revistaieee7

Alfonso Iglesias Velasco and Anass Gouyez Ben Allal
The role of the United Nations...
insufficient information being supplied about its programme and a lack of willingness
to cooperate, in the view of Israel and the United States, the major nuclear powers that
are unsympathetic to Iran. The limited knowledge of Iran’s various nuclear development
activities and its refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment activities have raised suspicions
about the potentially military nature of its programme and as a result international
pressure has increased.
It is worth noting that, in principle, the NPT does not provide for any restriction
whatsoever to the development of nuclear energy for civilian purposes, neither does it
establish a threshold in this field. Exceeding the percentage of 20% of enriched uranium
does not necessarily mean that one intends to develop a military nuclear programme,
as some technologies employed for civilian use also require a high percentage of enrichment,
which may even reach 80% -which is also the percentage required to produce
atomic bombs-. That said, the development of such capacity by Iran does not necessarily
imply that Iran intends to create nuclear weapons; therefore, in principle, it cannot be
categorically confirmed that a state is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons based only on
the fact that is it enriching uranium to a percentage above 20%.
On the other hand, the lack of cooperation shown by Iran not allowing IAEA inspectors
to enter and supervise a number of its installations and plants does not necessarily
mean that this country stood in violation of the NPT, although Iran is bound
to comply with the Safeguard Agreement that it has signed with the IAEA. 65 De facto
evidence to condemn Iran’s nuclear programme thus does not exist. The probable aim
of the Iranian regime was merely to demonstrate to the world that it possessed enough
technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons if it felt that it was necessary. In
this case, its nuclear programme aimed to reach strategic objectives, thereby achieving
so-called ‘virtual dissuasion’ and acting within the bounds of the NPT. 66
All in all, the uncertainty has sounded alarm bells amongst the international community
with respect to the development of this nuclear programme. The matter
reached the United Nations Security Council, which, from mid-2006, had approved
various resolutions demanding the Iranian government suspend its activities relating
to the enrichment of uranium.
Right from the outset, the issue of this suspected military nuclear programme created
a deep rift between positions both within the United Nations Security Council
65 The Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA has been in force since 15 May 1974
(https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1974/infcirc214.pdf). Moreover,
Iran had signed Additional Protocol 18 of December 2003, but it has not entered into force,
and it is therefore not obliged to comply with it. See LARA FERNÁNDEZ, Belén. ‘El programa
nuclear de Irán y la estabilidad estratégica en la zona’, in Higher Centre for National Defence Studies
(CESEDEN), Information Bulletin, no. 292, Madrid: Ministry of Defence, 2005, p.7.
66 IBAÑEZ, Fernando. ‘El programa nuclear iraní: estado de la cuestión y posibles escenarios’, in
Relaciones Internacionales (GERI-UAM), no. 16, 2011, pp. 140-143, at www.relacionesinternacionales.
info/ojs/article/view/271.html.
http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
269