revistaieee7

Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016
tives. Whilst those states continue to possess enormous amounts of nuclear weaponry
that is not subject to institutionalised international control, the Security Council will
not have the sufficient power or legitimacy required to enable it to take a firmer and
more forceful line in its decisions. In the light of this harsh reality, it is highly improbable
that the other states -nuclear and non-nuclear powers- will lend themselves
to satisfactory cooperation. Such evidence dashes any hopes entertained, at the same
time as advancing nuclear proliferation.
On the other hand, the perception of the threat posed by each national nuclear
programme is one that is not shared in the same manner by the different permanent
members of the Security Council. These countries agree to tackle the trend of nuclear
proliferation only so far as those efforts do not clash with their own national interests
and, conversely, they scramble to promote measures and strategies against national
programmes that they consider to be an obstacle to their strategic interests. The policies
of the major powers against nuclear proliferation are thus discriminatory; that is
to say, these states develop strategies and measures that are ambivalent and able to be
adapted to their geopolitical and strategic interests, which leads them to encourage
and support certain specific national nuclear programmes or, quite the contrary, to
attack and bring pressure to bear to halt others.
The Security Council, principally as a result of the inertia and disagreements seen
among its permanent members, tends to defer any collective response for too long, in
such a way as to render nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation a mere illusion.
This state of stagnation may degenerate with serious consequences, fuelling international
insecurity and rivalries between states.
Unfortunately, and despite the conditions of its creation and commencement, the
Security Council has remained a relatively passive body in this field, it functions with
the aim of preserving the balance between predominant forces, and only operates in
areas considered to be ‘neutral’, without breaking away from its traditional area of
activity.
On the other hand, states that have been acquiring nuclear weapons or who harbour
such ambitions do not cooperate with the international organisations in a satisfactory
manner. In fact, they also try to take advantage of the inconsistencies of
international politics, aligning themselves with one major power or another in order
to further their nuclear programme, or simply to reap political and economic benefits:
hence Pakistan did not hesitate to acquire its own nuclear weapons upon noting the
lack of effective international sanctions brought against the militarisation of the Indian
nuclear programme; in turn, seeing the lack of reaction from the Security Council
in the cases of India and Pakistan, North Korea worked against the clock to acquire
nuclear weapons, it withdrew from the NPT and revealed its status as a nuclear power
once it was no longer party to this treaty. As a matter of fact, the absence of firm
sanctions issued by the Security Council in these cases and the existing fragmentation
within its midst could be factors that will incite other states to develop their own military
nuclear programmes.
276
http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee