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Security and Intelligence Series<br />
Special Analytical Report<br />
December 2014<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans<br />
to ISIS<br />
Militant Islamism in<br />
Southeastern Europe
Copyright © 2014 by Gordon N. Bardos<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong> LLC<br />
All rights reserved
From the Balkans to ISIS:<br />
Militant Islamism in Southeastern Europe<br />
Contents<br />
Acknowledgments<br />
Abbreviations<br />
Executive Summary<br />
I. Introduction<br />
II.<br />
III.<br />
IV.<br />
The Origins and Ideology of Militant Islamism<br />
in Southeastern Europe<br />
The Infrastructure of Militant Islamism<br />
in Southeastern Europe<br />
Iran in the Balkans<br />
V. A Micro-Case Study of Terrorist Networks:<br />
The Bosnian Connections to the WTC Attacks<br />
VI.<br />
Policy Recommendations<br />
ii<br />
iii<br />
iv<br />
1<br />
2<br />
18<br />
30<br />
35<br />
40<br />
Appendix 1: Balkan Jihadi/Extremist Threat Matrix<br />
Appendix 2: Balkan Jihadi Fatalities in Iraq and Syria<br />
Appendix 3: Estimating the Size of the Militant Islamist Movement<br />
in Southeastern Europe<br />
Appendix 4: Balkan Militant Islamist Websites/Electronic Media<br />
Bibliography & Sources<br />
47<br />
51<br />
53<br />
60<br />
90<br />
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Acknowledgments<br />
This report is an updated, expanded and revised version of work that has previously appeared in<br />
a number of publications. For their kind permission to use these materials, I thank Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld<br />
of the American Center for Democracy (ACD), and Mr. James Denton, publisher of World<br />
Affairs Journal (Washington, DC.)<br />
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Abbreviations<br />
AID—Agencija za Istraživanje i Dokumentaciju (“Agency for Research and Documentation”),<br />
a secret intelligence service affiliated with Izetbegović’s Islamist party<br />
AIO—Aktivna Islamska Omladina (“Active Islamic Youth), a Bosnia-based youth organization<br />
composed of indigenous members of the Al Qaeda unit in the Bosnian jihad.<br />
BIF—Bosanska Idealna Futura, incorporated in the US as the Benevolence International Foundation<br />
BIK—Bashkesia Islame e Kosoves (Islamic Community of Kosovo)<br />
ISIS—“Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”<br />
IZBiH—Islamska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina)<br />
LISBA—Levizja Islamike Bashkohu (Islamic Movement Unite)<br />
OHR—Office of the High Representative<br />
RS—Republika Srpska (Republic of Srpska, the Serb entity in Bosnia & Herzegovina)<br />
SDA—Stranka Demokratske Akcije (“Party of Democratic Action”), Alija Izetbegovic’s<br />
Islamist political party.<br />
SHC—Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia & Herzegovina<br />
SJCRKC—Saudi Joint Committee for the Relief of Kosova and Chechnya<br />
TWRA—“Third World Relief Agency,” an Austro-Bosnian Al Qaeda front group<br />
VEVAK—“Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar,” the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence<br />
and National Security, also known as MOIS.<br />
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Executive Summary<br />
• Militant Islamism in southeastern Europe remains a distinctly minority-phenomenon. The<br />
available empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests only 5-10 percent of the Balkan Muslim<br />
populations adhere to it in some form. The majority of Balkan Muslims reject the views, attituders<br />
and actions described in this report.<br />
• Nevertheless, over the past several years the Balkans has emerged as a new front for militant<br />
Islamism. In June 2010, Islamist extremists bombed a police station in the central Bosnian<br />
town of Bugojno, killing one police officer and wounding six others. In February 2011, a<br />
Kosovo radical killed two US servicemen at Frankfurt Airport. In October 2011, a Sandžak<br />
Wahhabi attacked the US Embassy in Sarajevo. In April 2012, suspected Islamist extremists<br />
murdered five Macedonian citizens outside Skopje. In the first six months of 2012 alone, some<br />
200 Iranian “businessmen” entered Bosnia, including an individual Israeli intelligence has<br />
tracked in Georgia, India and Thailand (all countries in which terrorist attacks have targeted<br />
Israeli officials over the past two years). In July 2012, Hezbollah operatives bombed a bus full<br />
of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria. In March 2013, a Hezbollah operative was discovered<br />
monitoring Israeli citizens in Cyprus. In November 2013, a terrorist group composed of former<br />
Syrian jihad volunteers was uncovered in Kosovo. Two Balkan jihadis also carried out<br />
suicide-bombings in 2014.<br />
• The ideology of these groups and individuals is explicitly misogynistic, homophobic, anti-democratic,<br />
anti-American and anti-Semitic. Glorifications of violence, celebrations of jihad,<br />
endorsements of suicide-terrorism, and the rejection of secular authorities and institutions are<br />
frequent tropes of Balkan militant Islamists.<br />
• The growth of militant Islamism in southeastern Europe over the past two decades is not an<br />
accidental byproduct of the wars of the 1990s; it is the result of a long-term, planned effort of<br />
indigenous, clandestine Islamist circles operating in the Balkans since the 1930s.<br />
• Militant Islamist groups in the Balkans tend to be extra-systemic, created and operating in opposition<br />
to existing Islamic religious institutions, which throughout the region tend to be more<br />
conservative and moderate.<br />
• The militant Islamist movement in southeastern Europe is neither unified nor monolithic. Several<br />
different factions exist, some more radical, others less so, some closer to the Iranians, some closer<br />
to the Saudis. Considerable infighting and feuding exists between different factions and leaders.<br />
• Strongholds of Balkan Islamist militants provide the international jihadi movement with places<br />
to hide, recruit and train new adherents, and plan operations against local and international<br />
targets. Islamic “charities” and “NGO’s” provide jihadis with cover identities allowing them to<br />
circulate between the Middle-East, Europe, and North America, and the ability to launder and<br />
funnel monies to support terrorist actions and jihad around the globe.<br />
• Considerable variation can be observed in the attitudes and relationships of elites in Albania,<br />
Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo towards militant Islamism. In Albania and Kosovo, the<br />
predominantly Muslim-elites in power on the whole do not have an explicitly religious/Muslim<br />
political or social agenda. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, militant Islamism is supported by small,<br />
conspiratorial groups of militant Islamists that came to power in the 1990s, with hard-core elements<br />
of this group continuing to provide material support to the militant Islamist movement.<br />
Secularly-oriented Muslims in Bosnia & Herzegovina disapprove of the movement.<br />
• Competition between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey for ideological/spiritual influence and<br />
control over the Balkan Muslim populations has increased since the 1990s.<br />
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
• A number of developments over the past two decades threaten to change the historically more<br />
moderate nature of Islam in the Balkans. These include the infiltration of thousands of jihadis<br />
from Afghanistan and the Middle-East into the region, the billions of dollars states such as Iran<br />
and Saudi Arabia have been spending in southeastern Europe to spread their influence, and<br />
the new generation of Balkan Islamic clerics educated in the Middle-East and indoctrinated in<br />
more puritanical and extreme versions of Islam.<br />
• Two distinct types of individuals compose the militant Islamist movement in southeastern Europe:<br />
1) leaders tend to be clerics educated in the Middle-East; 2) lower-level adherents and<br />
followers tend to be alienated, disoriented young people, often estranged from their families<br />
and with a criminal background.<br />
• Analysts throughout the region report a consistent and successful effort by militant Islamists<br />
to infiltrate local political, social, educational and security institutions. Security sector reform<br />
in the region should thus focus on improving vertical coordination of existing security and<br />
intelligence services with international bodies such as NATO and Interpol to compartmentalize<br />
and limit the potential for security breaches. Horizontal integration of existing agencies and<br />
services would only serve to expand the access militant Islamists and their sympathizers and<br />
allies have to intelligence about their networks and activities.<br />
• International policy towards the spread of militant Islamism has been inconsistent, ranging<br />
from denial of the problem outright to occasionally hysterical over-reactions. Efforts to deal<br />
with the threat have been sacrificed for the sake of placating the movement’s Middle-Eastern<br />
patrons. More resources need to be devoted to intelligence-gathering on Balkan militant Islamist<br />
groups to enhance their identification, isolation, and removal, and more coordination is<br />
needed between regional and international authorities in combating the problem.<br />
• The danger confronting southeastern Europe and international policy in the region is not the establishment<br />
of radical Muslim states; it is that relatively small, clandestine groups of Islamist militants<br />
can use the area to provide material and logistical support for the global jihad movement.<br />
• There is an inverse relationship between the strength of militant Islamist movements in southeastern<br />
Europe and international efforts to create stable multiethnic democracies in the region:<br />
the stronger militant Islamism becomes, the lesser the chances international and local actors<br />
have to stabilize inter-religious and inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans, or to create stable,<br />
tolerant, democratic states and societies.<br />
• The Balkan Blowback (i.e., the impact of Balkan volunteers to the Iraqi and Syrian jihads<br />
returning to southeastern Europe) is already being felt and portends an upsurge in militant Islamist<br />
activity in the region over the coming 1-2 years.<br />
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I. Introduction<br />
Since the fall of communism two and a half decades ago, militant Islamism has been planting<br />
seeds and spreading roots in various parts of southeastern Europe, particularly the former Yugoslavia.<br />
1 With the help of local allies, militant Islamists have established training bases, recruiting<br />
stations, and safe-havens for would-be terrorists and terrorists on the run. Indeed, almost every<br />
major terrorist action of the recent past has roots or connections to the Balkans, 2 including the 9/11<br />
attacks, the August 1998 U.S. African embassy bombings, the December 1999 Millenium Bomb<br />
Plot targeting Los Angeles’ LAX Airport, the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbor,<br />
the October 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, the November 2003 Istanbul bombings, the March<br />
2004 Madrid Train bombings, the 7/7 London Underground bombing, the May 2007 Fort Dix<br />
bomb plot, the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the July 2009 Raleigh Group conspiracy, and the<br />
January 2010 conspiracy to attack the New York subway system. The late Richard Holbrooke made<br />
clear the dangerous extent to which militant Islamism has infiltrated southeastern Europe when he<br />
noted that had it not been for the Dayton Peace Accords, “al-Qaeda would probably have planned<br />
the Sept. 11 attacks from Bosnia, not Afghanistan,” 3 and a recent analysis by Radio Free Europe<br />
has noted that Bosnia has gone from being an importer of terrorists to and exporter. 4<br />
Thus, understanding the ideology, beliefs, and capacity of the various groups comprising the<br />
militant Islamist movement in southeastern Europe has become important for western security interests,<br />
and for the ramifications they may have on plans to integrate the region into Euro-Atlantic<br />
political and economic structures. Unfortunately, a thorough review of the ideology and activities<br />
of these groups is cause for considerable concern. What has been developing in southeastern Europe<br />
is a movement based on extreme forms of religious and ethnic intolerance, opposed to modern<br />
conceptions of democracy, human rights and civil liberties, and virulently anti-American, anti-Semitic,<br />
misogynistic and homophobic.<br />
Understanding the organization and infrastructure of militant Islamism in the Balkans is of<br />
course a crucial matter in dealing with the phenomenon and in determining its capacity to threaten<br />
U.S. and European security interests. Since the 1980s, militant Islamism in southeastern Europe has<br />
evolved from a relatively small, marginal, and conspiratorial effort of a few hundred people into a<br />
complex, multifaceted movement, comprising numerous bases in both urban and rural areas, extensive<br />
networks of organizations that can funnel monies and operational funds around the region and<br />
throughout the world, and fully modern and contemporary propaganda machinery using the latest<br />
social media to disseminate their ideology and facilitate communication amongst the movement’s<br />
members and adherents.<br />
While at present these individuals and groups account for only ±10 percent of the Muslim<br />
populations in southeastern Europe, the extreme nature of their ideology, their organization, and<br />
the aggressive way in which they promote their agenda is already complicating western efforts to<br />
establish the tolerant, democratic, multiethnic states and societies Washington and Brussels claim<br />
as their goal in the Balkans. Moreover, they are providing a dangerous stepping stone for the global<br />
jihadis’ efforts to launch attacks in Europe and beyond.<br />
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
II.<br />
The Origins and Ideology of Militant Islamism in<br />
Southeastern Europe<br />
The origins of militant Islamism in southeastern Europe can most directly be traced to the life<br />
and work of Bosnia’s late Islamist president, Alija Izetbegović. 5 In the late 1930s, Izetbegović and<br />
a conspiratorial group of like-minded Islamist extremists formed an organization called the Mladi<br />
Muslimani (“Young Muslims”) whose goal, as Izetbegović personally noted, was the creation of a<br />
“great Muslim state,” 6 or as one author has described it, an “Islamistan” throughout the Balkans,<br />
northern Africa, and the Middle-East, 7 what today Abu el Baghdadi would call a caliphate. Towards<br />
this goal, the Mladi Muslimani swore an oath asking Allah to grant them perseverance on their<br />
“path of jihad” and their “uncompromising struggle against everything non-Islamic.” 8 Tellingly, the<br />
name of their underground journal was Mudžahid (“Holy Warrior”). Ideologically, the Mladi Muslimani<br />
were influenced by the emergence of the contemporaneous Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,<br />
and the members’ early writings suggest that they were a group of Balkan Islamic puritans opposed<br />
to such things as Muslims associating with non-Muslims, the theater, the ballet, opera, circuses,<br />
dancing, men shaking hands with women, and mixed-gender beaches or mixed-gender evening<br />
promenades. 9 The founders of the Mladi Muslimani claimed their goal was to produce Islamic “fanatics,”<br />
10 and looked to Islam in its purged, salafist form to provide an authentic Muslim alternative<br />
to communism or fascism as a way of organizing society. 11<br />
During World War II, the Mladi Muslimani supported the idea of<br />
Bosnia & Herzegovina becoming an autonomous unit within the Third<br />
Reich, and ultimately a part of a global Islamic federation. The Germans,<br />
to their satisfaction, found “militant support” amongst the Mladi<br />
Muslimani, 12 and many members of the organization served as recruiters<br />
for the Bosnian SS “Handžar” division formed by the pro-German<br />
Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin el-Huseini. Izetbegović was allegedly a<br />
member of the faction within the Mladi Muslimani who supported the<br />
Handžar Division, and some Mladi Muslimani joined the unit outright. 13<br />
The goals of this pro-Nazi faction in Bosnian politics were laid out in<br />
A Memorandum of the ‘National Committee’ of 1 November 1942 to<br />
His Excellency Adolf Hitler, the Fűhrer of the German People, which<br />
called on the Fűhrer to lead the “300-million Islamic nation of the East .<br />
. . in the struggle against English imperialism, Jewry, Freemasonry and<br />
Bolshevism,” 14 and went on to ask Hitler to make Bosnia a separate unit<br />
within the Third Reich under the direct control of his personally appointed<br />
“Our goal was the creation<br />
of a great Muslim<br />
state.” Alija Izetbegović<br />
on the Mladi Muslimani<br />
administration. 15 In a letter to Heinrich Himmler, the Al Azhar-educated chief imam of the Handžar<br />
Division, Husein ef. Đoso (whom one scholar has called “the most influential Islamic thinker in<br />
Bosnia until his death in 1982” 16 ) saluted the Reichsfűhrer with the following words: “I consider<br />
it my duty to express my gratitude on behalf of the<br />
imams of the division and hundreds and thousands<br />
of the poor in Bosnia. We are prepared to lay down<br />
our lives in the struggle for the great leader Adolf<br />
Hitler and the New Europe.” 17<br />
The Mladi Muslimani “. . . with the help of Allah<br />
are embarking on jihad.”<br />
With the end of World War II, the Mladi Muslimani’s<br />
surviving members were rounded up and imprisoned<br />
as fascist collaborators. Izetbegović himself<br />
was in prison between 1946-1949. Nevertheless, Izetbegović’s<br />
political goals would remain faithful to those<br />
of the Mladi Muslimani throughout the rest of his political<br />
career. In his most famous political manifesto,<br />
the Islamic Declaration (written in 1970, the same<br />
year the Ayatollah Khomeini published his Towards an<br />
2
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Islamic Government) and showing the influence that one<br />
of Al Qaeda’s ideological antecedents, Sayyid Qutb, had<br />
had on his thinking, 18 Izetbegović anticipated by some two<br />
decades Osama bin Laden’s concept of perpetual jihad, or<br />
the belief that “jihad will continue until the day of judgement,”<br />
19 when he warned,<br />
“We are prepared to lay down our lives in the<br />
struggle for the great leader Adolf Hitler and<br />
the New Europe.” Husein ef. Đoso (second<br />
from left), “the most important Islamic thinker<br />
in Bosnia” with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj<br />
Amin al-Husseini, and members of the Waffen<br />
SS Handžar Division, Bosnia, 1943<br />
There is no peace or co-existence between Islamic<br />
faith and non-Islamic social and political<br />
institutions . . . Our means are personal example,<br />
the book, and the word. When will force be<br />
added to these means? The choice of this moment<br />
is always a concrete question and depends<br />
on a variety of factors. However, one general<br />
rule can be postulated: the Islamic movement<br />
can and may move to take power once it is morally<br />
and numerically strong enough, not only to<br />
destroy the existing non-Islamic government,<br />
but to build a new Islamic government. 20<br />
The fact that Izetbegović devotes a section in the tract to Pakistan (which Izetbegović called<br />
“our great hope”)—a religiously “clean” country formed by its violent secession from a larger<br />
multi-religious and multi-ethnic entity—had clear implications for Izetbegović’s views regarding<br />
multi-religious, multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. This is in contrast to the very critical view Izetbegović<br />
exhibited in the Islamic Declaration towards reformers in the Muslim world such as Kemal Ataturk;<br />
thus, as one scholar has observed, “The [Islamic] Declaration designated Pakistan as a model<br />
country to be emulated by Muslim revolutionaries worldwide. The Pakistan parallel also revealed<br />
Izetbegović’s vision of Yugoslavia’s fate as analogous to that of India after 1948.” 21 Another interpretation<br />
of Izetbegović’s agenda and goals concluded that<br />
Mi smo vojska Allahova<br />
Za Islam se borimo<br />
Ako treba život dati<br />
Za šehadet poginuti<br />
“We are the Army of Allah,<br />
Fighting for Islam.<br />
If we have to give our lives,<br />
For martyrdom we will die”<br />
-----marching song of Izetbegović’s El Mudžahedin battalion<br />
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Left: Heinrich Himmler inspecting the Bosnian SS Handžar Division, Neuhammer Waffen<br />
SS training camp, Silesia, 1943; right, Jihad in Europe, Izetbegović’s “Seventh Muslim Brigade,”<br />
Zenica, 1996<br />
In [Izetbegović’s] discourse with Westerners, in contrast to the Islamic Declaration,<br />
he used the language of multiculturalism. It is clear, at least in retrospect, that<br />
he hoped to establish an Islamic state in Bosnia but not necessarily an Islamist<br />
one. His ideal seems to have been the Ottoman Empire, an Islamic state in which<br />
non-Muslim dhimmis were tolerated. 22<br />
Indeed, many people who worked closely with Izetbegović were convinced that his primary<br />
goal was the creation of an ethnically- and religiously-homogenous Islamic state, 23 and numerous<br />
outside observers and international officials who dealt with Izetbegović also came to believe that<br />
his professed desire for a multiethnic state was more a public relations ploy for western audiences<br />
rather than a sincere ideal. 24<br />
In subsequent years the political philosophy of the Mladi Muslimani and Izetbegović’s Islamic<br />
Declaration remained the policy guidebook for the Islamists he led to power in Bosnia. Eight of the<br />
forty original members of the political party Izetbegović founded in 1990, the Stranka Demokratske<br />
Akcije (the “Party of Democratic Action,” Bosnian acronym, SDA) were Mladi Muslimani, and<br />
several others were younger Islamists who had gone to prison with Izetbegović in 1983. 25 Much<br />
like its Middle-Eastern sister movements such as Hamas or Hezbollah, throughout the 1990s Izetbegović’s<br />
SDA straddled the line between legitimate politics and terror.<br />
“Miracles of the Bosnian Jihad”: Title frame from a 2014 documentary hosted and narrated<br />
by Izetbegović wartime commander and current imam of the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo<br />
Nezim Halilović-Muderis<br />
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In terms of Izetbegović’s vision for Bosnia, one of his SDA<br />
associates described it in the following terms:<br />
The territory controlled by the Bosnian Army after the war<br />
will be a Muslim state . . . This is a desire of the Muslim<br />
people and, after all, our leaders: secular leader Alija<br />
Izetbegović and religious leader Mustafa Cerić (the latter<br />
one in a private conversation with me confirmed that the<br />
old dream of Alija Izetbegović, member of the organization<br />
Young Muslims, has been and remains the establishment of<br />
the Muslim state in Bosnia-Herzegovina; finally, his dream<br />
“There is no peace or co-existence<br />
between Islamic faith of that”) . . . The Muslim state will have a Muslim ideol-<br />
is close to realization and “he is not terribly upset because<br />
and non-Islamic social and ogy, based on Islam, Islamic religious, legal, ethical and<br />
political institutions.” Alija social principles, but also on the contents of Western origin<br />
Izetbegović<br />
which do not contradict Islamic principles . . . The Muslim<br />
ideology will be the basis for the complete state and legal<br />
system of the future Muslim state, from the state and national<br />
symbols, over the ruling national policy, to educational system, social and<br />
economic institutions, and of course, the Muslim family as the unit on which the<br />
whole state is based . . . the level of personal prosperity, besides personal initiative,<br />
will especially depend on the degree to which the individual accepts and applies<br />
the principles and spirit of the Muslim ideology. 26<br />
Indeed, the above-mentioned Mustafa Cerić, one of the founders of Izetbegović’s Islamist party<br />
and his handpicked choice to head Bosnia’s Islamic Community, would in September 1992 call<br />
on Muslims around the world to support what he called the Bosnian jihad against the Croat and<br />
Serb “crusade.” 27 Izetbegović’s war effort took on other rhetorical trappings of jihad as well, with<br />
soldiers who died in Izetbegović’s army being designated “šehids” (martyrs for Islam), 28 and individuals<br />
who led the war effort, such as Izetbegović’s vice-president, Ejup Ganić, being officially<br />
proclaimed “gazis” (i.e., Islamic warriors against the infidels). 29<br />
The view that Bosnia and other Balkan regions are “Muslim” has become a frequent refrain of<br />
the militant Islamists. According to a recent statement by the Syrian radical Omar Bakri Muhammed,<br />
“When Islam enters a territory, it becomes<br />
Islamic, therefore Islam is under obligation<br />
to eventually liberate it . . . Spain, for<br />
instance, is a Muslim territory. Eastern Europe,<br />
as well. Romania, Albania, Macedonia,<br />
Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia ... due to its<br />
decision to send troops to Afghanistan and<br />
Iraq and its military co-operation with Israel,<br />
Bulgaria is also a legitimate target.” 30<br />
Other Islamists frequently express<br />
the same views. Elfatih Hassanein, a Sudanese<br />
national and longtime friend of<br />
Izetbegović’s, once noted that “Bosnia, at<br />
the end, must be Muslim Bosnia.” 31 More<br />
recently, Mustafa Cerić has begun a campaign<br />
for Bosnia to be transformed into a<br />
“Bosniac” (i.e., Muslim state), claiming<br />
that all other peoples in Europe have their<br />
own national states, so Bosnia should be<br />
recognized as the Muslim national state<br />
“this is only the first round . . . further help will be necessary,<br />
and remain necessary, until Islam is victorious in<br />
this world.”<br />
Izetbegović wartime military commander Rasim Delić addressing<br />
the El Mudžahedin battalion, Zenica, late 1995<br />
(source: YouTube screenshot)<br />
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
(Independently of this, in April 2014 UK prime minister<br />
David Cameron ordered MI5 and MI6 to investigate<br />
Cerić’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood along with<br />
those of another controversial Muslim activist because<br />
of their affiliation with the Tony Blair Faith Foundation.<br />
The British government was at the time investigating<br />
the Muslim Brotherhood’s links to terrorism in the<br />
UK.). 32 Another Muslim politician, Sejfudin Tokić, has<br />
picked up this theme, arguing (with respect to Bosnia’s<br />
October 2013 census), “If there are more than 50% of<br />
us [Muslims], Bosnia will be a national state of Bosniaks<br />
and we will dominate the other two peoples.” 33<br />
In a recent sermon, the Bosnian Wahhabi leader Bilal<br />
Bosnić has claimed that everything “from Prijedor to<br />
the Sandžak” belongs to Muslims, 34 and that non-Muslims in Bosnia should be required to pay the<br />
jizya, a poll tax imposed on non-Muslims in “Islamic” countries. 35 On his deathbed, Alija Izetbegović<br />
went so far as to “bequeath” Bosnia to then-Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 36<br />
ءايلوأ ىراصنلاو دوهيلا اوذختت ال اونمآ نيذلا اهيأ اي<br />
“Our Path is Jihad”: still clip from a promotional<br />
video for the Al Qaeda unit in<br />
Izetbegović’s army<br />
”O vi koji vjerujete nemojte jevreje i kršćane uzimati za prijatelje ”<br />
From the Put Vjernika website. The quote from the Quran (5:51) reads,<br />
“O Believers, do not take Jews and Christians as your friends.” 49<br />
The belief that the Balkans are “Muslim lands” of course presupposes the understanding that<br />
sharia should ultimately be imposed throughout the region. As Izetbegović once told an interlocutor,<br />
“what is wrong with the sharia? Is it less humane to cut off a man’s hand than to take several<br />
years from his life in prison? You cut off the hand, it is done.” 37 Similarly, according to Mustafa<br />
Cerić, “Sharia is the basis of faith for every Muslim, about which there is no discussion. Sharia is<br />
like the Ten Commandments for Christians.” 38 On another occasion Cerić added,<br />
As far as Islam is concerned, all countries belong to one of the following categories:<br />
Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb, or Dar as-Sulh . . . in the third category, Sulh, the<br />
situation is such that Islam or the shariah cannot be implemented fully, but the<br />
government should endeavour to put it into practice as much as possible [Bosnia<br />
is in] the third category. Therefore, we are obliged to try our best to put Islamic<br />
legislation into practice, but it is [not] realistic to implement shariah completely.<br />
That’s what I want, of course, but it will not happen just like that. 39<br />
Left: “Spiritually and emotionally, I feel closer to a Muslim in the Philippines<br />
than to a Croat in Sarajevo.” Izetbegović ideologue and 1983 co-conspirator<br />
Džemaludin Latić; right: “We have to hate infidels, even if they are<br />
our neighbors or live in our homes” Bosnian Wahhabi leader Bilal Bosnić<br />
6
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Left: Women can jihad too: Bosnian ISIS volunteer Elvira<br />
Karalić; right: “Here we have unmarried brothers who<br />
want wives, and brothers who want more wives . . . Come<br />
and give birth and raise mudžahedins . . . “ Still-clip from a<br />
YouTube video of a Bosnian jihadi calling on women to join<br />
the Syrian jihad<br />
Recent public opinion surveys suggest<br />
a not-insignificant number of people in<br />
the region agree with such views. A 2013<br />
Pew Research survey, for instance, found<br />
that 36 percent of Muslims in southeastern<br />
Europe believed in severe corporal punishment<br />
for criminals, and 13 percent favored<br />
executing people who leave Islam.<br />
The same poll also found that 20 percent<br />
of Muslims in Kosovo and 15 percent in<br />
Bosnia favor making sharia the law of the<br />
land. 40 In Bosnia, the campaign to make<br />
public life sharia-compatible has become<br />
more and more visible. Wahhabi leaders<br />
Nusret Imamović and Bilal Bosnić, for<br />
instance, in early 2013 went on a a public<br />
lecture campaign speaking on the theme<br />
“The Perfection of Sharia, the Danger of<br />
Democracy.” 41<br />
A constant and central tenet in the ideology of Balkan militant Islamists has been a virulent<br />
form of ethnoreligious intolerance based on extreme interpretations of Islamic texts. Thus, an early<br />
essay by one of the Mladi Muslimani’s founding members exhorted Muslims to heed the Koranic<br />
injunction “O believers! Do not take infidels for friends in place of believers,” 42 a sentiment frequently<br />
repeated in Islamist circles today. 43 In the 1940s, the Mladi Muslimani issued a “Proclamation”<br />
in which their views on interethnic and inter-religious relations were evident:<br />
We have to gather and form into battle lines everything that is good, and embark on<br />
the path of jihad with the Tekbir on our mouths, and decisively and mujahedin-like<br />
persevere until the final victory . . . Depending on friendship with Serbs or Croats, as<br />
has today become evident to every one of our people who has had any relations with<br />
them, is the biggest stupidity and self-deception of oneself and one’s community.<br />
Both have sufficiently shown us their goals and intentions and we will never again<br />
believe them, regardless of their attempting to convince us and prove to us their good<br />
intentions. We are forced to adopt this position all the more because the Quran, as our<br />
only guide, warns us when it says “Will you take the infidels as friends?” or “Neither<br />
the Christians nor the Jews will be your friends until you accept that which they<br />
represent” . . . [the Mladi Muslimani] conscious of the correctness of their intentions,<br />
with the help of Allah are embarking on jihad . . . the goal and task of the organization<br />
is not resolving some narrow and local problem, but a great and momentous idea<br />
which should solely guide every one of us, and that is the establishment of an Islamic<br />
order and implementing Islam in the lives of people . . . These are days of survival,<br />
that is, days of jihad, and our organization is faithfully following that path. 44<br />
Good men must be hard to find: left: two Austro-Bosnian volunteer jihadi wives in Syria; center: Croatian-born<br />
Muslim-convert Irena Horak, wife of Al Qaeda propagandist Anwar Al-Awlaki (on right) killed<br />
in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in September 2011 (source: Long War Journal)<br />
7
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Various manifestations of Islamist supremacist<br />
doctrine come out on the websites<br />
and in the publications Islamist groups<br />
maintain and publish. One Wahhabi website<br />
urges readers to reject international law because<br />
it grants non-Muslims the same rights<br />
as Muslims, and counsels readers that they<br />
should not drink coffee with non-Muslim<br />
co-workers—unless they are trying to convert<br />
them to Islam. Wahhabis in Bosnia also<br />
decry freedom of religion, because then “we<br />
Muslims would not be allowed to destroy<br />
statues . . . . which are worshipped in spite of<br />
Allah.” 45 Grade school textbooks for Islamic<br />
religious classes in Bosnia now include<br />
the following: “Today Islamic countries are<br />
confronted with a form of blackmail: thus,<br />
if they want to join the United Nations, they<br />
“Women can be killed if they show their bodies or use<br />
nudism in the struggle against Islam.” From the Bosnian<br />
extremist website Ensarija Šerijata. Pictured: July 2010<br />
Sarajevo protest in support of wearing burqas in public<br />
have to tacitly renounce jihad as an organized form of Muslim interest.” 46 Extremists such as Nezim<br />
Halilović-Muderis and Fatmir Alispahić call for the abrogation of international agreements such as<br />
the Dayton Peace Accords and the elimination of Bosnia’s entities and cantons. 47 The International<br />
Crisis Group has similarly reported that Muderis and the Kosovo-born imam of the Vratnik White<br />
Mosque in Sarajevo, Sulejman Bugari, use their sermons “to preach hatred against Serbs and Jews<br />
and to advocate separation from Serbs.” 48 Sometimes the militant Islamists’ rejection of secular<br />
authorities and institutions takes on tragicomic dimensions; for instance, a noted Bosnian Islamist<br />
radical, Jusuf Barčić, was killed in an automobile accident in March 2007 when the vehicle he was<br />
in refused to stop at a traffic signal.<br />
Indicative of the ethnic distance Islamists try to impose between Muslims and non-Muslims<br />
are the views of Izetbegović’s inner circle. Džemaludin Latić, at one time the leading ideologist of<br />
Izetbegović’s SDA once announced that “spiritually and emotionally, I feel closer to a Muslim in<br />
the Philippines than I do to a Croat in Sarajevo,” 50 and Latić has reportedly similarly endorsed the<br />
Ayatollah Khomeini’s death sentence against “the apostate Salman Rushdie,” saying “the Imam<br />
Khomeini’s fatwa is a must for every Muslim to carry out.” 51 More recently, the aforementioned<br />
Wahhabi leader from Buzim, Bilal Bosnić, gave a sermon in which he claimed “We have to love<br />
the one who loves Allah, and hate the one who hates Allah. We have to hate infidels, even if they<br />
Left: “Our goal is to make sure that even the Vatican will be Muslim.” Bosnian Wahhabi leader Bilal Bosnić;<br />
center: ISIS publication “Dabiq” showing the black flag of jihad flying over Vatican City; right: “Know this,<br />
oh infidels: By Allah, we shall cleanse the Arabian Peninsula of you, you filth. We shall conquer Jerusalem<br />
from you, oh Jews! We shall conquer Rome and Andalusia, Allah willing. Say: Allah Akbar!” YouTube clip<br />
of a Kosovo jihadi in Iraq, May 2014 (source: MEMRI TV)<br />
8
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
“Mother Theresa belongs in the middle<br />
of Hell because she did not believe<br />
in Allah, the Prophet, and the Quran.”<br />
Kosovo Imam Shefqet Krasniqi<br />
are our neighbors or live in our homes.” 52 Pointing to the<br />
effect that the promotion of such views is having, in a recent<br />
public opinion poll 93% of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo<br />
said that all or most of their close friends were Muslims. 53<br />
Another frequent trope of Balkan militant Islamists is the<br />
view that non-Muslims cannot “understand” Muslims. Mustafa<br />
Cerić, for instance, on one occasion criticized a Bosnian<br />
Muslim family for hiring a Christian lawyer, because Christians<br />
“cannot understand Muslims.” 54<br />
Predictably, individuals with such worldviews emphasize<br />
racial and religious purity, and a consistent trope of the<br />
militant Islamists has been that they are not even ethnically<br />
related to their Slav neighbors. 55 The aforementioned Latić<br />
has vehemently argued against mixed marriages, claiming<br />
that “Mixed marriages, a symbol of misunderstood mutual<br />
life, are mostly ruined marriages in which big conflicts exist and children are frustrated by their origin.”<br />
56 Mirsad Ćeman, a former secretary-general of Izetbegović’s Islamist party noted that under<br />
a Bosnian Islamist regime, “a normal Muslim will marry a Muslim woman<br />
and others will be the exception,” and Mustafa Cerić once claimed that mixed<br />
marriages “are just another form of genocide.” 57 Unfortunately, such views<br />
were widespread; contrary to the myth about high rates of interethnic marriage<br />
in Bosnia spread by journalists and pop historians, even before the wars of the<br />
1990s on average less than seven percent of Bosnian Muslims married individuals<br />
from a different ethnic or religious group, and amongst Croats and Serbs,<br />
the intermarriage rate was only about fifteen percent. 58<br />
Misogyny is a central feature of the militant Islamists’ belief system. Islamist<br />
extremists advise their followers that “lazy wives” should be beaten, 59 and remind<br />
adherents that the proper Islamic punishment for unmarried adulterers is 100 lashes,<br />
and for married adulterers death by stoning. 60 To the militant Islamists, celebrating<br />
International Women’s Day is considered “un-Islamic.” 61 In Kosovo, the<br />
mufti of Prizren, Irfan Salihu, publicly claimed in a recent sermon “Any woman<br />
who has intimate acts without being married according to provisions of the Islam is<br />
a slut and a bitch . . . Leave the garbage out so everyone will know which of them<br />
was used.” 62 In Bosnian Wahhabi circles, girls are considered ready to be married at the age of 14, and<br />
women who argue with their husbands are deemed to be possessed by demons, the therapy for which is<br />
to have their backs cut with razor blades. 63 In the Sandžak there have been a number of reports of Wahhabis<br />
engaging in female genital mutilation,<br />
and in Bosnia Arab “humanitarian<br />
organizations” allegedly tried to spread<br />
the practice during the war in the 1990s.<br />
(It should be stressed that officials of<br />
the Islamic Community in the Sandžak<br />
condemned the practice.) 64 In the spring<br />
of 1999, Wahhabi’s violently broke up a<br />
conference in Sarajevo devoted to a discussion<br />
of women’s rights in Afghanistan.<br />
65 Polygamy is an accepted practice<br />
in Balkan Wahhabi communities; for<br />
instance, Bilal Bosnić has acknowledged<br />
having four wives. Reporting on<br />
Anti-gay jihad: the headline reads “Pederasts are the New Al<br />
Qaeda” (source: saff.ba)<br />
Three plots<br />
against the late<br />
Pope John Paul<br />
II originated in<br />
Bosnia<br />
new religious textbooks in Bosnia that<br />
describe the practice of women leading<br />
9
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
The anti-Santa Claus campaign in Bosnia: on left: Alija Izetbegović claims “Grandfather Frost is a communist<br />
fabrication”; center: graphic accompanying a hutba (sermon) by Sarajevo imam Nezim Halilović-Muderis<br />
(source: bosnjaci.net); right: an obituary announcing the death of Grandfather Frost, distributed in Zenica,<br />
Central Bosnia, in 2008<br />
prayers in mosques, a Saff editor claimed “We cannot allow sick feminist minds to teach our children in<br />
its ugly way.” 66<br />
Catholics in central Bosnia have been particular targets of the militant Islamists. As Vatican<br />
Radio recently reported, “Christians are massively leaving post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina amid<br />
mounting discrimination and Islamization.” 67 On Christmas Eve 2004, Wahhabi convert Muamer<br />
Topalović murdered three members of a Bosnian Croat family as they were preparing to go to Midnight<br />
Mass. Vinko Cardinal Puljić, the Catholic archbishop of Bosnia, claims that although seventy<br />
new mosques have been built in Sarajevo alone, building approvals for churches “take years,” 68 and<br />
he decried the fact that he had been denied permission to build a new church in Sarajevo for over<br />
