revistaieee7

Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016
constitute a threat to international peace and security. The particular state of affairs
in each case is a delicate issue for the body responsible for the maintenance of peace
since the Security Council is not able to deal with them on the basis of the provisions
of the NPT.
Following the rival nuclear tests undertaken by India and Pakistan in May 1998,
the Security Council confined itself to condemning the threat that these tests posed to
international security via Resolution 1172 (1998), 88 without this having major repercussions
for the nuclear programmes of either of the two countries. In this resolution, the
Security Council once more recalled that the United Nations Charter confers it ‘the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’, but it
did not draw practical practical consequences from this statement. 89
With the same backdrop, the President of the Security Council drafted two declarations
about the tests carried out by both states, regretting that they took place, ‘urging’
the two states to renounce their nuclear ambitions and to refrain from carrying out
further tests in the future. 90 For this purpose, they asked them to demonstrate good
will and take immediate measures to relieve the tensions that existed between them.
These presidential declarations by the Security Council reveal the threat that such
tests represent to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and encourage parties to seek
a peaceful solution. However, its dubious legal nature is an international source of
obligation neither for state parties to the NPT, nor for the states acting outside of the
treaty.
The Security Council is mandated by virtue of Chapter VII of the Charter to address
such cases and take measures in order to counter any violation of disarmament
and non-proliferation obligations –even if neither of these two states are parties to
the NPT-, if it considers that the attitude of India and/or Pakistan constitutes a clear
threat to international security. Yet, what is certain is that these two countries are
engaged in programmes to modernise their nuclear capabilities, without this leading
to any effective reaction from the Security Council. Resolution 1172 (1998) does not
refer to Chapter VII of the Charter, which means that the Council wanted to evade its
responsibility, by omitting to avail itself of the option to express itself with a coercive
voice in these cases. Here, the Security Council did not classify such a situation on the
basis of the enforcement provisions of the Charter so that it was not forced to draw
88 Resolution 1172 (1998) of the Security Council, of 6 June 1998.
89 In its operative point 11, Resolution 1172 (1998) recalls that, ‘in accordance with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon
State’, despite the fact that the two states are not parties to the NPT and that neither have they ratified
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996.
90 Declarations of the President of the Security Council S/PRST/1998/12, of 14 May 1998, and S/
PRST/1998/17, of 29 May 1998, addressing the nuclear testing undertaken by India and Pakistan
respectively.
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