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MALARIA ELIMINATION IN ZANZIBAR - Soper Strategies

MALARIA ELIMINATION IN ZANZIBAR - Soper Strategies

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US $<br />

FIGURE 27: COST OF RDTS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE/CONTROL FOR<br />

<strong>ELIM<strong>IN</strong>ATION</strong><br />

700,000<br />

600,000<br />

500,000<br />

400,000<br />

300,000<br />

200,000<br />

100,000<br />

0<br />

2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033<br />

SURVEILLANCE<br />

RAPID DIAGNOSTICS TESTS QUALITY CONTROL ON RDT’S<br />

A robust surveillance system is one of the most essential<br />

components of an elimination program and, as such, the<br />

resources that must be devoted to surveillance under elimination<br />

will be substantially greater than under sustained control. There<br />

are three main differences between the surveillance approach<br />

assumed for elimination compared with that of sustained control:<br />

�� Inclusion of Private Sector: Since it is essential that all malaria<br />

cases be tracked under an elimination program (including<br />

those that do not present in public health facilities), an<br />

elimination surveillance program in Zanzibar must include<br />

all private facilities. We thus assume that the MEEDS system<br />

would be expanded to all public facilities under sustained<br />

control and all cases, including cases detected in the private<br />

sector, trigger an appropriate response.<br />

�� Case Investigation: Under an elimination program, all<br />

suspected or reported malaria cases must be investigated.<br />

This costing includes district case investigation teams that<br />

travel to the household of the malaria patient, determine the<br />

likely source of the malaria infection, and screen surrounding<br />

households. As discussed in the technical feasibility section,<br />

we assume 100 households surrounding each newly identified<br />

case will be screened.<br />

�� Outbreak Response: Successfully achieving elimination will<br />

require that malaria outbreaks (>3 secondary cases) that do<br />

occur are halted as quickly as possible through focused vector<br />

control, screening and treatment.<br />

While the costs of the first priority are fixed (i.e., the functioning<br />

of the MEEDS system) and therefore should be constant over<br />

time, the costs of case investigation and outbreak response will<br />

depend on the number of malaria cases. The estimates of the<br />

expected number of cases that will require case investigation<br />

are based on the simulations described in Chapter 1 and vary<br />

based on the two core scenarios costed here. To calculate the<br />

number of surveillance teams that would be required to conduct<br />

this response, the number of expected cases and corresponding<br />

number of households to be screened were extrapolated. These<br />

3 | Financial Feasibility<br />

variables were adjusted based on the heterogeneity of transmission<br />

on Zanzibar, with the highest transmission risk districts (>2%<br />

prevalence) receiving one team additional to the number<br />

indicated by the estimated households requiring screening each<br />

year. It is assumed that one team of 3 can screen 20 houses per<br />

day and would work for 24 days per month. Districts with no<br />

transmission risk would not conduct active surveillance. For<br />

both costing scenarios, it is assumed that two districts are high<br />

risk, six are medium risk, and two are no risk until 2020. After<br />

2020, it is assumed that 1 district shifts from high to medium<br />

risk. Salaries of surveillance officers, transport costs (one vehicle<br />

per team, including maintenance), and administrative overhead<br />

are all included in the costing. The surveillance cost also includes<br />

the cost of RDTs used to screen all households. The simulator<br />

from the technical feasibility chapter suggests that screening 100<br />

households for each detected case is extremely likely to prevent<br />

an outbreak but we still included a contingency budget for<br />

outbreak response of initially $100,000 (the cost of a targeted<br />

IRS campaign in a single district) and $50,000 once elimination<br />

is achieved (outbreaks are even less likely to occur following<br />

elimination because of the assumed reductions in importation<br />

risk).<br />

The technical feasibility chapter describes how the main cost driver<br />

for surveillance–the number of cases that will trigger household<br />

screenings–depends heavily on assumptions of importation<br />

risk. It is expected that reductions in malaria transmission on<br />

the mainland alone will not be sufficient to achieve the very<br />

low levels of importation risk assumed in scenario 2. As such,<br />

targeted screening of travelers entering the islands at the main<br />

seaports (Stonetown, Mkoani or Wete, and Mkokotoni) is also<br />

assumed and costed for this scenario.<br />

TABLE 19: ASSUMPTIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF IMPORTATION RISK FOR<br />

2 <strong>ELIM<strong>IN</strong>ATION</strong> SCENARIOS<br />

2010 2020 2030<br />

Importation risk: Scenario 1 2/1000/year 1/1000/year 1/1000/year<br />

Reduction because of malaria control<br />

measures on the mainland<br />

Importation risk: Scenario 2 2/1000/year 1/1000/year 0.4/1000/year<br />

As there is no technical guidance and few experiences in other<br />

countries on which to base the assumed approach to border<br />

screening, the costing of this added intervention is inherently<br />

rough. It is assumed that cost drivers would include ongoing<br />

human resources, RDTs, other basic consumables, and<br />

management overhead. Assuming that screening would be<br />

conducted on board the vessels with an average travel time of 4<br />

hours per trip and that a team can screen up to 30 passengers per<br />

hour, it was estimated that 25 teams would be needed to deal with<br />

the maximum ferry capacity of around 3,000 passengers a day.<br />

It is important to emphasize that this approach is intended to only<br />

be used for the purpose of the costing of reduced importation<br />

risk and not as a basis for operational decisions; if the MOHSW<br />

wishes to explore implementation of border screening in the<br />

near-term, the authors recommend that a much more detailed<br />

71

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