a decade. Catholic nuns in Sarajevo now only go out in pairs for fear of being attacked by Islamist<br />
extremists, and report that Wahhabi bakers refuse to sell them bread, even when it is in plain sight. 69<br />
Similarly, the bishop of Banja Luka, Franjo Komarica, has recently warned that “we musn’t ignore<br />
the dark clouds arising to the southeast. Destructive, radical forces from the Arab world can very<br />
easily settle and flourish here.” 70 Even Mother Theresa is the object of the Islamists’ intolerance<br />
and hatred. In a recent sermon in Skopje, an imam from Kosovo, Shefket Krasniqi claimed that<br />
the Macedonian-born Albanian nun, “belongs in the middle of Hell because she did not believe in<br />
Allah, the prophet and the Koran ...” 71<br />
Indicative of the extent of anti-Catholic animosity Islamist<br />
extremists in the region promote is the fact that at least<br />
three plots against the late Pope John Paul II were linked to<br />
Bosnia. The first occurred during his pastoral visit to Sarajevo<br />
in April 1997, when a bomb was discovered under a bridge<br />
over which the Pope’s motorcade was supposed to pass only<br />
hours before his arrival. The perpetrators were never discovered.<br />
72 (Controversy about the Pope’s visit to Sarajevo had<br />
already erupted after Mustafa Cerić criticized local media for<br />
referring to John Paul II as “the Holy Father.” 73 )<br />
“ Jews . . . through the media industry<br />
of the Holocaust, especially<br />
film, are deceiving the world<br />
about their suffering, so that they<br />
can deny Zionist imperialism and<br />
crimes.” Bosnian polemicist Fatmir<br />
Alispahić<br />
Another attempt to kill the Pontiff took place later in the<br />
year, when Italian police discovered an assassination plot targeting<br />
John Paul II during a pastoral visit to Bologna. All<br />
fourteen men arrested were travelling on Bosnian passports. 74<br />
One of the individuals suspected of involvement in the attempt<br />
was Bosnian jihad veteran Karray Kamel bin Ali, a.k.a.,<br />
Abu Hamza, a Tunisian who had fought in the El Mudžahedin<br />
battalion (the Al Qaeda unit in Izetbegović’s army) during<br />
the war. In 2001, Italians authorities requested Abu Hamza’s<br />
extradition but Bosnian officials refused because Hamza had<br />
10
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
“The Koran on Jews: Jews currently create world policy, they hold in their hands money and the media<br />
. . . Jews are prepared, for the sake of interests of this world, to trample every rule and every law . . . [the<br />
Jews’] desire for gold and material goods of this world has shown itself throughout history . . . I pray to<br />
Allah to destroy the Zionists and their helpers.” A hutba (sermon), by Nezim Halilović-Muderis, imam of the<br />
Saudi-funded King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo (source: official website of the Islamic Community of Bosnia<br />
& Herzegovina); on right, CIA double agent Abdulrahman Khadr, attempted to infiltrate Al Qaeda cells in<br />
the King Fahd mosque in 2003<br />
“Bosnian citizenship.” 75 Subsequently arrested in 2007, he was released from Zenica prison and allowed<br />
to take a short “holiday” during which he promptly escaped. 76 News reports alleged that Bosnian<br />
security officials, including Tarik Sadović, a former security minister dismissed because of his<br />
refusal to expel foreign Islamist militants from Bosnia, had foreknowledge of Abu Hamza’s plans.<br />
(Interestingly, while in Zenica prison Abu Hamza was allowed to have phone and internet access. 77 )<br />
Bosnian-based extremists even plotted to attack John Paul II’s funeral. In 2005, Italian<br />
police uncovered a Gornja Maoča-based plan to attack the world leaders gathering in Vatican<br />
City to attend the Pontiff’s burial services. 78<br />
The gay community is a predictable target of Islamist extremists. In September 2008, Wahhabis<br />
attacked participants in the Sarajevo Gay and Lesbian Festival, after which the chairman of<br />
the Bosnian Helsinki Human Rights Commission said that the incident was reminiscent of “the<br />
pogroms that happened in the times of Adolf Hitler.” 79 The Sarajevo magazine Saff, a mouthpiece<br />
for Islamist extremists founded by local members of the El Mudžahedin battalion has been leading<br />
the anti-gay jihad in Bosnia. Recent Saff editorials, for<br />
instance, claim that “Fascism = Pederasty,” 80 “Pederasty =<br />
Terrorism,” 81 and “Pederasts are the Fathers of Pedophiles.” 82<br />
Typical of the views and argumentation one finds in Saff is<br />
the following:<br />
“And every tree and every rock<br />
will say, “Oh, Muslim, Servant of<br />
God, here is a Jew, he has hidden<br />
behind me, come and kill him.”<br />
Muharem Štulanović, Dean of the<br />
Faculty of Islamic Pedagogy in Bihać,<br />
Bosnia<br />
For Americans, pederasts are important, not Muslims,<br />
because no one is allowed to beat pederasts, but<br />
America itself beats Muslims . . . the Nazis, the Zionists,<br />
and the pederasts are genuine masters at making<br />
themselves out to be victims [even when] no one is<br />
bothering them. That is how Hitler burned the Reichstag<br />
and blamed the Jews. That is how the Jews<br />
prepared 9/11 and blamed the Muslims. That is how<br />
pederasts often beat themselves and then blame others<br />
. . . Let us not forget that pederasty is a totalitarian<br />
ideology, ready to engage in manipulations, corruption,<br />
lies and violence, and thus prepared to engage in<br />
terrorism as a form of struggle to impose its view on<br />
the world. 83<br />
Even Santa Claus has not been spared attacks from Balkan<br />
Islamists. In 1996, Alija Izetbegović initiated the anti-Santa<br />
campaign, announcing that “Santa Claus had no<br />
11
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
“The goal for all of us is death, especially in<br />
the battle against the Jews. Syria is not at<br />
all important to us. Our goal is Jerusalem.”<br />
Bosnian terrorist/Syrian jihad volunteer<br />
Bajro Ikanović<br />
business appearing on state television” and criticizing<br />
local Muslims for celebrating New Year’s Eve.<br />
He was joined in this effort by Mustafa Cerić, who<br />
argued that Santa Claus was “not an appropriate<br />
symbol for Muslims.” 84 In 2008, Sarajevo’s daycare<br />
centers banned the Bosnian equivalent of Santa<br />
(“Grandfather Frost”) because he was “not part of<br />
the Muslim tradition.” 85<br />
Other Muslims (and Muslim historical sites) can<br />
be the target of such extremists as well. In November<br />
2010, Macedonian Wahhabis set fire to a famous Sufi<br />
shrine in Tetovo, the Harabata Baba Bektashi complex,<br />
after years of trying to take possession of the<br />
site. 86 In February 2012, the Sarajevo cantonal education<br />
minister resigned due to fears of being assassinated<br />
by Islamist extremists. What had earned the<br />
minister the wrath of the official Islamic establishment<br />
and other extremists was a proposal that primary<br />
students’ grades in religion classes not be factored into their overall grade point averages. A letter<br />
sent to the minister’s home stated “Abandon Allah and his religion and the hand of the faithful will<br />
get you.” Enclosed was a 7.32 caliber bullet. 87 In August 2013, a Sunni extremist offered $20,000<br />
for the murder of a professor at the Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Sarajevo who specializes in Shia<br />
Islam (an even greater amount was offered if he was killed “with a sword”). 88 In November 2013,<br />
an NGO activist from Novi Pazar critical of the way young women were being manipulated into<br />
wearing the hijab was threatened by local Wahhabis and had to be given police protection, 89 and in<br />
Kosovo, Alma Lama, a prominent female politician, was forced to seek police protection after criticizing<br />
Islamist extremists. 90 Other individuals in Kosovo who have criticized the militant Islamist<br />
movement have been beaten up or had their cars bombed. 91<br />
Predictably, the most virulent forms of anti-Semitism are a favorite theme of Balkan Islamist<br />
militants. Izetbegović set the tone in his Islamic Declaration when he declared,<br />
the Zionists . . . have in Palestine extended a challenge to the entire Muslim world.<br />
Jerusalem is not just a question for the Palestinians, nor a question just for the Arabs.<br />
It is a question for all Muslim peoples To hold on to Jerusalem, the Jews must<br />
defeat Islam and the Muslims, which—thank God—is beyond their power . . . for<br />
the Islamic movement and all Muslims in the world there is only one solution: to<br />
continue the struggle, to extend it and prolong it, from day to day and year to year,<br />
without consideration for the victims or for how long the conflict might last, until<br />
[the Jews] are forced to return every piece of stolen land. 92<br />
In January 2009, after Mustafa Cerić appeared on a Sarajevo television station calling Israeli<br />
actions in Gaza “genocide,” graffiti and posters equating the Star of David with a swastika appeared<br />
in various parts of Bosnia. 93 The supposedly liberal<br />
Cerić has claimed that his critics are “judeocentric,”<br />
94 and dismisses criticism as “Islamophobia”;<br />
as a U.S. embassy cable from Sarajevo put<br />
it, “When addressing issues of Wahhabi influence<br />
in Bosnia or charges of pedophilia by imams, Ceric<br />
has consistently offered a knee-jerk reaction of<br />
labeling critics “Islamophobes,” whether Christian<br />
or Muslim, suggesting that such criticism is itself<br />
part of a continuing ‘genocide,’ . . .“ 95 Likewise,<br />
editors at Saff frequently refer to the “terrorist state<br />
of Israel” 96 and promote numerous forms of Holo-<br />
Tuzla Stadium, August 2014: local fans with a<br />
“modified” Israeli flag (source: Saff.ba)<br />
12
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
“With explosives on our chests we pave the way to paradise.” Left: Bosnian Wahhabi leader Bilal Bosnić;<br />
center: Kosovo suicide bomber Blerim Heta, killed several dozen people in Baghdad in March 2014; right:<br />
Bosnian suicide-bomber Emrah Fojnica, killed 24 people in Baghdad in August 2014<br />
caust denial. Thus, one of Saff’s most prominent writers, Fatmir Alispahić, has decried the fact that<br />
one cannot find “Western studies” in Bosnia in which readers could learn that in postwar Europe<br />
no significant amounts of ashes were found, whereas “six million Jews would have produced at<br />
least one hill of dross,” and further points out that these studies claim that at most 300,000 Jews died<br />
during World War II, mostly of typhus. Alispahić goes on to argue that “Jews . . . through the media<br />
industry of the Holocaust, especially film, are deceiving the world about their suffering, so that they<br />
can deny Zionist imperialism and crimes.” 97 Similarly, Bilal Bosnić has claimed that Jews are those<br />
who “create disorder on earth” and believe that “all are slaves, while they are the holy people.” 98<br />
At the Saudi-funded King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo, a focal point for Islamist extremists considered<br />
“a beehive of Al Qaeda activity,” 99 a German journalist reported on a sermon preached by<br />
one of Izetbegović’s wartime commanders, Nezim Halilović-Muderis:<br />
The obliteration of Israel is heralded in a torrent of words. “Zionist terrorists,” the<br />
imam thunders from the glass-enclosed pulpit at the end of the mosque. “Animals<br />
in human form” have transformed the Gaza Strip into a “concentration camp,”<br />
and this marks “the beginning of the end” for the Jewish pseudo-state. Over 4,000<br />
faithful are listening to the religious service in the King Fahd Mosque, named after<br />
the late Saudi Arabian monarch King Fahd Bin Abd al-Asis Al Saud. The women<br />
sit separately, screened off in the left wing of the building. It is the day of the Khutbah,<br />
the great Friday sermon, and the city where the imam has predicted Israel’s<br />
demise lies some 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) northwest of Gaza. It is a city in<br />
the heart of Europe: Sarajevo. 100<br />
Another radical Bosnian cleric, Muharem Štulanović, the<br />
dean of the Faculty of Islamic Pedagogy in Bihać, has offered<br />
the following views:<br />
Endorsing suicide terrorism:<br />
Gornja Maoča Wahhabi<br />
leader Nusret Imamović<br />
There are three foreign-political factors that play a role<br />
in creating BiH—America, the Jews, and the Shiites. As<br />
far as the Americans are concerned, everything is known.<br />
It is one of the main enemies of Muslims and Islam in<br />
the world. Furthermore, the Jews are the enemies of Islam,<br />
and enemy number one at that. And Judgment Day<br />
will not come, that is faithfully in the Hadis and it is<br />
true, without the Muslims completely winning. Judgment<br />
Day will not come, the conclusion of this world, until the<br />
Muslims begin a total battle against the Jews, and in that<br />
battle the Jews will be so defeated that they will hide be-<br />
13
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Two thumbs down: protests against the film “Innocence of Muslims” in Sarajevo (left), Novi Pazar (center),<br />
and Skopje (right), September 2012. The sign on the left reads:<br />
Death to the Film “Innocence of Muslims”<br />
Sam Bacile = Salman Rushdie = DEATH<br />
Israel = USA<br />
The Cause of the Death of the US Ambassador in Libya<br />
hind every tree and behind every rock. And every tree and every rock will say,<br />
“Oh, Muslim, Servant of God, here is a Jew, he has hidden behind me, come<br />
and kill him.”<br />
In Macedonia, another radical cleric, Bekir Halimi, who leads an “NGO” named Bamiresia, has<br />
given verbal support for attacks on synagogues. 101 The jihads in Iraq and Syria have given Balkan<br />
militant Islamists an opportunity to try to realize their ambitions; thus, as the Bosnian terrorist/Syrian<br />
jihad volunteer Bajro Ikanović explained in a recent interview, “The goal for all of us is death,<br />
especially in the battle against the Jews. Syria is not at all important to us. Our goal is Jerusalem.” 102<br />
Support for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda is frequently on evidence. In September 2012, a<br />
video surfaced of a group of Albanians in Macedonia gathered in a field singing<br />
Oh Osama, annihilate the American army.<br />
Oh Osama, raise the Muslims’ honor.<br />
In September 2001 you conquered a power.<br />
We all pray for you. 103<br />
U.S. military raids on Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in October-November 2001 turned up<br />
evidence that Balkan extremists had made it to Central Asia, as evident in a letter written by Damir<br />
Bajrami, a Kosovo native who suggested new targets of opportunity in western countries:<br />
I am interested in suicide operations. I have Kosovo Liberation Army combat experience<br />
against Serb and American forces. I need no further training. I recommend<br />
(suicide) operations against (amusement) parks like Disney. 104<br />
In a similar vein, the Bosnian Wahhabi Bilal Bosnić has posted a song on YouTube in which he sings<br />
The beautiful jihad has risen over Bosnia<br />
And the Bosnian started calling ‘Allah Akbar” and praying<br />
America had better know I am performing da’wa<br />
God willing, it will be destroyed to its foundations<br />
If you try to harm the mujahideen once more, oh infidels,<br />
Our Taliban brothers will come from all over,<br />
And they will sentence you with their swords.<br />
America and all the other tyrants had better know<br />
that all the Muslims are now like the Taliban,<br />
Jihad, Jihad, oh Allah, will be the redemption of the believers.<br />
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Allah Akbar. Allah is my Lord.<br />
Listen, all my brothers, believers from all the world,<br />
With explosives on our chests we pave the way to Paradise. 105<br />
The Next Generation?<br />
“Say: “Allah Akbar”<br />
My Greetings to Al-Baghdadi and his lions<br />
Sunna and the Quran, our state is victorious<br />
Send a message to the Crusaders in America,<br />
Your grave will be in Syria, our state is victorious<br />
The Islamic State is here to stay”<br />
----from the video clip “Bosnian Children<br />
with ISIS in Syria” (Source: MEMRI TV)<br />
The effects of such propaganda are already apparent.<br />
As early as 2005, security officials had discovered<br />
a European-wide network of Islamist extremists<br />
recruiting young Scandinavian Muslims as<br />
suicide-bombers and sending them to Bosnia, which<br />
would then be used “as a staging ground for attacks<br />
elsewhere in Europe.” 106 In March 2014, a Kosovo<br />
Islamist/Iraqi jihadi named Blerim Heta became “the<br />
Balkans’ first suicide bomber,” killing several dozen<br />
people in an attack in Baghdad. Heta’s family claimed<br />
his radicalization process started in April 2012 when<br />
he began attending sermons by the Kosovo imam<br />
Shefqet Krasniqi and the aforementioned Macedonian<br />
imam Bekir Halimi. 107 In August 2014, a Bosnian suicide-terrorist,<br />
Emrah Fojnica, killed 24 people in another<br />
Baghdad attack. 108 Fojnica had previously been<br />
arrested for accompanying Mevlid Jašarević on the<br />
day he attacked the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. 109<br />
Unfortunately, a number of factors suggest that<br />
the ideology of militant Islamism in southeastern Europe<br />
has the potential for further growth. First, radical<br />
Islamist states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to invest significant sums in the region,<br />
building mosques and madrasas in which more extreme interpretations of Islamic doctrine are<br />
taught, and expanding their influence through a variety of “NGOs” and “charities” (this latter topic<br />
will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections). Middle-Eastern funders have established<br />
some 25 madrasas (Islamic religious schools) in Bosnia through which some 2000 students have<br />
already passed, 110 and the Islamic faculties in Bihać and Zenica, built with generous donations from<br />
Saudi Arabia, promote the more extreme Salafi/Wahhabi interpretations of Islam. 111 In Kosovo,<br />
the Saudi Joint Committee for the Relief of Kosova and Chechnya (SJCRKC) has built a network<br />
of some 98 primary and secondary schools in Kosovo’s rural areas, which then feed students into<br />
thirty specialized Koranic schools built throughout the state. 112 Similarly, over the past twenty years<br />
dozens of new mosques and Wahhabi “teaching centers” funded by Middle-Eastern donors have<br />
been opened in Bulgaria, and number of which the government shut down in 2003 because of their<br />
ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremist groups. 113 Bulgarian security analysts have<br />
estimated that some 3000 youths have passed through these Wahhabi-funded educational centers in<br />
the past two decades. 114 Middle-Eastern donors have also been active in Montenegro; in April 2014,<br />
for instance, a Kuwaiti foundation, Rahma al-Alamiya, opened an all-female madrasa for 200 girls<br />
in the village of Miljes, near the Montenegrin capital of Podgorica. Another all-female madrasa,<br />
opened in 2001, operates in Rožaje. 115 This influx of Iranian, Saudi, and Turkish organizations in<br />
the region is promoting a view of state-society relations that are incompatible with the requirements<br />
of modern European democracies.<br />
The combination of this large new cohort of the indigenous population being educated in local<br />
institutions organized and funded by Middle-Eastern organizations, together with the large number<br />
of locally-born Islamic clerics who have studied in the Middle-East (including individuals such as<br />
Nedžad Balkan, Jusuf Barčić, Bilal Bosnić, Mustafa Cerić, Nezim Halilović-Muderis and Nusret<br />
Imamović) carries with it the danger of transforming what has usually been considered a “moderate<br />
Balkan Islam” into something more radical. Esad Hećimović, a leading expert on the Bosnian<br />
jihadi movement, has noted that “There is now a new generation of Islamic preachers in Bosnia<br />
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
who were educated after the war at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and other<br />
countries . . . Thus, it is no longer possible to distinguish between ‘imported’ and ‘local’ versions<br />
of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina anymore.” 116 In 2012, some seventy percent of the officials<br />
in the official Islamic Community in Bosnia were due either to retire or for their mandates to expire,<br />
to be replaced by “new people, many of them educated abroad, notably in Saudi Arabia.” 117<br />
A majority of the muftis in Bosnia have now been educated at Cairo’s Al Azhar Islamic university<br />
or other Islamic educational institutions in the Middle-East, where they were “exposed to Salafi<br />
teachings, schools of jurisprudence and lifestyles . . . Some of these imams [have] returned home<br />
with a hardened spirit and a politicized theocratic world-view, which they then tried to instill in<br />
their communities.” 118 Similarly, in Montenegro, observers have suggested that Middle-Eastern<br />
educated extremists were able to make inroads into some sections of the Montenegrin Muslim<br />
population because “Montenegro’s ‘poorly educated’ mainstream imams were at a disadvantage<br />
against aggressive and self-assured newcomers claiming to practice ‘true Islam’.” 119 The fact that a<br />
majority of Balkan Islamic clerics and scholars are now being educated in the Middle-East—where<br />
they are not only trained in more extreme forms of Islamic doctrine, but also developing various<br />
unsavory relationships and networks—is an exceptionally negative development which requires<br />
considerably more attention. Militant Islamism is also beginning to create explicitly political movements;<br />
for instance, in Kosovo in February 2013, a group of religious extremists formed a political<br />
party named the “Islamic Movement to Unite” (Albanian acronym: LISBA), which one observer<br />
called “the first Muslim fundamentalist party in the Balkans,” although as yet it gains negligible<br />
electoral support. 120<br />
Islamist roadside advertising: Bosnian-Australian extremist Adnan Karabegović’s banner over the Monash Freeway<br />
As noted above, a distinct minority of the Muslim populations in southeastern Europe can be<br />
said to be members of the militant Islamist movement in the region, or to subscribe to the beliefs it<br />
represents. A survey conducted in Bosnia in 2007 found that three percent of the population adhered<br />
to Wahhabism (perhaps some 50-60,000 people), out of an estimated Muslim population of approximately<br />
two million, while another ten percent identified with it in some form. 121 Current and former<br />
Bosnian Wahhabis, however, claim that the movement has many secret adherents. According to one<br />
former member, some forty percent of those adhering to the Wahhabi doctrine do not have the outward<br />
appearance of being Wahhabis. 122 Other former Bosnian Wahhabis have claimed that Wahhabi<br />
sympathizers have “infiltrated schools, universities, and the media.” 123 In Kosovo, security experts<br />
suggest about 50,000 people adhere to the more extreme Middle-Eastern forms of Islam, and are<br />
active in some thirty mosques around Kosovo. 124 One specialist on Balkan Islam has warned that “Exponents<br />
of Saudi-financed Wahhabism and of the Muslim Brotherhood have penetrated the highest<br />
levels of the official Kosovo Islamic apparatus,” 125 and one local expert has estimated that “the number<br />
of believers that follow a more extreme and fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran is growing<br />
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
in Kosovo.” 126 In Macedonia, the mufti of Skopje, Ibrahim Šabani, has estimated that there are some<br />
500-600 Wahhabis in the country (and possibly more), 127 while other security specialists believe up to<br />
3000 Wahhabis are active in Macedonia, mainly concentrated in areas around Skopje, Tetovo, Struga,<br />
and Kumanovo. 128 In Montenegro it is believed that there are “several hundred Wahhabis,” primarily<br />
located near the towns of Rožaje, Plav and Gusinje. 129 In the Sandžak, the International Crisis Group<br />
has estimated there are some 300 Wahhabis who control several mosques in the region, 130 and some<br />
local analysts have claimed that the leader of the Islamic Community in Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić,<br />
has close ties to the movement and receives funds from Wahhabi sources in Rome and Vienna. 131 (In<br />
September 2014, the mufti of Montenegro, Reis Rifat Fejzić, similarly accused the Sandžak Islamic<br />
organization of supporting the Wahhabi movement. 132 ) The growth of indigenous Balkan Islamist<br />
extremists is thus completing a circle in which natives are now taking the place of the foreign wave<br />
of extremists that moved into southeastern Europe in the 1990s; as one specialist on Al Qaeda in the<br />
Balkans has noted, in recent years there has been a substitution of foreign Islamist terrorists for “second<br />
generation” European Muslim converts and “Bosnian reverts.” 133<br />
As the preceding discussion suggests, there is some potential for militant Islamism to increase<br />
its influence in southeastern Europe over the coming years. Although it is highly unlikely that a<br />
majority of southeastern Europe’s Muslim populations would ever embrace the extreme forms<br />
of Islam found in the Middle-East and Central Asia, even relatively small-scale increases in the<br />
percentage of the population that adopts such views can do substantial damage to efforts to build<br />
stable multiethnic democracies in the region, and to western security interests in southeastern Europe.<br />
Moreover, as the Bosnian case shows, when historical circumstances have allowed militant<br />
Islamists to come to power and infiltrate various political and social institutions, the consequences<br />
are severe. As one long-time Izetbegović observer, Zlatko Dizdarević (the former head of Bosnia’s<br />
Helsinki Human Rights Committee) noted in 1999,<br />
there is an infinite amount of proof for the claim that in the case of Izetbegović we<br />
are talking about a consistent concept of life and politics which he has realized,<br />
from which he has not stepped back, and which he, in the end, has realized . . . today<br />
we are the victims of a consistent view of the world which has shown itself to<br />
be fundamentally conservative, anachronistic, and fundamentally unacceptable for<br />
modern politics and the modern way of life . . . when you today read that same text<br />
and know that behind it in these ten years has existed the possibility of realizing<br />
that platform with the support of something which is called the state, which are<br />
called institutions of that state, such as the army, the police, etc., that those things,<br />
which 10 or 30 years ago one could proclaim a citizen’s right to their own opinion,<br />
grows into something which has a different dimension . . . the Islamic Declaration<br />
has been realized. 134<br />
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
III. The Infrastructure of Militant Islamism in Southeastern Europe<br />
Over the past several years, the Balkans has emerged as a new<br />
battleground for militant Islamism. In June 2010, Islamist extremists<br />
bombed a police station in the central Bosnian town of Bugojno,<br />
killing one police officer and wounding six others. In February 2011,<br />
a Kosovo radical killed two US servicemen at Frankfurt Airport. In<br />
October 2011, a Sandžak Wahhabi attacked the US Embassy in Sarajevo.<br />
In April 2012, suspected Islamist extremists murdered five<br />
Macedonian citizens outside Skopje. In July 2012, Hezbollah operatives<br />
bombed a bus full of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria.<br />
In March 2013, a Hezbollah operative was discovered monitoring<br />
Israeli citizens in Cyprus. 135 (Hezbollah operatives are also known to<br />
have trained units of Izetbegović’s army). 136 In Kosovo in November<br />
2013, a terrorist cell composed of Syrian jihad volunteers was uncovered,<br />
and in September 2014, Albanian foreign minister Ditmir<br />
Bushati acknowledged that terrorist training camps for individuals<br />
joining the jihads in Iraq and Syria had emerged in Albania. 137<br />
As concerns grow about foreign jihad volunteers and the security<br />
threats they pose to their home countries if and when they return, 138<br />
one of the largest contingents of such foreign fighters come from the<br />
Balkans. According to one estimate, Bosnia has provided more Syrian<br />
jihad volunteers (per capita) than any other country in Europe, 139<br />
with several hundred citizens of Bosnia & Herzegovina now reported<br />
to be fighting in Syria, 140 along with a large number of Bosnian<br />
émigrés. 141 According to one report, thirty Bosnian veterans of the<br />
Syrian jihad have already returned to Bosnia, 142 and the Sarajevo<br />
newsmagazine Slobodna Bosna has reported there are thirty women<br />
“ Although Western intelligence<br />
agencies never<br />
labeled [the mujahedin<br />
activities] in Bosnia an<br />
al Qaeda jihad, it is now<br />
clear that is exactly what<br />
it was.”<br />
-----Former National Coordinator<br />
for Security,<br />
Infrastructure Protection,<br />
and Counter-Terrorism<br />
Richard A. Clarke<br />
alone from Bosnia who have joined the Iraqi and Syrian jihads. 143 Up to thirty individuals from the<br />
Sandžak have also joined the Iraqi and Syrian jihads, 144 and four Croatian women have become<br />
wives of ISIS jihadis. 145 Bosnia and Romania are also sources of weapons for the Iraqi and Syrian<br />
jihads, as the arrest of a Swedish imam-turned arms-procurer, Haythan Rahmeh, revealed. 146<br />
Joining this Bosnian, Croatian and Sandžak/Serbian volunteer jihad contingent is another large<br />
group of individuals from the southern Balkans. Up to 140 ethnic Albanians have been reported<br />
to be fighting alongside Islamist factions in Iraq and Syria, 147 with the Kosovo “Skenderaj”<br />
group alone reportedly providing some forty Syrian jihad volunteers. 148 A March 2014 study by<br />
the International Center for the Study of Radicalization estimates that some 300 individuals from<br />
Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia have joined the Iraqi and Syrian jihads. 149 Priština media have<br />
reported that some 30 individuals from Kosovo went to Syria in January 2014 alone, and that six<br />
Albanians have already died in the fighting there. 150 Several dozen individuals from Montenegro<br />
are also believed to have joined the Syrian jihad, 151 although Aida Skorupan, who has closely followed<br />
the Wahhabi movement in Montenegro, believes the number of Montenegrin volunteers is<br />
significantly higher than the estimate of thirty or so individuals usually used. 152 In September 2014,<br />
the CIA estimated that some 600-700 individuals from the Balkans had joined the jihads in Iraq<br />
and Syria. 153 Albanian security specialist Ilir Kulla has claimed that the number of jihad volunteers<br />
from the region could be “in the thousands” if one includes individuals from the Balkan diaspora. 154<br />
Bosnian-based extremists also recruit volunteers for the Iraqi and Syrian jihads in other countries as<br />
well; Bilal Bosnić, for instance, is reported to have recruited five Slovenian nationals to join ISIS, 155<br />
and Italian media have claimed Bosnić is the “headhunter for ISIS in Italy.” 156<br />
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Estimated Number of Balkan Jihadi Volunteers in Iraq and Syria<br />
(by country)<br />
Albania 140<br />
Bosnia 350<br />
Kosovo 150<br />
Macedonia 20<br />
Montenegro 30<br />
Serbia 3<br />
(Source: Central Intelligence Agency, September 2014)<br />
This cohort of Balkan jihad volunteers is largely drawn from pre-existing indigenous extremist<br />
groups already operating in southeastern Europe. In 2010, a Bosnian security official estimated that<br />
there are 3000 potential terrorists in Bosnia, 157 and a former Al Qaeda operative, the Bahraini-born<br />
Ali Hamad, claimed there are some 800 individuals in Bosnia of local origin making up a “white Al<br />
Qaeda”: i.e., people who can pass through security checks avoiding racial profiling. 158 In the immediate<br />
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, NATO officials suggested there was a “hardcore group” of some<br />
thirty individuals in Bosnia with direct links to international terrorism. 159 Bosnia has also become<br />
an important base of activity for security and intelligence services of various Islamist states; for<br />
instance, an estimate released in late 2014 suggested that Iran, Pakistan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia<br />
had some 1000 intelligence agents operating in Bosnia alone. 160<br />
In an interesting example of comparative rates of radicalization, one observer has noted<br />
that more individuals from the Balkans have joined the Iraqi and Syrian jihads than from<br />
Central Asia or the Caucasus. 161 By January 2014, the seriousness of the problem merited<br />
the dispatch of a large, multiagency U.S. government delegation (including individuals from<br />
the FBI, the NSA, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice) on a fact-finding<br />
mission to the region. 162<br />
The Balkan blowback from the Iraqi and Syrian jihads is already being felt. In November 2013,<br />
six suspected terrorists (two of whom are believed to have fought in Syria) were arrested in Kosovo<br />
on suspicion of plotting terrorist attacks using cell-phone activated explosive devices. The group<br />
was also believed to have been involved in an attack on two American Mormon missionaries in<br />
Priština on November 3 rd . 163 A group called “Xhemati i Xhehadit” subsequently warned police of<br />
“painful attacks” if their comrades were not released, claiming that “without doubt, we have people<br />
who love death more than you life in this world.” 164 The continuing threat from militant Islamist<br />
groups in the region was further on evidence in November 2013 when the largest illegal arms cache<br />
discovered in postwar Bosnia was found near the central Bosnian town of Tešanj, in the heart of<br />
territory where foreign mujahedin and their local allies operate. The weapons, which arrived in the<br />
area about 1999, included over five-hundred 84mm grenades for rocket-propelled grenade launchers,<br />
which local authorities claimed could be used for terrorist attacks or provided for use on other<br />
jihad fronts. 165 And the question intelligence agencies and security services now have to deal with<br />
is what happens when these people return home, as was the case, for instance when in December<br />
2013 German police arrested Kreshnik Berisha, an Islamic State fighter born in Germany from a<br />
Kosovo émigré family, at Frankfurt Airport. 166<br />
These have not been unexpected attacks and developments. Already in May 2007, a leading<br />
American observer of Balkan Islam had noted that “a visitor to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania,<br />
Kosovo, and Macedonia encountered unmistakable evidence that extremist intruders are opening<br />
a Balkan front in the global jihad,” 167 and in January 2010 Israeli officials warned that the Balkan<br />
region “is global jihad’s next destination for creating an infrastructure and recruiting activists.” 168<br />
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Indeed, over the past three<br />
decades militant Islamists in<br />
the the Balkans have created a<br />
sophisticated infrastructure consisting<br />
of four main componenets:<br />
1) local allies in political,<br />
security, and religious establishments;<br />
2) safe havens consisting<br />
of radical-controlled mosques<br />
and remote villages which provide<br />
militant Islamists places to<br />
recruit, organize, train and hide;<br />
3) NGO’s and financial institutions<br />
providing terrorists with<br />
cover identities and the ability<br />
to clandestinely transfer operational<br />
funds; and 4) various<br />
electronic and print media promoting<br />
their extremist ideology.<br />
Such complex, multi-faceted<br />
organization allows militant Islamist groups to sustain the occasional crackdown or arrest<br />
without substantial damage to their networks or infrastructure as a whole. 169<br />
Local Allies<br />
Left: Bosnia, “an excellent tactical base for espionage, fundraising,<br />
and terrorist activities . . . a major center for terrorist recruitment<br />
and fundraising. . . a place where recruits could train, coalesce into<br />
cells, and seek shelter from prosecution by foreign law enforcement.”<br />
right: the “fundamentalist triangle” in the Balkans (source: Repubblica<br />
(Rome).<br />
The existence of an indigenous cadre Balkan militant Islamists made it relatively easy for Al<br />
Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups to implant themselves in Bosnia and extend their operations<br />
throughout Europe in the 1990s. Estimates of the number of non-indigenous mujahedin who<br />
moved to Bosnia during this period range from several hundred to six thousand. 170 After the Soviets<br />
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Bosnia, according to one study, became “[a] new refuge,<br />
close to both the heart of Europe and the Middle East . . . an excellent tactical base for espionage,<br />
fundraising, and terrorist activities . . . a major center for terrorist recruitment and fundraising. . . a<br />
place where recruits could train, coalesce into cells, and seek shelter from prosecution by foreign<br />
law enforcement.” 171 Along similar lines, as Douglas Farah has noted,<br />
It is often forgotten<br />
that Bosnia played an<br />
extremely significant<br />
role in the formation of<br />
al Qaeda, and that the<br />
infrastructure established<br />
during that war<br />
was never eradicated.<br />
Al Qaeda and other<br />
Salafist groups used<br />
Bosnia as a training<br />
ground, a financial center,<br />
a weapons storage<br />
site and a money laundering<br />
center. 172<br />
Map depicting the origin and approximate numbers of foreign mudžahedin<br />
moving into Bosnia between 1992-1995 (source: Oluic, 2008)<br />
Other analyses provide similar<br />
conclusions; thus, by 2004<br />
one report noted that “Bosnia<br />
is well-known in intelligence<br />
circles as a major center of Al<br />
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Jihad is a family affair: from left: Bosnian jihad veteran (and Osama bin Laden son-in-law) Sulaiman abu-<br />
Ghaith (source: Al Jazeera); Bosnian jihad veteran (and Osama bin Laden cousin) Abu Zubair al-Madani;<br />
Bosnian jihad veteran (and Osama bin Laden bodyguard) Nasser Ahmed Al-Bahri, a.k.a., “the Father of<br />
Death”; Bosnian jihad veteran (and Osama bin Laden bodyguard) Khalid al-Juhani, involved in the May<br />
2003 Riyadh bombings<br />
Qaeda activity. The Americans believe that Bosnia had become the pipeline for Al Qaeda volunteers<br />
who wanted to join up with the resistance in Iraq,” 173 and the former NATO commander in<br />
Bosnia, U.S. Army Major General Virgil Packett, claimed that “Bosnia [had] moved from being<br />
a sanctuary for terrorism to a gateway for terrorism.” 174 Other concurrent studies suggested that<br />
Bosnia had become a command and control center for various groups of regional militants due to<br />
the existence of an extensive network of individuals sympathetic to the militant Islamist cause. 175<br />
Increasing the threat and capacity of Balkan militant Islamists is the support and cooperation<br />
they receive from local authorities sympathetic to their cause. In February 1996, NATO forces<br />
raided an Iranian-operated terrorist training camp in Bosnia where they found plans to NATO installations,<br />
booby-trapped children’s toys, and essays on how to assassinate political opponents and<br />
critical journalists. The camp’s director was the personal intelligence advisor to Alija Izetbegović<br />
(this event is described in more detail in section IV). 176 Alija Izetbegović’s son Bakir (currently a<br />
member of the Bosnian state presidency) has admitted to personally being in touch with leading<br />
mujahedin figures in Bosnia such as Imad al-Husin, a.k.a Abu Hamza. 177 The younger Izetbegović<br />
was also reportedly caught trying to sell surface-to-air missiles to Al Qaeda in Iraq, for which<br />
American officials threatened him with a trip to Guantanamo. 178 A Saudi terrorist named Ahmed<br />
Zuhair, a.k.a. Abu Hanzala, wanted in connection with the September 1997 Mostar Car bombing<br />
and the November 1995 murder of U.S. citizen William Jefferson near Tuzla, was revealed to<br />
have been hiding at one point in the apartment of the Travnik chief of police (American intelligence<br />
ultimately captured Zuhair in Pakistan and transferred him to Guantanamo). 179 Ali Hamad, a<br />
Bahraini-born Al Qaeda operative, has claimed that “from the political and military leadership in<br />
Sarajevo at the time we received the highest privileges and immunity from the police,” 180 and that<br />
Al Qaeda figures would visit Bosnia with “state protection.” 181<br />
Local allies also provide<br />
international jihadis with new<br />
identities allowing them to<br />
travel and conduct operations<br />
around the world. A secret report<br />
prepared for the Clinton<br />
Administration in late 2000<br />
“shocked everyone” when the<br />
scale on which the Izetbegović<br />
regime had provided travel<br />
documents to international<br />
extremists was revealed. 182 By<br />
