revistaieee7

Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016
ed. 47 Germany’s approach to returnees can be defined as a combination of repressive
and preventive measures. The German Criminal Code used to punish only the formation
of, participation in and support for a terrorist organization, leaving foreign
fighters the opportunity to travel to Syria without any sort of impediment. Since June
2015 a new anti-terrorist law makes it a crime to travel outside the country with the
intent to receive terrorist training and creates national identity card as well as passport
restrictions on foreign fighters, among other changes. 48 The authorities can confiscate
passports of nationals if they pose a threat, order residents not to leave the country
and replace national identity cards by a document not valid to travel outside Germany.
With respect to the confiscation of passports, it may lead to believe that forcing
would-be jihadists to stay in the country instead of ‘waging jihad’ would frustrate
them and maybe increase their intention of perpetrating an attack in the homeland.
Nonetheless, if potential jihadists were allowed to leave the country, they would
have fewer opportunities to be de-radicalized and authorities would lose their track
without the guarantee of finding them in case they return.
For their part, the German security services perform a doubled function. One the
one hand, they often approach individuals suspected of planning to leave the country
informing them that authorities are aware of their plans and reminding them what
implications their actions have. On the other, they notify police, city councils and offices
for foreigners about individual cases. 49 Counter-radicalization programs have also
been implemented across Germany. The Berlin-based Centre for Democratic Culture
runs HAYAT, a national counseling program available to individuals who are seeking
to go, have gone to, or have returned from Syria as well as to their relatives and
friends. 50 Other programs however involve experts from the local Muslim community
as they are who know best the salafist narrative and therefore how to argue against it,
but addressing relationships and opportunities rather than ideology has proved to be
more effective. In addition, Muslim communities in Germany seem to be integrated:
in the last survey only 9 % of respondents said they had no contact with non-Muslims.
51 So far, no returnees have plotted an attack in Germany. This is probably not
only because harmless returnees are offered to go through counter-radicalization programs
instead of jail and because the Muslim population is in general integrated into
the society, but also due to the country’s decision not to take military action in Syria
or Iraq as well as its commitment to host the highest number of Syrian refugees in
Europe.
47 THE GUARDIAN. How do you deradicalise returning ISIS fighters? 2014.
48 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. Germany: New Anti-Terrorism Legislation Entered Into Force,
2015.
49 CSS ETH ZURICH. Foreign fighters: an overview of responses in eleven countries, 2014, p. 11.
50 KOEHLER, Daniel. Family Counselling as Prevention and Intervention Tool Against ‘Foreign
Fighters’, The German ‘Hayat’ Program, 2013.
51 THE LOCAL. 57 percent of Germans feel Islam is a threat: poll, 2015.
406
http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee