Serial Killer Silently Pwning Your Java Endpoints

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XStream, can you run readObject()? XStream works with <strong>Java</strong> serializa@on so that if a class contains a readObject() or readResolve() method, it will call them as part of the deserializa@on. XStream turns any XStream deserializa@on endpoint into a standard <strong>Java</strong> one Can we bypass XStream permission system by running code in readObject(), readResolve(), finalize(), … ? Any LookAhead bypass gadget will also be valid to bypass XStream blacklist 30
#RSAC Finding Vulnerabili;es & Gadgets in the Code SAST Tips
Page 1 and 2: SESSION ID: ASD-F03 Alvaro Muñoz S
Page 3 and 4: What is Java Serializa;on again? Ta
Page 5 and 6: Standing on the Shoulder of Giants
Page 7 and 8: Triggering Execu;on via "Magic Meth
Page 9 and 10: Exploi;ng "Magic Methods" But what
Page 11 and 12: Exploi;ng Invoca;onHandler (IH) Gad
Page 13 and 14: New RCE Gadget in BeanShell (CVE-20
Page 15 and 16: New RCE Gadget in Jython (CVE pendi
Page 17 and 18: Demo of aMack Let’s take a look a
Page 19 and 20: Exis;ng Mi;ga;on Advice Simply remo
Page 21 and 22: Exis;ng Mi;ga;on Advice Simply remo
Page 23 and 24: Bypassing LookAhead Blacklists New
Page 25 and 26: Example (has been fixed) org.apache
Page 27 and 28: Demo of bypass Let’s take a look
Page 29: Exploi;ng JNA 1 2 calc.exe 3 4 ja
Page 33 and 34: Finding Direct Deserializa;on Endpo
Page 35 and 36: Finding Gadgets for Fun & Profit Si
Page 37 and 38: Passive Deserializa;on Endpoint Det
Page 39 and 40: Hardening Advice #RSAC
Page 41 and 42: Apply What You Have Learned Today N

Serial Killer Silently Pwning Your Java Endpoints

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