one count some 12,000 Bosnian<br />
passports were distributed<br />
to international jihadis, 183 and<br />
both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia<br />
Al Qaeda co-founder and U.S. African Embassy attacks plotter<br />
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, visited Bosnia three months prior to the<br />
bombings on a “business trip”<br />
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
March 2004 Madrid Train Bombing conspiracy: on left: bombing ringleader Serhane bin Abdulmajid<br />
Fakhet; middle: Amer Azizi, received explosives training in Zenica (Bosnia); on right, Fakhet’s Bosnian<br />
roommate Sanel Sjekirica. Although Sjekirica had previously been under suspicion by Spanish authorities<br />
of involvement in Islamic extremist activities, he was ultimately cleared of personal involvement in the attacks.<br />
Sources: El Pais (Madrid), El Mundo (Madrid)<br />
accused the Izetbegović regime of giving Bosnian passports to known terrorists. 184 The distribution<br />
of new identities to international terrorists proved a useful way for the Izetbegović regime to evade<br />
provisions in the Dayton Peace Accords which required foreign fighters to be expelled from the<br />
country; thus, as security expert Evan Kohlmanm has noted,<br />
The Dayton Accords had specifically mandated that the Bosnian government expel<br />
soldiers who were not of ‘local origin.’ In order to evade this provision, Izetbegović’s<br />
regime simply issued thousands of BiH passports, birth certificates, and other<br />
official paperwork to various members of the foreign [mujahedin] battalion . . .<br />
. many of the most dangerous ones . . . were protected by religious and political<br />
hardliners at the most senior levels of the Bosnian government, and thus were able<br />
to easily ‘melt into’ mainstream Bosnian society. 185<br />
Osama bin Laden himself was the owner of a Bosnian passport, 186 and Western reporters even saw<br />
him Izetbegović’s office during the war. 187 According to Abdel Bari Atwan, bin Laden visited mujahedin<br />
camps in Bosnia three times between 1994-96, and Ayman al-Zawahiri took personal charge Al<br />
Qaeda’s efforts in Bosnia. 188 bin Laden bodyguard Nasser Abdel al-Bahri, a.k.a. “the Father of Death”<br />
was also a Bosnian jihad veteran, as was bin Laden’s son-in-law, Sulaiman abu Ghaith. 189 In the<br />
1990s, Al Qaeda operative Safet Abid Catovic was given cover as a diplomat at Bosnia’s UN Mission<br />
in New York. 190 In 1998, three months before the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam<br />
and Nairobi, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, the<br />
mastermind of the attacks, visited Bosnia on a<br />
“business trip” on a visa issued to him by the<br />
Bosnian consulate in Ankara. 191 In September<br />
1999, Turkish police arrested Mahrez Auduni<br />
(at the time considered one of bin Laden’s top<br />
aides) traveling on a Bosnian passport. 192 As<br />
late as March 2014, the chairman of the security<br />
committee in Izetbegović’s Islamist party<br />
was a man on the U.S. government’s Specially<br />
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons<br />
List, and otherwise widely considered to be a<br />
leading Iranian agent in Bosnia. 193<br />
Balkan Bases<br />
In remote, isolated villages around the<br />
Balkans militant Islamists have developed a<br />
Bosnian jihad veteran Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri, operational<br />
commander and mastermind of the October<br />
2000 attack on the USS Cole. The two actual<br />
suicide-bombers themselves, Ibrahim al-Thawar and<br />
Hassan al-Khamiri, also spent time in Bosnia<br />
22
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
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Facsimile of a Central Bosnia Canton Interior<br />
Ministry police directive to end all investigations<br />
of “individuals, groups and organizations<br />
which could be connected with the so-called<br />
‘Wahhabi movement’.” Issued after a wave<br />
of violence against Croat returnees in Central<br />
Bosnia (source: Bosnian Federation TV)<br />
network of extra-territorial, sharia-run enclaves that<br />
serve as recruiting stations for local converts and safe<br />
havens for jihadis from around the world. Bulgaria’s<br />
former chief mufti, Nedim Gendzhev, claims that<br />
extremists are trying to create a “fundamentalist triangle”<br />
formed by Bosnia, Macedonia and Bulgaria’s<br />
Western Rhodope mountain range. 194 Adding to concerns<br />
about the threat militant Islamist groups in the<br />
region pose is their often strategic choice in establishing<br />
outposts and bases. According to a 2014 Austrian<br />
intelligence report, for instance, the milieu in which<br />
militant Islamism in southeastern Europe flourishes,<br />
the Wahhabi movement, continues to grow and build<br />
new communities, 195 one example of which can be<br />
seen in the northwestern Bosnian village of Bosanska<br />
Bojna (near Velika Kladuša), where Wahhabis have<br />
begun establishing a new settlement only a few dozen<br />
meters from the Croatian border, making it an ideal<br />
base for smuggling individuals and other contraband<br />
into and out of the EU. 196<br />
In remote Bosnian villages such as Bočinja Donja, inhabited by some 600 people, extremists live<br />
“separate lives untroubled by local police, tax-collectors or any other authorities. Outsiders never set<br />
foot in the small community.” 197 Bočinja Donja has been associated with numerous international terrorists,<br />
including Karim Said Atmani, the document forger for the Millenium Bomb plot. After wouldbe<br />
LAX bomber Ahmed Ressam was arrested on the U.S.-Canadian border in December 1999, U.S.<br />
officials tried to track down his former roommate, Atmani, who was known to be traveling between<br />
Sarajevo and Istanbul. Bosnian officials denied that Atmani had ever been there; however, investigators<br />
later learned that Atmani had been issued a Bosnian passport six months earlier 198 ); Khalil Deek,<br />
arrested in December 1999 for his involvement in a plot to blow up Jordanian tourist sites; and Omar<br />
Saeed Sheikh, involved in the murder/beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, 199 were<br />
there as well, and Al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al Zawahiri, also is known to have visited<br />
the village in 1997 200 and spent much of the 1990s in nearby Bulgaria.<br />
Left: Bosnian-Swedish extremist Mirsad Bektašević, arrested in 2005 for plotting<br />
suicide-bombing attacks against Western embassies in Sarajevo. Bektašević reportedly<br />
served as an internet recruiter for Iraqi insurgency leader Abu Musab<br />
al-Zarqawi (center). Right: Abu Amas al-Shami, Zarqawi’s second-in-command,<br />
killed in a U.S. missile strike in Iraq in 2004. al-Shami spent considerable time<br />
in Bosnia in the 1990s. U.S. officials believed Bosnia served “as a pipeline for Al<br />
Qaeda volunteers who want to join the Iraqi resistance.”<br />
23
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Left: Bočinja Donja (Bosnia) resident Karim Said Atmani, document forger for the<br />
LAX Millenium Bomb Plot conspirators; center: would-be shoe-bomber Saajid Badat,<br />
trained in terrorist camps in Bosnia in 1998; right: Bosnian jihad veteran and<br />
Al Qaeda explosives expert Tarik Mahmud Ahmad, spent 1992-1999 in Bosnia. The<br />
Egyptian-born Ahmad, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood who also had<br />
Bosnian citizenship, specialized in developing IED’s intended for use against U.S. forces<br />
and commercial airliners. Ahmad also created a prototype shoe-bomb for Al Qaeda.<br />
Ahmad provided U.S. interrogators substantial intelligence on the ARBiH 3rd Corps’<br />
activities and ties to terrorist groups. After leaving Bosnia he ran an explosives curriculum<br />
at the Abu Ubaydah Camp in Afghanistan<br />
Another Bosnian village, Gornja Maoča, was formerly the headquarters of Bosnia’s main Wahhabi<br />
leader, Nusret Imamović, whom the U.S. State Department in September 2014 designated one<br />
of ten “global terrorists.” According to a former resident of Gornja Maoča, members of the community<br />
who know Arabic regularly inform members about news and information from Al Qaeda<br />
websites, and some residents claim to personally know the editor of Inspire (Al Qaeda’s online<br />
publication). Large weapons caches have been discovered in forests surrounding the village, 201 and<br />
the village has frequently been used as a way station for extremists joining jihads in Chechnya, Afghanistan,<br />
and Yemen. In October 2011, the Sandžak Wahhabi Mevlid Jašarević left the village on<br />
the day he attacked the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. One of his companions that day, Emrah Fojnica,<br />
died in a suicide-bombing in Iraq in August 2014. 202 Another visitor to Gornja Maoča was Edis<br />
Bosnić, a Bosnian émigré living in Jacksonville, Florida,<br />
who was arrested in the village in February 2010.<br />
Bosnić had maintained contact with Adis Medunjanin,<br />
another Bosnian émigré living in New York City who<br />
was arrested for his involvement in the plot to blow up<br />
the New York City subway system. 203 Another Wahhabi<br />
outpost in Bosnia is Bužim (near Bihać) in northwestern<br />
Bosnia, home to Bilal Bosnić, known for his YouTube<br />
spots supporting suicide bombings, glorifying the Taliban,<br />
and various anti-Semitic rants.<br />
In these remote Islamist-controlled areas, under the<br />
guise of “youth camps,” former mujahedin take young<br />
people into the local hills and forests where they are given<br />
military training and give the new cadres the chance to<br />
build relationships needed to sustain extremist networks.<br />
The camps are intentionally non-permanent, making it<br />
more difficult for security officials to track them. 204 The<br />
training regimens typically last 6-7 weeks, and involve intensive<br />
religious indoctrination and other activities, such<br />
October 2011: Sandžak Wahhabi<br />
Mevlid Jašarević attacking the U.S.<br />
Embassy in Sarajevo. The attack merited<br />
mention in paragraph 88 (out of 98)<br />
in the OHR’s semi-annual report to the<br />
UN Secretary-General<br />
24
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Enjoy visa-free travel throughout Europe: jihad<br />
volunteer showing off his Bosnian passport and<br />
“Islamic State” identity card (Source: VijestiUmmeta.com)<br />
as watching videos of jihads in Afghanistan and<br />
Iraq. 205 Between 1992 and 1995 alone, some<br />
2000 people are believed to have undergone<br />
“religious training” at just one such camp, run<br />
by Egyptian-born Imad al-Misri. 206 In March<br />
2007, Serbian police raided one such camp in<br />
the mountainous Sandžak region straddling the<br />
border between Serbia and Montenegro, arresting<br />
a number of individuals and seizing weapons,<br />
explosives, and food stocks. 207 The group<br />
was allegedly planning to attack western embassies<br />
in Belgrade. In March 2008, several remote<br />
mountain cottages were discovered in central<br />
Bosnia where military equipment was stored<br />
and evidence suggested military-style exercises<br />
had been held. The cottages were discovered after<br />
a map was found in the Sarajevo apartment of<br />
Rijad Rustempašić, called by police “one of the<br />
most notorious and most violent radical Bosnian<br />
Muslims.” 208 Would be shoe-bomber Saajid Badat trained in just such a Bosnian terrorist training camp<br />
in 1998. 209 Similarly, in July 2013 a raid near the village of Kalošević, close to the central Bosnian town<br />
of Tešanj, uncovered the largest stash of undeclared weaponry and explosives found since the end of the<br />
Bosnian war, including over 500 rocket-propelled grenades. Local inhabitants of the village claimed the<br />
arms and ammunition were hidden there on the order of a high-ranking member of Izetbegović’s party<br />
Bosnian media cite as one of the main local liaisons with Al Qaeda operatives in the country. 210<br />
Throughout the western and southern Balkans, extremist-led mosques also serve as bases for militant<br />
Islamists. The Saudi-funded King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Center in Sarajevo has been called<br />
“the epicenter of the spreading of radical ideas” in Bosnia, 211 which for a number of years functioned<br />
autonomously under the direct supervision of the Saudi embassy in Bosnia. In 2003, the CIA attempted<br />
to infiltrate the King Fahd mosque’s Al Qaeda cells with a Pakistani double agent, Abdulrahman Khadr,<br />
the son of a prominent Al Qaeda official. The success of the effort remains unclear. 212 The White Mosque<br />
in Sarajevo is the headquarters of Sulejman Bugari, a Kosovo Albanian-born imam whom some reports<br />
have described as a go-between and point-of-contact for Albanian and Bosnian extremists. 213 In Kosovo,<br />
the Makowitz mosque on the outskirts of Priština and the Mitrovica mosque are reportedly recruiting<br />
militants to fight alongside Islamist groups in Iraq and Syria. 214 In Macedonia,<br />
Wahhabi extremists have taken control of four mosques in Skopje, and are active<br />
in western parts of the country as well. 215<br />
Some of the most violent elements in the Balkan Islamist movement are<br />
headquartered outside the region. For instance, the Sandžak extremist Nedžad<br />
Balkan, considered a leader in the Takfiri movement in both Bosnia and Serbia,<br />
has established himself in the Sahaba Mosque in Vienna’s 7 th Bezirk, 216<br />
while another prominent Bosnian militant Islamist, Muhamed Porča, is based<br />
in Vienna’s al-Tawhid mosque, frequented by Asim Cejvanović, the Bosnian<br />
émigré who attacked the US embassy in Vienna in October 2002.<br />
Throughout the Balkans, prisons also serve as recruiting grounds for<br />
militant Islamists; in Zenica prison in Bosnia, for instance, militant Islamists<br />
such as Abu Hamza have established cells that recruit and indoctrinate<br />
inmates, as a result of which, as one security expert noted, “they come out<br />
of prison as professionals, ready to do terrorist acts.” 217 Militant Islamists<br />
have also taken advantage of young people afflicted by drug addiction; in<br />
one example, the International Crisis Group has reported how the imam of<br />
An excerpt from Al<br />
Qaeda’s donor’s<br />
list, the “Golden<br />
Chain,” discovered<br />
in Sarajevo,<br />
March 2002<br />
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Bosnian jihad veterans Azad Ekinci (left) and Habib Aktaş (middle), involved in the November 2003 Istanbul bombings<br />
Sarajevo’s Vratnik White Mosque runs a program which brings drug-addicted young people from<br />
Sandžak to a “rehabilitation center” in Sarajevo, whereupon “when the former addicts return, almost<br />
all sport Wahhabi beards and dress and appear to adhere to a fundamentalist form of Islam.” 218<br />
NGOs and Financial Institutions<br />
Militant Islamists support their efforts in southeastern Europe through a network of “NGO’s,”<br />
“charities” and “humanitarian aid” organizations, often funded by known Al Qaeda financial donors.<br />
The CIA has estimated that one third of the Bosnian NGO’s operating worldwide have terrorist<br />
connections or employ people with terrorist links. 219 During the Bosnian jihad, various NGO’s<br />
with known ties to Al Qaeda funneled several hundreds of millions of dollars to Izetbegović’s war<br />
effort, 220 and U.S.-based “charities” with close ties to Osama bin Laden, such as Care International,<br />
Inc., received checks with memo lines reading “Bosnia mujahedin,” “for jihad only,” and “Chechen<br />
Muslim fighters.” 221 Of the estimated $800 million the Saudis alone gave to Bosnia after Dayton,<br />
some $100 million is untraceable, lost in a maze of Al Qaeda front organizations funding terror<br />
activities worldwide. 222 In the aftermath of 9/11, a raid in Sarajevo on just such a “charity,” the<br />
Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia, netted “maps of Washington, material for making false<br />
State Department identity cards and anti-American manuals designed for children.” 223 (The Saudi<br />
High Commission for Aid to Bosnia has been named as a defendant in the lawsuit brought by 9/11<br />
victims and families in U.S. federal court.) Also found in Sarajevo in March 2002 was Al Qaeda’s<br />
donor’s list, the so-called “Golden Chain.”<br />
Among the Al Qaeda-linked organizations working in the Balkans have been the Benevolence<br />
International Foundation (which had offices and personnel in Chicago), the “Taibah Foundation,”<br />
Osama bin Laden bodyguard recruiter and Bosnian jihad veteran Abdu Ali Sharqawi; right: Bosnian jihad veteran<br />
Zuri-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, ‘mastermind’ of the November 2008 Mumbai bombings<br />
26
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Left: Bosnian terrorist Adis Medunjanin, involved in the January 2010 plot to blow up the NYC subway<br />
system, described by US Attorney General Eric Holder as “the most serious threat against the US homeland<br />
since 9/11” Medunjanin earned a spot on CNN’s Top Terror Takedowns of 2012; center: Medunjanin’s co-indictee<br />
Adnan Shukrijumah, considered Al Qaeda’s head of external operations, killed in a raid in Pakistan’s<br />
south Waziristan tribal areas in December 2014; right: Kosovo extremist Arid Uka, murdered two US servicemen<br />
at Frankfurt Airport in February 2011<br />
the “Global Relief Foundation,” which operated in Bosnia and Kosovo, and al Haramain, which<br />
was active in Albania. 224 The Turkish-based IHH (the “Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms<br />
and Humanitarian Relief,” or Insani Yardim Vakfi in Turkish) which was involved in the Mavi<br />
Marmara incident off the Israeli coast in May 2010, began its activities in Bosnia in the 1990s.<br />
In June 2010, Turkish authorities began an investigation of the group’s founder, Bűlent Yildirim,<br />
for funding Al Qaeda. 225 Although impossible to verify independently, the Iranian news agency<br />
Farsnews has claimed that IHH had recruited 769 Albanians (as of August 2013) to join the “Free<br />
Syrian Army.” Of those, Farsnews claimed that 450 had defected and gone on to join the Al Nusra<br />
front. 226 In Kosovo, a leading political analyst, Ilir Deda, has claimed that Middle-Eastern “charities”<br />
invested some $800 million there between 1999-2010. 227<br />
Bosnian citizen/Bosnian passport<br />
holder Abu Zubaydah, one<br />
of bin Laden’s top lieutenants, in<br />
charge of maintaining contacts<br />
with other terrorist organizations<br />
and admissions to terrorist<br />
training camps in Afghanistan<br />
The lack of transparency in many Middle-Eastern-based banking institutions makes it extremely<br />
difficult to track the flow of monies to militant groups in the region. 228 Monies donated<br />
for legitimate charitable purposes often get siphoned off and<br />
used to support weapons purchases or to provide support for<br />
families of imprisoned or killed jihadis. Members of the Al<br />
Qaeda cell in Albania, for instance, working under the cover<br />
of various Middle-East based charities (such as the Islamic<br />
Revival Foundation, an organization with alleged ties to Bin<br />
Laden), were required to contribute 26 percent of their salaries<br />
to support the global jihad; one such individual claimed that<br />
he diverted $800 per month (from funds intended for Albanian<br />
orphans) for such purposes. Monies provided from such sources<br />
have also financed political asylum applications in western<br />
countries, helping militants establish terrorist cells in Europe<br />
and the U.S. The Islamic Revival Foundation ran an “educational<br />
institute” in the Albanian town of Elbasan, consisting of<br />
four buildings, surrounded by a high wall topped with barbed<br />
wire. 229 By 2010, the Albanian government had seized and confiscated<br />
some $7.5 million (USD) in assets from two individuals<br />
and thirteen foundations believed implicated in terrorist<br />
finance. 230 In Macedonia, U.S. officials have alleged that the<br />
NGO “Bamiresia,” run by radical cleric Bekir Halimi, was<br />
involved in a variety of schemes laundering Middle-Eastern<br />
27
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
money in the region. Among other things, Halimi’s students received funds from Al-Waqf<br />
Al-Islamiya, an organization known for providing funds for individuals who want to go on<br />
jihad. 231 As usual, money buys influence; thus, in Kosovo Stephen Schwartz has claimed that<br />
“a Saudi-based Wahhabi group operating in Western Europe exercises alarming financial influence<br />
over the highest Kosovo Islamic leadership.” 232 Islamist NGO’s and humanitarian groups<br />
also finance sending school-age children to study in countries such as Egypt, Libya, Saudi<br />
Arabia and Syria where they are indoctrinated in extreme forms of Islam. 233<br />
Militant Media and Propaganda<br />
Militant Islamists in the Balkans have developed an extensive array and network of print periodicals,<br />
bookstores, websites, and YouTube spots spreading religious intolerance, glorifications<br />
of violence, and anti-American, anti-Semitic, anti-democratic messages. Islamic bookstores from<br />
Belgrade to Novi Pazar distribute tracts by Islamist extremists such as Yussuf Qaradawi and Sayyib<br />
Qutb. Websites such as the “Way of the Believer” (putvjernika.com), “Way of Islam” (stazomislama.com),<br />
Ensarije Serijata (“Partisans of Sharia” http://www.geocities.ws/ensarije_seriata/index-2.html),<br />
“Saved Community” (spasenaskupina.com, affiliated with Bilal Bosnić), “News of the<br />
Community“ (vijestiummeta.com), and the Sandžak Wahhabi website kelimetul-haqq.org promote<br />
jihad, suicide bombings, and the killing of non-Muslims. 234 These websites also relay news from<br />
other jihadi fronts, sermons by extremist preachers from the Middle-East, and messages from Al<br />
Qaeda leaders; for instance, the PutVjernika website recently carried “A New Order from Zawahiri:<br />
Focus on Attacks on American Interests.” 235 Militant Islamist extremist networks also use videos of<br />
snipers killing American soldiers in Iraq to recruit new volunteers for the Iraq jihad. 236 According to<br />
Fahrudin Kladicanin, the co-author of a recent study on Balkan extremists’ use of the internet and<br />
social media, “The number of those who are ‘liking,’ making comments and sharing the content<br />
of these pages, especially when it comes to religious leaders, extreme Islamists and Wahhabists,<br />
is rising on a daily basis.” The Facebook profiles of almost all such extremist leaders have over<br />
5,000 “friends” and even more “likes.” 237 In October 2014, the Islamist extremist website Vijesti<br />
Ummeta claimed that in one 24-hour period 110,905 unique readers visited their website, 238 and the<br />
aforementioned radical imam from Kosovo Shefqet Krasniqi reportedly gets more YouTube hits<br />
than any Kosovo politician. 239 The Facebook page Krenaria Islame (Albanian for “Islamic Pride”),<br />
which posts pictures and stories of Albanians fighting in Syria, has 2,500 followers. According to<br />
“A New Order from Zawahiri: Focus Your Attacks on American Interests.” From the Put-<br />
Vjernika website (posted on 12 October 2013). maintained by Bosnian extremists in Gornja<br />
Maoča. Note that southeastern Europe is claimed as part of Al Qaeda’s proposed Caliphate<br />
28
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Bosnian-extremist website Put hilafeta (“Way of the Caliphate”); the title reads “A<br />
Message to Obama: We Will Attack You in Your Country!” (posted on 30 September 2014)<br />
the Tirana-based security expert Arjan Dyrmishi, “If all the followers of this page were identified as<br />
terrorists, they would make a small army and pose a major problem. Such a large number of followers<br />
would pose a concern, even if these people were to be identified only as supporters of political<br />
Islam.” 240 As of mid-October 2014, Vijesti Ummeta had 13,551 Facebook fans, and Saff had 12,352.<br />
The Albanian-language website ligjerataislame.com, which posts sermons by the extremist imam<br />
Bekir Halimi, had 20,763 likes. An October 2014 YouTube search of the “SalafiMedia Balkan”<br />
channel returned 943 results.<br />
Evidence of the increasing technological sophistication of Balkan militant Islamists have been<br />
recent episodes in which they have engaged in low-level cyber-warfare. An extremist from the central<br />
Bosnian town of Bugojno, Haris Čaušević (suspected of involvement in the June 2010 bombing<br />
of a police station in Bugojno in which one police officer was killed) was accused of hacking several<br />
government websites, 241 and in Kosovo in August 2009, the website of the newspaper Express,<br />
which had run articles critical of militant Islamists in Kosovo, was hacked, with the culprits imposing<br />
an Al Qaeda flag on the website and various threats in Albanian and English. 242<br />
The Sarajevo-based extremist publication Saff was originally founded by indigenous Bosnian<br />
members of the Al Qaeda unit in the Bosnian jihad (the El Mujahedin brigade), who formed an organization<br />
called Aktivna Islamska Omladina (“Active Islamic Youth,” local acronym, AIO). According<br />
to the U.S. State Department, the AIO spreads extremist views and has links with radical groups in<br />
Western Europe and the U.S. 243 Saff is available in both print and an online electronic version which<br />
the State Department has described as anti-American and tending towards extremism. AIO has also<br />
established itself in various cities and towns in Macedonia. 244 A Wahhabi TV channel in Kosovo,<br />
ironically called “Peace TV,” established by the radical preacher Zahir Naik, “insults . . . in aggressive<br />
terms, spiritual Sufis, Shia Muslims, non-fundamentalist Sunnis, Jews, Christians, and Hindus,<br />
among others.” In his sermons Naik has praised Osama bin Laden and supported terrorism. 245<br />
29
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
IV. Iran in the Balkans<br />
A major concern amongst Western security officials over the past two decades has been containing<br />
Iranian influence in southeastern Europe, particularly in Bosnia. This concern has increased in<br />
recent years as the possibility of military conflict over Iran’s nuclear program has grown, raising fears<br />
Iran or its allies such as Hezbollah could retaliate to such an attack by launching counter-strikes outside<br />
the Middle-East. When a suspected Hezbollah suicide-bomber attacked a bus in Burgas, Bulgaria<br />
in July 2012, killing six Israeli tourists, it confirmed to many observers that southeastern Europe was<br />
indeed a potential front for Iran or its proxies in any future conflict.<br />
Western concern over the possibility that pro-Iranian Islamist factions in southeastern Europe<br />
could cause serious problems for Western interests in the event of military conflict with Tehran has<br />
increased in recent years. In the first six months of 2012 alone, 200 Iranian “businessmen” were<br />
granted visas to enter Bosnia. More ominously, an Iranian diplomat known to have been in Georgia,<br />
Thailand and India (all countries in which there have been terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens)<br />
has now been stationed in Bosnia. 246 In August 2012, the American and British ambassadors to<br />
Sarajevo privately warned Bosnian officials to cut their ties to Iran, 247 and a former international<br />
high representative in Bosnia publicly told the Bosnians that their future lay with the EU, not with<br />
Iran. 248 More ominously, in September 2012 a Sarajevo newspaper claimed that pro-Iranian factions<br />
in the Bosnian government were re-activating para-intelligence cells leftover from the time<br />
Alija Izetbegovic. 249<br />
In 2014 Tehran again began intensifying its espionage efforts in Bosnia. Iranian agents were reported<br />
to be making contacts with Bosnian “NGO’s” with known extremists ties, and meeting with<br />
individuals from the Wahhabi village of Gornja Maoća. A high-ranking MOIS official, Abolghazem<br />
Parhizkar, made two trips to Bosnia in 2014, and other Iranian agents have been observed shuttling<br />
between Istanbul, Sarajevo, and Vienna on a frequent basis. By this time, it was believed that Iran,<br />
Pakistan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had some 1000 intelligence agents operating in Bosnia. 250<br />
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Izetbegović and his colleagues had been inspired and encouraged<br />
by the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran. Several of Izetbegović’s closest<br />
collaborators at the time secretly went to Iran in January 1982 to attend anniversary celebrations<br />
marking the establishment of the Islamic Republic, and to attend a congress aimed at the reunification<br />
of Sunni and Shia’ Islam. 251 These activities, together with the views promoted in the Islamic<br />
Declaration, earned Izetbegović a second prison term in 1983 in a trial in which a dozen other<br />
Bosnian Islamists were also sentenced. The indictees of the 1983 trials would in 1990 form the<br />
core of Izetbegović’s newly-formed political party, the SDA. One of those tried with Izetbegović at<br />
this time, Omer Behmen, was in 1992 entrusted with the job of becoming the Izetbegović regime’s<br />
ambassador to Tehran. 252 Another 1983 trial indictee, Hasan Čengić, would in the 1990s be widely<br />
seen as the leading Iranian agent in Bosnia. (According to the former chief of the CIA’s unit for<br />
tracking Osama bin Laden, Michael Scheuer, Čengić was one of the agency’s top surveillance targets<br />
in Europe in the 1990s.) 253 Iranian influence in the former Yugoslavia was also spread at this<br />
time by educational exchanges in which several hundred<br />
Yugoslav Muslim students were sent to study in<br />
Iranian institutions. By 1989, there were a reported<br />
606 Iranian nationals in Yugoslavia. 254<br />
The Bosnian war in 1992 opened the doors for<br />
Iran to exponentially increase its influence in Bosnia.<br />
Iran was one of the first Islamic countries to provide<br />
support to the Izetbegović regime, and within a few<br />
weeks of the outbreak of fighting UN peacekeepers<br />
were already reporting the arrival of Iranian forces<br />
in Bosnia. 255 Moreover, with the tacit approval of the<br />
Clinton Administration the Iranians provided Izet-<br />
Bakir Izetbegović with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,<br />
Cairo, February 2013<br />
30
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
begovic’s war effort with considerable military, intelligence, and logistical<br />
support. Throughout this period, the Iranians developed an extensive<br />
intelligence network throughout the territory and in the various institutions<br />
controlled by Izetbegović’s forces, running a well-developed ring<br />
of “charities” in cities such as Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, Bihac, and Visoko.<br />
256 The Iranians also initiated an intensive training program for Bosnian<br />
intelligence and security officials during this time. 257 The importance<br />
of Bosnia in Iranian plans was evident in the sheer number of Iranians visiting<br />
the country; for instance, in June 2000 alone, 1,298 Iranian passport<br />
holders entered Bosnia on one- and two-week visas. Only 116 “officially”<br />
departed. Although many of these “visitors” might have been involved in<br />
human trafficking operations, the ease with which Iranian agents could<br />
enter Bosnia and then disappear was obvious. 258<br />
Importantly, during the war the Izetbegović regime’s preference for<br />
Iran as a sponsor and model was very apparent. According to Cees Wiebes,<br />
throughout the conflict “Turkey and Saudi Arabia were very willing to<br />
deliver weapons and to lure Izetbegović away from Iran, but the orientation<br />
of the Bosnian government was far more towards Iran.” 259 American<br />
Hasan Čengić, indicted<br />
co-conspirator<br />
with Alija Izetbegović<br />
in 1983, key Bosnian<br />
liaison with Iran.<br />
intelligence operatives in Bosnia came to the same conclusion. Robert Baer, a CIA agent stationed<br />
in Sarajevo during the war, claimed that “In Sarajevo, the Bosnian Muslim government is a client<br />
of the Iranians . . . If it’s a choice between the CIA and the Iranians, they’ll take the Iranians any<br />
day.” 260 Along similar lines, John Sray (former G-2 for UNPROFOR during the Bosnian war) noted,<br />
The Bosnian Muslim government certainly does not reflect the image of a liberal<br />
western-style democracy as the press misleadingly portrays it. This group remains<br />
Islamist-dominated and desperately attempts to hide its true sentiments. It is more<br />
likely to be influenced by Iran and the Mujahedin than by anyone in the West.<br />
These radical groups may remain underground or depart during NATO’s deployment,<br />
but they will return later to ensure that the Bosniac population becomes<br />
properly politicized and obedient to fundamentalist doctrine. 261<br />
This was also the conventional wisdom within the State Department. Should Croats and<br />
Serbs secede from Bosnia, according to one former US diplomat, the result would be “a non-viable<br />
rump Islamic state that would be a platform for Iranian terrorism.” 262 Similarly, amongst<br />
scholars there was a belief that a Muslim mini-state in Bosnia “could hardly be [a] secular<br />
pro-Western entity . . . It could very well seek its sources<br />
of ideology, inspiration and arms from the East.” 263 By<br />
the war’s end public opinion polls showed some 86%<br />
of the Bosnian Muslim population expressed a positive<br />
attitude towards Iran. 264<br />
Alija Izetbegović’s personal intelligence<br />
advisor, Bakir Alispahić, believed<br />
to be a leading Iranian agent in<br />
BiH, on the USG’s Specially Designated<br />
Nationals and Blocked Persons List<br />
Indeed, Washington would soon have dangerous evidence<br />
of the degree to which the Izetbegović regime had become Iranian<br />
clients. When a new CIA station chief was sent to Sarajevo<br />
in 1995, he was immediately betrayed by his local Bosnian<br />
colleagues to Iranian agents who quickly began preparing his<br />
assassination. 266 Iranian support was also what the Izetbegović<br />
regime counted on in its efforts to lift the arms embargo; as Silajdžić<br />
admitted in one conversation with Carl Bildt, lifting the<br />
arms embargo would allow “ten thousand Iranian soldiers” to<br />
come to Bosnia. 267 Izetbegović also used his frequent visits to<br />
Iran to give more credibility to the threats he issued against his<br />
opponents; for instance, in October 1992, standing at the tomb<br />
of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Izetbegović threatened to launch<br />
poisonous gas attacks against the Serbs. 268<br />
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“No one can escape the obvious, there is terrorist training activity going on in this building<br />
and it has direct association with people in the government.” NATO commander Admiral<br />
Leighton Smith inspecting the Iranian-run Pogorelići terrorist training camp in February<br />
1996. 265 (source: Associated Press)<br />
With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, one of the main goals of<br />
U.S. policy became reducing the influence of Iran and the various mujahedin forces in Bosnia.<br />
This proved a difficult task, for pro-Iranian factions had by this time become deeply embedded in<br />
numerous Bosnian institutions. According to a leaked CIA report Izetbegović himself was “literally<br />
on the [Iranian] payroll,” receiving on just one occasion $500,000 (US) in cash from Iranian<br />
agents. 269 Tellingly, the Iranian ambassador to Bosnia was the only foreign diplomat accompanying<br />
Izetbegović on his electoral campaign in 1996, 270 and on one of Haris Silajdžić’s trips to London,<br />
Margaret Thatcher herself observed that he was escorted by Iranian guards and transported in Iranian<br />
vehicles. 271<br />
By 1997, it was estimated that Iran had approximately 200 agents in various Bosnian institutions.<br />
A particular Iranian target was the American-sponsored “arm and train” program for the<br />
Muslim-Croat Federation Army. Thanks to the support of key allies within the Izetbegović regime,<br />
Iranian intelligence services were able to infiltrate drivers, translators, and clerical personnel into<br />
the program, all of whom had been picked by the pro-Iranian faction in Izetbegović’s security service.<br />
For instance, the chief liaison with the US Defense Department for coordinating the “arm and<br />
train” program, General Dzemal Merdan, was also Izetbegović’s officer in charge of relations with<br />
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and one of the founders of the “7 th Muslim Brigade” which had<br />
incorporated the mujahedin forces in Bosnia. 272 The Iranians were also running a network of 5-7<br />
training camps in central Bosnia for an intelligence service that Izetbegović had set up in January<br />
1996 in contravention of the Dayton Accords, 273 and during this period the Bosnian government<br />
was training military personnel in Iran as well. 274 Iran also extended its influence in Bosnia by infiltrating<br />
agents into various charities, news agencies, and even a hamburger chain in Sarajevo. 275<br />
The most concerted U.S. effort to purge pro-Iranian officials from positions of influence in Bosnia<br />
was the removal of Hasan Cengić, one of Izetbegović’s closest collaborators. As noted earlier,<br />
Čengić had gone to prison with Izetbegović in the 1980s and during the war was the SDA’s primary<br />
fundraiser abroad, using this position to establish strong contacts in many Islamic countries. In the<br />
summer of 1996, under strong American pressure (including a threat to halt the “arm and train”<br />
program), Izetbegović was forced to dismiss Čengić as deputy defense minister in the Federation,<br />
along with the first director of Izetbegović’s secret intelligence service, the Agencija za istraživanje<br />
i dokumentaciju (“Agency for Research and Documentation,” or AID), Bakir Alispahić. 276 Despite<br />
American objections, however, both Čengić and Alispahić continued to play very important roles within<br />
Izetbegović’s movement. Čengić himself was reputedly one of the wealthiest people in Bosnia and<br />
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remained the leader of the pro-Iranian wing of the SDA. By one account, Čengić was even supposed<br />
to succeed Izetbegović as SDA leader until American officials made it clear to the latter that in such<br />
a case the SDA would join Hezbollah and Hamas on the U.S.’ list of terrorist organizations. 277 For his<br />
part, Alispahić used his ties with Iran and his connections within the Bosnian intelligence community<br />
to allegedly amass a small fortune of his own; according to one report, Alispahić controlled an Iranian<br />
funded Muslim drug-smuggling network stretching to Europe and North America. 278<br />
Both during and after the war, Iran’s intelligence service, VEVAK, took particular interest in operating<br />
terrorist training camps in Bosnia. On 14 February 1996, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher<br />
travelled to Sarajevo where, in a meeting with Izetbegović, he insisted that such camps be closed.<br />
Izetbegović personally assured Christopher that no such terrorist facilities existed in Bosnia. Less than<br />
twenty-four hours later, NATO forces raided just such a camp near the Bosnian town of Pogorelici run<br />
by Iranian and Bosnian intelligence agents. After inspecting the camp, the NATO commander in Bosnia,<br />
Admiral Leighton Smith, told reporters that “No one can escape the obvious, there is terrorist training<br />
activity going on in this building and it has direct association with people in the government.” 279<br />
Among the objects found at the Pogorelići camp were plans to NATO installations in Bosnia,<br />
essays on how to assassinate regime opponents, and booby-trapped childrens’ toys. Individuals who<br />
attended courses at the camp were trained to commit various forms of terror, such as assassinating<br />
political opposition figures of the Izetbegović regime, manufacturing car bombs and booby-trapped<br />
children’s toys, and various forms of ecological terrorism. Among the “student essays” confiscated<br />
at the camp was one by an Adnan Dugonjić, who wrote “Our job is assassinating important figures,<br />
blackmail, kidnapping, forgery of money, and the creation of ecological catastrophes in certain areas.”<br />
Another student planned an assassination of Muslim opposition leader Muhammed Filipović, suggesting<br />
“The liquidation can be carried out by us, or by a hired person who is not a member of intelligence<br />
… I suggest liquidation by poisonous chemical placed in water or food or transferred by skin.” 280<br />
In the predictable coverup that followed NATO’s raid on Pogorelići, Izetbegović’s intelligence<br />
service would subsequently change the identities of the Bosnians NATO arrested at the camp. 281 Other<br />
individuals connected to Pogorelići were not so lucky. A few months after the raid, Nedžad Ugljen, a<br />
highly-ranked member of AID considered to be a leader of the pro-Iranian faction within Izetbegović’s<br />
security service, was suspected by his colleagues of preparing to approach the Americans and the<br />
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with information about Bosnian ties to Iran<br />
and various war crimes. Before he could talk, Ugljen was assassinated in Sarajevo in September 1996.<br />
His killers have never been found.<br />
The Iranian factor remains an important variable in the current Bosnian security calculus. To take<br />
