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Luis Francisco Cepeda Lucas Clausewitz’s theory on war in the fight against ...
is also identifiable in the “Long War”. 88 These are the three primary and distinctive
tendencies of the Clausewitzian trinity, which have remained unalterable.
Complementary to the three primary tendencies, hostility, chance, and purpose or
rationale are what may be considered secondary elements of the trinity, on the basis
of collective groups and institutions associated with each one of the primary elements.
These are, respectively, the people, the army, and the government. They themselves do
not constitute the essence of the trinitarian concept of war, but rather subjective representations
of them, and change with the passing of time. 89 But the primary tendencies,
Clausewitz’s trinitarian basis, remain unalterable, as has been previously stated.
As a result, it is in the confusion about what Clausewitz’s trinity tendencies mean that
one of the reasons argued to invalidate his theory lies. The people, the army, and the
government are only secondary trinitarian tendencies, which are modified and adapted,
with different portrayals according to the type of conflict and operative environment.
Identifying Clausewitz’s trinitarian conception with these three tendencies is a reductionist
and simplistic view of its real meaning. 90 Nonetheless, the interaction of the three
primary trinitarian tendencies is identifiable in the COIN campaigns that predominate
in the military operations at the beginning of this century.
In this sense, a strategy to effectively fight against the threat from the global jihad
must deal with each one of the three tendencies of the triad, constituting in any case
the tendency “passion and hate” or hostility, represented by the whole of the Muslim
population potentially favoring this type of global insurgency, which is the one that
must receive a higher priority from the Western governments, 91 which is in agreement
with Mao’s principles about guerrilla warfare mentioned above. In short, it is about
preferably implementing a “population focused” COIN.
All of the above, together with the identification of the fundamental features of
his theory of war in the characteristics of the current paradigm of the conflict, lead to
the conclusion that Clausewitz’s theory of war maintains its validity in explaining the
88 ECHEVARRIA. Clausewitz and Contemporary War. Op. Cit. p. 74.
89 “… the trinity is not the people, government, and military -as some have argued, but rather the
principal tendencies: hostility, purpose, and chance. Clausewitz held that the institutions themselves
to be little more than the subjective representations of those tendencies. Thus, the fundamental
problem with so-called non-trinitarian war is that it does not understand the concept it purports to
negate.” ECHEVARRIA. Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. Op. Cit. p. 217.
90 WILLIAMSON, Steven. From Fourth Generation Warfare to Hybrid War. Strategic Studies
Institute. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2009. p. 10. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/
GetTRDoc?AD= ADA498391 (viewed August 6th, 2015).
91 “… the most important element for United States policymakers to consider in the War on Terror
is the passion of the mass of people who adhere to radical Islam [...] The GWOT cannot be won unless
or until the number of people who believe in radical Islam’s central tenets – namely its antipathy
toward Western values – is greatly reduced, or until they can be persuaded to eschew violent means.”
HEERWAGEN. Op. Cit. p. 9.
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