revistaieee7

Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016
Cells and groups provide the degree of organization needed to conduct complex attacks
that jihadists operating alone do not have. The worst attacks in Europe in the
last decade, i.e. the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 7 July 2005 London bombings 17 ,
the Charlie Hebdo shooting and the November 2015 Paris attacks, were carried out by
cells. Additionally, the mere fact that returnees have some sort of connection with terrorists
is a source of encouragement, assistance or even instructions to conduct attacks
and, for this reason, solo-jihadists (those with network ties) seem to be more effective
operatives than lone-wolf jihadists (those acting in isolation). Indeed, solo-jihadists
were behind five of the seven individual plots that caused fatalities in the EU between
1995 and 2015. 18 Thus, the capability to attack depends on the amount of foreign fighters
who travelled to Syria or Iraq as well as the existence of radical islamist cells or
groups in the homeland. On the one hand, those countries with more foreign fighters
are likely to have more returnees and, therefore, a higher number of them who may
try to join one of those groups, create another one or contact possible jihadist cells.
However, none of the variables are independent from each other and the cases that
do not follow the tendency were deeply evaluated. On the other, cells or groups may
contact and recruit returnees in order to perpetrate attacks.
Secondly, to evaluate the intentions of each returnee is the most important challenge
and, at the same time, the most difficult one. The term ‘intention’ refers to whether
returnees are interested in resuming their former lives or they show apparent signs of
having gone through a radicalization process that may lead them to attack at home.
Those returnees that authorities say they are still involved in radical environments were
considered in this study as would-be jihadists who may commit crimes at any moment.
Several different aspects needed to be examined, namely the policy adopted to deal with
them, how much the Muslim community is integrated and what sort of organization
the returnee belonged to as well as its intentions. Countries adopting repressive measures
instead of preventive ones will likely face more cases of returnees who feel mistreated by
their Government and may seek revenge. The establishment of communication paths
with the families of those returnees is necessary to get an idea of the extent they may
have been radicalized, especially bearing in mind that it is sometimes not possible to
interrogate them directly. The degree of integration the Muslim community has in the
country is also an important aspect to take into account since that is the environment
foreign fighters will be exposed to upon return. Moreover, whether or not the returnee
had joined a terrorist organization and this one threatens the country may influence
the person depending on how much he or she feels identified with the group, but only
threats related to the Syrian or Iraqi conflicts were considered. The intentions of some
jihadist groups at the same time may be influenced by the military intervention of a
given country in the US-led coalition against Daesh.
17 Documents found by German authorities on a terrorist suspect arrested in Berlin in May 2011
have suggested that Rashid Rauf, a British al Qaeda operative, played a key role in planning the
attacks.
18 Data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
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