but one example—Alija Izetbegović’s son, Bakir Izetbegović, currently a member of the three-man<br />
Bosnian presidency, is widely seen as the leader of the pro-Iranian faction in Bosnian Muslim political<br />
circles. One of the younger Izetbegović’s main advisors is Fikret Muslimović, the head of the Association<br />
of Iranian-Bosnian Friendship. 282 Meanwhile, the former commandant of the Pogorelići camp, the<br />
aforementioned Bakir Alispahić, as late as March 2014 remained the head of the security committee<br />
of Izetbegović’s SDA—despite being on the black list of individuals prohibited from visiting the U.S.<br />
because of terrorist ties. 283 Sarajevo is now home to the largest Iranian embassy in Europe, and several<br />
hundred Iranians are active in Bosnia whether as diplomats, journalists, “charitable workers,” or attached<br />
to the Iranian Cultural Center in Sarajevo. There is also believed to be a pro-Iranian, pro-Shiite<br />
faction within the Bosnian religious establishment (despite the fact that Bosnian Islam itself is Sunni).<br />
Since the end of the war, Iran has invested considerable sums and energy into various forms of<br />
“public diplomacy,” promoting academic and cultural ties with elite circles in Bosnia. One example<br />
of such efforts was the establishment of a Persian-Bosnian College outside Sarajevo which offers<br />
graduating students trips to Iran. 284 By some accounts, the Iranian government and Iranian security<br />
services are promoting Shia’ proselytizing and missionary work in Bosnia, and a small Shia community<br />
has been formed in the village of Lješeva (on the outskirts of Sarajevo), part of an overall Shia<br />
community in BiH estimated to have some 250-300 members. 285 Other organizations that promote<br />
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closer Bosnian-Iranian ties are the Fondacija Mulla Sadra (website: http://www.mullasadra.ba/), and<br />
the Ibn Sina Naučno-istraživački institut (website: http://www.ibn-sina.net/) which promotes academic<br />
and intellectual dialogue between Bosnian and Iranian scholars. Some members of the official Islamic<br />
Community in Bosnia are claimed to be secret adherents of Shiism, and plans are reportedly underway<br />
to build a Shia university in Bosnia. 286<br />
Along with these more public aspects of the Iranian presence in Bosnia, Tehran’s more surreptitious<br />
efforts in Bosnia continue. In May 2013, it was discovered that the second and third secretaries<br />
at the Iranian embassy in Sarajevo, Hamzeh Doolab Ahmad and Jadidi Sohrab, had been<br />
establishing ties with Nusret Imamović and his Wahhabi community in Gornja Maoča, reportedly<br />
bringing “cash and best wishes.” Under western pressure the two Iranian diplomats were ultimately<br />
expelled from the country. 287<br />
Despite this history, however, the concerted Iranian effort to establish a Balkan or Bosnian beachhead<br />
in Europe has had only limited success. The limits to Iranian influence in Bosnia were evident<br />
when Bosnia voted in June 2010 in favor of tightening sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council,<br />
revealing the utility of having Croat and Serb members of the Bosnian presidency exert their influence<br />
on Bosnian foreign policy. Iran’s room for maneuver in Bosnia is also limited by the substantial<br />
autonomy of Bosnia’s Croat-populated cantons and the Serb entity in Bosnia, the Republika Srpska,<br />
where the Iranians enjoy no sympathy. Moreover, a three-way struggle is taking place now within the<br />
Bosnian Muslim political and religious establishment as well which pits Iranian sympathizers against<br />
one group that is in favor of closer ties with Saudi Arabia, and another that sees Turkey as the appropriate<br />
role model for Bosnia.<br />
Iran has also been active in other Balkan states, albeit not so prominently. In Albania, for instance,<br />
Iran has also attempted to create what Reza Shafa has called “a foothold in the European continent.” As<br />
in Bosnia, the attempted Iranian infiltration of Albania followed the pattern of setting up “charities” and<br />
“cultural organizations” that serve as front organizations for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps<br />
(IRGC) and VEVAK.<br />
Despite such efforts, however, Iran draws little popular sympathy in Albania. President Sali Berisha,<br />
for instance, was an outspoken critic of the Ahmadinejad regime; in August 2012 Berisha claimed<br />
that “Ahmadinjead proves that he and his ideology are a growing threat to peace and stability in the<br />
Middle East . . . Ahmadinejad’s Nazi declarations should be a wake-up call that Iran’s nuclear program<br />
should be stopped by any means, as the greatest threat to peace and stability in the world.” 288 Another<br />
sore point in Albanian-Iranian relations is the fact that several dozen members of an anti-Islamic Republic<br />
resistance group, the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) are with U.S. support being resettled from<br />
Iraq to Albania. MEK is a controversial group that had earlier been listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization<br />
(FTO) by the U.S. government, but in recent years has been seen as useful in the effort to<br />
contain Tehran. 289<br />
It remains unclear how influential Iran can remain or become in southeastern Europe. As with<br />
the militant Islamist threat in the region in general, there is little danger of an Iranian-style Islamic<br />
republic being established in Bosnia or anywhere else in the Balkans. What is a very real and present<br />
danger, however, is that Iranian cells or pro-Iranian factions in the region could provide the logistical<br />
infrastructure for an Iranian counter-strike in the Balkans should conflict erupt between Tehran and<br />
the West. Iran’s infiltration of official institutions in Bosnia should also give NATO pause for concern<br />
regarding Bosnia’s eventual admission into the alliance. As a NATO member, Bosnia would be privy to<br />
much of the intelligence shared amongst alliance members. With Iranian agents still in many positions<br />
of power in Bosnian institutions, this essentially means that they would have access to NATO intelligence,<br />
planning and operations.<br />
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V. A Micro-Case Study of Terrorist Networks:<br />
The Bosnian Connections to the World Trade Center Attacks<br />
In April 2008, the late Richard Holbrooke claimed “If it had not been for the Dayton Peace<br />
Accords, 9/11 would probably have been planned in Bosnia, not in Afghanistan.” 290 The numerous<br />
Bosnian connections to both World Trade Center attacks suggest that the situation was probably<br />
even more serious than Holbrooke realized. Although it is unlikely that Izetbegović or his associates<br />
had prior knowledge of or approved of the two World Trade Center attacks, what is known is<br />
that Bosnia served as the common stomping ground for many of the individuals involved in the<br />
attacks.<br />
“If it had not been for the<br />
Dayton Peace Accords,<br />
9/11 would probably have<br />
been planned in Bosnia,<br />
not in Afghanistan.”<br />
Richard Holbrooke<br />
This of course follows a well-established, predictable pattern<br />
of what ensues when militant Islamist movements take control of<br />
territory and institutions and ideological affinities impel them toward<br />
alliances with the most extreme elements along the militant<br />
Islamist spectrum. Whether observing Afghanistan under the Taliban,<br />
Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini and Mahmud Ahmadinejad,<br />
Lebanon under Hezbollah, the Gaza Strip under Hamas, Sudan<br />
under Hasan al-Turabi and his National Islamic Front, or Bosnia<br />
under the Izetbegović regime, such movements consistently provide<br />
the permissive environments and safe havens Islamist terrorists<br />
need to set up the organizations and infrastructure required to<br />
plan operations, train and recruit new adherents, and hide from<br />
Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies.<br />
The first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 was<br />
financed in part by monies provided by the Third World Relief<br />
Agency (TWRA), a Vienna-based “Islamic charity” founded by<br />
a long-time Izetbegović associate, the Sudanese national Elfatih<br />
Hassanein. Former National Security Agency analyst John Schindler<br />
has called TWRA “Bosnia’s unique gift to radical Islam and Al<br />
Qa’ida . . . the Bosnian ‘model’ of how to use NGOs and aid money<br />
to pay for jihad and terrorism.” 291 Along similar lines, J.M. Berger has claimed that in large part<br />
through TWRA “Bosnia raised more money for extremism than virtually any other event you can<br />
point to in history.” 292 According to Thomas Joscelyn,<br />
TWRA was run by senior Bosnian government officials, and sponsored the relocation<br />
of hundreds, if not thousands, of jihadists to Bosnia to fight in the 1990s.<br />
While carrying out some legitimate humanitarian functions as a cover, TWRA was<br />
really a front for global terrorist operations. 293<br />
A number of Alija Izetbegović’s closest associates were on the board of TWRA. At a meeting<br />
in Vienna on 14 September 1992 attended by Izetbegović, Ejup Ganić, Haris Siljadžić and Hassanein,<br />
Izetbegović intimates Irfan Ljevaković, Husein Živalj and Derviš Djudjević were elected to<br />
TWRA’s board. 294 (Živalj, and Djudjević had gone to prison with Izetbegović in 1983. Ljevaković<br />
was charged with running a terrorist training camp in Central Bosnia in April 2002). Other sources<br />
have claimed that Hassanein, Mustafa Cerić, Hasan Čengić (widely considered to be the leading<br />
Iranian agent in Bosnia), and Bakir Izetbegović (currently a member of Bosnia’s joint state presidency)<br />
also controlled the Vienna TWRA account. 295<br />
By some accounts, TWRA alone collected $400 million (US) for Izetbegović’s war effort, 296<br />
while other reports claim as much as $2.5 billion passed through TWRA on its way to Bosnia. 297<br />
TWRA also ran a covert program attempting to use US military personnel serving in Bosnia to convert<br />
to Islam and join Al Qaeda. At least a dozen US soldiers reportedly participated in this effort. 298<br />
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Left: Bosnian jihad veteran Sulaiman abu-Ghaith with Bosnian passport-holder Osama bin Laden and<br />
Ayman al-Zawahiri, director of Al Qaeda’s Bosnian operations, Afghanistan, circa November 2001; center:<br />
Osama bin Laden with Bosnian jihad veteran Khaled al-Harbi, Afghanistan, November 2001; right: Al Qaeda<br />
logistical expert and Bosnian passport holder Muhammed al-Zawahiri (Ayman’s brother)<br />
Clement Rodney Hampton-el, an American who had trained in terrorist camps in Afghanistan,<br />
admitted in federal court that he had obtained TWRA funds to operate military-style training camps<br />
in New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania for individuals who would go on to be involved in the<br />
1993 World Trade Center attack. 299 In addition to obtaining TWRA funds from Vienna, Hampton-el<br />
is also reported to have gone to Bosnia circa 1992-93. 300 Another TWRA employee, John Fawzan,<br />
was discovered to have been the suicide bomber involved in the October 1995 attack on the police<br />
headquarters in Rijeka, Croatia. 301 In December 1995, an individual wanted in connection with the<br />
first World Trade Center bombing was killed by Bosnian Croat forces near Zepce in central Bosnia. 302<br />
Another individual involved with TWRA was Omar Abdel-Rahman, a.k.a. “the blind sheik,”<br />
convicted in U.S. federal court for seditious conspiracy in the Landmarks Bombing Plot in 1993,<br />
which had targeted the United Nations Building, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, the George<br />
Washington Bridge, and FBI headquarters in Manhattan. After the first World Trade Center bombing,<br />
the FBI succeeded in turning Rahman’s former Sudanese-born driver into an informant, who<br />
began telling American officials about a terrorist organization named “Al Qaeda.” In 1993-94 the<br />
driver travelled to Sudan and met with bin Laden. In 1994, he began working for the CIA and was<br />
sent by the agency to infiltrate Bosnian Al Qaeda cells. Unfortunately, his identity was betrayed,<br />
and he was killed by Al Qaeda operatives in Bosnia at some point in 1994-95. 303<br />
The Bosnian connections to the greatest mass murder in American history are just as direct.<br />
Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, fought in the Bosnian jihad and<br />
was given Bosnian citizenship. Two other 9/11 bombers, Khalid al Mindhar and Nawaf al Hazmi,<br />
also fought in Izetbegović’s army. 304 The British journalist Eve-Anne Prentice of The Guardian<br />
Bosnian jihad veteran Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks; Bosnian jihad veteran<br />
and Mohammed Atta recruiter Mohamed Haydar Zammar, “surrogate father to the pilots surrounding<br />
Mohammed Atta”; Bosnian “tourist” Ramzi Bin al-Shihb, “coordinator” of the 9/11 attacks<br />
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Bosnian jihad veterans Khalid al Mindhar and Nawaf<br />
al Hazmi, hijackers of AA Flight 77 on 9/11<br />
and German journalist Renate Flottau of Der<br />
Spiegel reported meeting Osama bin Laden<br />
in Izetbegović’s office during the war, 305 and<br />
bin Laden was even given a Bosnian passport<br />
by Izetbegović’s foreign ministry. 306 When<br />
asked to respond to allegations that he had<br />
met bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Izetbegović<br />
evasively replied “During and after<br />
the war I met with thousands of people coming<br />
from the Islamic world but I can remember<br />
the faces and names of only a few.” 307<br />
The Bosnian politician Sejfudin Tokić has<br />
claimed that Council of Europe officials had<br />
told him of the existence of a photograph<br />
showing Izetbegović with bin Laden. 308<br />
The core group behind the 9/11 attacks was Al Qaeda’s so-called “Hamburg cell,” led by Bosnian<br />
jihad veteran Mohammed Haydar Zammar, reportedly the man who recruited Mohammed<br />
Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11 attacks. 309 Zammar has been variously described as the “patron” of<br />
the Hamburg Cell, the man “under whose tutelage” it operated, 310 and “a sort of surrogate father to<br />
the pilots surrounding Mohammed Atta.” 311 Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, “coordinator” of the 9/11 attacks,<br />
was seen in Bosnia in the summer of 1996. 312 Other 9/11 participants have been reported to have<br />
had Bosnian connections as well. 313<br />
Sarajevo rental-car agent Reda Seyam, named by a Spanish court as “Osama Bin Laden’s financier<br />
in Europe,” deposited $250,000 into an account controlled by Mamoun Darkanzli, an Hamburg<br />
businessman of Syrian origin with known ties to the 9/11 bombers. 314 Seyam himself was subsequently<br />
implicated in the October 2002 Bali nightclub bombings. 315<br />
Darkanzli attracted the attention of the Bundesnachtrichtdienst (the German intelligence service,<br />
or BND) when they noticed he had power-of-attorney over a German bank account opened<br />
by Mamdouh Mahmud Salim. According to U.S. government lawyers, Salim “was present for the<br />
founding of al Qaeda, served on its shurah (consultation) council, issued fatwahs authorizing violence<br />
against America and authorized efforts to obtain uranium for nuclear weapons for al Qaeda<br />
. . . [Salim] described Bosnia as the base for al Qaeda operations in Europe.” 316 Salim, who was<br />
subsequently convicted in U.S. federal court for being the organizer of the August 1998 U.S. African<br />
embassy bombings, travelled to Bosnia on a “business trip” three months before the bombings<br />
at the invitation of the Bosnian-based “Ljiljan Commerce Group” on a visa issued to him by the<br />
Bosnian consulate in Turkey. 317<br />
The Ljiljan Commerce Group was owned by Enaam<br />
Arnout, who was also the director of a Chicago-based<br />
“Islamic charity” named the Benevolence International<br />
Foundation, with a Sarajevo-based subsidiary organization<br />
called “Bosanska Idealna Futura” (BIF). Although Arnout<br />
denied knowing bin Laden, federal prosecutors found photographs<br />
of the two together at the Al Masada mudžahedin<br />
camp in Afghanistan dating back to 1988.<br />
Sarajevo rental-car agent Reda<br />
Seyam (pictured with his son Jihad),<br />
“Osama bin Laden’s financier in Europe”<br />
(source: deutschlandwoche.de)<br />
Raids on the Sarajevo BIF office in March 2002 turned<br />
up Al Qaeda’s donor’s list, the so-called “Golden Chain,”<br />
documents relating to Al Qaeda’s founding, and scans of<br />
handwritten correspondence between bin Laden and Arnout.<br />
Raids on the Sarajevo residences of BIF employees<br />
turned up loaded submachine guns, ski masks, and instruc-<br />
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tion manuals for improvised explosive devices (IED’s), missiles and mortars, and falsified identity<br />
documents. 318 Between June 2000 and September 2001, the BIF transferred $1,414,404 from a<br />
Swiss bank to its checking account in Chicago. These monies were then redistributed to BIF offices<br />
abroad. 319 In March 2002, the US Embassy in Sarajevo was shut down after it was learned that Al<br />
Qaeda operatives had met in Sofia where they decided that “in Sarajevo something will happen to<br />
Americans similar to New York last September.” Subsequently, Munib Zahiragić, a BIF director<br />
in Sarajevo and former member of Izetbegović’s secret police was arrested in connection with the<br />
plot, and charged with leaking classified documents which allowed a member of Al Qaeda in Bosnia<br />
to escape capture. 320<br />
Another organization used to support the Bosnian jihad was the Saudi High Commission for<br />
Relief of Bosnia (SHC), which a U.S. federal court ruled was “a fully integrated component of<br />
al Qa[e]da’s logistical and financial support infrastructure.” Raids on SHC offices in Sarajevo in<br />
October 2001 found “computer hard drives containing photos of the World Trade Center, the U.S.<br />
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the U.S.S. Cole (all targets of terrorist attacks); documents<br />
about pesticides and crop dusters; photos and maps of Washington, D.C. (with prominent government<br />
buildings marked); and instructions for fabricating U.S. State Department badges.” 321<br />
Left: “It was not a significant matter. It was not a big threat. It didn’t<br />
become a big threat.” Former U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith<br />
on the Islamist terrorist threat emanating from Bosnia; right:<br />
“the terrorists involved in the 9/11 atrocity had connections in several<br />
European countries—BiH not among them” (?) former High Representative<br />
Paddy Ashdown<br />
38
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
An indication of how secure Al Qaeda leaders must have felt in Bosnia at this time is the fact<br />
that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, security officials claimed that some seventy Al Qaeda members<br />
were planning to flee from Afghanistan for Bosnia in anticipation of expected U.S. attacks on the<br />
Taliban. 322 * * * * *<br />
One month after the 9/11 attacks, Alija Izetbegović resigned from the last of his public positions.<br />
As one analyst noted,<br />
Despite desperate attempts to conceal his duplicity in his dealings with Muslim<br />
militants, Izetbegović’s days as a respected political leader were permanently<br />
over. A month after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, he officially<br />
stepped down as head of Bosnia’s most powerful Muslim nationalist party, citing<br />
health reasons. 323<br />
Upon Izetbegović’s death in October 2003 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former<br />
Yugoslavia (ICTY) announced that he had been under investigation for war crimes.<br />
In 1996, the Third World Relief Agency was awarded a gold medal by the Izetbegović government<br />
for its “services to Bosnia.” In the same year, the Central Intelligence Agency named TWRA<br />
an NGO that “employ[s] members or otherwise facilitate[s] the activities of terrorist groups operating<br />
in Bosnia.” 324<br />
After the war, European investigators discovered financial documents showing that Hasan<br />
Čengić, one of Alija Izetbegović’s closest political allies, had provided TWRA funds to Wa’el<br />
Hamza Julaidan, one of Al Qaeda’s co-founders. 325 In May 2008, Bosnian Federation TV reported<br />
that Čengić “personally signed a money transfer intended for the Al-Qai’dah 9/11 terrorist attacks<br />
on New York and Washington.” 326<br />
In December 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District restored a lawsuit brought<br />
by 9/11 families and victims that named the Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
as a defendant in a case they have brought in U.S. federal court.<br />
In March 2014, Bosnian jihad veteran Sulaiman abu-Ghaith was convicted in US Federal Court<br />
for conspiring to kill Americans during the 9/11 attacks.<br />
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” President George W. Bush,<br />
September 20 th , 2001. Pictured: Alija Izetbegović with Abu el-Maali, aka, “the little<br />
Osama bin Laden,” central Bosnia, circa 1995. el-Maali, considered to be under<br />
Izetbegović’s “personal protection,” was in direct personal contact with Osama bin<br />
Laden.<br />
39
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
VI. Policy Recommendations<br />
A long-overdue effort to dismantle the militant Islamist infrastructure in southeastern Europe finally<br />
began in late 2014. In March, seven individuals were arrested in Albania for recruiting volunteers<br />
to join Al Qaeda forces in Syria. The individuals involved, including the imams of two Tirana<br />
mosques, Genci Balla and Bujar Hysi, were charged with ‘recruiting of individuals in order to carry<br />
terrorist acts, incitement and propaganda.” 327 In August 2014, forty suspected Islamist militants<br />
with ties to the Syrian and Iraqi jihads were arrested in Kosovo. Raids at sixty different locations,<br />
including private homes and makeshift mosques, resulted in the discovery of several weapons<br />
stockpiles, including AK 47’s, small-calibre weapons, and electronic communications equipment.<br />
Among the individuals arrested were a number who were believed to have either returned to Kosovo<br />
after fighting with Al Nusra or ISIS, or were involved in their recruitment. Fourteen “NGO’s”<br />
suspected of involvement with Islamist extremists also had their accounts blocked. 328 Subsequent<br />
raids in September in Priština, Mitrovica and a dozen other locations around Kosovo rounded up<br />
individuals such as Fuad Ramiqi, the leader of the Muslim religious party LISBA, and Shefqet<br />
Krasniqi, the imam of the Grand Mosque in Priština. 329<br />
The proposed Caliphate of the “Islamic State of Iraq<br />
and the Levant,” with southeastern Europe included.<br />
On 3 September 2014, Bosnian police<br />
began an operation code-named “Operation<br />
Damascus” conducted over seventeen locations<br />
and resulting in the arrest of sixteen<br />
individuals, including Bilal Bosnić. The<br />
apprehended individuals were accused of<br />
financing and publicly supporting terrorist<br />
activities, organizing terrorist groups, and recruiting<br />
individuals to fight in Iraq and Syria.<br />
Adding to the urgency of arresting Bosnić<br />
was undoubtedly the fact that he had recently<br />
voiced his support for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s<br />
proclamation of the “Islamic State.” Arrest<br />
warrants were also submitted for a number<br />
of Bosnian citizens already believed to be<br />
abroad. 330 On September 24 th , the U.S. State Department named two of the most prominent Balkan<br />
militant Islamists, Bosnian Wahhabi leader Nusret Imamović and Kosovo extremist Lavdrim Muhaxheri,<br />
specially-designated global terrorists. 331 Imamović had already left Bosnia in late 2013 and<br />
joined the Al Nusra front in Syria; in the aftermath of his being blacklisted by the State Department,<br />
his website, PutVjernika, was apparently shutdown. In October, Serbia charged five men from Novi<br />
Please don’t come home: Albanian ISIS volunteers with “global terrorist” Lavdrim Muhaxheri<br />
(second from left) (source: Gazeta Dita); on right, Kosovo ISIS volunteer Besnik Fanaj executing<br />
prisoners in Iraq, September 2014 (source: Koha.net)<br />
40
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Balkan militant Islamists on the march: left: protest organized by Bosnian-Australian extremist Harun<br />
Mehičević, Melbourne, September 2012; center: Skopje, July 2014; right: Novi Pazar, September 2014<br />
(source: SandžakPress)<br />
Pazar and Belgrade with recruiting volunteers to join ISIS and arranging for their travel to Iraq and<br />
Syria. Among those arrested was Abid Podbičanin, a Sandžak native who had studied in Medina<br />
and was the leader of the Furkan center of the Islamic Youth of the Sandžak in Novi Pazar. 332 A<br />
frequent visitor of Podbičanin’s Furkan center had been Mevlid Jašarević, who carried out the October<br />
2011 attack on the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. Also in September, Slovenian police arrested<br />
a number of suspected Islamist extremists, including two individuals who had recently returned to<br />
Slovenia after participating in the Iraqi and Syrian jihads. 333<br />
It is still too early to tell how serious these blows have been to the militant Islamist movement<br />
in southeastern Europe. As noted above, the movement’s infrastructure is designed in such a way<br />
as to absorb such occasional crackdowns without causing serious overall damage. Moreover, some<br />
of these actions inevitably were geared more towards mollifying international demands for action<br />
or settling scores with domestic political opponents. In Kosovo, a number of those arrested (such<br />
as Shefqet Krasniqi) have already been released. 334<br />
Nevertheless, the recent surge of attention devoted to the problem of militant Islamism in southeastern<br />
Europe should make it difficult to continue ignoring the problem. For the past two decades,<br />
the focus of the international effort in the Balkans has been on things that are only of secondary or<br />
tertiary importance to vital western interests, while the growth and spread of a movement completely<br />
antithetical to U.S. and European values and beliefs has been<br />
largely ignored. Paradoxically, international policy in southeastern<br />
Europe has been guided by the belief that militant Islamists<br />
are not a threat to stability in the Balkans, but if they go to Iraq<br />
or Syria the very same individuals suddenly become global terror<br />
threats. A corollary to this paradox is the frequently-posited<br />
argument that it is of only tangential interest or importance that<br />
so many individuals involved in various terrorist actions around<br />
the world have travelled through the Balkans—an argument that<br />
conveniently elides the fact that during their time spent in the<br />
region these individuals have developed numerous connections<br />
with like-minded indigenous extremists, sowing the seeds for<br />
new generations of radicals that threaten Balkan stability, and<br />
indeed U.S. and western security interests around the globe.<br />
Happy honeymoon: Bosnian jihadi<br />
Enes Iriškić with his wife<br />
in Syria<br />
The challenge now confronting local and international policymakers<br />
in dealing with southeastern Europe’s militant Islamist<br />
movement is calibrating a response which neither exaggerates<br />
nor ignores the threat. Unfortunately, over the past two<br />
decades the tendency has been much more towards the former.<br />
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, a former High Representative in<br />
Bosnia, Wolfgang Petritsch, somewhat incredibly claimed that<br />
41
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Left: “. . . no evidence has been produced [that Bosnia] has served as a base for Al Qaeda”-<br />
-former International High Representative in BiH Wolfgang Petritsch; right: “The Wahhabis<br />
in Bosnia are not a danger to Europe”—current High Representative Valentin Inzko<br />
“no evidence has been provided [that Bosnia] has served as a base for Al Qaeda.” 335 Similarly, even<br />
after the October 2011 attack on the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo, the current High Representative in<br />
Bosnia, Valentin Inzko, would claim that the Wahhabis in Bosnia “pose no danger to Europe.” 336<br />
Indicative of the way in which international officials have tried to bury the story about the militant<br />
Islamist movement in southeastern Europe is the fact that Mevlid Jašarević’s attack on the U.S. embassy<br />
only merited mention in paragraph 88 (out of 98) in the High Representative’s semi-annual<br />
report to the UN Secretary-General. 337<br />
Sometimes international officials have even sabotaged efforts to deal with the militant Islamists.<br />
Former international High Representative Paddy Ashdown in October 2002 removed from<br />
office the only Bosnian official who had shown a desire to confront the militant Islamist infrastructure<br />
in the country. 338 Ashdown also parroted the line that Bosnia had no terrorist connections, on<br />
one occasion claiming that “the terrorists involved in the 9/11 atrocity had connections in several<br />
European countries -- BiH not among them . . . I am confident that BiH is not and will not become<br />
a base for any kind of terrorism.” 339 The unfortunate reality, however, as Evan Kohlmann has put it,<br />
is that individuals who deny that such terrorist groups are operating in the Balkans “are either lying<br />
or have no idea what they are talking about.” 340 Either way, such attitudes are not serving U.S. or<br />
European interests, or protecting the security of ordinary citizens in the Balkans and beyond.<br />
In Kosovo, the international community has likewise often sabotaged efforts to confront militant<br />
Islamism. According to Kosovo’s former interior minister Bajram Rexhepi, when he was trying<br />
to propose draft laws against religious extremism,<br />
Left: “The Koran teaches us to terrorize tyrants. The Koran does not distinguish between civilians and<br />
combatants . . . the United States’ arrogance is the root cause of all of this.” Bosnian jihad veteran and London<br />
Finsbury Mosque imam Abu Hamza al-Misri; right: “Selam Alejkum dear brother Bosnians. I pray to<br />
Allah to treat you that one day you may terrorize Allah’s enemies the way we are about to”: two Bosnian<br />
jihad volunteers on the Syrian front (from an ISIS recruitment video)<br />
42
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
U.S. State Department-designated global terrorists: left: Bosnian “sheik” Nusret Imamović;<br />
right: Lavdrim Muhaxheri from Kosovo<br />
I was told by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg we could be sued for denial of<br />
religious freedom. . . . I asked [the Europeans] ‘if your states were to consider their<br />
national security at risk because of this problem, would you maintain such abstract<br />
respect for human rights? Probably not. Then why experiment on us in Kosovo? 341<br />
To a significant extent this denial of the militant Islamist danger in southeastern Europe is due<br />
to the fact that international efforts to deal with the problem have been driven more by political correctness<br />
and the desire to mollify the movement’s Middle-Eastern patrons than by a serious effort<br />
to confront its root causes. Although as argued in this study the majority of the Muslim populations<br />
in southeastern Europe remains relatively moderate and pro-western (in comparison to Muslim<br />
populations in the Middle-East and Central Asia), significant empirical and anecdotal evidence<br />
suggests that 5-10 percent of the Balkans’ Muslim populations have become radicalized. The threat<br />
in Bosnia is more serious, however, because (as seen above) important segments of the political,<br />
religious, and security establishments have close ties to the international jihadist movement.<br />
Even such relatively small numbers, however, provide Islamist militants with numerous ideological,<br />
logistical and human assets to seriously threaten regional stability and American, European and Israeli<br />
interests. Given the above, crafting an effective counter-terrorism strategy aimed at eradicating the influence<br />
of Islamist militant groups in the Balkans requires the following:<br />
------Create an effective organizational and bureaucratic framework for pooling intelligence<br />
resources. Unfortunately, in this regard the situation in southeastern Europe poses particular problems.<br />
Although by their very nature intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts benefit from various<br />
agencies sharing information, the complex reality of the phenomenon in southeastern Europe<br />
creates particular difficulties for implementing such policies where allies and sympathizers of militant<br />
Islamism have infiltrated government agencies and non-governmental organizations. Predictably,<br />
such people deny or attempt to cover up their connections with Islamist terrorists. 342 But the<br />
consequences of such infiltration are obvious; as one analysis in Bosnia concluded,<br />
the results of the investigations conducted between 1993 and 2001 regarding relations<br />
between terrorists and humanitarian organizations in the country have been<br />
ignored, marginalized or even covered up. The first independent investigation on<br />
the relationship between terrorists and humanitarian organizations was conducted<br />
in 2001, at the strong request of US officials. Basically, the results have not been<br />
published, and major suspects would disappear when they came under investigation<br />
or police surveillance. 343<br />
Thus, in situations such as those obtaining in places like Bosnia, security sector reform should<br />
focus on improving vertical coordination of existing security and intelligence services with international<br />
bodies such as NATO and Interpol to compartmentalize and limit the potential for security<br />
breaches. Horizontal integration of existing agencies and services would only serve to expand<br />
43
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
The militant Islamists’ way of war, from the Balkans to the Islamic State: top left: Bosnian<br />
jihadi with the head of a decapitated Serb prisoner, circa 1993. The ARBiH’s 3rd Corps commander<br />
was reportedly within ten meters of the beheadings; top right: Kosovo jihadi Lavdrim<br />
Muhaxheri beheading a captive in Iraq, July 2014; bottom left: Bosnian jihad veteran Omar<br />
Saeed Sheik, participant in the murder/beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl;<br />
bottom right: British humanitarian aid worker David Haines, spent five years in the Balkans<br />
the access militant Islamists and their sympathizers have to intelligence about their activities and<br />
networks. Unfortunately, as numerous experts have noted, existing institutions have refused to<br />
confront the problem. 344<br />
-----Increase support for intelligence-gathering efforts against militant Islamist groups in<br />
southeastern Europe. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq intelligence resources devoted to monitoring<br />
conditions in southeastern Europe were drastically cut, leading experts such as Douglas Farah<br />
to bemoan the fact that although<br />
there remains a small, dedicated group gathering intelligence on these types of operation<br />
. . . [t]heir work is given a low priority and the entire intelligence-gathering structure,<br />
providing what little reliable information available on radical Islamic movements<br />
and leaders in Bosnia, is slated to disappear at the end of the year. This is an incredibly<br />
short-sighted move by international donors who no longer want to pay relative pocket<br />
change, only a few million dollars a year, to keep the operation going. 345<br />
A number of experts have suggested ways in which the intelligence effort against militant Islamists<br />
in southeastern Europe could be stepped up; for instance, by encouraging law-enforcement<br />
and intelligence services to incorporate social-network analysis in their study of the relationships<br />
between extremists and their potential activities, and more expanded use of various cyber-warfare<br />
and surveillance techniques (such as cookie softwares, the creation of “honey pot” websites, and<br />
keystroke reconstructions of hacked computers) to disrupt and destroy Islamist terrorist networks<br />
in the region. 346<br />
-----Adopt more concerted and consistent efforts to isolate and remove Islamist militants<br />
from positions of power and influence. Over the past two decades, the international community<br />
44
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
On their way to Paradise? Bosnian-Syrian “martyrs” Ebu Bilal from Zenica, Mevludin Cicvara from Vitez,<br />
and Ebu Ismail from Teslic (source: PutVjernika.com)<br />
has used various powers (including issuing war cimes indictments, the HR’s so-called Bonn Powers,<br />
and intense political pressure) to remove from positions of power and influence individuals<br />
even suspected of “endangering the peace process.” Unfortunately (and inexplicably) these powers<br />
have only on rare occasions been used against militant Islamists (a few rare examples have been the<br />
U.S. push in 1997 to remove Izetbegović protégés Hasan Čengić and Bakir Alispahić from office,<br />
or the 2009 case of former Bosnian defense minister Tarik Sadović who was obstructing the effort<br />
to expel of Al Qaeda operatives from Bosnia).<br />
-----Redouble efforts to dismantle the infrastructure supporting militant Islamist networks in<br />
southeastern Europe. With the exception of a brief period after the 9/11 attacks, over the past two<br />
decades both international and local officials have essentially ignored the expansion and growth<br />
of the militant Islamist infrastructure in southeastern Europe. During this time, militant Islamists<br />
recruiting new followers and raising funds for jihad have travelled around Europe unhindered, extra-territorial<br />
enclaves harboring international terrorists have been allowed to function, and media<br />
propagating the most vile hate speech have continued to operate. Containing the militant Islamist<br />
movement in southeastern Europe will require instituting international travel bans on extremist<br />
activists, shutting down their media outlets, strangling their sources of finance, and returning constitutional<br />
order and the rule-of-law to militant Islamist outposts.<br />
-----Change and update the legal framework to make it easier to conduct surveillance on and<br />
prosecute militant Islamist groups. On the positive side, a number of countries in the region<br />
have recently adopted more stringent legal prohibitions against citizens being involved in foreign<br />
conflicts. 347 The Council of Europe’s Country Profiles on Counter-Terrorism Capacity provide<br />
useful checklists for the legistation enacted in various member-states. 348 In Serbia, a law presently<br />
in parliament would criminalize recruiting for foreign conflicts. In April 2014, Bosnia introduced<br />
jail terms of up to ten years for individuals either recruiting or volunteering to fight in foreign conflicts<br />
in an attempt to deter people from going to Syria. 349 Similar legislation passed in Macedonia<br />
in September 2014 envisions five year prison terms for individuals either participating in foreign<br />
conflicts or otherwise found to be in indirect support of such actions. 350<br />
----Indigenous Islamic institutions should speak out more forcefully against individuals and<br />
organizations recruiting individuals for jihad. Mainstream public opinion amongst the Muslim<br />
45
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
populations of southeastern Europe on the whole condemns the phenomenon of local young people<br />
going to fight on foreign jihadi fronts, and the leaders of official Islamic institutions have as well.<br />
Still, the perception amongst many observers is that this condemnation must be much more forceful<br />
and explicit. 351<br />
The actual and potential return of hundreds of Balkan militant Islamists from the Iraqi and Syrian<br />
jihads adds increased urgency to the need for international and local officials to concentrate and devote<br />
their efforts to this problem. As the EU’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014 has noted,<br />
the threat to the EU from extremists returning from the Syrian jihad is likely to “increase exponentially”<br />
in the near future. 352 Given the infiltration of militant Islamists into so many political, social, and<br />
religious institutions in southeastern Europe and the sophisticated infrastructure they have created,<br />
this is a particularly pressing issue for southeastern Europe. As Esad Hećimović has warned in the<br />
case of Bosnia, “Radical Islamic groups are waiting for a resurrection of the violent conflict . . . It is<br />
still conceivable that Islamic leaders and groups are waiting for a new jihad.” 353 The same could be<br />
said for the situation throughout the western and southern Balkans.<br />
Militant Balkan Islamists, for their part, are not hiding their long-term intentions. As a Bosnian<br />
jihadi fighting in Syria recently noted, “I left Bosnia with the intention only to return with weapons<br />
in my hand. I am a part of the revolution and this is the morning of Islam . . . [by allowing us to leave<br />
