revistaieee7

Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016
as well as the international community in general. While the United States, the United
Kingdom and France believed that the matter of the Iranian nuclear programme
should be put to the Security Council in order for the body to adopt appropriate
measures, other states such as Russia, Pakistan, India and China –all nuclear powersopposed
the West’s initiative of referring the Iranian issue to the Security Council and
instead backed a negotiated solution. The same position was adopted by the members
of the Non-Aligned Movement, which discredited the proposal of the West as an attempt
made by developed countries to control weaker countries, and they trumpeted
the right of all countries to access to peaceful nuclear technology. 67
While these countries did recognise the severity of the Iranian nuclear crisis, they
rejected the West’s conceptual approaches and did not wish the mistrust surrounding
the Iranian nuclear programme to end up transforming ‘uranium enrichment’ into a
violation of international law per se. In this regard, these countries expressed their will
for the case of Iran to not become a precedent that would subsequently act against
their own nuclear development plans. 68
Yet the growing suspicion aroused by this nuclear programme came to a head as the
Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution in February 2006 that asked its
Director to submit the case of Iran’s nuclear programme to the United Nations Security
Council. Moreover, the aforementioned Board of Governors deemed it necessary
for Iran to re-establish the suspension of all uranium enrichment related activities, as
well as research and development in this field. 69 The Iranian government’s response
was that it would not bow down to what it considered to be unfounded threats.
From then onwards, the Security Council proceeded to approve various resolutions
on the matter –for instance, Resolutions 1737 (2006), 70 1747 (2007), 71 1803 (2008), 72
1929 (2010) 73 and 2224 (2015)-. 74 These were adopted by virtue of Article 41 of the
Charter of the United Nations -Chapter VII-, with a view to bringing greater pressure
to bear on Iran so that it would suspend its uranium enrichment and ballistic missiles
development programmes. The content of these resolutions includes sanction meas-
67 See PARADAS, Marion. ‘Les crises de prolifération (Iran, Corée du Nord)’, in Fondation pour la
Recherche Stratégique, Les defis de la prolifération au XXIème siècle, Paris, 2007, p.12 and ff.
68 BALLESTEROS MARTÍN, Miguel Ángel. ‘La proliferación nuclear en Asia’, in SPANISH
INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, El auge de Asia: implicaciones estratégicas, Strategy
Papers no. 143, Madrid: Ministry of Defence, 2010, p. 19.
69 See UN News Centre, 6 February 2006, at
www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyFAr.asp?NewsID=11815&Cr= &Cr1=iran&Kw1=iran&Kw2=scell%E9&Kw3=.
70 Resolution 1737 (2006) of the Security Council, of 23 December 2006.
71 Resolution 1747 (2007) of the Security Council, of 24 March 2007.
72 Resolution 1803 (2008) of the Security Council, of 3 March 2008.
73 Resolution 1929 (2010) of the Security Council, of 9 June 2010.
74 Resolution 2224 (2015) of the Security Council, of 9 June 2015.
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