revistaieee7

Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016
frame. 19 The generic and ambiguous character of the clause reflects the real intention of
the five nuclear powers of conserving their privileged status for an indeterminate period
of time and their desire to monopolise the non-proliferation regime. 20
Finally, we should recall that the NPT does not lay down the measures to take
against state parties who violate their obligations. Consequently, this lacuna affords
the Security Council exclusive competence for decisions regarding all cases that pose
a threat to international peace and security. This is precisely the source of major contention,
since it’s five permanent members -with a right to veto- are the very same five
de iure nuclear powers recognised by the NPT.
The evolution of Security Council practice: towards greater control of
nuclear proliferation
Meanwhile, for a long period of time, the Council found itself paralysed due to
confrontation among its members –above all due to rivalry between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the prolonged Cold War-. Its actions in this regard did
not reflect a particular interest on the part of its members to invoke the provisions
of the Charter in order to tackle the threats to peace and security associated with the
proliferation of armaments.
Amongst the modest initiatives launched by the Security Council at the time in this
area, one which stands out is the creation of a commission for armaments –albeit for
conventional ones not nuclear ones- in February 1947 at the request of the General
Assembly. 21 One of the very few resolutions that the United Nations body adopted in
this field was its Resolution 135 (1960), of 27 May 1960, in support of continuing negotiations
between members of the Council to refrain from the threat of use and the
use of force, while at the same time calling for states to put an end to the arms race,
to make efforts towards general disarmament and to proceed to the suspension of all
nuclear tests.
In the same vein we encounter another relevant Security Council resolution, Resolution
255 (1968), of 19 June 1968: 22 here, the Council recognises its responsibility
19 Ibidem, p.5 y ff.
20 FERNÁNDEZ COLÓN, Gustavo. ‘El Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear ¿Es posible el desarme?’,
in Humania del Sur (University of the Andes), no. 1, July-December 2006, pp. 47-64.
21 This commission was established by Resolution 18 (1947) of the Security Council, of 13 February
1947 (operative point 3), following the request of the General Assembly as set out in its Resolution 41
(I), of 14 December 1946. This commission was to be subsequently dissolved in 1952 –Resolution 97
(1952) of the Security Council, of 30 January 1952-.
22 Resolution 255 of the Security Council, adopted on 19 June 1968 with five abstentions, including
those of France and Pakistan.
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