Bosnia] your intelligence agencies made a mistake thinking that they would be rid of us, however, the<br />
problem for them will be the return of individuals trained for war.” 354<br />
46
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Appendix 1<br />
Balkan Jihadi/Extremist Threat Matrix 355<br />
Action Date Balkan Jihadi/<br />
Extremist Participants<br />
World Trade Center Bombing February 1993 Third World Relief Agency<br />
(TWRA) 356<br />
Rijeka Police Headquarters<br />
Car Bombing<br />
October 1995<br />
Clement Rodney<br />
Hampton-el<br />
Anwar Shaaban<br />
John Fawzan (TWRA)<br />
Saudi National Guard<br />
Building Bombing, Riyadh<br />
November 1995 Muslih Al Shamran 357<br />
Lille G7 Car bombing attempt/<br />
Roubaix Gang<br />
March 1996<br />
Christophe Caze<br />
Lionel Dumont 358<br />
Pope John Paul II<br />
Assassination Plot, Sarajevo<br />
Pope John Paul II<br />
Assassination Plot, Bologna<br />
April 1997 (Never discovered) 359<br />
September 1997 Algerian Group 360<br />
Mostar Car Bombing September 1997 Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad<br />
Ahmad Zayid al Zuhayri<br />
Nabil Ali al-Hilai 361<br />
African U.S. Embassy Bombings August 1998 Mamdouh Mahmud Salim 362<br />
Abdul Rashim al-Nashiri 363<br />
Millenium Bomb Plot December 1999 Karim Said Atmani 364<br />
USS Cole Attack October 2000 Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri 365<br />
Hassan al-Khamiri<br />
Ibrahim al-Thawer,<br />
aka “Nibras” 366<br />
World Trade Center/Pentagon September 2001 Khalid Sheikh<br />
Muhammed 367<br />
Nawaf al-Hazmi<br />
Khalid al-Mindhar<br />
Ramzi Binalshihb<br />
Daniel Pearl Murder February 2002 Omar Saeed Sheikh 368<br />
Bali Nightclub Bombings October 2002 Reda Seyam 369<br />
47
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Action Date Balkan Jihadi/<br />
Extremist Participants<br />
Anđelić Family Murders,<br />
Konjica<br />
Christmas Eve 2002<br />
Muamer Topalović<br />
Riyadh Bombings May 2003 Khalid al-Juhani 370<br />
Abdel Karim Al-Tuhami<br />
Al-Majatii 371<br />
Istanbul Bombings November 2003 Habib Aktaş 372<br />
Azad Ekinci 373<br />
Madrid Train Bombings March 2004 Amer Azizi 374<br />
Al-Khobar Massacres<br />
Murder/beheading<br />
of U.S. citizen Paul Johnson<br />
Abdelmajid Bouchar 375<br />
May/June 2004 Abdel Aziz Al-Muqrin 376<br />
Theo van Gogh murder November 2004 (Murder weapon traced to Bosnia) 377<br />
Pope John Paul II Funeral<br />
Bombing Plot<br />
April 2005 Gornja Maoča Cell 378<br />
London Underground Bombing July 2005 Abu Hamza al-Masri 379<br />
Sarajevo Western Embassies<br />
Attack Conspiracy<br />
October 2005<br />
Mirsad Bektašević<br />
Abdulkadir Cesur<br />
Bajro Ikanović 380<br />
Salt Lake City Mall Massacre February 2007 Sulejman Talović 381<br />
Fort Dix Bomb Plot May 2007 Dritan Duka<br />
Shain Duka<br />
Ejljvir Duka 382<br />
Agron Abdulahu<br />
Vienna U.S. Embassy Attack October 2007 Asim Cejvanović 383<br />
Mehmed Dzudzić<br />
Catholic/International Targets Plot March 2008 Rijad Rustempašić 384<br />
Muhamed Meco<br />
Abdulah Handžić<br />
Edis Velić<br />
Muhamed Ficer<br />
48
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Action Date Balkan Jihadi/<br />
Extremist Participants<br />
UK Bomb Plot/”PM Threat” August 2008 Krenar Lusha, et. Al. 385<br />
Mumbai Bombings November 2008 Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi 386<br />
Raleigh Group<br />
Conspiracy<br />
NYC Metro Attack<br />
Conspiracy<br />
July 2009 Enes Subašić 387<br />
Hysen Sherifi<br />
January 2010 Adis Medunjanin 388<br />
“Tahir” 389<br />
Mavi Marmara May 2010 Bulent Yildirim<br />
Fuad Ramiq 390<br />
Bugojno Police Station<br />
Bombing<br />
Osman Atalay 391<br />
June 2010 Naser Palislamović 392<br />
Haris Čaušević<br />
Et. Al.<br />
Sarajevo U.S. Embassy Attack October 2011 Mevlid Jašarević 393<br />
Tampa Nightclub<br />
Bombing Plot<br />
Frankfurt Airport<br />
U.S. Servicemen Murder<br />
January 2012 Sami Osmakac 394<br />
February 2012 Arid Uka 395<br />
Skopje Murders April 2012 Alil Demiri 396<br />
Afrim Ismailovic<br />
Fejzi Aziri<br />
Haki Aziri<br />
Sami Ljuta<br />
Burgas Bus Bombing July 2012 Balkan Hezbollah Cell<br />
Australia Terrorist Cell September 2012 Adnan Karabegović<br />
Harun Mehičević 397<br />
Kosovo Terrorist Cell November 2013 “Xhemati i Xhehadit”<br />
Genc Selimi,<br />
aka “Ebu Hafs al Albani” 398<br />
Nigde, Turkey Terrorist Attack March 2014 Albanian and Kosovar<br />
Syrian jihad veterans 399<br />
49
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Action Date Balkan Jihadi/<br />
Extremist Participants<br />
Baghdad Suicide Attack March 2014 Blerim Heta 400<br />
Baghdad Suicide Attack August 2014 Emrah Fojnica 401<br />
50
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<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Appendix 2<br />
Balkan Jihadi Casualties in Iraq and Syria<br />
(Reported)<br />
Name origin Date of<br />
Death<br />
Place Force /<br />
Affiliation<br />
Anri Maliqai Tirana, Albania Nov-12 Syria n/a<br />
Naman Demolli Pristina, Kosovo Nov-12 Syria n/a<br />
Ermal Xhelo Vlore, Albania Dec-12 Syria Al Nusra<br />
Denis Jangulli Debar, Macedonia Jan-13 Syria Al Nusra<br />
Emrah Pilipovic Velika Kladusa, BiH Jan-13 Syria n/a<br />
Hamit Muslija Laprake, Albania Jan-13 Syria n/a<br />
Muaz Ahmeti Presevo, Serbia Feb-13 Syria n/a<br />
Diamant Rasha Debar, Macedonia Feb-13 Syria Al Nusra<br />
Muhamet Koprova Mitrovica, Kosovo Mar-13 Syria n/a<br />
Moussa Ahmadi Serbia Mar-13 Syria n/a<br />
Muaz Sabic Zenica, BiH Apr-13 Aleppo, Syria n/a<br />
Eldar Kundakovic Novi Pazar, Sandzak May-13 Aleppo, Syria n/a<br />
Adis Salihovic Rozaje, Sandzak May-13 Syria n/a<br />
Rasim Zeqiri Gostivar, Macedonia May-13 Damascus, Syria n/a<br />
Sami Abdullahu Skopje, Macedonia Jul-13 Syria n/a<br />
Nimetullah Imeri Skopje, Macedonia Aug-13 Syria n/a<br />
Elmedin Velic Sarajevo, BiH Sep-13 Syria Al Nusra<br />
Dervis Halilovic Nemile, BiH Sep-13 Damascus, Syria n/a<br />
“Abduldzafar” (Nom<br />
de guerre)<br />
(unknown) (unknown) n/a n/a<br />
Anri Maliqi Tirana, Albania (unknown) Syria Al Nusra<br />
Dervis Osmanovic Zenica, BiH Sep-13 n/a n/a<br />
Pajtim Olluri Lipljan, Kosovo Sep-1 Syria n/a<br />
Senad Kobas Travnik, BiH Nov-13 Syria n/a<br />
Halit Maliqaj Tirana, Albania (unknown) Syria n/a<br />
Ebu Bilal Zenica, BiH 2013 Syria n/a<br />
Ebu Ismail Teslic, BiH 2013 Syria n/a<br />
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Name origin Date of<br />
Death<br />
Place Force /<br />
Affiliation<br />
Vernes Vehabovic Zenica, BiH Dec-13 Syria n/a<br />
Azmir Alisic Sanski Most, BiH Jan-14 Syria n/a<br />
Amir Kargic Travnik, BiH Jan-14 Syria n/a<br />
Mevludin Cicvara Vitez, Bosnia Jan-14 Syria n/a<br />
Mujo Hamidovic Sjenica, Sandzak Jan-14 Syria n/a<br />
Mirza Ganic Novi Pazar, Sandzak Jan-14 Aleppo, Syria ISIS<br />
Hasan Korvafaj Vlora, Albania (before March<br />
2014)<br />
Syria<br />
Al Nusra<br />
Ferid Tatarevic Zenica, BiH Mar-14 Syria n/a<br />
Blerim Heta Ferizaj, Kosovo Mar-14 Baghdad ISIS<br />
Anri Maliqi Tirana, Albania Mar-14 Syria n/a<br />
Munifer Karamelski Bosnia, Italy Mar-14 Syria ISIS<br />
Adnan Rexhepi Kumanovo, Macedonia May-14 Iraq ISIS<br />
Nusmir Pjanic Kalesija, BiH May-14 Syria ISIS<br />
Midhat Djono (aka<br />
“Usama Bosni”)<br />
Hadzici, BiH May-14 Syria ISIS<br />
Ismar Mesinovic Teslic, BiH July 2014 (?) Syria ISIS<br />
Patriot Matosi Gnjilane, Kosovo Aug-14 Syria ISIS<br />
Emhrah Fojnica n/a Aug-14 Baghdad, Iraq ISIS<br />
Idajet Balliu Dragostunja, Albania Aug-14 Aleppo, Syria ISIS<br />
Midjen Haljijl Ljatifi Srbica, Kosovo Aug-14 Syria n/a<br />
Sejdin Omerdzic Zenica, BiH Sep-14 Ajnul-Arab, Syria ISIS<br />
“Xhelal” Skopje, Macedonia Sep-14 n/a ISIS<br />
Ramo Pazarac Teslic, BiH Sep-14 Koban, Syria ISIS<br />
Fatima Mahmutovic Srebrenik, BiH Sep-14 Raqqa, Syria ISIS<br />
Melos Selami Kosumi Gnjilane, Kosovo Sep-14 Syria ISIS<br />
Jure Korelec Medvod, Slovenia Sep-14 Syria ISIS<br />
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Appendix 3<br />
Estimating the Size<br />
of the Militant Islamist Movement<br />
in Southeastern Europe<br />
Estimating the size of the militant Islamist movement in southeastern Europe provides several<br />
difficulties. The first is providing a precise definition of the phenomenon itself. The approach<br />
taken in this report, i.e., that militant Islamism is a doctrine which espouses an aggressive, if not<br />
always violent, approach to imposing Islamic laws and precepts on the state and society at large,<br />
is of course somewhat vague, and whether or not a specific individual or group should be included<br />
or excluded will be open to debate. Although militant Islamism can be defined and understood in<br />
various ways, as a general rule the Wahhabi movement in southeastern Europe approximates many<br />
of the attributes of the phenomenon.<br />
A second difficulty lies in finding adequate public opinion or survey data. The only data this author<br />
has seen dealing with the issue is a reported 2007 Bosnian study which found that three percent<br />
of (the presumably Muslim) population claimed to adhere to Wahhabism, and a further ten percent<br />
identified with it in some form. 402 Current and former Bosnian Wahhabis, however, claim that the<br />
movement has many secret adherents, and allegedly some forty percent of those supporting Wahhabi<br />
doctrines do not have the outward appearance of being Wahhabis. 403 Other former Bosnian Wahhabis<br />
have claimed that Wahhabi sympathizers have “infiltrated schools, universities, and the media.” 404<br />
In Kosovo security experts estimate about 50,000 people adhere to the more extreme Middle-Eastern<br />
interpretations of Islam, 405 and one expert on Balkan Islam has warned that “Exponents of Saudi-financed<br />
Wahhabism and of the Muslim Brotherhood have penetrated the highest levels of the official<br />
Kosovo Islamic apparatus.” 406 Another security specialist has claimed that “the number of believers that<br />
follow a more extreme and fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran is growing in Kosovo.” 407<br />
In Macedonia, members of the official Islamic community have estimated that there are some<br />
500-600 Wahhabis in the country (and possibly more), 408 while other security specialists believe up<br />
to 3000 Wahhabis are active in Macedonia, mainly concentrated in areas around Skopje, Tetovo,<br />
Struga, and Kumanovo. 409<br />
In Montenegro “several hundred Wahhabis” are reportedly active, primarily located near the<br />
towns of Rožaje, Plav and Gusinje. 410<br />
In 2005, the International Crisis Group estimated there were some 300 Wahhabis active in the<br />
Sandžak who control several mosques in the region. 411<br />
In the absence of more specific data on the size of the militant Islamist movement in southeastern<br />
Europe, useful information can be gleaned from the Pew Research Center’s 2013 survey<br />
of public opinion amongst various Islamic communities entitled The World’s Muslims: Religion,<br />
Politics & Society. 412 Most evident in the study is the fact that the Muslim populations in southeastern<br />
Europe are by far the most moderate in their views and attitudes of any Islamic population in<br />
the world. Thus, overwhelming majorities (some 80-90%) of the Muslim populations consistently<br />
show relatively tolerant and moderate positions on a variety of issues concerning the state, society,<br />
and religious affairs.<br />
Extrapolating from the survey data provided in the Pew report does, however, give an indication<br />
of the size of the militant Islamist phenomenon in the region. Although the survey does not ask<br />
specific questions such as “Do you adhere to Wahhabism?”, aggregating responses to a cluster of<br />
questions regarding issues typically associated with militant Islamism, such as suicide-terrorism,<br />
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capital and corporal punishment, apostasy from Islam, polygamy, and the desirability of imposing<br />
sharia law can serve as proxies for more direct questions about an individual’s particular loyalties<br />
to extreme interpretations of Islamic doctrine.<br />
The 2013 Pew report surveyed the Muslim populations in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and<br />
Kosovo, with fieldwork for all three countries being carried out between October 2011—January<br />
2012. Although the Pew report does not mention the size of the Muslim populations in each country,<br />
this exercise uses statistics provided by the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook as<br />
a standard reference to estimate the overall numerical size of the Muslim population in each given<br />
country. The World Factbook’s population estimates are then multiplied by the percentage’s reported<br />
in the 2013 Pew report to provide rough estimates of the size of the militant Islamist movement<br />
in each country. Thus, the following equation is used to calculate the size of a militant Islamist<br />
population in a given country:<br />
N x PRP = Estimated size of militant Islamist population<br />
Where N equals the CIA’s estimate for the size of the Muslim population for a particular country,<br />
and PRP equals the percentage response to specific Pew Research report questions.<br />
For the three countries covered by the survey, the CIA estimates the Muslim populations thus:<br />
Albania: 1,775,882 413<br />
BiH: 1,548,657<br />
Kosovo: 1,766,243 414<br />
With these numbers we can then begin to estimate the size of the militant Islamist movement in<br />
each country. As noted above, the estimate is based on responses to a cluster of questions deemed<br />
to reflect the attitudes and philosophies of Wahhabism/militant Islamism. The first concerns individual<br />
attitudes towards the imposition of sharia law. According to the Pew report, the positive<br />
responses per country can be seen below:<br />
Thus, 12 percent of Muslims in Albania favor making sharia the law of the land, 15 percent<br />
of Muslims in BiH, and 20 percent of Muslims in Kosovo. Applying these numbers to the above<br />
equation returns the following numbers:<br />
Do you favor making sharia the law of the land?<br />
20%<br />
12%<br />
15%<br />
Albania BiH Kosovo<br />
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Albania (N = 1,775,882) x 0.12 = 213,106<br />
BiH (N = 1,548,647) x 0.15 = 232,297<br />
Kosovo (N = 1,766,243) x 0.20 = 353,249<br />
Another question the Pew report posed to participants in its survey pertained to attitudes regarding<br />
suicide bombings; specifically, the question asked “Do you feel that suicide bombing and<br />
other forms of violence against civilians are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies?” 415<br />
In the below, the positive responses “Often justified” and “Sometimes justified” are aggregated<br />
together; thus,<br />
Do you feel that suicide bombing and other forms of<br />
violence are justified in order to defend Islam from<br />
its enemies?<br />
11%<br />
6%<br />
3%<br />
Albania BiH Kosovo<br />
From the above responses, the number of individuals who believe suicide bombings are “Often”<br />
and “Sometimes” justified to defend Islam is as follows:<br />
Albania (N = 1,775,882) x 0.06 = 106,553<br />
BiH (N = 1,548,647) x 0.03 = 46,459<br />
Kosovo (N = 1,766,243) x 0.11 = 194,287<br />
The Pew survey also asked respondents to provide their views on severe forms of corporal<br />
punishment; specifically, question 92c asked “Do you favor or oppose punishments like whippings<br />
and cutting off hands for crimes like theft and robbery?” 416 The positive responses were as follows:<br />
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Do you favor or oppose punishments like whipping and<br />
cutting off hands for crimes like theft and robbery?<br />
20%<br />
12%<br />
15%<br />
Albania BiH Kosovo<br />
In terms of actual numbers, the responses suggest the following:<br />
Albania (N = 1,775,882) x 0.09 = 159,829<br />
BiH (N = 1,548,647) x 0.13 = 201,324<br />
Kosovo (N = 1,766,243) x 0.10 = 176,624<br />
A follow-up question (Q92d) asked respondents “Do you favor or oppose stoning people who<br />
commit adultery?” 417 The positive responses were as follows:<br />
Do you favor or oppose stoning people who<br />
commit adultery?<br />
20%<br />
12%<br />
15%<br />
Albania BiH Kosovo<br />
Albania (N = 1,775,882) x 0.06 = 106,552<br />
BiH (N = 1,548,647) x 0.06 = 92,919<br />
Kosovo (N = 1,766,243) x 0.09 = 158,962<br />
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Q92d asked respondents “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for people who leave the<br />
Muslim religion?”, with the positive responses as below: 418<br />
Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for people<br />
who leave the Muslim religion?<br />
20%<br />
12%<br />
15%<br />
Albania BiH Kosovo<br />
Albania (N = 1,775,882) x 0.02 = 35,517<br />
BiH (N = 1,548,647) x 0.04 = 61,946<br />
Kosovo (N = 1,766,243) x 0.03 = 52,987<br />
Finally, Q84b asked respondents about another issue often associated with Wahhabi/militant Islamist<br />
communities, i.e., attitudes towards polygamy. Thus, in response to a question as to whether<br />
polygamy is morally acceptable or morally wrong (or whether it is a moral issue at all), the positive<br />
responses were as follows:<br />
Is polygamy morally acceptable?<br />
20%<br />
12%<br />
15%<br />
Albania BiH Kosovo<br />
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Albania (N = 1,775,882) x 0.10 = 177,588<br />
BiH (N = 1,548,647) x 0.04 = 61,946<br />
Kosovo (N = 1,766,243) x 0.21 = 370,911<br />
Averaging out the responses to the above five questions which in this theoretical exercise represent<br />
the value or belief system of the “typical” militant Islamist hypothetically yields the potential<br />
following sizes of the militant Islamist movement in each of the three countries:<br />
Albania = 117,208<br />
BiH = 92,919<br />
Kosovo = 190,754<br />
Although the figures for Albania and BiH seem plausible, the estimate for the size of the militant<br />
Islamist movement in Kosovo seems rather high in comparison to the other two countries. This<br />
is probably due to the exceptionally large number of positive responses in Kosovo to the question<br />
about polygamy. A number somewhere in the range of 125,000 —140,000 thus seems more plausible.<br />
In analyzing the above data, the encouraging news is that substantial majorities of southeastern<br />
Europe’s Muslim populations reject extreme interpretations of Islamic doctrines and texts.<br />
On the other hand, a critical albeit-small mass of the population does appear to have internalized<br />
and now espouses the more extreme versions of Islam common in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan,<br />
or Saudi Arabia. Within the three countries surveyed, the data suggests some 147,000 people believe<br />
apostates from Islam should be given the death penalty, 359,000 people believe adulterers<br />
should be stoned to death, 530,000 people believe in cutting off hands and whippings for various<br />
crimes, 300,000 people endorse suicide-bombings to defend Islam, and close to 800,000 people<br />
believe sharia law should be adopted in their countries.<br />
The Pew report unfortunately did not cover Muslim attitudes in other Balkan countries, but<br />
were Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia to be included, the size of the militant<br />
Islamist movement in southeastern Europe would most probably number over 500,000 people.<br />
Other anecdotal and inferential evidence suggests the Wahhabi/militant Islamist movement in<br />
the region is continuing to grow and attract new adherents, or is at least attracting more individuals<br />
interested in learning about extreme-Islamist perspectives on current events. As noted above, the<br />
aforementioned 2014 Austrian intelligence report claimed that the Wahhabi movement in Bosnia<br />
continues to grow and build new communities. 419 Similarly, interest in extremist websites is growing<br />
at a rapid pace. In the one month between mid-October 2014 and mid-November 2014, the<br />
number of Facebook fans of the extremist website Vijesti Ummeta increased by over ten percent,<br />
from 13,551 to 15,133 (as of 22 November 2014). In the same period the extremist website Saff<br />
showed a similar increase in the number of Facebook fans, rising from 12,352 to 13,496 (as of 22<br />
November 2014), another increase of some ten percent.<br />
Potential increases in the size of the militant Islamist movement in southeastern Europe raise<br />
important concerns for both domestic and international policymakers. Arguably, relatively normal<br />
democratic politics can be sustained in these societies if the size of the militant Islamist movement<br />
remains at current levels and remains a marginal phenomenon. What is unknown, however, is what<br />
the impact on these states and societies would be if, for instance, the militant Islamist movement in<br />
the region was to grow from 5-10 percent of the population to 15-20 percent.<br />
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An implicit argument in this analysis is that the origins of any terrorist threat emanating from<br />
southeastern Europe will most likely be found in the milieu which gives rise to such individuals—<br />
the militant Islamist movement. Thus, knowledge of the number of individuals who espouse or<br />
endorse the core values of this movement is crucial to determining the actual size of the movement<br />
itself. For security and intelligence agencies, these numbers should provide an indication of the<br />
magnitude of the challenge they are facing, and help them in deciding upon an adequate allocation<br />
of resources to containing the threat.<br />
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Appendix 4<br />
Balkan Militant Islamist Websites/<br />
Electronic Media<br />
Website/Media Address Orientation/<br />
Editorial<br />
Policy<br />
Associated<br />
with<br />
Facebook<br />
Fans<br />
Balkanski Emirat http://balkanskiemirat.blogspot.com/ n/a Nusret Imamović n/a<br />
Ensarija Šerijata<br />
http://www.geocities.ws/ensarije_seriata/<br />
onama.htm<br />
Islamist/Pro-Taliban<br />
Abu Hamza<br />
al-Misri<br />
Kelimetul-Haqq http://www.kelimetul-haqq.org/ (unknown) Nedžad Balkan n/a<br />
PutHilafeta http://puthilafeta.blogspot.com/ Islamist/Pro-ISIS (unknown) n/a<br />
PutVjernika www.putvjernika.com Pro-al Nusra Front Nusret Imamović n/a<br />
n/a<br />
PutVjernika<br />
(Facebook portal)<br />
SalafiMedia Balkan<br />
https://www.facebook.com/putvjernika.<br />
official<br />
https://www.youtube.com/user/SalafiMediaBalkans<br />
Pro-al Nusra Front Nusret Imamović 5,495<br />
Pro-ISIS<br />
Saff www.saff.ba Islamist/Anti-ISIS Fatmir Alispahić,<br />
Ezhar Beganović<br />
Spašena Skupina www.spasenaskupina.com Islamist/Pro-ISIS Bilal Bosnić n/a<br />
Stazom Islama www.stazomislama.com (non-political) Idriz Bilbani 122<br />
14,757<br />
Vijesti Ummeta www.vijestiummeta.com Islamist/Pro-ISIS (unknown) 16,370<br />
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Endnotes<br />
1. “Islamism” is here defined as a doctrine calling for the imposition of Islamic laws and precepts on the state and<br />
society at large. “Militant Islamists” refers to those individuals who reject secular institutions and advocate an<br />
aggressive (if not completely violent) approach to imposing such a system. Although roughly equivalent to Gilles<br />
Kepel’s definition of “salafi jihadism,” the term “militant Islamism” is more appropriate in the Balkan case since<br />
Balkan Islam adheres to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, as opposed to the Hanbali school from which<br />
Salafism derives. The most extreme and violent subset of the militant Islamists is usually considered the takfiri<br />
movement who support using violence even against other Muslims if they are not devout. For a useful dissection<br />
of the various factions and trends amongst militant Islamists, see Muhamed Jusić, “Islamistički pokreti u XX<br />
stoljeću i njihovo prisustvo u Bosni i Hercegovini,” in Islamska scena u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: Udruženje<br />
Ilmijje Islamske Zajednice BiH/Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, 2011), 29-41. Here it is imperative to stress that<br />
Balkans Muslim populations generally have a more secular and moderate outlook than those in North Africa<br />
or the Middle-East. Thus, relatively few Balkan Muslims can be considered Islamists, and only a subset of those<br />
militant. The problem of Islamist terrorism in southeastern Europe is usually equated with the Wahhabi movement,<br />
although, as one truism goes, “Not all Wahhabis are terrorists, but all terrorists are Wahhabis.”<br />
2. For a listing of international terrorist actions that have Balkan roots or connections, see Appendix 1, “Balkan<br />
Jihadi/Extremist Threat Matrix,” page 45.<br />
3. See Holbrooke, “Lessons from Dayton for Iraq,” The Washington Post, 23 April 2008, A21.<br />
4. See Dženna Halimović “BiH od uvoznika postala izvoznik terorista,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 August 2014, at<br />
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/bih-od-uvoznika-postala-izvoznik-terorista/26529122.html, accessed on<br />
24 August 2014 at 9:44am EST.<br />
5. For useful, concise analyses of Izetbegović life, work, and legacy, see David Binder’s obituary, “Alija Izetbegovic,<br />
Muslim Who Led Bosnia, Dies at 78,” The New York Times, 20 October 2003; and Damjan Krnjević de Miskevic,<br />
“Obituary: Alija Izetbegovic, 1925-2003.” The National Interest, 22 October 2003.<br />
6. See, for instance, Izetbegović’s interviews in Mladi Muslimani (Sarajevo: Muslimanska Biblioteka, 1991), 53-69,<br />
and in Sead Trhulj, Mladi Muslimani (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), 59.<br />
7. See Mehmedalija Bojić, Historija Bosne i Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: Šahinpašić, 2001), 237-240; and Kasim Suljević,<br />
Nacionalnost Muslimana (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1981), 217-220.<br />
8. The “Zakletva” (Oath) of the Mladi Muslimani dates from approximately 1947; see Trhulj, Mladi Muslimani, op.<br />
cit., 121.<br />
9. See the “Uputstvo za rad” (“Instructions for Work”) of the Mladi Muslimani, available in Trhulj, Mladi Muslimani,<br />
op. cit., 131-138.<br />
10. Thus, one of the Mladi Muslimani’s original members, Emin Granov, wrote a pamphlet in the organization’s early<br />
years entitled “Kako ćemo se boriti” (“How we will struggle”) in which he explains the following: “Ideological<br />
strength . . . gives us the necessary fanaticism with which we will feverishly and persistently defend Islam to the end.<br />
We will fight with equal fanaticism in any discussion, polemics, war of nerves, whether in physical, political, military<br />
struggle! That’s how Mladi Muslimani should be! . . . The strength and effect of our reaction depends upon<br />
our fanaticism and ideological development. The more fanatic and developed we are the stronger our reaction will<br />
be . . . When a person loves and values something fanatically, in this concrete case Islam, then it hurts and insults<br />
them when someone dismisses, laughs at, attacks or destroys it. In our ideological upbringing and development we<br />
will choose people who are combative to the end, irreconcilable and fanatic advocates of Islamic thought, because<br />
our entire movement depends upon such people! . . . How must Mladi Muslimani be! Muslims, and if possible all<br />
of them, but Mladi Muslimani unconditionally, must be determined and irreconcilable fighters, hard and fanatic in<br />
their Islamic convictions . . . and the bright future of Islam will be assured!” See Granov’s essay in Trhulj, Mladi<br />
Muslimani, op. cit., 122-125. (Emphasis added).<br />
11. See Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), 242.<br />
12. See Enver Redžić, Muslimansko autonomaštvo i 13. SS divizija (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1987), 205. In recent years,<br />
a neo-fascist fringe group has been formed in Bosnia named Bosanski Pokret Nacionalnog Ponsa (“the Bosnian<br />
Movement of National Pride”) which explicitly claims to have a “national socialist” program. Although the party<br />
maintains a website and appears to distribute leaflets in various cities around Bosnia, it remains a minuscule fringe<br />
group. For more on Bosnia’s most explicitly fascist party, see the group’s website at http://www.bosanski-nacionalisti.org,<br />
and Marija Arnautović, “Osnovan Bosanski Pokret Nacionalnog Ponosa,” Radio Slobodna Evropa,<br />
12 February 2014, at http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/neonacisti_bih/1956417.html, accessed on 30 April<br />
2014 at 10:12am EST.<br />
13. See Xavier Bougarel, “L’islam bosniaque, entre identité culturelle et idéologie politique,” in Xavier Bougarel and Nathalie<br />
Clayer, Le Nouvel Islam balkanique: Les musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme, 1990-2000 (Paris: Maisonneuve<br />
& Larose, 2001), 82-83. The New York Times veteran Balkan correspondent, David Binder, has reported<br />
that Izetbegović sided with the faction within the Mladi Muslimani that supported the SS Handžar division. See<br />
Binder, “Alija Izetbegovic, Muslim Who Led Bosnia, Dies at 78,” op. cit. For more on the role of the Bosnian SS<br />
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Handžar Division, see David G. Dalin and John F. Rothman, Icon of Evil: Hitler’s Mufti and the Rise of Radical<br />
Islam (New York: Random House, 2008); George Lepre, Himmler’s Bosnian Division: The Waffen SS Handschar<br />
Division, 1943-1945 (Schiffer Publishing, 1997); Jonathan Trigg, Hitler’s Jihadis: Muslim Volunteers of the<br />
Waffen SS (Gloucestershire, UK: Spellmount Publishers, 2012); and Redžić, Muslimansko autonomaštvo i 13. SS<br />
divizija, op. cit.<br />
14. As cited by Vuk Baćanović, “SS oficir za bratstvo i jedinstvo,” BH Dani 855 (Sarajevo), 1 November 2013, 32—34.<br />
15. For the full text of the “Memorandum,” see Redžić, Muslimansko autonomaštvo i 13. SS divizija, op. cit., 71-79.<br />
16. See Armina Omerika, “The Role of Islam in the Academic Discourses on the National Identity of Muslims in<br />
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1950-1980,” Islam and Muslim Societies 2 (2006), 365.<br />
17. See “Osnovna škola u Goraždu nosi ime po nacističkom SS oficiru,” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 22 October 2013, at<br />
http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/10985/dio_roditelja_ogorchen_osnovna_skola_u_gorazdu_nosi_ime_po_nacistichkom_ss_oficiru_photo.html,<br />
accessed on 23 October 2013 at 9:40am EST.<br />
18. For more on these points, see Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, op. cit., 239; see also John R. Schindler,<br />
Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida and the Rise of Global Jihad (St. Paul, MN.: Zenith Press, 2007), 37-46.<br />
19. See the comments by Afghanistan and Bosnia jihad veteran Sheik al-Mujahideen Abu Abdel Aziz ‘Barbaros’ (Bosnia),”<br />
Al-Sirat al Mustaqeem (“The Right Path”), No. 33 (August 1994).<br />
20. See Izetbegović, Islamska Deklaracija (Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990), 22-43. Izetbegovic’s view that “there is no peace<br />
or co-existence between Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political institutions,” anticipates of course the<br />
views of Osama bin-Laden and other Islamist extremists some two decades later. As the Rand Corporation<br />
terrorism expert Brian Jenkins notes, “for the jihadis, war is a condition, war is perpetual, war is infinite.” See<br />
Jim Woolen, “Endless War is bin-Laden’s Whole Point,” available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128353&page=1#.T7KCTFLy_IU,<br />
accessed on 15 May 2012 at: 12:26pm EST.<br />
21. See Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford, 2002), 77.<br />
22. See Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Tedd Robert Gurr, Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist<br />
and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security (New York: Routledge, 2013), 69. “Dhimmi” is an historical and<br />
judicial term referring to a non-Muslim citizen of an Islamic state in which various political, social and economic<br />
restrictions are imposed upon them. For an extensive examination of the concept of ‘dhimmitude,” see Bat Ye’or,<br />
The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson<br />
University Press, 1996).<br />
23. For instance, Sefer Halilović, the first chief of staff of the Bosnian Muslim army, reported a conversation with<br />
Izetbegović in which he said, “We need a piece of land which can hold some two million people. Some will come,<br />
some will go, and it will be enough.”See Halilović, Lukava Strategija (Sarajevo: Marsal, 1997), 23. Along<br />
similar lines, one Sarajevo commentator would note after the SDA’s Second Party Congress in September 1997,<br />
“the SDA wants BosniaHerzegovina, but mainly as a (mono) religious and mono (ethnic) state, and on as big a<br />
piece of territory as possible.” See Mirko Šagolj’s commentary in Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 23 September 1997, 2.<br />
Izetbegović’s aim to create a Muslim mini-state in Bosnia remains a topic of considerable interest and debate in<br />
Bosnia. For eyewitness accounts of the internal plans within the Izetbegović regime to create a Muslim mini-state<br />
at this time, see, for instance, A. Dučić, “I Bakir Izetbegović 1993. godine učestovovao u podjeli BiH,” Dnevni<br />
Avaz (Sarajevo), 20 March 2014, at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/teme/i-bakir-izetbegovic-1993-ucestvovao-u-podjeli-bih,<br />
accessed on 20 March 2014 at 9:49am EST.<br />
24. As General Sir Michael Rose, the commander of UN forces in Bosnia in 1994-95, later noted, “I came to believe<br />
that his talk of creating a multi-religious, multi-cultural state in Bosnia was a disguise for the extension of his own<br />
political power and the furtherance of Islam.”See Rose, Fighting for Peace (London: Harvill, 1998), 38. Similarly, as<br />
one Western diplomat in Bosnia told The New York Times, “. . . ‘If you read President Izetbegović’s writings, as<br />
I have, there is no doubt that he is an Islamic fundamentalist,’ said a senior Western diplomat with long experience<br />
in the region. ‘He is a very nice fundamentalist, but he is still a fundamentalist. This has not changed. His goal is<br />
to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia, and the Serbs and Croats understand this better than the rest of us’ . . . “ See<br />
Chris Hedges, “Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies,” The New York Times, 2 September 1996.<br />
25. According to Bougarel, “L’islam bosniaque, entre identité culturelle et idéologie politique,” op. cit., 87.<br />
26. See Jahić, “A Virtuous Muslim State,” Front Slobode (Tuzla), 23 August 1996, available at: http://www.ex-yupress.com/<br />
froslo/froslo4.html, accessed on 24 June 2012 at: 8:08pm EST.<br />
27. As cited by Ina Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transnationalism<br />
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 60.<br />
28. On the debates in Bosnia over whether it was appropriate to proclaim soldiers killed in Izetbegović’s army “šehids,”<br />
see Xavier Bougarel, “Death and the Nationalist: Martyrdom, War Memory and Veteran Identity among Bosnian<br />
Muslims,” in Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duijzings, eds., The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories<br />
and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 167-191.<br />
29. Ganić was named a “gazi” in 2011 by the official Islamic Community of Bosnia. See Stephen Schwartz, “Defending<br />
Bosnia-Herzegovina from Radical Islam,” 11 June 2011, at http://www.islamicpluralism.org/1810/defending-bosnia-hercegovina-from-radical-islam,<br />
accessed on 3 January 2014 at 1:14pm EST.<br />
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30. See Ivana Jovanovic, Muhamet Brajshori and Paul Ciocoiu, “Radical Islamist Threatens Balkans with Terror Attacks,”<br />
The Southeast European Times, 8 October 2012, at http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/10/08/feature-02,<br />
accessed on 10 March 2013 at 10:35am EST.<br />
31. See John Pomfret, “Bosnia’s Muslims Dodged Embargo,” The Washington Post, 22 September 1996, A01.<br />
32. On Cerić’s calls for a “Bosniac state,” see, for instance, “Bošnjaci moraju napraviti svoju mapu puta,” at http://panbosnjak.com/2012/04/12/bosnjaci-moraju-napraviti-svoju-mapu-puta/,<br />
accessed on 21 January 2013 at 12:37pm EST, and<br />
Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 24 April 2009, at http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/index.php?id=9948 accessed on 21 January<br />
2013 at 12:26pm EST. See also “Tony Blair’s Charity under Investigation for Brotherhood Ties,” Al Arabiya, 13<br />
April 2014, at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2014/04/13/Tony-Blair-s-charity-under-investigation-over-Brotherhood-ties.html,<br />
accessed on 18 November 2014 at 7:03pm EST. The involvement of Cerić and<br />
Al-Shatti in Blair’s foundation prompted U.K. prime minister David Cameron to order MI5 and MI6 to investigate the<br />
two individuals’ ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. See Robert Verkaik and Robert Mendik, “Tony Blair’s advisers<br />
and their ‘ties to extremist group’.” The Guardian (U.K.), 13 April 2014, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/10762919/Tony-Blairs-advisers-and-their-ties-to-extremist-group.html,<br />
accessed on 18 November<br />
2014 at 7:10pm EST.<br />
33. As quoted by Katie Harris, “Bosnia’s First Ever Census Sparks Heated Debate About National Identity,” Time, 14<br />
October 2013, at http://world.time.com/2013/10/14/bosnias-first-ever-census-sparks-heated-debate-over-national-identity/,<br />
accessed on 21 October 2013 at 10:09 am EST. Emphasis added.<br />
34. See Dragan Sladojević, “Bosnić: Naše je od Prijedora do Sandžaka,” Nezavisne Novine (Banja Luka), 16 September<br />
2013, at http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Bosnic-Nase-je-od-Prijedora-do-Sandzaka-209475.html,<br />
accessed on 17 September 2013 at 8:50am EST.<br />
35. See “Srbi i Hrvati trebaju dati ‘harač’ da ih niko nebi dirao,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 18 February 2013, at http://<br />
www.avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/srbi-i-hrvati-trebaju-dati-harac-da-ih-niko-ne-bi-dirao, accessed on 14<br />
March 2013 at 10:33am EST.<br />
36. See Hajrudin Somun, “Sarajevo as Seen by Erdoğan and Milorad Dodik,” Today’s Zaman (Ankara), 7 October<br />
2012, at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-294484-sarajevo-as-seen-by-erdogan-and-milorad-dodik-by-hajrudin-somun*.html,<br />
accessed on 17 September 2013 at 11:15am EST.<br />
37. See Brian Hall, The Impossible Country: A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin,<br />
1995), 162.<br />
38. See Zorica Ilić, “Dr. Mustafa Cerić: Od Pohvala do Osuda,” Deutsche Welle, 16 November 2012, at http://www.<br />
dw.de/dr-mustafa-ceri%C4%87-od-pohvala-do-osuda/a-16384747, accessed on 16 October 2013 at 2:56pm EST.<br />
On another occasion, Cerić similarly noted, “Of course if you look at the Sharia of the way it is presented as the<br />
poenal (sic) law – cutting the head and cutting the hand on (sic) so on . . . Then of course your understanding of<br />
Sharia is fearful and is appalling to you . . . [but] I cannot disavow myself from the Sharia.” See Cerić’s interview,<br />
“Second Hour: Dr. Mustafa Ceric, Grand Mufti of Bosnia,” conducted on 18 March 2007, at http://www.abc.net.<br />
au/sundaynights/stories/s1874731.htm, accessed on 10 October 2013 at 3:43pm EST.<br />
39. See Nadeem Azan, “A Conversation with Dr. Mustafa Cerić,” at http://www.angelfire.com/hi/nazam/Aceric.html,<br />
accessed on 16 July 2014 at 9:14am EST. Cerić is known for promoting himself as a “moderate” Islamic leader<br />
before western audiences while within Bosnia “according to some Bosnian human rights activists, Cerić is nothing<br />
less than a fundamentalist, hidden under a fake image of tolerance.” See Stefano Giantin, “Bosnian Grand Mufti<br />
Ceric is No Peacemaker and Should Not Receive Ducci Foundation Peace Prize,” Il Piccolo (Trieste), 6 March<br />
2012, at http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=72271, accessed on 16 July 2014 at 10:03am EST.<br />
40. See The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics & Society (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2013), 46.<br />
41. A video of the February 2013 lecture by Imamović and Bosnić in Tuzla is available at http://www.youtube.com/<br />
watch?v=lgMzQiIlTDQ As of October 2014 it has received over 5,650 hits. Some five hundred people were in the<br />
audience. For a report on the meeting, see Robert Coalson and Maja Nikolic, “Radical Islamists Seek to Exploit<br />
Frustration in Bosnia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1 March 2013, at http://www.rferl.org/content/bosnia-islamists/24916517.html,<br />
accessed on 27 October 2013.<br />
42. See the aforementioned essay by Granov, Kako ćemo se boriti,” in Trhulj, Mladi Muslimani, op. cit., 122-125.<br />
43. For just a sampling of such references, see “Srebrenica je Mekka u Bošnjaka,” Saff (Sarajevo), no. 320, 29 June<br />
2012, 5; see also Dzenanna Karup’s interview with several members of Aktivna Islamska Omladina (AIO), a<br />
group with close ties to the Wahhabi’s, where again readers are reminded that Muslims “should not take Jews and<br />
Christians as friends,” See Karup, “Kur’an je naš ustav,” BH Dani 72 (Sarajevo), 30 March 1998, at http://www.<br />
bhdani.com/arhiva/72/tekst172.htm, accessed on 25 November 2012 at 11:05am EST.<br />
44. See the Proglas (“Proclamation”) of the Mladi Muslimani, available in Trhulj, Mladi Muslimani, op .cit., 126-128.<br />
