revistaieee7

Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016
visions in the Charter that provide that the application of these resolutions is obligatory. 38
Such attitudes highlight the reticence of numerous states to accept this state of affairs,
one of impasse, which may adversely affect international cooperation in the area;
this thus indirectly fuels the nuclear ambitions of those states with advanced development
and modernisation programmes, which would prefer to maintain them to offset
the interventionism and supremacy of the so-called ‘nuclear club’.
THE CONTROVERSIAL ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE SECURITY
COUNCIL IN LIGHT OF THE VARIOUS NATIONAL NUCLEAR
PROGRAMMES
If we follow the same line of analysis, the fact that the five countries which are
permanent members of the Security Council are also the same states which may legitimately
possess nuclear weapons, in accordance with the NPT, is a privilege that may
function both as a regulating element and as a destabilising factor.
The reason behind this is that the members of the Security Council may let their
own strategic interests prevail over their responsibility for maintaining international
peace and security. In other words, the controversial right to veto within the Security
Council affords its permanent members the possibility to obstruct, without further
reasoning, any attempt by this UN body to respond to the violation of an international
treaty or a situation that may pose a unequivocal threat to international security. 39
At the other end of the scale, the members of the Security Council may speed up
the adoption of enforcement measures, by opting for exaggerated measures or even
the use of force against a state without giving them sufficient time to seek alternative
peaceful options.
It is worth underscoring that in this regard the Charter of the United Nations
provides the Security Council with certain discretionary powers; that is to say, that
members of the Council are fully within their rights to assess whether a situation constitutes
a threat to international peace and security or not. This UN body thus has possesses
undeniable decision-making competences concerning enforcement measures,
which may go as far as to include the use of force, or even to overlook the particular
case it is presented with, depending on the interests of its member states, in particular
those of its permanent members. 40
38 Ibidem.
39 Article 27.3 of the Charter of the United Nations, whose wording states that ‘decisions of the
Security Council on all [substantive matters] shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members
including the concurring votes of the permanent members’.
40 Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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