versed in the MCP history, he informed me that
these were different organisations commonly led by Boo. And the Chinese name of the MCL was
actually 马 来 亚 共 产 主 义 者 同 盟 . 15 No matter whether the AIL and the MCL were same or
different, the main faction’s criticism was directed at Boo’s theory.
By the account of Zhang Ming Jin ( 张 明 今 ), one of the MCP leaders in the late 1930s and the first
half of the 1940s, Boo had insisted that as the consciousness of the worker-peasant masses of
Malaya was still low, the Party should work on intellectuals and the petit bourgeoisie first, and only
after deploying a mass movement like the May 4th Movement of China, work on the working class.
Lai Teck, who had just been infiltrated into the MCP by the Special Branch and was rapidly rising
in the Party, instigated the CC to eliminate Boo and his group. 16
But to Ma Ning, propaganda head of the AIL, the AIL’s objective was to unite not only Chinese
but also Malays and Indians in order to liberate all Malayan nationals. As Boo insisted that a
revolution by workers and intellectuals was necessary, and a worker-peasant struggle was not, he
was executed as an anti-party element. 17
Why were the interpretations of the main objective of the dissident group different? The Comintern
document noted that the dissidents opposed the new policy of an anti-imperialist united front. The
AIL, led by Boo, would have adopted this new policy. The mainstream faction of the MCP, led by
Lai Teck, might have informed the Comintern in 1942 that the anti-imperialist policy was its own
policy because it was known later that the Comintern in 1935 regarded the anti-imperialist policy as
being correct. It is now known that Lai Teck eliminated all capable opponents in the Party by
secretly supplying information on them to the Special Branch which resulted in their arrests, and by
assassinations. 18
3. Reformation of the Comintern
This portion is a summary of Kurihara’s argument.
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