The Proglas was written at some point in the 1940s (no specific date provided), penned by organization members<br />
in Mostar and accepted by the organization’s leadership in Sarajevo. “Tekbir” is the Arabic term for the phrase<br />
“Allahu Akbar” (i.e., “God is Great”).<br />
45. See “Odgovor na reagovanje Partije Pravog Puta povodom minulih izbora,” 10 January 2012, at http://www.putvjernika.com/Fetve-i-odgovori/odgovor-na-reagovanje-partije-pravog-puta-povodom-minulih-izbora.html,<br />
accessed<br />
on 6 August 2012 at 8:06pm EST.<br />
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46. See Maja Radević, “Budučnost obrazovanja u BiH je dobra—jer teško da može biti gora,” Slobodna Bosna 840<br />
(Sarajevo), 13 December 2012, 56.<br />
47. See, for instance, Halilović’s hutba (sermon), “Bosna i Hercegovina na udaru neprijatelja,” at http://www.medzlis-konjic.com/cms/index.php/hutbe-i-tekstovi/nezim-ef-halilovic/1731-bosna-i-hercegovina-na-udaru-neprijatelja,<br />
accessed on 8 April 2014 at 12:29pm EST, and the article by Fatmir Alispahić, “Treba srušiti dejtonski poredak,<br />
a ne ovu ili onu vlast,” Saff (Sarajevo), 9 February 2014, at http://www.Saff.ba/bih/1020-treba-srusiti-dejtonskiporedak-a-ne-ovu-ili-onu-vlast,<br />
accessed on 8 April 2014 at 12:33pm EST.<br />
48. See Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten (Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group Europe Report No. 162), 8<br />
April 2005, 25.<br />
49. As published on the PutVjernika website, http://www.putvjernika.com/Fetve-i-odgovori/ispijanje-kahve-sa-nevjernikom-i-propis-el-vela-vel-beraa-privrenost-i-odricanje.html,<br />
accessed on 13 February 2014 at 4:44pm EST.<br />
Some Islamic scholars claim “friends” should be translated as “allies.”<br />
50. Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 26 September 1997, 8.<br />
51. As quoted by Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qaida, and the Rise of Global Jihad, op. cit., 142.<br />
52. See Bosnić’s sermon, “Muslimani, Jedno Tijelo,” at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IyiDp5jeOPE, accessed on<br />
19 November 2013 at 11:09am EST. As of October 2014 the sermon had received 8,360 hits.<br />
53. See The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics & Society, op. cit., 123.<br />
54. See Tihomir Loza, “Apartheid Redux,” at http://www.tol.org/client/article/21168-apartheid-redux.html The belief<br />
that ethnoconfessional differences impose barriers between people has long been a trope of Islamists in the region.<br />
In the late 1980s, for instance, the anthropologist Tone Bringa related the following discussion she had with a<br />
Muslim cleric in the central Bosnian village she studied: “the local hodza (Islamic instructor) reminded me that<br />
there was a limit to my friendship with and understanding of the Muslims. Ultimately I was not one of them, I was<br />
not Muslim.” See Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village<br />
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), xvi.<br />
55. The aforementioned “Memorandum” of 1942, for instance, claimed that “Even if we live in this land in which the<br />
majority consists of Slavic peoples, even if we speak the Bosnian language which is similar to Serbo-Croatian, by<br />
race and by blood we are not Slavs, but Goths in origin.” See Redžić, Muslimansko autonomaštvo i 13. SS divizija,<br />
op. cit., 72. Mustafa Imamović, the author of a recent history entitled Historija Bošnjaka, suggests that throughout<br />
their history the Bosnian Muslims intermixed very little with neighboring Slav populations. According to<br />
Imamović, “the Bosnian Slavs, later the Bošnjaks or Bosnian Muslims . . . mixed very little with other peoples . . .<br />
Bošnjaks rarely mixed blood even with other non-Slavic Muslims, despite the strong spiritual ties with the Islamic<br />
Orient.” See Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998), 23. This theme has been taken up by Muslim<br />
clerics in the Sandzak as well; for instance, the Mufti of the Islamic Community in Serbia, Muamer Zukorlić,<br />
has urged his followers to claim that they are “Illyrs” rather than Slavs; see “Zukorlić: Mi Bošnjaci smo poreklom<br />
Iliri,” Politika (Belgrade), 6 May 2010.<br />
56. See Roger Cohen, “Bosnians Fear a Rising Tide of Islamic Authoritarianism,” The New York Times, 10 October<br />
1994, at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/10/world/bosnians-fear-a-rising-islamic-authoritarianism.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm,<br />
accessed on 13 May 2012 at: 10:59am EST.<br />
57. Ibid. Today, the aforementioned Ćeman is a judge on Bosnia’s Constitutional Court.<br />
58. See Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2 nd Edition (Bloomington, In: Indiana<br />
University Press, 1992), 21. A 1998 United States Information Agency (USIA) public opinion survey also found<br />
little evidence of interethnic unions; for instance, 99% of Bosnian Muslim respondents said that their mother had<br />
been Muslim, and 98% said their fathers had been Muslims. Among Bosnian Serbs, the respective figures were<br />
95% and 98%, and among Bosnian Croats, the respective figures were 99% and 100%. Source: Public Opinion<br />
in Bosnia-Hercegovina Volume V: Two Years After Dayton (Washington, DC: United States Information Agency,<br />
April 1998), page 171, Tables 159-160.<br />
59. See “Sufijski šejh iz Zenice preporučuje da lijene žene treba tući,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 19 August 2013, at<br />
http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/sufijski-sejh-iz-zenice-preporucuje-da-lijene-zene-treba-tuci, accessed<br />
on 24 August 2013 at 8:14am EST.<br />
60. See Hfz. Mersudin ef. Kasumović, “Kult golotinje,”at http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14980:kult-golotinje&catid=201:aktuelnosti-kat&Itemid=633,<br />
accessed on 24 August 2013<br />
at 8:55am EST.<br />
61. See the hutba (sermon) given by Sarajevo imam Nezim Halilović-Muderis, “Dan žena je neislamski praznik,” 7<br />
March 2014, at http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18961:dan-zena-je-neislamski-praznik&catid=21:nezim-ef-haliloviuderris&Itemid=602,<br />
accessed on 2 April 2014 at 8:44am EST.<br />
62. See Edona Peci, “Kosovo Muslims Probe Mufti’s Anti-Women Rant,” BalkanInsight, 7 June 2013, at http://www.<br />
balkaninsight.com/en/article/insulting-kosovo-mufti-investigated-after-hatred-speech, accessed on 1 October 2013<br />
at 8:43am EST.<br />
63. See the recent expose of practices in the Bosnian Wahhabi community by Edina Đogo, “Edinin bijeg iz vehabijskog<br />
pakla,” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 28 August 2013, at http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/10193/ekskluzivno_edinin_bijeg_iz_vehabijskog_pakla.html,<br />
accessed on 17 September 2013 at 12:15am EST.<br />
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64. See, for instance, a field report by the NGO Women in Black, “Sandzak and Fundamentalist Tendencies” (no date given,<br />
but it appears to be 2007 or later) at http://www.zeneucrnom.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=<br />
363&Itemid=78&lang=en, accessed on 27 November 2013 at 2:47pm EST. and “Genital Mutilation of Women in<br />
Sandzak,” 23 January 2007, at http://dalje.com/en-world/genital-mutilation-of-women-in-sandzak/17024, accessed<br />
on 27 November 2013 at 2:50pm EST.<br />
65. See Nidzara Ahmetasevic, “Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia,” BalkanInsight, 21 March 2007<br />
at http://birn.eu.com/en/75/10/2490/, accessed on 17 July 2012 at 11:55am EST.<br />
66. See the commentary by Ezher Beganović, “IZ u BiH mora spriječiti širenje bolesnih feminističkih tumačenja islama<br />
u srednjim školama,” Saff (Sarajevo), 9 August 2014, at http://Saff.ba/iz-u-bih-mora-sprijeciti-sirenje-bolesnih-feministickih-tumacenja-islama-u-srednjim-skolama/#.U-oQ1KOBXuA,<br />
accessed on 12 August 2014 at 9:13am EST.<br />
67. See “Catholics Leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Vatican Radio, 13 October 2012, at http://www.news.va/en/news/<br />
catholics-leaving-bosnia-herzegovina, accessed on 2 December 2012 at 12:16pm EST.<br />
68. See “Fundamentalism Rising in Bosnia,” 19 January 2012, at http://www.churchinneed.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6909,<br />
accessed on 7 July 2012 at 10:42am EST; “Radical Islam on the Rise, Sarajevo Cardinal Warns,”<br />
26 January 2012, at: http://catholicismpure.wordpress.com/2012/01/26/radical-islam-on-the-rise-sarajevo-cardinal-warns/,<br />
accessed on 7 July 2012 at: 10:44am EST.<br />
69. See “Bosnian Catholics Facing Increasing Islamic Fundamentalism,” 26 January 2012, at http://www.cinews.ie/<br />
article.php?artid=9629, accessed on 7 July 2012 at 11:24 am EST.<br />
70. See the interview published by Aid to the Church in Need, “Bishop in Bosnia-Herzegovina: instability plays into<br />
the hands of the extremists,” at http://www.churchinneed.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8055&news_iv_<br />
ctrl=1001, accessed on 6 November 2014 at 10:02am EST.<br />
71. See James M. Dorsey, “Militant Islam Gains Ground in the Balkans,” Deutsche Welle, 12 October 2010, at http://<br />
www.dw.de/militant-islam-gains-ground-in-the-balkans/a-6100488, accessed on 8 October 2013 at 10:17am EST.<br />
72. See “Bosnian Bomb Plot Fails to Stop Pope” at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/12/newsid_4022000/4022841.stm,<br />
accessed on 24 April 2013 at 10:23am EST; and Medina Delalić, “Loše plaćeni policijski<br />
amateri,” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 5 October 2002, 5-7.<br />
73. See Kemal Kurspahić, “Missed Opportunities in Post-War Bosnia,” in Media and Global Change: Rethinking<br />
Communication for Development (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales septiembre. 2005), Chapter 21,<br />
at http://sala.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl252/cgi-bin/library?e=d-000-00---0edicion--00-0-0--0prompt-10---4------0-1l--1-<br />
ru-Zz-1---20-preferences---00031-001-0-1gbk-00&cl=CL2.1&d=HASH014b1be2d97caf5ab80fba27.5.3&gc=1),<br />
accessed on 26 June 2012 at 2:40pm EST.<br />
74. See Anes Alic, “Wahhabism: From Vienna to Bosnia,” ISN Security Watch, 6 April 2007 at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/<br />
isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail//?id=53104&lng=en, accessed on 15 September 2012 at 11:28am EST.<br />
75. See Anes Alic, “The Ringleaders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Wahhabi Movement,” at http://www.jamestown.org/<br />
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1048, accessed on 14 June 2012 at: 8:06pm EST).<br />
76. See Srecko Latal, “Intrigue Over Islamic Fighter’s Escape,” at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/21424/,<br />
accessed on 3 August 2009 at 10:30am EST.<br />
77. See Jusuf Ramadanovic, “The Escape and Arrest of Abu Hamza,” The Southeast European Times, 10 September<br />
2009, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2009/09/10/<br />
feature-02, accessed on 10 October 2014 at 9:50am EST. The aforementioned Sadović has recently been named<br />
Bosnian ambassador to Qatar.<br />
78. See Rade Maroevic and Daniel Williams, “Terrorist Cells Find Foothold in the Balkans,” The Washington Post, 1<br />
December 2005.<br />
79. See Walter Mayr, “The Prophet’s Fifth Column: Islamists Gain Ground in Sarajevo,” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 25<br />
February 2009, at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-prophet-s-fifth-column-islamists-gain-groundin-sarajevo-a-609660.html,<br />
accessed on 14 June 2012 at 7:29pm EST. Homophobia is in fact a common feature<br />
of religious extremists throughout the region. Gay Pride parades have been attacked by Orthodox fundamentalist<br />
thugs in Belgrade and Podgorica as well.<br />
80. See Fatmir Alispahić, “The Spectre of Pederasty . . . “ Saff (Sarajevo), 16 June 2012, at http://www.Saff.ba/index.<br />
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2365:bauk-pederluka-krui&catid=49:kolumna&Itemid=82, accessed<br />
on 26 June 2012 at 10:42am EST.<br />
81. Fatmir Alispahić, “Sarajevski Pederistan,” Saff (Sarajevo), 15 February 2014, at http://saff.ba/sarajevski-pederistan/#.<br />
VEkPNVeOqSo, accessed on 24 October 2014 at 10:24am EST.<br />
82. Fatmir Alispahić, “Pederi su očevi pedofila,” in his collected volume, 40 izabranih kolumni iz Saffa 2003-2013 (Tuzla:<br />
Batva, 2013), 85-89.<br />
83. Alispahić, “Sarajevski Pederistan,” op. cit.<br />
84. See Tracy Wilkinson, “Muslim Regime Says Bosnia is No Place for Santa Claus,” The Los Angeles Times, 28<br />
December 1996, at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-12-28/news/mn-13133_1_santa-claus-banishment, accessed<br />
on 22 April 2013 at 8:57am EST.<br />
85. See “Father Christmas Banned in Kindergartens in Bosnia,” The Telegragh (UK), 28 December 2008, at http://<br />
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www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/4001031/Father-Christmas-banned-in-kindergartens-in-Bosnia.html,<br />
accessed on 22 April 2013 at 8:50am EST. See also Peter Beaumont, “Nationalists Triumph as ‘Grandfather<br />
Frost’ Banned in Sarajevo Infant Schools,” The Guardian (UK), 20 December 2013, at http://www.guardian.<br />
co.uk/world/2008/dec/21/balkans-christmas-school, accessed on 22 April 2013 at 9:01am EST.<br />
86. See Irfan Al-Alawi and Stephen Schwartz, “From Sweden to Macedonia: Radical Islam Continues Probing Europe,”<br />
The Weekly Standard, 14 December 2010, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/sweden-macedonia-radical-islam-continues-probing-europe_523300.html,<br />
accessed on 27 November 2013 at 4:36pm EST.<br />
87. See Elvira Jukic, “Islamist Death Threats Force Out Bosnia Minister,” BalkanInsight, 14 February 2012, at http://<br />
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dignity-rather-than-chair-sarajevo-slogans-say, accessed on 7 June 2012 at:<br />
7:25pm EST.<br />
88. See “Poziv na ubistvo: 20.000 dolara za ubistvo Rešida Hafizovića,” Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 17 August 2013,<br />
at http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/poziv-na-ubistvo-20000-dolara-za-smrt-resida-hafizovica, accessed on<br />
18 August 2013 at 8:45am EST, and Edina Kamenica, “Reakcije na prijetnje smrću prof. dr. Rešidu Hafizoviću:<br />
Ljudi nestaju, a policija šuti,” Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 20 August 2013, at http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/<br />
reakcije-na-prijetnje-smrcu-prof-dr-residu-hafizovicu-ljudi-nestaju-a-policija-suti, accessed on 24 August 2013 at<br />
9:35am EST.<br />
89. See S. Degirmendžić, “Vehabija poziva na likvidaciju Aide Ćorović,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 27 November 2013,<br />
at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/vehabija-poziva-na-likvidaciju-aide-corovic, accessed on 27<br />
November 2013 at 4:06pm EST.<br />
90. See Stephen Schwartz, “Radical Islam’s Intimidation in Kosovo,” 5 March 2014, at http://www.gatestoneinstitute.<br />
org/4202/alma-lama-kosovo-radical-islam, accessed on 29 March 2014 at 6:36pm EST.<br />
91. See Arbana Xharra, “Kosovo: Radikaler Islam als ‘tickende bombe’,” Der Standard (Vienna), 28 January 2013 at<br />
http://derstandard.at/1358304927258/Radikaler-Islam-als-tickende-Bombe-im-Kosovo, accessed on 25 April 2013<br />
at 10:40am EST; Arbana Xharra, “Fissures in the Faith: Rise of Conservative Islamists Alarms Kosovans,” BalkanInsight,<br />
24 December 2012, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fissures-in-the-faith-rise-of-conservativeislamists-alarms-kosovans,<br />
accessed on 22 April 2013 at 2:41pm EST.<br />
92. See Izetbegović, Islamska Deklaracija, op. cit., 53-54.<br />
93. See the cable produced by the US Embassy in Sarajevo, “Bosnia: Gaza Reaction Reveals Ugly Side,” at http://www.<br />
cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09SARAJEVO40, accessed on 2 May 2012 at: 4:59pm EST. Cerić’s colleague,<br />
Ismet Spahić, has likewise claimed that the Americans are committing “genocide” in Iraq. See Yaroslav Trofimov,<br />
Faith at War: A Journey on the Frontlines of Islam From Baghdad to Timbuktu (New York: Henry Holt and<br />
Company, 2005), 292.<br />
94. An accusation he has made against Stephen Schwartz of the Center for Islamic Pluralism, see Schwartz’ “Six<br />
Questions for Mustafa Ceric,” 21 May 2007, at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1837158/posts, accessed<br />
on 20 April 2013 at 12:37pm EST.<br />
95. See “Bosnia: Reis’ing Toward Trouble,” Embassy Sarajevo, 24 February 2009, Cable #09SARAJEVO226_, at<br />
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SARAJEVO226_a.html, accessed on 2 September 2014 at 3:59pm EST.<br />
96. See, for instance, Abdusamed Nasuf Bušatlić, “Sveopći rat protiv Muslimana i Islama,” Saff (Sarajevo), 13 May<br />
2013, at http://www.Saff.ba/kolumne/6-hoce-li-21-stoljece-biti-obiljezeno-stradanjem-ili-pobjedom-muslimana,<br />
accessed on 27 October 2013 at 9:52am EST.<br />
97. See Alispahić’s essay, “Marketing Tragedije,” in 40 izabranih kolumni iz Saffa 2003-2013, op. cit. 25-28. Along<br />
similar lines, when Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska, the Serb entity in Bosnia & Herzegovina,<br />
sent a message of condolence to the Israeli people on the death of Ariel Sharon, Alispahić retorted by saying that<br />
“Ariel Sharon is the Hitler of the second half of the twentieth century . . . the most prominent Zionist criminal.”<br />
See Alispahić’s comments on his weekly program Defter Hefte which airs on Sarajevo’s TV Igman, broadcast on<br />
19 January 2014 (10 th episode). In contrast to the negative attitudes displayed towards Israel in the Federation, it<br />
is interesting to note that under Dodik’s mandate the RS has been expressly pro-Israel. For instance, during the<br />
celebration of the “Day of Israel” in Banja Luka, the Israeli ambassador to Bosnia, H.E. David Cohen, expressed<br />
his thanks to President Dodik by saying “Mr. President, the State of Israel is grateful to you for your personal<br />
contribution to ensuring that Bosnia never votes against Israel at the UN or any other international forum.“ See<br />
“Cohen: Hvala Dodiku što BiH nikad nije glasala protiv Izraela,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 7 October 2013,<br />
at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/cohen-hvala-dodiku-sto-bih-nikad-nije-glasala-protiv-izraela,<br />
accessed on 28 January 2014 at 11:55pm EST. The Jerusalem Post has described the RS as “Israel’s Best Friend in<br />
Europe.” See Michael Freund, “Israel’s Best Friend in Europe,” The Jerusalem Post, 3 May 2014, at http://www.<br />
jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Fundamentally-Freund-Israels-best-friend-in-Europe-351233, accessed on<br />
24 October 2014 at 10:10am EST.<br />
98. As reported by Lorenzo Vidino, “Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland” (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich,<br />
November 2013), at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=172401, accessed<br />
on 28 January 2014 at 12:26pm EST. A YouTube spot of the specific Bosnić sermon is available at http://www.<br />
youtube.com/watch?v=WIfCn5gR16E&list=UUDrQo1TGhnA6_8jt1ZgIvHA&index=39%20%28.<br />
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99. As noted by the PBS Frontline documentary “Son of Al Qaeda,” at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/<br />
khadr/family/cron.html, accessed on 15 January 2015 at 10:02am EST.<br />
100. See Mayr, “The Prophet’s Fifth Column: Islamists Gain Ground in Sarajevo,” op. cit. The reference to Jews<br />
as “animals” is not the rant of an isolated extremist, it is relatively mainstream in Islamist religious and political<br />
circles. Thus, in 2010, the recently deposed president of Egypt, Mohammed Morsi, urged Egyptians to “nurse our<br />
children and our grandchildren on hatred for Jews and Zionists . . . the descendants of apes and pigs.” See David<br />
D. Kirkpatrick, “Morsi’s Slurs Against Jews Stir Concern,” The New York Times, 14 January 2013, at http://www.<br />
nytimes.com/2013/01/15/world/middleeast/egypts-leader-morsi-made-anti-jewish-slurs.html?_r=0, accessed on 14<br />
March 2013 at 2:02pm EST.<br />
101. According to the US State Department cable, “ Macedonia: A/s O’Brien Visit Highlights Terrorism Financing Issues,”<br />
Embassy Skopje (Macedonia), 22 August 2007, at http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07SKOPJE695&q=macedonia,<br />
accessed on 28 January 2014 at 11:45pm EST.<br />
102. See “Selefije u ‘svetom ratu’: ekslusivna ispovijest bh. džihad ratnika u Siriji,” 10 July 2013, at http://source.ba/<br />
clanak/1400134/vijesti/Ekskluzivna%20ispovijest%20bh.%20d%C5%BEihad%20ratnika%20u%20Siriji/?ref=najcitaniji,<br />
accessed on 27 July 2013 at 10:05am EST.<br />
103. See Veselin Toshkov, Sabina Niksic, Dusan Stojanovic, Llazar Semini, Nebi Qena and Elena Becatoros, “Radical<br />
Islam on Rise in Balkans, Raising Fears of Security Threats to Europe,” Associated Press (dateline Skopje), 18<br />
September 2010, at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/09/18/radical-islam-rise-balkans-raising-fears-security-threat-europe/,<br />
accessed on 17 July 2013 at 1:17pm EST.<br />
104. Jack Kelley, “Bin Laden’s training camps teach curriculum of carnage,” USA Today, 26 November 2001, 1A.<br />
105. The video (with translation) is available at http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/3459.htm, accessed on 8 October 2013<br />
at 10:38 EST. Similarly, Nusret Imamović has endorsed suicide bombings against non-believers as being consistent<br />
with Islamic tenets. See See Vlado Azinovic, “The True Aims of Bosnia’s ‘Operation Light’,” at http://www.<br />
rferl.org/content/The_True_Aims_Of_Bosnias_Operation_Light/1954254.html, accessed on 25 April 2012 at:<br />
7:40pm EST.<br />
106. See Wood, “Police Raid Raises Fear of Bosnia as Haven for Terrorists,” The New York Times, 3 December 2005,<br />
at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/03/international/europe/03bosnia.html?ei=5099&en=e0e1466f0bb188f3&ex-<br />
=1134190800&adxnnl=1&partner=TOPIX&adxnnlx=1133586686-oKfynmL95HY2Roh6Wumt+w&_r=0, accessed<br />
on 13 February 2014 at 9:22am EST.<br />
107. See Visar Duriqi, “Rrëfimi i familjes së kamikazit nga Kosova që vrau 50 persona në Bagdad: E mashtruan, ndiqte<br />
ligjëratat e Shefqet Krasniqit,” Gazeta Express (Priština), 1 April 2014, at http://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/<br />
rrefimi-i-familjes-se-kamikazit-nga-kosova-qe-vrau-50-persona-ne-bagdad-e-mashtruan-ndiqte-ligjeratat-e-shefqetkrasniqit-6019/,<br />
accessed on 24 September 2014 at 9:47am EST.<br />
108. See Hajrudin Somun, “Balkan Jihadists Part of a Global Menace,” Today’s Zaman (Istanbul), 4 October 2014, at<br />
http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_balkan-jihadists-part-of-a-global-menace_360616.html, accessed on 6 October<br />
2014 at 1:18pm EST.<br />
109. See “Emrah Fojnica šehidio danas u Iraku,” Vijestiummeta, 12 August 2014, at http://vijestiummeta.com/emrah-fojnica-sehidio-danas-u-iraku/,<br />
accessed on 12 August 2014 at 9:23am EST; “U Iraku danas poginuo Emrah Fojnica<br />
pri pokušaju izvođenja samoubilačkog napada,” Saff (Sarajevo), 8 August 2014, at http://Saff.ba/u-iraku-dans-poginuo-emrah-fojnica/#.U-oTXKOBXuA,<br />
accessed on 12 August 2014 at 9:26am EST.<br />
110. Ceresnjes and Green, “The Global Jihad Movement in Bosnia,” op. cit.<br />
111. See the comments by Professor Adnan Silajdžić of the Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Sarajevo in the program “Tkz.<br />
Selefije i Vehabije,” (Sarajevo: Bosnian Federation TV program Pošteno). Date unknown.<br />
112. See Isa Blumi, “The Islamist Challenge in Kosova,” Current History (March 2003), 125.<br />
113. See Konstantin Testorides, “Radical Islam on Rise in Balkans,” Associated Press, 19 September 2011 at http://<br />
hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BALKANS_RADICAL_ISLAM?SITE=TNMEM&SECTION=HOME&-<br />
TEMPLATE=DEFAULT, accessed on 21 September 2010 at: 5:45pm EST<br />
114. See the comments by Dmitar Avramov in Toshkov, et. Al, “Radical Islam on Rise in Balkans, Raising Fears of<br />
Security Threats to Europe,” op. cit.<br />
115. See Dusica Tomovic, “All Female Islamic School Opens in Montenegro,” BalkanInsight, 28 April 2014, at http://<br />
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegro-gets-female-madrasah, accessed on 29 April 2014 at 3:56pm EST.<br />
116. See Esad Hećimović, “Radical movements—a challenge for moderate Balkan-Islam?” (paper available at http://<br />
www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/rel_exterm_vs_fried_beweg_05_radical_movements_moderate_balkan_<br />
islam_e_hecimovic_17.pdf , 96, 109, accessed on 22 January 2014 at 6:06pm EST.<br />
117. See Azinović’s comments in Rusmir Smajilhodzić, “Saudi Style Wahhabism Flourishes in Bosnia,” Middle East<br />
Online, 29 September 2010, at http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=41577, accessed on 11 February<br />
2014 at 12:56pm EST. Similarly, Senad Agić, a Bosnian imam in the United States, warned in 2004 that Wahhabi<br />
groups in Bosnia “are increasing in strength, publishing magazines, and have their own radio stations. If that is<br />
not monitored and controlled, there is a possibility that traditional Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina will change.”<br />
See Agić’s comments as quoted by Stephen Schwartz, “Wahhabism and Al Qaeda in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” The<br />
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Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 20, 20 October 2004, at http://www.islamicpluralism.<br />
org/1270/wahhabism-and-al-qaeda-in-bosnia-herzegovina, accessed on 30 March 2014 at 11:01am EST.<br />
118. See Kerem Őktem, “New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans,”<br />
(European Studies Center, University of Oxford: December 2010), 19. As of 2005, Ahmet Alibašić has reported<br />
that there were 100 Bosnian students in Saudi Arabia, 60 in Syria, 40 in Egypt, 35 in Jordan, 30 in Iran, 10 in Pakistan,<br />
10 in Turkey, and 20 in Malaysia. See Alibašić, “Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina”<br />
(Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society Working Paper No. 2, 17 February 2008), 4.<br />
119. See the State Department cable entitled “Radical Islam in Montenegro,” (Origin: Embassy Podgorica, Cable date<br />
10 July 2009), Reference # PODGORICA 00000171, at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09POD-<br />
GORICA171, accessed on 11 February 2014 at 1:04pm EST.<br />
120. See Stephen Schwartz, “Kosovo Radical Islamists in New Political Offensive,” The Weekly Standard, 13 February<br />
2013, at https://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/kosovo-radical-islamists-new-political-offensive_701196.html,<br />
accessed on 29 March 2014 at 6:26pm EST.<br />
121. As cited by Ahmetasevic, “Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia,“ op. cit.<br />
122. See Ikanović’s statements in “Selefije u ‘svetom ratu’: eksluzivna ispovijest bh. džihad ratnika u Siriji,” op. cit.<br />
123. See the statements by “Nermina” (pseudonym), a former Bosnian Wahhabi who left the movement, as quoted by<br />
Ahmetasevic, “Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia,” op. cit.<br />
124. See Xharra, “Kosovo: Radikaler Islam als ‘tickende bombe’,” op. cit., and Xharra, “Fissures in the Faith: Rise of<br />
Conservative Islamists Alarms Kosovans,” op. cit.<br />
125. See Stephen Schwartz, “Kosovo Radical Islamists In New Political Offensive,” The Weekly Standard, 13 February<br />
2013, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/kosovo-radical-islamists-new-political-offensive_701196.<br />
html?page=1, accessed on 10 March 2013 at 11:30am EST.<br />
126. See the comments by Krenar Gashi of the Institute for Development Policy in Priština in “Fear of Jihadis in Balkans<br />
Lacks Some Perspective,” Monitor Global Outlook, 25 November 2013, at http://monitorglobaloutlook.com/<br />
news-story/fear-of-jihadis-in-balkans-lacks-some-perspective/, accessed on 30 June 2014 at 2:34pm EST.<br />
127. “Vehabija sve više i u Makedoniji,” Nezavisne Novine (Banja Luka), 4 August 2010 at http://www.nezavisne.com/<br />
novosti/ex-yu/Vehabija-sve-vise-i-u-Makedoniji-65294.html, accessed on 23 April 2013 at 11:46am EST.<br />
128. See Misko Taleski, “Law Enforcement Re-examines Islamic Groups in the Balkans,” The Southeast European Times,<br />
6 May 2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/05/06/feature-02,<br />
accessed on 23 November 2013 at 6:36pm EST.<br />
129. State Department cable entitled “Radical Islam in Montenegro,” op. cit., ftn. 87.<br />
130. See Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten (Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 8 April 2005), 24.<br />
131. According to Aida Ćorović, human rights activist and former director of the Novi Pazar-based NGO Urban-In. See<br />
“Radical Groups in the Balkans: The Case of Wahhabi Jašarević,” op. cit., 11.<br />
132. See “Fejzić optužio Muftijstvo Sandžačko da podržava ‘vehabijski pokret’,” Sandžak Press, 6 September 2014,<br />
at http://sandzakpress.net/fejzic-optuzio-muftijstvo-sandzacko-da-podrzava-vehabijski-pokret, accessed on 17<br />
September 2014 at 4:07pm EST.<br />
133. See Evan Kohmann, “The North African Mujahedin Network,” in Michael A. Innes, ed., Bosnian Security After<br />
Dayton: New Perspectives (Oxford: Routledge, 2012) 113.<br />
134. See the interview with Zlatko Dizdarević in BH Dani (Sarajevo), No. 124, October 1999. Along similar lines, Dževad<br />
Galijašević, the former mayor of the central Bosnian municipality of Maglaj and a former member of Haris Silajdzić’s<br />
Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBiH), has claimed “Alija Izetbegović was the father of [the project to set<br />
up an Islamic republic in Bosnia.] . . . This type of BiH is Izetbegović’s life’s work.” See Galijašević’s interview<br />
with Sara Babić, “Silajdžić je doveo mudžahedine u Bosnu,” Nacional 574 (Zagreb), 14 November 2006, at http://<br />
www.nacional.hr/clanak/29058/silajdzic-je-doveo-mudzahedine-u-bosnu, accessed on 26 April 2013 at 8:51am<br />
EST. For interesting critiques of Izetbegović’s writings, see Dr. Jasna Samić’articles “Cari Arapskog Jezika,”BH<br />
Dani 145 (Sarajevo), 10 March 2000, and “Zašto postoji nesto a ne ništa?” BH Dani 146 (Sarajevo), 17 March<br />
2000.<br />
135. For a sampling of the literature on Islamist extremist groups in southeastern Europe, see Juan Carlos Antúnez, “Wahhabism<br />
in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (12 September 2008) at http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2468,<br />
accessed on 12 April 2013 at 9:57am EST; Bosnia’s Dangerous Tango: Islam and Nationalism (Brussels/<br />
Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, 26 February 2013); A. Ceresnjes and R. Green, “The Global Jihad Movement<br />
in Bosnia: A Time Bomb in the Heart of Europe” (Washington, DC: Middle East Media and Research Institute,<br />
June 2012); Slaven Blavicki, “Islamist Terrorist Networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Monterey, CA: Naval<br />
Postgraduate School, 2009); Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America (New York:<br />
Forum, 2001); Evan F. Kohlman, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (Oxford: Berg, 2004);<br />
Kenneth Morrison, “Wahhabism in the Balkans” (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom: Advanced Research<br />
and Assessment Group, February 2008); and former National Security Agency analyst John R. Schindler, Unholy<br />
Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida and the Rise of Global Jihad, op. cit. Kohlmann’s book provides the most detailed<br />
analysis of Al Qaeda’s move from Afghanistan to Europe. The Schindler volume is the best extant work placing<br />
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the rise of militant Islamism in Bosnia within the context of Alija Izetbegović’s movement. The most detailed Bosnian<br />
examination of the topic is Esad Hećimovič, Garibi: Mudžahedini u BiH 1992-1999 (Zenica: Fondacija Sina, 2006).<br />
136. According to Matthew Levitt, see “Hearing on the Blacklisting of Hezbollah by the European Union,” (Testimony<br />
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, 9 July 2013), at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/LevittTestimony20110709-EU.pdf,<br />
accessed on 6 October 2014 at 1:55pm EST.<br />
137. See “Bushati Says Terrorists Are Trained in Albania,” ALBEU, 2 September 2014, at http://english.albeu.com/<br />
news/news/bushati-says-terrorists-are-trained-in-albania/168317/, accessed on 2 September 2014 at 10:55am EST.<br />
138. See, for instance, Harvey Morris, “Could Syria’s Civil War Create Jihadis in Europe and the U.S.?” The New York<br />
Times, 24 April 2013, at http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/could-syrias-civil-war-create-european-and-american-jihadis/?_r=0,<br />
accessed on 20 November 2013 at 11:25am EST.<br />
139. Estimate according to Dr. Thomas Hegghammer of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, as cited<br />
by Frank Gardner, “Europe Could Feel the Backlash from Jihadist Conflicts,” at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/<br />
world-middle-east-25155188, accessed on 2 December 2013 at 10:19am EST. Bosnian recruits for the Syrian jihad<br />
allegedly receive €15,000, and the families they leave behind are provided for. See A. Čorbo-Zećo, “I žene iz BiH<br />
idu u Siriju,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 28 November 2013, at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/teme/i-zene-iz-bih-iduu-siriju,<br />
accessed on 29 November 2013 at 12:11pm EST. The interior minister of Republika Srpska in Bosnia<br />
& Herzegovina, Radislav Jovičić, has said that according to his information Syrian jihad volunteers from Bosnia<br />
receive €1500-2000 per month. See Jovičić’s interview in Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), “Neki od BH ratnika u Siriji se<br />
pripremaju za samoubilačke akcije!”, 19 January 2014, at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/intervju/neki-od-bh-ratnikau-siriji-pripremaju-se-za-samoubilacke-akcije1,<br />
accessed on 31 January 2014 at 10:37am EST.<br />
140. According to a news report by Večernje Novosti (Belgrade), an analysis produced by the BiH Joint Commission for<br />
Security and Defence had determined that 340 BiH citizens had gone to fight in Syria by August 2013. See M. Filipović,<br />
“Džihad preti Evropi!” Večernje Novosti (Belgrade), 27 August 2013, at http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:451151-Dzihad-preti-i-Evropi,<br />
accessed on 31 August 2013 at 8:15am EST. See also “U Siriji ratovalo<br />
52 bh. državljanina, jedan je poginuo,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 17 May 2013, at http://www.avaz.ba/globus/svijet/u-siriji-ratovala-52-bh-drzavljanina-jedan-je-poginuo,<br />
accessed on 18 May 2013 at 5:26pm EST; Dženana Halimović,<br />
“Selafistički borci iz BiH u Siriji: Korijeni iz devedesetih godina,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, 1 June 2013,<br />
at http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/selafisticki-borci-iz-bih-na-ratistima-sirom-svijeta/25003939.html, accessed<br />
on 17 June 2013 at 4:53pm EST; S. Mijatović, “Imena vehabija iz BiH na ratištu u Siriji,” Slobodna Bosna<br />
(Sarajevo), 23 May 2013, at http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/7996/ekskluzivno_imena_vehabija_iz_bih_na_<br />
ratistu_u_siriji.html, accessed on 11 July 2013 at 11:24am EST; S Mijatović, “Bosanci u sirijskom ratu,” Slobodna<br />
Bosna (Sarajevo), 17 June 2013, at http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/8634/bosanci_u_sirijskom_ratu.html,<br />
accessed on 11 July 2013 at 11:27am EST; S. Mijatović, “Gornja Maoča je transit za vehabije koje odlaze u sveti<br />
rat,” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 2 April 2013, at: http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/275/gornja_maocha_je_<br />
tranzit_za_vehabije_koje_odlaze_u_sveti_rat.html, accessed on 11 July 2013 at 11:34am EST; Suzana Mijatović,<br />
“Bosanski džihad u Siriji: U svojoj vjeri, na tuđoj zemlji,” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 10 October 2013, No. 883,<br />
at http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/login.html?brl=%2Ftekst%2F34643%2Fnovi_zivot_bosanskih_ratnika_u_siriji_<br />
hoces_kucu_nadji_zenu.html; Zoran Arbutina and Nemanja Rujević, “Vehabije iz BiH u ‘svetom ratu’,” Deutsche<br />
Welle (Bosnian service), at http://www.dw.de/vehabije-iz-bih-u-svetom-ratu/a-17403012, accessed on 3 February<br />
2014 at 11:29am EST.<br />
141. According to Bajro Ikanović, a well-known Bosnian extremist who has been in Syria since January 2013. Ikanović<br />
had been arrested in Bosnia in 2005 for his involvement in the Bektašević plot, an aborted attempt to launch suicide-terrorist<br />
attacks against western embassies in Sarajevo. See “Selefije u ‘svetom ratu’: ekslusivna ispovijest bh.<br />
džihad ratnika u Siriji,” 10 July 2013, at http://source.ba/clanak/1400134/vijesti/Ekskluzivna%20ispovijest%20<br />
bh.%20d%C5%BEihad%20ratnika%20u%20Siriji/?ref=najcitaniji, accessed on 27 July 2013 at 10:05am EST.<br />
As of January 2014, some 15 Bosniacs (Muslims either from Bosnia proper or the Sandžak) have reportedly been<br />
killed in Syria, eleven from Bosnia and four from the Sandžak. See “Mujo Hamidović iz Sjenice poginuo u<br />
Siriji,” SandžakPress (Novi Pazar), 22 January 2014, at http://sandzakpress.net/mujo-hamidovic-iz-sjenice-poginuo-u-siriji,<br />
accessed on 22 January 2014 at 5:35pm EST.<br />
142. See “Ferid Tatarević iz Zenice poginuo u Siriji,” klix.ba, 14 March 2014, at http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ferid-tatarevic-iz-zenice-poginuo-u-siriji/140314125,<br />
accessed on 24 March 2014 at 5:34pm EST.<br />
143. See Suzanna Mijatović, “Od Gornje Maoče do Islamske Države: Ženska strana priče,” Slobodna Bosna 934 (Sarajevo),<br />
2 October 2014.<br />
144. See “Još jedan građanin BiH poginuo na ratištu u Siriji?,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 25 September 2013, at http://<br />
www.avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/jos-jedan-gradjanin-bih-poginuo-na-ratistu-u-siriji, accessed on 7 October<br />
2013 at 4:51pm EST.<br />
145. See the comments by Croatian foreign minister Vesna Pusić in Ivica Kristović, “Cetiri su Hrvatice na teritoriji ISIL-a:<br />
Pitanje je treba li ih spasiti ili sankcionirati,” Večernji list (Zagreb), 3 October 2014, at http://www.vecernji.hr/<br />
hrvatska/vesna-pusic-cetiri-hrvatice-su-na-teritoriju-isil-a-965006, accessed on 3 October 2014 at 11:23am EST.<br />
146. According to research done by Rafaël Lefévre of the University of Cambridge, see “Swede Behind Syria Arms<br />
69
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Smuggling,” Radio Sweden, 31 October 2013, at http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=5690625,<br />
accessed on 31 January 2014 at 12:07pm EST.<br />
147. See Mohammed al-Arnout, “Albanian Islamists Join Syrian War,” Al Monitor, 28 April 2013, at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/04/albanian-kosovo-islamists-join-syria-war.html,<br />
accessed on 2 May 2013 at 8:25am<br />
EST; and Muhamet Hajrullahu, “Kosovo Muslim Embraces ‘Jihad’ in Syrian War,” BalkanInsight, 13 June 2013,<br />
at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-muslim-embraces-jihad-in-syrian-war, accessed on 17 June<br />
2013 at 4:47pm EST. Several Albanians from Macedonia have also died in the Syrian conflict, although some<br />
appear to have been recruited in western Europe; see Sase Dimovski, “Syrian War Claims Macedonian Albanian<br />
Lives,” BalkanInsight, 30 August 2013, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/syrian-war-claims-macedonian-albanian-lives,<br />
accessed on 7 September 2013 at 9:54am EST. See also Zorana Gačovska Spasova, “Kolku makedonski<br />
drzavjani se borat vo Siriji?” Radio Slobodna Evropa, 28 May 2013 at http://www.makdenes.org/content/article/24999489.html,<br />
accessed on 22 January 2014 at 6:24pm EST; and Marija Mitevska, “IVZ apelira da se ne odi<br />
vo Sirija,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, 15 January 2014, at http://www.makdenes.org/content/article/25230607.html,<br />
accessed on 22 January 2014 at 6:15pm EST. For a brief analysis of the phenomenon of Albanian jihadis in Syria,<br />
see Angelina Verbica’s interview with Gido Šteinberg, “Albanski džihadisti u Siriji,” Deutsche Welle, 23 March<br />
2014, at http://www.dw.de/albanski-d%C5%BEihadisti-u-siriji/a-17510603?maca=bos-TB_bs_avaz_sve-4962-html-cb,<br />
accessed on 23 March 2014 at 1:22pm EST.<br />
148. See “Afro 40 të rinj nga Skënderaj janë muxhahedinë në Siri,” Gazeta Express (Priština), 2 May 2014, at http://www.<br />
gazetaexpress.com/lajme/afro-40-te-rinj-nga-skenderaj-jane-muxhahedine-ne-siri-11426/, accessed on 2 May 2014 at<br />
10:05am EST.<br />
149. Besar Likmeta, “Albania Nabs Suspected Al Qaeda Recruiters,” BalkanInsight, 12 March 2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-arrests-seven-suspected-al-qaeda-recruiters,<br />
accessed on 22 March 2014 at 12:39pm EST.<br />
150. See “Kërcënimi nga Siria” (“The Threat from Syria”), Koha Ditore (Priština), 26 January 2014, at http://www.koha.<br />
net/?page=1,13,173123, accessed on 27 January 2014 at 7:39pm EST.<br />
151. Estimate according to Aida Skorupan; see Predrag Tomović, “Vehabije na Balkanu su izmanipulisane,” Radio Slobodna<br />
Evropa, 1 June 2013, at http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/vehabije-na-balkanu-izmanipulisane/25003930.<br />
html, accessed on 4 February 2014 at 12:07pm EST.<br />
152. See Aida Skorupan’s comments as cited by Petar Komnenić, “Crnogorske vlasti najavile reakciju nakon vijesti RSE<br />
