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Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016<br />

cy in Syria or Iraq will go back to their respective countries interested in perpetrating<br />

attacks between two and twelve months from their return.<br />

NOTE: The two-month minimum was obtained by calculating the average of time<br />

that took most of the returnees already arrested to perpetrate or plot an attack, when<br />

the information was available. The hypothesis also considers that no more than 10% of<br />

the returnees will pose a threat, based on the already mentioned counting of European<br />

foreign fighters that plotted an attack upon return between 1990 and 2010.<br />

These two hypotheses were tested through dataset analysis to find out the number<br />

of returnees involved in plots as well as their background.<br />

- Research questions<br />

The study aimed at finding the answer to two main questions in order to conclude<br />

which countries should be especially on alert to the threat of returnees and where security<br />

measures need to be focused on.<br />

RQ-1: How likely is that foreign fighters from the countries studied could perpetrate<br />

an attack in the homeland if they have returned or are expected to return from<br />

Syria or Iraq?<br />

For this first question, social network analysis was used to link returnees with terrorist<br />

organizations, extremist groups or other foreign fighters. Moreover, content<br />

analysis was conducted to evaluate the existence of de-radicalization programs in the<br />

countries studied and examine to what degree the return of foreign fighters is under<br />

control. Returnees that continue operating in the extremist scene, whether they establish<br />

suspicious connections or they just start recruiting or disseminating extremist<br />

material, were considered potential threats. However, the performance of the last two<br />

activities is less bound to the likelihood of attack than the first one.<br />

RQ-2: What are the most likely targets that returning jihadists could attack in their<br />

countries?<br />

For the second question, dataset analysis was used to find out what kind of targets<br />

returnees have so far chosen to attack. Content analysis was also conducted to examine<br />

how returnees may fit into the strategy that terrorist organizations operating in<br />

Syria or Iraq have. The typical scenarios that the study looked for in the data were<br />

Jewish places and satirical magazines/artists that publish content on the prophet Muhammad,<br />

although public spaces and landmarks were also taken into account.<br />

BACKGROUND<br />

Jihadists have today fewer opportunities to attack in the EU because most of the<br />

governments have already become aware of the threat that jihadism entails, and leg-<br />

400<br />

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