Serial Killer Silently Pwning Your Java Endpoints

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New RCE Gadgets More of our reported RCE gadgets s;ll being fixed ZDI ID Affected Vendor(s) Severity (CVSS) ZDI-CAN-3511 Oracle 7.5 ZDI-CAN-3510 Oracle 7.5 ZDI-CAN-3497 Oracle 7.5 ZDI-CAN-3588 Oracle 7.5 ZDI-CAN-3592 Oracle 7.5 Stay tuned! TwiEer: @pwntester & @cschneider4711 Blog: hEps://hp.com/go/hpsrblog 16
Exis;ng Mi;ga;on Advice Simply remove gadget classes from ClassPath Blacklist & Whitelist based check at ObjectInputStream.resolveClass Different implementa@ons of this "Lookahead"-Deserializa@on exist: Use of ObjectInputStream subclass in applica@on’s deserializa@on code Agent-based (AOP-like) hooking of calls to ObjectInputStream.resolveClass() Ad hoc SecurityManager sandboxes during deserializa@on 17
Page 1 and 2: Chris;an Schneider Serial Killer: S
Page 3 and 4: Standing on the Shoulder of Giants
Page 5 and 6: AWack Surface Usages of Java serial
Page 7 and 8: Triggering Execu;on via "Magic Meth
Page 9 and 10: Exploi;ng "Magic Methods" But what
Page 11 and 12: Exploi;ng Invoca;onHandler (IH) Gad
Page 13 and 14: New RCE Gadget in BeanShell (CVE-20
Page 15: New RCE Gadget in Jython (CVE pendi
Page 19 and 20: Exis;ng Mi;ga;on Advice Simply remo
Page 21 and 22: How did vendors handle this recentl
Page 23 and 24: Is this for real or is this just fa
Page 25 and 26: Now with home delivery javax.media.
Page 27 and 28: Is it just Java Serializa;on? XStre
Page 29 and 30: XStream, can you run readObject()?
Page 31 and 32: Who Should Check for What? 1. Check
Page 33 and 34: High-Level Gadget Categories Gadget
Page 35 and 36: What to Check During Pentests? DAST
Page 37 and 38: Ac;ve Vulnerability Scanning Some B
Page 39 and 40: How to Harden Your Applica;ons? DO
Page 41: Chris;an Schneider @cschneider4711

Serial Killer Silently Pwning Your Java Endpoints

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