o odlasku na strana ratišta,” Radio Slobodna Evropa, 18 September 2014, at http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/<br />
content/dobrovoljci-iz-crne-gore-u-isiriji-i-iraku-vlast-reagovala-nakon-vijesti-rse/26592466.html, accessed on 30<br />
September 2014 at 9:32am EST.<br />
153. See Dusica Tomovic, “Hundreds of Balkan Jihadists Have Joined ISIS, CIA Says,” BalkanInsight, 17 September<br />
2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hundreds-of-balkan-jihadist-reportedly-joined-isis, accessed on<br />
17 September 2014 at 3:37pm EST.<br />
154. See Kamil Arli, “Albanian Expert: Turkey Waypoint for Balkan Jihadists,” Today’s Zaman (Istanbul), 19 July 2014,<br />
at http://www.todayszaman.com/interviews_albanian-expert-turkey-waypoint-for-balkan-jihadists_353477.html,<br />
accessed on 17 September 2014 at 3:59pm EST.<br />
155. See “V Siriji umrl slovenski državljan,” Delo (Ljubljana), 30 September 2014, at http://www.delo.si/svet/krize/v-siriji-umrl-slovenski-drzavljan.html,<br />
accessed on 1 October 2014 at 10:48am EST; and “V Siriji umrl Slovenec<br />
Jure Korelec,” Svet24 (Ljubljana), 30 September 2014, at http://svet24.si/clanek/novice/slovenija/542ae0c19acd3/v-siriji-umrl-slovenec-jure-korelec,<br />
accessed on 1 October 2014 at 10:52am EST.<br />
156. See di Giuliano Foschini and Fabio Tonnaci, “Bilal Bosnic: “Ci sono italiani nell’ls, conquisteremo Il Vaticano,”<br />
Repubblica (Rome), 28 August 2014, at http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2014/08/28/news/bilal_bosnic_ci_sono_<br />
italiani_nell_is_conquisteremo_il_vaticano-94559220/, accessed on 24 October 2014 at 11:34am EST.<br />
157. See the estimate by Almir Džuvo, director of the BiH Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA), as cited in the European<br />
Police Mission BiH Daily Media Summary, 13 July 2010 at http://www.eupmbih.eu/Detail.aspx?ID=1451&TabID=5,<br />
accessed on 12 July 2012 at 9:01 EST.<br />
158. See the interview by Renate Flottau with Ali Hamad entitled “Weiße Qaida in Bosnien: ‘Mit Motorsägen zerstückeln’,”<br />
Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 3 December 2006 at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/weisse-qaida-in-bosnien-mit-motorsaegen-zerstueckeln-a-451729.html,<br />
accessed on 20 April 2013 at 3:17pm EST. See also William<br />
J. Kole, “Are Terrorists Recruiting ‘white Muslims’?” Associated Press (Dateline Sarajevo), 18 April 2006, at<br />
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2002936760_balkans18.html, accessed on 13 February 2014 at 9:39am<br />
EST. According to Aida Ćorović, a human rights activist from Novi Pazar, “white Muslims” from the Balkans<br />
“are a good terroristic force because they are very familiar with other Europeans and look different from other<br />
Muslims. It is easy to place them in order to manage terroristic acts without being easily noticed.” As quoted by<br />
Ivana Jovanovic, “Experts Say ‘white al-Qaeda’ is the Biggest Terrorist Threat in the Region,” The Southeast<br />
European Times, 7 February 2014, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2014/02/07/feature-02,<br />
accessed on 13 February 2014 at 11:28am EST.<br />
159. See Craig Pyes, Josh Meyer and William C. Rempel, “Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists,”<br />
The Los Angeles Times, 7 October 2001, at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/07/news/mn-54505, accessed<br />
on 20 November 2013 at 11:48am EST.<br />
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160. See N. K., “Iranski špijuni opet aktivni u BiH,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 20 October 2014, at http://www.avaz.ba/<br />
clanak/141675/iranski-spijuni-opet-aktivni-u-bih, accessed on 21 October 2014 at 10:47am EST.<br />
161. See Hajrudin Somun, “’Mujahedin’ from Balkans in Syria,” Today’s Zaman (Istanbul), 23 June 2013, at http://<br />
www.todayszaman.com/news-318952-mujahideen-from-balkans-in-syria-by-hajrudin-somun-.html, accessed on<br />
31 January 2014 at 11:56am EST.<br />
162. See “US Officials on Balkan Counter-Terrorism Mission,” BalkanInsight, 28 January 2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/us-officials-in-balkans-counter-terrorism-mission,<br />
accessed on 31 January 2014 at 11:44am<br />
EST; and “Američki zvaničnici u borbu protiv terorizma u posjeti BiH,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 31 January 2014<br />
at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/americki-zvanicnici-za-borbu-protiv-terorizma-u-posjeti-bih,<br />
accessed on 31 January 2014 at 11:47am EST.<br />
163. See Nebi Qena, “Kosovo Police Arrest Six Terror Suspects,” Associated Press (Dateline Priština), 12 November<br />
2013, at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/kosovo-police-arrest-terror-suspects-20862708, accessed<br />
on 13 November 2013 at 8:48 am EST; Linda Karadaku, “Kosovo Moves Against Islamic Extremists,” The Southeast<br />
European Times, 13 November 2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/<br />
features/2013/11/13/feature-01, accessed on 23 November 2013 at 6:41pm EST; and Linda Karadaku, “Facing a<br />
Threat, Kosovo Seeks More Information About Terrorist Group,” The Southeast European Times, 14 November<br />
2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/11/14/feature-02,<br />
accessed on 23 November 2013 at 6:45pm EST.<br />
164. See “Xhemati i Xhihadit” kërcënon me sulme Policinë e Kosovës” Koha Ditore (Priština), 12 November 2013, at<br />
http://www.koha.net/?page=1,13,165321, accessed on 13 November 2013 at 8:59am EST. A Bosnian translation of<br />
the group’s communiqué was released on the Put Vjernika website; see “Džemat Džihada prijeti napadima Policiji<br />
Kosova,” at http://www.putvjernika.com/balkan/dzemat-dzihada-prijeti-napadima-policiji-kosova.html, accessed<br />
on 13 November 2013 at 9:02am EST.<br />
165. For reports on the Tešanj arms cache and the attempted coverup, see “SIPA u Tešnju pronašla 500 granata,” Dnevni<br />
Avaz (Sarajevo), 1 November 2013, at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/sipa-u-tesnju-pronasla-500-granata,<br />
accessed on 13 November 2013 at 9:43am EST, and “Mehmedović nam je rekao: “Zakopajte to<br />
za ne daj Bože!“ Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 8 November 2013, at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/teme/mehmedovicnam-je-rekao-zakopajte-to-za-ne-daj-boze,<br />
accessed on 13 November 2013 at 9:45am EST. The area in which<br />
the arms cache was found is in territory controlled Šemsudin Mehmedović, considered to be an Islamist hardliner<br />
in Izetbegović’s party and one of the main Bosnian liaisons with foreign Islamist militants in central Bosnia. See<br />
Mike O’Connor, “Police Official’s Methods Raise Ethnic Fears in a Region of Bosnia,” The New York Times, 16<br />
June 1996, at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/16/world/police-official-s-methods-raise-ethnic-fears-in-a-regionof-bosnia.html,<br />
accessed on 2 April 2014 at 9:08am EST.<br />
166. See “ISIS Fighter Goes on Trial in Germany,” Associated Press (Dateline: Berlin) 15 September 2014, at http://<br />
english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/09/15/ISIS-fighter-goes-on-trial-in-Germany.html, accessed on 16<br />
September 2014 at 11:45am EST.<br />
167. See Stephen Schwartz, “The Balkan Front,” The Weekly Standard, 14 May 2007, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/<br />
Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/612zecct.asp, accessed on 27 November 2013 at 4:40pm EST. Several years<br />
earlier, a leading Albanian politician in the region, the late Arben Xhaferi, had told the present author that the biggest<br />
danger facing Albanian societies in southeastern Europe was the threat of “re-Islamisation.” (Interview with the<br />
author, Tetovo, Macedonia, June 2003.)<br />
168. See the comments of former Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, as cited by Hajrudin Somun, “What is Israel<br />
Aiming for in the Balkans?” Today’s Zaman (Istanbul), 17 August 2010 at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-<br />
219234-109-centerwhat-is-israel-aiming-for-in-the-balkans-bribyi-brhajrudin-somun-center.html, accessed on<br />
10 April 2013 at 9:44 EST.<br />
169. A point made by Bodansky; see Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America, op. cit., 100.<br />
170. LTC. John E. Sray (USA) put the number at 4000; see Sray, “Mujahedin Operations in Bosnia” (Ft. Leavenworth,<br />
KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, February 1995) at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/muja.htm, accessed<br />
on 22 February 2013 at 8:27am EST. Sray was the G-2 (Chief, Intelligence Section) for the UN Command<br />
in Sarajevo during the Bosnian civil war. A former Bosnian jihadi/mujahedin from Syria, Abu Hamza al-Suri, has<br />
on the other hand claimed that foreign-born members of Izetbegović’s Al Qaeda battalion, the Kateebat el-Mujahidin<br />
(otherwise known as the El Mudžahid battalion), only numbered about 300 fighters. See Abu Hamza’s interview<br />
with Franco Galdini, “From Syria to Bosnia: Memoirs of a Mujahid in Limbo,” The Nation, 19 December<br />
2013, at http://www.thenation.com/blog/177669/syria-bosnia-memoirs-mujahid-limbo#, accessed on 3 February<br />
2014 at 10:43am EST.<br />
171. See Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, op. cit., xii, 11, 221, and 230, respectively; and Harry de Quetteville,<br />
“US Hunts Islamic Militants in Bosnia,” The Telegraph (UK), 26 July 2004 at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/<br />
worldnews/europe/bosnia/1467897/US-hunts-Islamic-militants-in-Bosnia.html, accessed on 2 October 2012 at<br />
8:47am EST<br />
172. See Douglas Farah, “London and the Possible Bosnia Connection,” 14 July 2005, at http://counterterrorismblog.<br />
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
org/2005/07/douglas_farah_london_and_the_p.php, accessed on 5 February 2014 at 2:35pm EST. Emphasis added.<br />
Similarly, even Bosnia’s former deputy security minister, Dragan Miketić, noted that “all the indicators show<br />
that Bosnia is a territory where [terrorists] can come and rest, organize their activities, and then go and<br />
carry out [attacks elsewhere.” See Nicholas Wood, “Police Raid Raises Fear of Bosnia as Haven for Terrorists,”<br />
The New York Times, 3 December 2005, at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/03/international/europe/03bosnia.<br />
html?ei=5099&en=e0e1466f0bb188f3&ex=1134190800&adxnnl=1&partner=TOPIX&adxnnlx=1133586686-oKfynmL95HY2Roh6Wumt+w&_r=0,<br />
accessed on 13 February 2014 at 9:22am EST. The former deputy director of<br />
Bosnia’s state level intelligence agency, SIPA (the Bosnian equivalent of the FBI), has similarly claimed “Bosnia<br />
has become a breeding ground for terrorists, including some on international wanted lists. We can clearly say<br />
that.” See Kole, “Are Terrorists Recruiting ‘white Muslims’?” op. cit.<br />
173. See the transcript to the PBS Frontline documentary, “Son of Al Qaeda,” op. cit.<br />
174. As quoted by Joel E. Starr, “How to Outflank Al Qaeda in the Balkans,” European Affairs V (Fall 2004), at http://<br />
www.europeaninstitute.org/20040902272/Fall-2004/how-to-outflank-al-qaeda-in-the-balkans.html<br />
175. See, for instance, “Balkan Training Camps Pose a New Attack Threat,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 1 April<br />
2005, at: www.stratfor.com, accessed on 5 October 2013 at 1:53pm EST.<br />
176. See Anes Alić and Jen Tracy, “Training for an Islamic Bosnia,” Transitions Online, 26 April 2002 at http://www.<br />
tol.org/client/article/4246-training-for-an-islamic-bosnia.html, accessed on 10 July 2012 at 8:38am EST. For a description<br />
of the raid by the tactical advisor to the NATO CINC in Bosnia, see Col. David Hunt (USA, Ret.), They<br />
Just Don’t Get It (New York: Crown Forum, 2005), 1-4.<br />
177. When Abu Hamza was arrested in Bosnia, the younger Izetbegović offered “to help in any way.” See the transcript<br />
of BiH press reports compiled by the European Union Police Mission in BiH, PPID Daily Media Summary, 10<br />
March 2008, at http://www.eupm.org/Details.aspx?ID=745&TabID=5, accessed on 31 August 2013 at 8:25am EST.<br />
The younger Izetbegović has for years also been considered to have close ties to local criminal organizations.<br />
After the war, Bakir Izetbegović was placed in charge of Sarajevo’s City Development Institute, which had the authority<br />
to grant citizens occupancy rights to their apartments. Izetbegovic was alleged to be charging $2,000 to the citizens<br />
to obtain the rights. Many of the apartments Izetbegović was giving out belonged to Croats or Serbs before the war.<br />
The younger Izetbegović was also reported to be getting a cut of the extortion money Sarajevo’s gangsters were<br />
charging shopkeepers See Chris Hedges, “Leaders in Bosnia are Said to Steal Up To $1 Billion,” The New York<br />
Times, 17 August 1999, at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/17/world/leaders-in-bosnia-are-said-to-steal-up-to-1-<br />
billion.html, accessed on 7 November 2014 at 10:53am EST.<br />
178. According to STRATFOR analyst Marko Papic; see “Bosnia/Serbia: Dodik Wins RS Presidential Race,” 4 October<br />
2010, at http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/17/1798664_re-g3-bosnia-serbia-dodik-wins-rs-presidential-race-.html,<br />
accessed on 8 July 2014 at 6:40pm EST.<br />
179. See Vildana Selimbegović, “Slučaj Leutar: Rat AID-a i Hrvatskih Obaveštajnih Službi,” BH Dani 98 (Sarajevo),<br />
29 March 1999, at https://www.bhdani.com/portal/arhiva-67-281/98/tekst898.htm, accessed on 16 October 2014 at<br />
12:06pm EST; and Kohmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network, op. cit., 199.<br />
180. See Flottau, “Weiße Qaida in Bosnien: ‘Mit Motorsägen zerstückeln’,” op. cit.<br />
181. See “Jihad, Bought and Sold,” ISN Security Watch, 26 January 2009, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/<br />
Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=95734, accessed on 30 June 2012 at 3:09pm EST.<br />
182. See Pyes, et. Al., “Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists,” op. cit.<br />
183. See “Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism” (Belgrade/Podgorica/Pristina/Sarajevo/Skopje/<br />
Tirana/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 9 November 2001), 11.<br />
184. See Wood, “Police Raid Raises Fear of Bosnia as Haven for Terrorists,” op. cit.<br />
185. See Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, op. cit., 163.<br />
186. Senad Pečanin, “I Osama bin-Laden ima bosanski pasoš,” BH Dani 121 (Sarajevo), 24 September 1999 at http://www.<br />
bhdani.com/arhiva/121/t212a.htm, accessed on 1 June 2012. In just one instance, Alija Izetbegović and his son<br />
Bakir reportedly gave fifty Bosnian passports to a group of Bosnian jihadis. See Vildana Selimbegović, “Putovnica<br />
za gori život,” BH Dani 224, 21 September 2001, at http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/224/t22416.shtml, accessed on<br />
1 June 2012 at 7:13pm EST.<br />
187. Erich Follath and Gunther Latsch, “Der Prinz und die Terror-GMBH,” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 15 September 2001.<br />
188. See Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al Qaeda (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008, Updated<br />
Edition), 255. Yossef Bodansky also reports that bin-Laden visited the Balkans at least once in the early 1990’s<br />
to help set up a terrorist/financial network; see Bodansky, Bin-Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America<br />
(New York: Prima Publishing, 2001), 100. Other reports have claimed that bin-Laden visited the Balkans on three<br />
occasions between 1994 and 1996. See Marcia Christoff Kurop, “Al Qaeda’s Balkan Links,” The Wall Street Journal<br />
(Europe), 1 November 2001. In a promotional video that the Bosnian mudžahedin produced entitled Odred<br />
El-Mudžahedin Bosna 1, during a scene showing a gathering of mudžahedin in central Bosnia during the war the<br />
camera focuses for several seconds on a man resembling Osama bin Laden (the individual is also wearing the<br />
white prayer cap bin Laden was frequently photographed wearing), but the video’s poor resolution makes it impossible<br />
to positively identify him. See Odred El-Mudžahedin Bosna 1, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kngioq0TK0I.<br />
The individual who resembles bin Laden appears at approximately minute 1:40.<br />
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189. See Nasser Al-Saqqaf, “From “Father of Death” to Life Coach: The Journey of Osama Bin-Laden’s Bodyguard,”<br />
The Yemen Times, 30 April 2014, at http://www.yementimes.com/en/1777/intreview/3799/From-%E2%80%98father-of-death%E2%80%99-to-life-coach-The-journey-of-Osama-Bin-Laden%E2%80%99s-bodyguard.htm,<br />
accessed on 20 September 2014 at 10:13am EST. Al-Bahri claimed he was moved to join the Bosnian jihad after<br />
he watched a video in which he saw “six young men battling 10,000 Serbian fighters.”<br />
190. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, op. cit., 37-39.<br />
191. Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, op cit., 201.<br />
192. “Bin-Laden’s Arrested Aide was Bosnian Citizen,” Agence France Presse, 21 September 1999. Auduni’s Bosnian<br />
nom de guerre had been Abu Talha. See also “Executive Order 13224 – Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions<br />
with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism” (Washington, DC: The White<br />
House, 23 September 2001), at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/documents/terror.pdf,<br />
accessed on 10 May 2013 at 9:41am EST.<br />
193. For the person in question, Alija Izetbegović’s personal former intelligence chief Bakir Alispahić, see “Office of<br />
Foreign Assets Control: Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List,” 23 January 2014, page 63, at<br />
http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf, accessed on 3 February 2014 at 1:15pm EST. See also I.<br />
Ćatić, “Paraobavještajni odbor SDA ignorira vladu SAD-a: Čovjek s američke crne liste šef ministru sigurnosti,”<br />
Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 5 July 2012 at http://www.dnevniavaz.ba/vijesti/teme/99173-paraobavjestajni-odbor-sdaignorira-vladu-sad-a-covjek-s-americke-crne-liste-sef-ministru-sigurnosti-bih.html,<br />
accessed on 6 June 2012 at:<br />
1:55pm EST.<br />
194. See Veselin Toshkov, Sabina Niksic, Dusan Stojanovic, Llazar Semini, Nebi Qena and Elena Becatoros, “Radical<br />
Islam on Rise in Balkans, Raising Fears of Security Threats to Europe,” Associated Press (dateline Skopje), 18<br />
September 2010, at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/09/18/radical-islam-rise-balkans-raising-fears-security-threat-europe/,<br />
accessed on 17 July 2013 at 1:17pm EST.<br />
195. See Verfassungsschutzberiicht 2014 (Wien: Bundesamt fűr Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung, 2014), 36.<br />
196. See “Radikalni selefije kupuju zemlju i kuće za novo gnijezdo vehabija,” Dnevnik.hr (Zagreb), 5 October 2014,<br />
at http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/husein-bilal-bosnic-jedan-od-vodja-vehabijske-zajednice-u-bih-kupuje-zemlju-i-kuce-za-novo-gnijezdo-vehabija---355197.html,<br />
accessed on 21 October 2014 at 11:31am EST, and “Vehabije<br />
kupuju srpsku zemlju u Velikoj Kladuši,” Nezavisne Novine (Banja Luka), 20 October 2014, at http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Vehabije-kupuju-srpsku-zemlju-u-Velikoj-Kladusi-268954.html,<br />
accessed on 21 October<br />
2014 at 11:35am EST.<br />
197. See Janez Kovac, “Mujahedin Resist Eviction,” IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, 21 July 2000, at http://iwpr.net/<br />
report-news/mujahideen-resist-eviction, accessed on 7 October 2013 at 4:45pm EST.<br />
198. See Pyes et. Al., “Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists,” op. cit.<br />
199. See R. Jeffrey Smith, “A Bosnian Village’s Terrorist Ties: Links to US Bomb Plot Arouse Concern About Enclave<br />
of Islamic Guerillas,” The Washington Post, 11 March 2000, A01 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-03/11/006r-031100-idx.html,<br />
accessed on 15 March 2013 at 9:49am EST, and Yaroslav Trofimov, Faith<br />
at War: A Journey on the Frontlines of Islam, From Baghdad to Timbuktu (New York: Henry Holt & Company,<br />
2005), 289.<br />
200. See Morrison, “Wahhabism in the Balkans,” op. cit., 5.<br />
201. Suzana Mijatović, “Gornja Maoča je transit za vehabije koje odlaze u sveti rat,” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 2<br />
April 2012, at http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/275/gornja_maocha_je_tranzit_za_vehabije_koje_odlaze_u_<br />
sveti_rat.html, accessed on 18 May 2013 at 6:14pm EST.<br />
202. In 2010, Jašarević had been arrested in Novi Pazar while standing in front of the Municipal Hall carrying a longblade<br />
knife during a visit by the American ambassador to Belgrade, Mary Warlick. See “Radical Groups in the<br />
Balkans: The Case of Wahhabi Jašarević,” Helsinki Bulletin No. 84 (Belgrade: Helsinki Human Rights Committee<br />
in Serbia, November 2011), 1. For more on would-be suicide-bomber Emrah Fojnica, see “Emrah Fojnica poginuo<br />
u Iraku,” Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 12 August 2014, at http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/emrah-fojnica-poginuo-u-iraku,<br />
accessed on 16 September 2014 at 11:57am EST.<br />
203. See “American Arrested in Raid on Bosnian Village,” Intelwire, 9 February 2010 at http://intelwire.egoplex.<br />
com/2010_02_09_blogarchive.html, accessed on 10 October 2014 at 9:41am EST.<br />
204. Sherrie Gossett, “Jihadists Find Convenient Base in Bosnia,” 17 August 2005 at http://www.aina.org/<br />
news/20050817121245.htm, accessed on 30 June 2012 at 2:24pm EST.<br />
205. See, for instance, Dzenana Karup’s description of the experiences of a Central Bosnian recruit to the Wahhabi<br />
movement, Samir Pracalić, in “Poslednji dani raja,” BH Dani 67 (Sarajevo), January 1998, at https://www.bhdani.<br />
com/portal/arhiva-67-281/67/tekst567.htm, accessed on 30 September 2014 at 9:22am EST; and the description<br />
of the recruitment process into the El Mujahedin brigade by Esad Hećimović in the documentary Bosanski Lonac<br />
(“The Bosnian Kettle”). Belgrade: TV B92, 2009. Producer:Petar Ilić Ćiril. Available at http://www.youtube.com/<br />
watch?v=QAzcRjXGVWw<br />
206. See Giovanni Gacalone, “Il Jihadismo nei Balcani: I Nuovi Focolai Bosniaci” (Milan: Instituto Per Gli Studi di<br />
Politica Internazionale, Analysis No. 264, July 2014), 9.<br />
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207. See Amela Bajrovic, “Raid on Wahhabi ‘Camp’ Raises Tensions in Sandzak,” BalkanInsight, 22 March 2007 at<br />
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/raid-on-wahhabi-camp-raises-tensions-in-sandzak, accessed on 25 April<br />
2013 at 1:13pm EST.<br />
208. See Damir Kaletovic and Anes Alic, “Terror Plot Thwarted in Bosnia,” ISN Security Network (Zurich), 28 March<br />
2008, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail//?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B-<br />
9C13D4&lng=en&id=52023, accessed on 13 February 2014 at 10:29am EST.<br />
209. See Karen McVeigh, “Former al-Qaida operative turned informant testifies in Abu Hamza trial,” The Guardian (UK),<br />
28 April 2014, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/28/abu-hamzaa-trial-saajid-badat-testifies Accessed<br />
on 7 May 2014 at 12:32pm EST. Badat’s email address was “sacrifice72@yahoo.com” with the “sacrifice” signifying<br />
his willingness to be a suicide bomber, and the “72” referring to Al Qaeda’s doctrine that suicide terrorists are<br />
given 72 virgins in Paradise. See “Would-be bomber, Saajid Badat, used sacrifice72 as his email name.” Agence<br />
France-Presse, 30 April 2014, at http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1500876/would-be-bomber-saajid-badat-used-sacrifice72-his-e-mail-name,<br />
accessed on 7 May 2014 at 12:37pm EST.<br />
210. See “Nastavljena istraga o odgovornim za skrivanja oružja,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 16 July 2013, at http://www.<br />
avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/nastavljena-istraga-o-odgovornim-za-skrivanje-naoruzanja, accessed on 17<br />
July 2013 at 12:50pm EST.<br />
211. Antúnez, “Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” op. cit.<br />
212. For the story of Abdulrahman Khadr, see the PBS Frontline Documentary “Son of Al Qaeda,” op. cit.<br />
213. See, for instance, “Balkan Training Camps Pose a New Attack Threat,” 2 April 2005, at www.stratfor.com.<br />
214. al-Arnout, “Albanian Islamists Join Syrian War,” op. cit.<br />
215. Sinisa Jakuv Marusic, “Radical Islam Threatens Macedonia,” BalkanInsight, 2 July 2010 at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/29193/,<br />
accessed on 2 July 2010 at: 1:24pm EST, and Bojan Pancevski, “Saudis Fund<br />
Balkan Muslims Spreading Hate of the West,” The Sunday Times (London), 28 March 2010, at http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Europe/article251901.ece,<br />
accessed on 30 October 2014 at 9:22am EST.<br />
216. See Anes Alic, “A New Generation of Extremists Threaten Bosnia,” Eurasia Press and News, 14 January 2011, at<br />
http://eurasia.ro/?p=39758, accessed on 23 March 2014 at 1:03pm EST. For a useful profile of Balkan, see Alic,<br />
“Nedžad Balkan: The Face of Southeastern Europe’s Newest Radical Threat,” Jamestown Foundation Militant<br />
Leadership Profile, Vol. 2, Issue 1, at www.jamestown.org, accessed on 23 March 2014 at 1:42pm EST.<br />
217. See Miki Trajkovski, “Experts Warn of Spread of Extremism in Balkan Prisons,” The Southeast European Times,<br />
12 February 2014, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2014/02/12/<br />
feature-01, accessed on 31 March 2014 at 9:50am EST.<br />
218. See Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten, op. cit., 25.<br />
219. The CIA report is available at http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/cia-ngos-1996.pdf, accessed on 10 July 2012 at 4:49pm EST.<br />
220. See Kurop, “Al Qaeda’s Balkan Links,” op. cit. For a useful survey of how Saudi sources financed various NGO’s<br />
with links to Al Qaeda, see David E. Kaplan, “The Saudi Connection: How Billions in Oil Money Spawned a<br />
Global Network of Terror,” US News and World Report, 7 November 2003, at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/<br />
news/articles/031215/15terror.htm.<br />
221. See Matthew Levitt, “Prosecuting Terrorism beyond ‘Material Support’,” Washington Institute Policy #1326, 14<br />
January 2008, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/prosecuting-terrorism-beyond-material-support,<br />
accessed on 22 January 2014 at 5:26pm EST. Levitt claims that between August 1993 and June 1995<br />
Care International Inc. sent $167,000 from the US to the Al Qaeda affiliate in Bosnia, Mektab al-Khidmat (MAK),<br />
the Afghan Services Bureau established by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden.<br />
222. See Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad, op. cit., 284. According to a Radio<br />
Free Europe report, the Saudis claim to have spent $1 billion (US) in Bosnia between 1992-1998 on “Islamic<br />
activities.” See Nenad Pejic, “The Suicide of Multiethnic Sarajevo,” at http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Suicide_Of_Multiethnic_Sarajevo/2023847.html,<br />
accessed on 26 November 2013 at 12:02pm EST. When Izetbegović was asked<br />
why the monies were not used to build factories or rebuild the economy, he noted “They would not give money<br />
for building factories . . . They would only support building mosques.” Another estimate of the amount the Saudis<br />
gave to Bosnia is $600 million (US); see David Pallister, “Terrorist Material Found in Sarajevo Charity Raid,” The<br />
Guardian (UK), 22 February 2002, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/23/davidpallister, accessed on<br />
26 November 2013 at 12:54pm EST.<br />
223. See Nidzara Ahmetasevic, “Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia,” 21 March 2007 at http://birn.eu-<br />
.com/en/75/10/2490/, accessed on 17 July 2012 at 11:55am EST. See also Matthew Levitt, “Charitable and Humanitarian<br />
Organizations in the Network of International Terrorist Financing,” 1 August 2002 (Testimony before the<br />
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance),<br />
at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/charitable-and-humanitarian-organizations-in-the-network-of-international-t,<br />
accessed on 26 November 2013 at 12:37pm EST.<br />
224. “F.B.I. Raids 2 of the Biggest Muslim Charities; Assets of One Are Seized,” The New York Times, 15 December<br />
2001; “KFOR Search Operations Combat International Terrorism,” KFOR News Release, 14 December 2001;<br />
“Coordinated Moves Against Suspected bin-Laden Balkan Link,” RFE/RL Newsline, 17 December 2001 at http://<br />
www.rferl.org/content/article/1142581.html, accessed on 12 April 2013 at 10:03am EST.<br />
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225. See “Turkey Investigating IHH Head for Funding al-Qaida,” The Jerusalem Post, 15 May 2010, at http://www.<br />
jpost.com/International/Turkey-investigating-IHH-head-for-funding-al-Qaida, accessed on 27 November 2013 at<br />
4:16pm EST. See also Jamie Dettmer, “Turkey Acts Against Jihadists,” Voice of America, 15 January 2014, at http://<br />
www.voanews.com/content/turkey-acts-against-jihadists/1830973.html, accessed on 12 June 2014 at 10:06pm EST.<br />
226. See “Turkish NGO Recruiting Muslim Albanians for War in Syria,” Fars News Agency (Dateline Tehran), 14<br />
August 2013, at http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920523000421, accessed on 5 November 2014<br />
at 9:24am EST.<br />
227. See Sylvia Poggioli, “Radical Islam Uses Balkan Poor to Wield Influence,” National Public Radio, 25 October 2010,<br />
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130801242, accessed on 16 October 2013 at 2:39pm EST.<br />
228. See, for instance, Oluic, “Radical Islam on Europe’s Frontier—Bosnia & Herzegovina,” op. cit., 45.<br />
229. See Susan Sachs, “An Investigation in Egypt Illustrates Al Qaeda’s Web,” The New York Times, 21 November 2001, at<br />
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/21/international/middleeast/21JIHA.html, accessed on 11 April 2013 at 9:19am<br />
EST; R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Probes Blasts’ Possible Mideast Ties,” The Washington Post, 12 August 1998, A19,<br />
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/stories/albania081298.htm, accessed on<br />
29 April 2014 at 4:0-pm EST.<br />
230. See Country Reports on Terrorism 2010 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Counterterrorism, July 2011) at http://www.<br />
state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/index.htm, accessed on 11 April 2013 at 9:38am EST.<br />
231. According to the US State Department cable, “Macedonia: A/s O’brien Visit Highlights Terrorism Financing Issues,”<br />
Embassy Skopje (Macedonia), 22 August 2007, at http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07SKOPJE695&q=macedonia,<br />
accessed on 28 January 2014 at 11:45pm EST.<br />
232. See Schwartz, “How Radical Islam Infiltrates Kosovo,” The Weekly Standard, 30 August 2012, at http://www.<br />
weeklystandard.com/blogs/how-radical-islam-infiltrates-kosovo_651173.html?nopager=1, accessed on 4 May<br />
2014 at 10:27am EST.<br />
233. See Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 109.<br />
234. For descriptions and analyses of the content of these websites and YouTube spots, see Ceresnjes and Green, “The<br />
Global Jihad Movement in Bosnia—A Time Bomb in the Heart of Europe,” op. cit.; Halimović, “Vehabije u Bosni:<br />
Od Bočinje do Maoče,” op. cit.; and Blavicki, Islamist Terrorist Networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, op. cit., 31-35.<br />
235. See “Nova naređenja Zavahirija: fokusirajte se na napad na američke interese,” 12 October 2013, at http://www.<br />
putvjernika.com/Glas-dzihada/nova-naredenja-zavahirija-fokusirajte-se-na-napad-na-americke-interese.html,<br />
accessed on 21 October 2013 at 9:31am EST.<br />
236. See Alic and Kaletovic, “Bosnia Investigates Radical Threats,” op. cit.<br />
237. See the comments by Fahrudin Kladicanin of the Forum 10 academic initiative from Novi Pazar in Ivana Jovanovic,<br />
“Extremists Use the Internet to Recruit in the Region, Experts Say,” The Southeast European Times, 19 November<br />
2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/11/19/feature-01,<br />
accessed on 29 November 2013 at 12:22pm EST.<br />
238. See “Posjećnost portala Vijesti Ummeta sve više raste,” Vijesti Ummeta, 17 October 2014, at http://vijestiummeta.<br />
com/posjecenost-portala-vijesti-ummeta-sve-vise-raste/, accessed on 17 October 2014 at 11:54am EST.<br />
239. See “Imam Shefqet Krasniqi najgledaniji Kosovar na YouTubeu,” Saff (Sarajevo), 18 August 2014, at http://Saff.<br />
ba/imam-shefqet-krasniqi-najgledaniji-kosovar-na-youtubeu/ , accessed on 21 August 2014 at 10:22am EST.<br />
240. See Besar Likmeta, “Islamists are Threat to Albania, Experts Say,” BalkanInsight, 16 January 2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/jihadists-pose-threat-to-albania-s-security?utm_source=Balkan+Insight+Newsletters&utm_<br />
campaign=55509fef24-BI_DAILY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4027db42dc-55509fef24-308238421,<br />
accessed on 16 January 2014 at 2:56pm EST.<br />
241. See Anes Alic, “A New Generation of Extremists Threaten Bosnia,” op. cit.<br />
242. See Stephen Schwartz, “Jihad from North Carolina to Kosovo,” The Weekly Standard, 19 August 2009, at http://<br />
www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/851tqrch.asp, accessed on 21 October 2014 at<br />
11:02am EST.<br />
243. Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 30<br />
April 2009), at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2008/122432.htm, accessed on 25 April 2013 at 5:16pm EST.<br />
For background on AIO, see Ena Latin, “Suspicious Islamic Missionaries: Active Islamic Youth,” Southeast<br />
European Times, 30 June 2003, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2003/06/030630-ENA-001,<br />
accessed on 31 March 2014 at 9:30am EST.<br />
244. See Atanas Panovski, The Spread of Islamic Extremism in the Republic of Macedonia (Monterey, CA.: Naval<br />
Postgraduate School, December 2011), 44.<br />
245. See Irfan al-Alawi, “Extremists Establish Foothold in the Balkans,” (Gatestone Institute International Policy Council,<br />
24 September 2012) at http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3360/kosovo-peace-tv, accessed on 22 April 2013 at<br />
3:16pm EST.<br />
246. See “Tajna Diplomatska Ofanziva Iranaca u BiH,” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 24 October 2012, at http://www.<br />
slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/2933/ekskluzivno_tajna_diplomatska_ofanziva_iranaca_u_bih.html, accessed on 20<br />
November 2012 at 8:29am EST.<br />
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
247. See “Radikali prešli dozvoljenu crtu: Ahmetović i SDA upzoreni zbog ‘iranaca’!” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 3 August<br />
2012, at http://www.dnevniavaz.ba/vijesti/teme/109387-radikali-presli-dozvoljenu-crtu-ahmetovic-i-sda-upozoreni-zbog-iranaca.html,<br />
accessed on 11 October 2012 at 7:12am EST.<br />
248. See the comments by former high representative Wolfgang Petritsch, “BiH se mora okrenuti ka Evropi, and ne Iranu!,”<br />
Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 28 August 2012, at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/intervju/bih-se-mora-okrenuti-ka-evropi-ane-iranu,<br />
accessed on 11 October 2012 at 6:59am EST.<br />
249. See Tarik Lazović, “Vitalno savezništvo,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 12 September 2012, at http://www.avaz.ba/<br />
vijesti/komentar-dana/vitalno-saveznistvo, accessed on 11 October 2012 at 6:54am EST.<br />
250. See N. K., “Iranski špijuni opet aktivni u BiH,” op. cit.,; “Najvažniji punkt iranskih špijuna a u BiH je Institut Ibn<br />
Sina u Sarajevo,” Saff (Sarajevo), 21 October 2014, at http://saff.ba/najvazniji-punkt-iranskih-spijuna-u-bih-je-institut-ibn-sina-u-sarajevu/#.VEZyPFeOqSo,<br />
accessed on 21 October 2014 at 10:51am EST; and Željko Trkanjec,<br />
“Upozorenje zapadnih služi: ‘Tisuca agenata islamskih zemalja tajno djeluju u BiH,” Jutarnji list (Zagreb), 27<br />
October 2014, at http://www.jutarnji.hr/tisucu-agenata-islamskih-zemalja-tajno-djeluje-u-bih-/1231050/, accessed<br />
on 27 October 2014 at 11:45am EST.<br />
251. Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, op. cit., 246.<br />
252. See Nedzad Latić, “Kondicioni sudija i lepa Hercegovka,” BH Dani 121 (24 September 1999), at http://www.bhdani.<br />
com/arhiva/121/feljton21.htm, accessed on 4 June 2012 at: 3:09pm EST, and Ljiljana Smajlovic, “Strategy of<br />
Flirt,” at http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme15.html, accessed on 13 May 2012 at: 9:01 am EST.<br />
253. See Scheuer’s comments in Sarajevo Ricochet, op. cit.<br />
254. Ivo Lucic, “Bosnia and Herzegovina and Terrorism,” op. cit, 123.<br />
255. See Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo (Vancouver/Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993), 195.<br />
256. Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 11 March 1996, 4.<br />
257. See Vildana Selimbegović and Esad Hećimović, “Slučaj Pogorelici: Globalni terorizam i(li) čaršijska osveta,” BH<br />
Dani 253 (Sarajevo), 19 April 2002, at https://www.bhdani.com/portal/arhiva-67-281/253/t25314.shtml, accessed<br />
on 3 October 2014 at 11:43am EST.<br />
258. See the figures as compiled by the UN Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, as cited in Jeremy King, A. Walter Dorn,<br />
and Matthew Hodes, An Unprecedented Experiment: Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Saferworld,<br />
2002) 20.<br />
259. See the interview with Cees Wiebes by Brendan O’Neill, “You are Only Allowed to See Bosnia in Black and White,”<br />
at http://www.spiked-online.com/articles/0000000CA374.htm, accessed on 13 May 2012 at: 9:20am EST.<br />
260. See Robert Baer and Dayna Baer, The Company We Keep (New York: Broadway, 2012), 130. Chris Deliso<br />
interviewed one former MI-6 official who expressed similar views, albeit stressing the Saudi connection instead:<br />
“the Bosnians are just not reliable partners. We’ve seen them befriending the Saudis, but also others if it suits<br />
[their interests]. Bottom line being, they are never going to be trusted completely.” See Deliso, “Attack on US<br />
Bosnia Embassy Not Seen as a Major Security Concern, Despite Precedents and International Links,” Balkananalysis.com,<br />
28 November 2011, at http://www.balkanalysis.com/bosnia/2011/11/28/attack-on-us-bosnia-embassy-not-seen-as-a-major-security-concern-despite-precedents-and-international-links/,<br />
accessed on 26 March 2014<br />
at 7:36pm EST.<br />
261. See Sray, “Selling the Bosnian Myth to the American Public: Buyer Beware,” op. cit. Indeed, this was a common<br />
view amongst U.S. and European military officials in Bosnia at this time. After a year of dealing with Izetbegović,<br />
General Sir Michael Rose, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia in 1994-95, similarly noted that “I came to<br />
believe that his talk of creating a multi-religious, multi-cultural state in Bosnia was a disguise for the extension of<br />
his own political power and the furtherance of Islam.” See Rose, Fighting for Peace (London: Harvill, 1998), 38.<br />
262. See Daniel Server, “Why Bosnia Can’t Be Divided,” 20 August 2012, at http://www.peacefare.net/?p=10516,<br />
accessed on 26 September 2012 at 8:16am EST. Bosnian journalists have expressed similar views; thus, according<br />
to Senad Pečanin, if Croats and Serbs were allowed to secede from Bosnia, “a sort of European Gaza would be<br />
created for the Bosnian Muslims . . . [leading to the creation of a radical Islamic republic] . . . The worst scenario<br />
for the Bosniaks: a radical Islamic state led by the clerics.” See the interview with Pečanin by Andrea Rossini<br />
entitled “Bosnian Chess,” Osservatorio balcani e caucaso, 2 July 2009, at http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-countries/Bosnia-Herzegovina/Bosnian-Chess-46072,<br />
accessed on 29 August 2014 at 12:28pm EST.<br />
263. See Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine Jr., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia<br />
University Press, 1994), 268. For extended analyses of Iranian policy in the Balkans, see Alireza Bagherzadeh,<br />
“L’ingérence iranienne en Bosnie-Herzégovine,” in Xavier Bougarel and Nathalie Clayer, eds., Le Nouvel Islam<br />
balkanique: Les Musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme 1990-2000 (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001),<br />
397-428; and Gordon N. Bardos, “Iran and the Balkans: A History and a Forecast,” World Affairs 175 (January/<br />
February 2013), 59-66.<br />
264. As cited by Bagherzadeh, “L’ingerence iranienne en Bosnie-Herzégovine,” op. cit., 416.<br />
265. Laurent Rebours, “NATO Captures Terrorist Training Camp in Bosnia, Claims Iranian Involvement,” Associated Press (Dateline<br />
Dusina, Bosnia & Herzegovina), 16 February 1996; and Kit R. Roane, “NATO Links Bosnia Government to<br />
Training Center for Terrorists,” The New York Times, 17 February 1996, at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/17/<br />
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world/nato-links-bosnia-government-to-training-center-for-terrorists.html, accessed on 24 September 2014 at<br />
2:32pm EST.<br />
266. For the story of the foiled Iranian plot to kill the CIA station chief in Sarajevo, see H.K Roy (pseudonym), Betrayal<br />
in the Balkans, August 2001, at www.worldandi.com In 1995, Hezbollah operatives were also discovered in what<br />
is believed to have been a plan to assassinate U.S. officials in Croatia. See James Risen and Doyle McManus,<br />
“Terrorist Risk to Americans in Croatia is Linked to Iran,” The Los Angeles Times, 21 May 1996, at http://articles.<br />
latimes.com/1996-05-21/news/mn-6549_1_terrorist-threat, accessed on 24 March 2014 at 6:25pm EST.<br />
267. As cited by Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), 51.<br />
268. See “Bosnian Threatens Poisonous Gas Against Serb Forces,” The New York Times, 31 October 1992, at http://<br />
www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/world/bosnian-threatens-poison-gas-against-serb-forces.html, accessed on 19<br />
September 2014 at 11:13am EST.<br />
269. See James Risen, “Iran Gave Bosnia Leader $500,000, CIA Alleges,” The Los Angeles Times, 31 December 1996,<br />
at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-12-31/news/mn-14139_1_iranian-influence, accessed on 22 October 2012 at<br />
1:28pm EST. A written statement released to the press by the SDA in 1997 admitted that the party received the<br />
money, which it claimed was used to provide student scholarships. See Senad Slatina, “Iranski novac za bosanskog<br />
predsjednika?” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 12 January 1997.<br />
270. Chris Hedges, “Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies,” The New York Times, 2 September 1996.<br />
271. See Robin Harris, Not for Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher (London: Bantam Press, 2013), 389.<br />
272. John Pomfret, “Arming the Bosnians: U.S. Program Would Aid Force Increasingly Linked to Iran,” The Washington<br />
Post, 26 January 1996, A 25.<br />
273. See John Pomfret and Christine Spolar, “Foreign Fighters Train Security Corps for Bosnian Muslims,” The Washington<br />
Post, 7 March 1996, A19.<br />
274. Kenneth Katzmann, Julie Kim, and Richard Best, “Bosnia and Iranian Arms Shipments: Issues of U.S. Policy and<br />
Involvement,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 24 April 1996, cited by Al-Marashi, op. cit.<br />
275. See Mike O’Connor, “Spies for Iran are Said to Gain a Hold in Bosnia,” The New York Times, 28 November 1997,<br />
at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/28/world/spies-for-iranians-are-said-to-gain-a-hold-in-bosnia.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm,<br />
accessed on 14 May 2012 at: 11:47am EST.<br />
276. See John Pomfret, “Disputed Bosnian Official Removed; Ouster of Muslim With Ties to Iran Opens Way for Arms<br />
Deliveries,” The Washington Post, 20 January 1996, A28.<br />
277. See Nedžad Latić, “Izbor Tihića nije bio greška: Ako je Alija Izetbegović morao birati između Sulejmana Tihića<br />
i Hasana Čengića!” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 5 October 2014, at http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/139021/izbor-tihica-nije-bio-greska-ako-je-alija-izetbegovic-morao-birati-izmedu-sulejmana-tihica-i-hasana-cengica,<br />
accessed on 7<br />
October 2014 at 12:02pm EST.<br />
278. According to “The World Geopolitics of Drugs Annual Report 1995/96,” Observatoire Geopolitique Des Droges<br />
(Paris), 1997, at: http://www.ogd.org/rapport/RP01_RAP.html.<br />
279. Laurent Rebours, “NATO Captures Terrorist Training Camp in Bosnia, Claims Iranian Involvement,” Associated Press<br />
(Dateline Dusina, Bosnia & Herzegovina), 16 February 1996; and Kit R. Roane, “NATO Links Bosnia Government<br />
to Training Center for Terrorists,” The New York Times, 17 February 1996, at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/17/<br />
world/nato-links-bosnia-government-to-training-center-for-terrorists.html, accessed on 24 September 2014 at<br />
2:32pm EST.<br />
280. As quoted by Anes Alic and Jen Tracy, “Training for an Islamic Bosnia,” Transitions Online, 26 April 2002.<br />
Another reported target of the Pogorelici trainees, the Sarajevo lawyer Faruk Balijagić, narrowly escaped an assassination<br />
attempt at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn only ten days after meeting with Izetbegović to discuss state terrorism<br />
and crime. For a detailed report on attempts to liquidate Bosniac opposition leaders, see Senad Avdić, “Novi<br />
dokazi o terorizmu celnika AID-a: Kako je pripremana likvidacija Fikreta Abdica,” Slobodna Bosna 284, at http://<br />
www.slobodna-bosna.ba/tekstovi_pdf/284.pdf<br />
281. See Selimbegović and Hećimović, “Slučaj Pogorelici: Globalni terorizam i(li) čaršijska osveta,” op. cit.<br />
282. See S. Numanović, “Izetbegović i Dodik na listi nepoželjnih?” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 23 May 2013, at http://www.<br />
avaz.ba/vijesti/teme/izetbegovic-i-dodik-na-listi-nepozeljnih, accessed on 3 June 2013 at 7:05pm EST.<br />
283. See I. Ćatić, “Paraobavještajni odbor SDA ignorira vladu SAD-a: Čovjek s američke crne liste šef ministru sigurnosti,”<br />
Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 5 July 2012, at http://www.dnevniavaz.ba/vijesti/teme/99173-paraobavjestajni-odbor-sdaignorira-vladu-sad-a-covjek-s-americke-crne-liste-sef-ministru-sigurnosti-bih.html,<br />
accessed on 6 June 2012 at:<br />
1:55pm EST.<br />
284. See Harun Karčić, “Globalization and Islam in Bosnia: Foreign Influences and Effects,” Totalitarian Movements<br />
and Political Religions 11 (June 2010), 160-162.<br />
285. See Ezher Beganović, “Šiijska zajednica iz Lješeva kod Ilijaša,” Saff (Sarajevo), 14 October 2013, at http://www.<br />
Saff.ba/islamske-teme/428-siijska-zajednica-iz-ljeseva-kod-ilijasa, accessed on 30 March 2014 at 10:03am EST.<br />
286. See “Ramazanska ofanziva šija na Bosnu i Hercegovinu,” Saff (Sarajevo), 16 August 2013, at http://www.Saff.ba/<br />
bih/142-ramazanska-ofanziva-sija-na-bosnu-i-hercegovinu, accessed on 18 August 2013 at 9:05am EST.<br />
287. See “Iranske diplomate napustili teritoriju BiH,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 14 May 2013, at http://www.avaz.ba/sport/<br />
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rukomet/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/iranske-diplomate-napustili-teritoriju-bih, accessed on 18 May 2013 at 5:43pm<br />
EST; see also John Schindler’s report on the incident, “Bosnia tells Iranian Spies to Leave . . . to No Avail,” at<br />
http://20committee.com/, 7 May 2013, accessed on 18 May 2013 at 5:47pm EST.<br />
288. See Besar Likmeta, “Albania Backs Israel, Compares Iranian Chief to Hitler,” BalkanInsight, 22 August 2012, at<br />
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/israel-finds-new-cheerleader-in-albania-s-pm, accessed on 20 November<br />
2012 at 8:43am EST.<br />
289. For reports on the dispute over the MEK between Albania and Iran, see “Resettled MKO Members in Albania Disobey<br />
Ringleaders,” Fars New Agency (Dateline Tehran), 29 June 2013, at http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.<br />
aspx?nn=13920408000229, accessed on 5 November 2014 at 10:04am EST, and “Tens of Members of Defect MKO<br />
Upon Arrival in Albania,” Fars News Agency (Dateline Tehran), 19 October 2013, at http://english.farsnews.com/<br />
newstext.aspx?nn=13920727001109, accessed on 5 November 2014 at 10:08am EST. For a useful overview of<br />
the MEK’s history and orientation, see Jonathan Masters, “Mujahedeen-e-Khalq,” Council on Foreign Relations<br />
Backgrounders, 28 July 2014, at http://www.cfr.org/iran/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek/p9158, accessed on 5 November<br />
2014 at 10:11am EST.<br />
290. See Holbrooke, “Lessons from Dayton for Iraq,” The Washington Post, 23 April 2008, A21.<br />
291. See Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida and the Rise of Global Jihad, op. cit., 150.<br />
292. See Berger’s comments in Sarajevo Ricochet (Oslo: Fenris Film, 2010). Directed by Ola Flyum and David Hebditch.<br />
In the same documentary, former Bosnian diplomat Muhammed Filipović claimes that the elder Izetbegović<br />
apparently spent so much time alone in the apartment of the forementioned Hassanein that his security detail<br />
began to believe they had a sexual relationship. Filipović is also of the belief that the TWRA funds were controlled<br />
by a relatively small circle of people, i.e., Aljia and Bakir Izetbegović and Hasan Cengić. Bakir Izetbegović’s<br />
central role in his father’s policies during this period are widely acknowledged. In one interview, for instance, the<br />
elder Izetbegović publicly stated that he most readily accepted his son’s advice. See Alija Izetbegović’s interview<br />
entitled “Odgovori Alije Izetbegovića na 100 pitanja magazina Start,” at http://www.mm.co.ba/index.php/bs/aktuelno/vijesti-iz-bih/930-odgovori-alije-izetbegovica-na-100-pitanja-magazina-start,<br />
accessed on 9 November 2014<br />
at 9:43am EST. Similarly, as a leading Bosnian journalist, Vildana Selimbegovic, has noted, “for a long time it has<br />
not been a secret that the recent president of the presidency Alija Izetbegović, through his son Bakir controlled the<br />
military and police officials at the highest levels, and it’s an open secret that around the younger Izetbegović specifically<br />
a team of the unofficial Bosnian secret services has been formed.” See Selimbegović, “Žrtva rata orlova i<br />
Ševa? Kome je smetao Nedžad Ugljen?” BH Dani 178 (Sarajevo), 27 October 2000.<br />
293. Thomas Joscelyn, “ISNA [Islamic Society of North America] Gave $100K to Terrorist Front Group,” The Weekly<br />
Standard, 24 June 2009, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/06/report_isna_gave_100k_<br />
to_terro.asp, accessed on 20 February 2014 at 10:19am EST.<br />
294. The most detailed investigation into TWRA’s operations made public so far was carried out by German police<br />
authorities at the request of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). See Expert Report<br />
Concerning the Area—Financial Investigations—relating to the judicial assistance request, ref. no. INV/10289/<br />
T09-PH (245), dated 8/27/2002 of the “Office of the Prosecutor” (OTP) of the International Court of Criminal<br />
Justice for the Former Yugoslavia relating to the “Third World Relief Agency” (TWRA) Vienna/Austria. Meckenheim:<br />
Federal Office of Criminal Investigations, ST-45-2-185-02, 8/28/2003.<br />
295. See Sefer Halilović’s interview with Senad Pečanin, “Izetbegović je izdajnik, a mora dokazati da nije kriminalac,”<br />
BH Dani 119 (Sarajevo), 10 September 1999 at http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/119/inter.htm, accessed on 16 April<br />
2013 at 9:23am EST. Mustafa Cerić and Salim Šabić (at the time the vice-president of the SDA) have also been<br />
reported to have been in charge of TWRA’s Zagreb office; see Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida and<br />
the Rise of Global Jihad, op. cit., 148. For more on TWRA, see Douglas Farah, “The Role of Sudan in Islamist<br />
Terrorism: A Case Study,” 13 April 2007, at http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.156/pub_detail.asp,<br />
accessed on 18 March 2014 at 12:31pm EST; Thomas H. Kean, et. Al., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report<br />
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company),<br />
58; Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, op. cit., 45-47; John Pomfret, “Bosnia’s Muslims Dodged Embargo,” The<br />
Washington Post, 22 September 1996, A01, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/bosvote/<br />
front.htm, accessed on 18 March 2014 at 10:06am EST; Dženana Karup-Druško, “BIO i ostao največi bošnjački<br />
tajkun,” BH Dani 229 (Sarajevo), 26 October 2001 at http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/229/t22907.shtml, accessed<br />
on 16 April 2013 at 9:12am EST; and Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995 (Műnster:<br />
LitVerlag, 2003), 180-181.<br />
296. Estimate according to Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun; see Merchant of Death: Money, Guns and the Man Who<br />
Makes War Possible (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 50.<br />
297. Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al Qa’ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad, op. cit., 149.<br />
298. See J.M. Berger, “Al Qaeda and the U.S. Military,” Intelwire, 5 December 2011, at http://news.intelwire.com/search/<br />
label/Bosnia. accessed on 13 February 2014 at 8:53am EST.<br />
299. For a profile of Clement Rodney Hampton-el, see Francis X. Clines, “Spectre of Terror; U.S.-Born Suspect in Terror Plots:<br />
Zealous Causes and Civic Roles,” The New York Times, 28 June 1993, at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/28/<br />
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nyregion/specter-terror-us-born-suspect-bombing-plots-zealous-causes-civic-roles.html, accessed on 25 March<br />
2014 at 2:09pm EST.<br />
300. According to Landmarks Plot co-conspirator Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali; see Kohmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe:<br />
The Afghan-Bosnian Network, 73-74.<br />
301. Ibid., 152-53.<br />
302. See Colin Soloway, “Kosovo Reckoning: Bin Laden Casts a Shadow over Sarajevo Summit,” The Independent (UK),<br />
29 July 1999, at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/kosovo-reckoning-bin-laden-casts-a-shadow-over-sarajevo-summit-1109335.html,<br />
accessed on 11 June 2014 at 10:03am EST.<br />
303. See Richard Esposito, “Mole Who Met Bin Laden Killed by Al Qaeda in Bosnia,” NBC News, 27 February 2014, at<br />
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/exclusive-mole-who-met-bin-laden-killed-al-qaeda-bosnia-n39306,<br />
accessed on 17 October 2014 at 11:38am EST.<br />
304. See Kean, et. Al., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon<br />
the United States, op. cit., 154.<br />
305. See Erich Follath and Gunther Latsch, “Der Prinz und die Terror-GMBH,” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 15 September 2001.<br />
306. See Senad Pečanin, “I Osama bin-Laden ima bosanski pasoš,” BH Dani 121 (Sarajevo), 24 September 1999 at<br />
http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/121/t212a.htm, accessed on 1 June 2012.<br />
307. See the interview with Izetbegović in Time (European edition), 31 October 2001.<br />
308. See Hana Imamović, “Reactions in South East Europe to the Attacks on September 11,” AIMPRESS Sarajevo,<br />
11 October 2001, at http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/dos/archive/data/2001/11012-dose-01-14.htm, accessed on 29<br />
October 2013 at 12:28am EST.<br />
309. According to John Schindler; see “9/11 Planner Freed by Syrian Jihadists,” The XX Committee, 11 March 2014, at<br />
http://20committee.com/page/2/, accessed on 29 March 2014 at 10:13am EST.<br />
310. See Peter Finn, “Hamburg’s Cauldron of Terror: Within Cell of 7, Hatred Toward US Grew and Sept. 11 Evolved,”<br />
The Washington Post, 11 September 2002, A01.<br />
311. See Holger Stark, “The Forgotten Prisoner: A Tale of Extraordinary Renditions and Double Standards,” Der Spiegel<br />
(Hamburg), 21 November 2005, at http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/the-forgotten-prisoner-a-tale-of-extraordinary-renditions-and-double-standards-a-386033.html,<br />
accessed on 30 March 2014 at 6:11pm EST.<br />
312. See John Crewdson (with Viola Gienger), “2 Firms Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudi Intelligence Agency,” The Chicago<br />
Tribune, 31 March 2004, at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-03-31/news/0403310198_1_al-qaeda-saudi-arabian-mamoun-darkazanli,<br />
accessed on 7 February 2014 at 9:53am EST; and “JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment<br />
for Ramzi Abdullah Mohammed Bin al-Shihb,” (Department of Defense, Headquarters, Joint Task Force<br />
Guantanamo, 8 December 2006), at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/10013-ramzi-bin-al-shibh,<br />
accessed on 30 March 2014 at 6:25pm EST.<br />
313. For instance, Michael A. Ledeen, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, has reported that Mohammed<br />
Atta, the operational leader of the 9/11 attack, trained in terrorist camps in Bosnia, and that Said Bahaji, another<br />
key member of the Hamburg Cell, had been in Bosnia as well. See “Talking to Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, 18<br />
August 2007, at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB118739533381601535, accessed on 16 July 2014.<br />
314. See “Germany Nabs Suspected Al Qaeda Financier,” The Associated Press (Dateline Berlin, 16 October 2004),<br />
at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-10-16-al-qaeda-ties_x.htm, accessed on 31 March 2014 at<br />
11:45am EST.<br />
315. Reda Seyam was an Egyptian suspected of helping to finance the October 2002 Bali bombings which killed over<br />
200 people. Seyam managed a rental-car agency in Sarajevo which was considered a front for Saudi intelligence.<br />
A Spanish indictment against Seyam named him “Osama Bin Laden’s financier in Europe.” See Crewdson, et. Al.,<br />
“2 Firms Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudi Intelligence Agency,” op. cit.; Richard Bernstein, “The Fear Born of a Much<br />
Too Personal Look at Jihad,” The New York Times, 27 September 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/27/<br />
international/europe/27fprofile.html?pagewanted=print&position=&_r=1&, accessed on 18 August 2014 at<br />
8:45am EST; and John Crewdson, Viola Gienger, Lilian-Astrid Geese, and Dewi Loevard, “A Couple’s Life Torn<br />
Apart by Islamic Jihad,” The Chicago Tribune, 26 November 2004, at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-11-<br />
26/news/0411260271_1_saudi-arabia-islamic-jihad-german-federal-prosecutor, accessed on 15 August 2014 at<br />
8:23am EST.<br />
316. See “United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, United States of America vs. Enaam<br />
M. Arnout, Section 5, 68-69.<br />
317. Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, op cit., 201.<br />
318. See the State Department cable “BiH Federation Police Search Benevolence International,” # 00934, Embassy<br />
Sarajevo, March 2002, at http://intelwire.egoplex.com/DOS-Benevolence-Binder.pdf, accessed on 26 April 2014<br />
at 1:01pm EST.<br />
319. See “Benevolence Director Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy: Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda and<br />
Other Violent Groups,” U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, 9 October<br />
2002; at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2002/pr1009_01.pdf, accessed on 26 August 2014 at 1:52pm<br />
EST.<br />
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320. See Matthew A. Levitt, “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” Middle East Review of International<br />
Affairs 6 (December 2002), 58, and Viola Gienger, “Bosnian Tied to Chicago-area Charity Found Guilty,” The<br />
Chicago Tribune, 2 July 2003, at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-07-02/news/0307020210_1_al-qaeda-benevolence-international-foundation-enaam-arnaout,<br />
accessed on 26 August 2014 at 2:02pm EST. Predictably,<br />
Zahiragić was found guilty of a lesser offense and released.<br />
321. See “United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. IN RE: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.<br />
Docket No. 06-0319-cv(L). Decided: August 14, 2008.”<br />
322. For reports on attempts by Al Qaeda leaders to flee to Bosnia after the 9/11 attacks, see Craig Pyes, Josh Meyer<br />
and William C. Rempel, “Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists,” The Los Angeles Times,<br />
7 October 2001, at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/07/news/mn-54505, accessed on 20 November 2013 at<br />
11:48am EST; “Bosnian Leadership Prepared to Intercept Militants with Links to Bin-Laden,” Radio Free Europe/<br />
Radio Liberty Newsline, 1 October 2001; Azhar Kalamujić, “Agenti FBI učestvovali u hapšenju Jordanaca Abu<br />
Kharrourba Majeda,” Oslobođenje (Sarajevo), 5 October 2001, 5. The director of Bosnia’s State Border Service,<br />
Tomislav Mihalj, also claimed that after 9/11 members of al-Qaeda were trying to reach Bosnia. BH Dani 234<br />
(Sarajevo), 30 November 2001.<br />
323. See Kohmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, op. cit., 218.<br />
324. The CIA report on Bosnian NGO’s supporting terrorist organizations and operations is available at http://intelfiles.<br />
egoplex.com/cia-ngos-1996.pdf, accessed on 10 July 2012 at 4:49pm EST.<br />
325. See the documents reported in Sarajevo Ricochet, op. cit.<br />
326. See “Bosnian TV Alleges Muslim Official Linked to 9/11 Attacks,” BBC Monitoring Europe, 9 May 2008.<br />
(Available on the LexisNexis Academic database), accessed on 26 April 2013 at 9:19am EST. The present author<br />
remains skeptical of the accuracy of this particular report.<br />
327. See Besar Likmeta, “Albania Nabs Suspected Al Qaeda Recruiters,” op. cit.<br />
328. For reports on the August 2014 raids against Islamist militants in Kosovo, see “Kosovo police net Iraq and Syria<br />
‘militant suspects’,” BBC News, 11 August 2014, at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28739084, accessed<br />
on 12 August 2014 at 8:54am EST; Nektar Zogjani, “Kosovo President Hails Roundup of Suspected Militants,”<br />
BalkanInsight, 11 August 2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-police-arrests-suspected-terrorists,<br />
accessed on 12 August 2014 at 8:50am EST; Bahri Cani, “Jihad ‘Made in Kosovo’,” Deutsche Welle, 24<br />
August 2014, at http://www.dw.de/jihad-made-in-kosovo/a-17874069, accessed on 3 October 2014 at 2:37pm EST;<br />
and “Kosovo Nastavlja Policijska Akcija Protiv Muslimana,” Vijestiummeta, (no date given), at http://vijestiummeta.com/kosovo-na-kosovu-se-nastavlja-policijska-akcija-protiv-muslimana/,<br />
accessed on 3 October 2014 at<br />
2:33pm EST.<br />
329. See Nektar Zogjani, “Kosovo Police Swoop on Hardline Muslim Leaders,” BalkanInsight, 17 September 2014, at http://<br />
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-police-swoop-on-hardline-muslim-leaders, accessed on 3 October 2014.<br />
330. See “Velika antiteroristička akcija SIPA-e: Uhapšeni Bosnić, Muratović, Durguti, Fojnica . . . “ Oslobođenje<br />
(Sarajevo), 3 September 2014, at http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/u-toku-velika-antiteroristicka-akcija-sipe-u-bih-uhapseno-15-osoba,<br />
accessed on 2 October 2014 at 11:46am EST. Among the locations raided in<br />
Operation Damask were Wahhabi outposts in Sarajevo, Kiseljak, Zenica, the villages of Ošve and Gornja Bočinja<br />
near Maglaj, Gornja Maoča, Bužim, and Teslić. See also Elvira M. Jukic, “Bosnia Arrests 16 Suspected Jihad<br />
Recruiters,” BalkanInsight, 3 September 2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-arrests-15-alleged-terrorists,<br />
accessed on 2 October 2014 at 11:58am EST; Jukic, “Bosnia Steps Up Crackdown on Islamic<br />
Militants,” BalkanInsight, 8 September 2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-steps-up-crackdown-on-islamic-militants,<br />
accessed on 2 October 2014 at 12:11am EST.<br />
331. See “Designations of Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 24 September 2014),<br />
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/232067.htm, accessed on 2 October 2014 at 11:32am EST.<br />
332. See “Serbia Charges Alleged ISIS Funders and Recruiters,” BalkanInsight, 7 October 2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-files-charges-against-alleged-isis-funders-and-recruiters,<br />
accessed on 28 October 2014 at<br />
11:12am EST.<br />
333. “Slovenksa policija hapsila pristalice Bilala Bosnića,” Saff (Sarajevo), 24 September 2014, at http://saff.ba/slovenska-policija-hapsila-pristalice-bilala-bosnica/,<br />
accessed on 28 October 2014 at 11:31am EST.<br />
334. Petrit Collaku, “Kosovo Court Rejects Detention of Terror Suspects,” BalkanInsight, 3 October 2014, at http://www.<br />
balkaninsight.com/en/article/court-of-appeal-finds-no-legal-reason-for-detention-on-remand-for-terrorist-suspects,<br />
accessed on 28 October 2014 at 11:24am EST.<br />
335. See Petritsch, “Islam is Part of the West, Too,” The New York Times, 20 November 2001, at http://www.nytimes.<br />
com/2001/11/20/opinion/20PETR.html, accessed on 9 April 2014 at 2:04pm EST. Petritsch did add the proviso<br />
“although this cannot be excluded,” although given the fact that he had been in Bosnia over two years at this point,<br />
to be unaware of the role Bosnia played in the greatest security threat to Western interests in the post-Cold War era<br />
reveals the willful ignorance all too many Western officials have about conditions in the region. Six months later,<br />
Petritsch continued to promote the same obfuscations, claiming that “Rumours have it that there is evidence that<br />
Al-Qaeda has a substantial base in Bosnia. That is not true.” See Petritsch’s interview with Financeel Dagblaad,<br />
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as posted on the OHR website, “Bosnia is Much More European then Denmark,” at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/<br />
presso/pressi/default.asp?content_id=7402, accessed on 11 October 2014 at 2:37pm EST.<br />
336. See “Inzko: Vehabije u BiH nisu opasnost Evropi,” Al Jazeera, 1 March 2012, at http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/<br />
inzko-vehabije-u-bih-nisu-opasnost-evropi, accessed on 3 February 2014 at 11:57am EST. Indeed, given such inaction<br />
by international officials in Bosnia, perhaps Mustafa Cerić was not being entirely facetious when he claimed<br />
that “If Al Qaeda collaborators are in BiH, then the Office of the High Representative and NATO are responsible<br />
for their existence.” See Cerić’s comments as quoted in “Cerić tvrdi da u BiH nema simpatizera Al-Qaide,”<br />
Dnevnik.hr, 19 August 2007, at http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/ceric-tvrdi-da-u-bih-nema-simpatizera-al-qaide.html,<br />
accessed on 30 March 2014 at 11:16am EST.<br />
337. See “41 st Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina<br />
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” 15 May 2012, at http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.<br />
asp?content_id=47159, accessed on 13 October 2014 at 11:56am EST.<br />
338. It has been speculated that Ashdown purged Alibabić on the advice of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also<br />
known as MI6), allegedly because Alibabić bore some grudge against SIS and had begun leaking the names of SIS<br />
agents in Bosnia hunting war crimes suspects. See Henry de Quetteville and Hugh Griffiths, “MI6 Spies Exposed<br />
by Balkan Rivals,” The Telegraph (UK), 27 September 2004, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/4193735/MI6-<br />
spies-exposed-by-Balkan-rivals.html, accessed on 24 October 2014 at 12:12pm EST.<br />
339. See Antonio Prlenda’s interview with Ashdown, entitled “Time for BiH Politicians to Take Crucial Steps to Future,”<br />
The Southeast European Times, 30 January 2004, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/document/setimes/features/2004/02/040130-ANTONIO-001,<br />
accessed on 23 October 2014 at 9:55am EST.<br />
340. As quoted by Branka Branković, “Selefije i vehabije ozbiljna pretnja region,” Danas (Belgrade), 26 November 2008,<br />
at http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/terazije/selefije_i_vehabije_ozbiljna_pretnja_regionu.14.html?news_<br />
id=146451, accessed on 20 November 2013 at 11:06am EST.<br />
341. As quoted by Stephen Schwartz, “How Radical Islam Infiltrates Kosovo,” op. cit.<br />
342. Understandably, Izetbegović’ and his circle consistently lied about the presence of jihadis and Iranian security forces<br />
in Bosnia. At the signing ceremonies for the Dayton Peace Agreement in Paris in December 1995, President Clinton<br />
told Izetbegović that it was imperative for all the mujahedin and Iranian forces to leave Bosnia in accordance<br />
with the agreement just signed. As Holbrooke described it, “Izetbegović told the president that the bulk of such<br />
personnel ‘had already left,’ a statement we knew not to be true.” See Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random<br />
House, 1998), 321. Former NATO commander General Wesley Clark had a similar experience when dealing<br />
with Izetbegović and his closest associates. After the Paris signing ceremonies for the Dayton Accords, Clark went<br />
to Sarajevo to himself impress upon the Muslim leadership the overriding importance of removing the mujahedin<br />
and the Iranians from Bosnia. Izetbegović told Clark to talk to his intelligence chief, Alispahić. When Clark<br />
discussed the mujahedin/Iranian problem with Alispahić, the latter said he had been misinformed. When Clark<br />
presented evidence that the US had accumulated about the mujahedin/Iranian presence in Bosnia, Alispahić told<br />
him it was incorrect. Alispahić then went to the extent of signing a statement certifying that no Iranian terrorists<br />
were in Bosnia running training camps. See Sead Numanović, “Iranci su nam bili posebna briga, to su, u suštini,<br />
bili teroristi!,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 4 October 2013, at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/intervju/iranci-su-nam-bili-posebna-briga-to-su-u-sustini-bili-teroristi,<br />
accessed on 7 October 2013 at 10:05am EST. Secretary of State Warren Christopher<br />
received the same treatment. In February 1996, Christopher went to Sarajevo to impress upon Izetbegović<br />
the need to shut down the terrorist training facilities in Bosnia. Izebegović assured Christopher that “I am sure<br />
that they don’t exist, and I just spoke with my intelligence director, Bakir Alispahić, and he told me the same” See<br />
Anes Alic and Jens Tracy, “Training for an Islamic Bosnia,” Transitions Online, 26 April 2002, at http://www.tol.<br />
org/client/article/4246-training-for-an-islamic-bosnia.html, accessed on 30 June 2012 at 1:57pm EST.<br />
343. See Blavicki, “Islamist Terrorist Networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” op. cit., 63.<br />
344. For instance, according to Vlado Azinović, “any resolute action aimed at reestablishing law and order [in Wahhabi<br />
villages] would enrage the country’s official Islamic Community. In recent years, this body in charge of<br />
the religious affairs of Bosnian Muslims and a driving force behind the ruling Party of Democratic Action,<br />
was quick to brand as Islamophobia any criticism of Salafi radicalization in Bosnia.” See Azinovic, “The True<br />
Aims of Bosnia’s ‘Operation Light’,” at http://www.rferl.org/content/The_True_Aims_Of_Bosnias_Operation_<br />
Light/1954254.html, accessed on 25 April 2012 at: 7:40pm EST. Similarly, according to Nenad Pejić, “There are<br />
countless examples of local authorities in Bosnia failing to act properly against Islamic extremism. The majority of<br />
these criminal cases have not been resolved and when the terrorists are identified the trials take years . . . Islamic<br />
community leaders and local politicians described terrorist acts in BiH as isolated “criminal acts” and not a<br />
consequence of growing Islamic extremism. Attempts to initiate police investigations of the Wahhabi movement<br />
were often defined as Islamophobic.” See Pejic, “Wahhabist Militancy in Bosnia Profits from Local and International<br />
Inaction,” The Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 9, Issue 42, 17 November 2011, at http://www.jamestown.<br />
org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38681, accessed on 26 April 2012 at: 8:49am EST. According to<br />
Rešid Hafizović, a professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, “The reaction of the top of the Islamic<br />
community has always been understood by the Wahhabi gang as a tacit green light for their actions. That this is<br />
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true is confirmed by the fact that every new Wahhabi attack in the country has been worse, more planned out, and<br />
more dangerous.” See the interview with Hafizović, “Vehabije dolaze po tapiju na BiH,” Oslobođenje (Sarajevo),<br />
5/6 November 2011, 32. Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/74688492/Vehabije-dolaze-po-tapiju-na-BiHintervju-dr-Re%C5%A1id-Hafizovi%C4%87-Oslobo%C4%91enje-05-11-2011-god,<br />
accessed on 24 June 2012<br />
at: 7:26 pm EST. According to another Sarajevo academic, Esad Duraković, “Wahhabi doctrine . . . has expanded<br />
very seriously, it has metastasized in the institutions of the Islamic Community: in some madrasas, at some faculties<br />
of the Islamic Community, etc. Wahhabis pronounce their own fatwas, that is, they give their own formal and<br />
parallel interpretations of Islam, and the Islamic Community is silent. Thus, the Wahhabis have entered deeply into<br />
the system, they are educating the youth, while the leadership of the Islamic Community is silent or compliments<br />
them for being the “new Muslims.” See the interview with Esad Duraković, “Vehabizam je ovdje izrazito suicidna<br />
ideologija, tragično je što to ne shvataju mnogi muslimani, ni Bošnjaci,” 5 November 2011, at http://www.depo.<br />
ba/front/vehabizam-je-ovdje-izrazito-suicidna-ideologija-tragicno-je-sto-to-ne-shvataju-mnogi-muslimani-ni-bosnjaci,<br />
accessed on 24 June 2012 at 7:44pm EST. Similarly, the leading Bosnian journalist tracking Islamist<br />
extremists in Bosnia, Esad Hečimović, has noted “Even though the Bosnian tragedy is in the very center of the<br />
motivations of [Al-Qaeda], never did one single Bosnian-Herzegovinian religious, national, or state leader oppose<br />
these abused ideological interpretations which created a pretext for the new crimes against civilians from Jerusalem<br />
to New York.” See Hećimović, “Nastavak ‘pobjede iz Jemena?”, op. cit. Similarly, Mustafa Spahić, another<br />
leading Islamic cleric in Bosnia, has said of Mustafa Cerić’s refusal to confront the Wahhabi movment in Bosnia,<br />
“He is not fulfilling his duties. He travels to Germany and collects one award after another instead of dealing with<br />
the radicals here.” See Walter Mayr, “The Prophet’s Fifth Column: Islamists Gain Ground in Sarajevo,” op. cit.<br />
Similarly, in Kosovo, according to Ilir Deda, one of Kosovo’s leading political analysts, “The institutions have not<br />
dealt with this issue . . . Radical Islam is mid- to long-term one of the biggest dangers for Kosovo, because they<br />
are aiming to change our social fabric.” See Deda’s comments as quoted by Sylvia Poggioli, “Radical Islam Uses<br />
Balkan Poor to Wield Influence,” National Public Radio, 25 October 2010, at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/<br />
story.php?storyId=130801242, accessed on 16 October 2013 at 2:39pm EST.<br />
345. See Farah’s post at “London and the Possible Bosnia Connection,” Counterterrorism Blog, posted 14 July 2005,<br />
at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2005/07/douglas_farah_london_and_the_p.php, accessed on 27 March 2014 at<br />
10:51am EST.<br />
346. On these issues, see Music, Encountering the Wahhabi Movement in Bosnia: The Benefits of Social Network<br />
Analysis in Intelligence Management and Police Harmonization, op. cit., and Panovski, The Spread of Islamic<br />
Extremism in the Republic of Macedonia, op. cit.<br />
347. For a review of measures pending in various Balkans states, see Miki Trajkovski, “Balkan Countries Create Deterrent<br />
for Citizens Fighting in Syria,” The Southeast European Times, 21 January 2014, at http://www.setimes.com/<br />
cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2014/01/21/feature-03, accessed on 31 March 2014 at<br />
11:20am EST.<br />
348. The Council of Europe’s Country Profiles on Counter-Terrorism Capacity are available at http://www.coe.int/t/<br />
dlapil/codexter/country_profiles.asp Although useful for background on legislation that has actually been passed<br />
by individual countries, the CoE’s Country Profiles unfortunately reflect little actual knowledge of the problematic<br />
outside of where legislation stands in each country’s political/bureaucratic process.<br />
349. See Dario Sito Sucic, “Bosnia Introduces Jail Terms to Curb Recruitment for Syria,” Reuters (Dateline Sarajevo),<br />
29 April 2014, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-syria-crisis-bosnia-idUSBREA3S0PN20140429,<br />
accessed on 14 May 2014 at 11:10am EST.<br />
350. Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “US Praises Macedonian Law to Jail Militants,” BalkanInsight, 20 October 2014, at http://<br />
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/us-praises-macedonian-bill-to-jail-militants, accessed on 21 October 2014 at<br />
9:11am EST.<br />
351. As one expert on the Balkan militant Islamist phenomenon has observed: “If we look at this within international<br />
dimensions, Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi is the person who is calling people to join the jihad in Syria, but if you ask<br />
about this in Bosnia & Herzegovina itself, then you will see that Sheik Qaradawi was received here by the new<br />
reis-ul-Ulema Kavazović, by the former reis Cerić, and by the BiH presidency member Bakir Izetbegović, and no<br />
one in any way publicly objected to his call for jihad in Syria. How can we now criticize young men for going to<br />
jihad in Syria, if at the same time we do not ask those people who are publicly calling for jihad what their position<br />
on this is?” See the comments by Esad Hećimović in “Mudžahid Senad Kobaši iz Zenice poginuo u Siriji,” BH<br />
Magazin, 24 November 2013, at http://www.bhmagazin.com/bih-index/item/16403-mud%C5%BEahid-senad-koba%C5%A1-iz-travnika-poginuo-u-siriji-foto.html,<br />
accessed on 1 November 2014 at 10:34am EST.<br />
352. See “Returning Fighters from Syrian Conflict Cause Concern in the EU,” EUROPOL Press Release, 29 May 2014,<br />
at https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/returning-fighters-syrian-conflict-cause-concern-eu, accessed on 17 June<br />
2014 at 2:38pm EST.<br />
353. See Hećimović, “Radical movements—a challenge for moderate Balkan-Islam?” op. cit.<br />
354. See “Selefije u ‘svetom ratu’: eksluzivna ispovijest bh. džihad ratnika u Siriji,” op. cit.<br />
355. “Balkan jihadi/extremists” are here defined as either foreign or indigenous individuals who participated in the<br />
Balkan wars of the 1990s or spent time in the region over the past twenty years.<br />
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356. Some of the operational funds for the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 were provided by the<br />
Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a Vienna-based “Islamic charity” run by a long-time Izetbegović associate,<br />
the Sudanese national Elfatih Hassanein. Osama bin Laden was known to work through TWRA. TWRA and the<br />
first World Trade Center bombing is described in detail in section V.<br />
357. Bosnian jihad veteran Muslih al-Shamrani was involved in the November 1995 bombing of the Saudi National<br />
Guard building in Riyadh in which five Americans and two Indian nationals were killed. al-Shamrani was a Sunni<br />
from Saudi Arabia who had participated in the jihad in Afghanistan as well as in Bosnia. He was beheaded by the<br />
Saudi government in 1996. See Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network , op.cit.,<br />
158; Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Touchstone, 2002),<br />
90; and Joshua Teitelbaum and David Long, “Islamic Politics in Saudi Arabia,” Washington Institute Policy Watch<br />
259 (9 July 1997), at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/islamic-politics-in-saudi-arabia,<br />
accessed on 7 January 2015 at 4:04pm EST.<br />
358. Lionel Dumont was a French convert to Islam who participated in the Bosnian jihad, where his nom de guerre<br />
was “Abu Hamza.” In March 1996, together with another Frenich-Muslim convert, Christophe Caze, Dumont was<br />
part of the so-called “Roubaix Gang,” which in early 1996 participated in a spate of armed robberies in France,<br />
culminating in a car-bombing of the police station in Lille, two hundred meters away from where French president<br />
Jacques Chirac was supposed to open the G7 meeting two days hence. Caze was killed attempting to flee France,<br />
while Dumont returned to Bosnia and again became involved in criminal activities. During the course of one of his<br />
robberies he killed a policeman. He was ultimately tracked down and arrested in an apartment in ??? belonging to<br />
the Interior Ministry of Zenica-Doboj Canton. After little more than a year in prison, Dumont escaped from a Sarajevo<br />
prison just five days he was supposed to be extradicted to France. As Kohlmann notes, French officials were<br />
immediately suspicious of the timing, adding that “Perhaps Bosnian officials were embarrassed at the prospect of<br />
what Dumont might testify to in a French court . . . . [that] senior-level members of the Bosnian government continued<br />
to provide covert protection to the Arab mujahideen, even after they had committed cold-blooded crimes<br />
against innocent Bosnian Muslims themselves.” See Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian<br />
Network, op. cit., 194-97.<br />
359. Medina Delalić, “Loše plačeni policijski amateri,” Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo), 5 October 2002, 5-7.<br />
360. See Anes Alic, “The Ringleaders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Wahhabi Movement,” at http://www.jamestown.org/<br />
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1048, accessed on 14 June 2012 at: 8:06pm EST, and Anes Alic, “Wahhabism:<br />
From Vienna to Bosnia,” ISN Security Watch, 6 April 2007, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/<br />
Articles/Detail//?id=53104&lng=en, accessed on 15 September 2012 at 11:28am EST.<br />
361. See “JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Mustafa Ait Idr, 30 June 2008,” at http://wikileaks.org/gitmo/pdf/ag/us4ag-010004dp.<br />
pdf The Mostar Car bombing injured some fifty people. Some reports have suggested that Ahmad Zuhayri had also<br />
been involved in the murder of U.S. citizen William Jefferson near Banovići, Bosnia, in November 1995, and in<br />
the bombing of the USS Cole. See Thomas Joscelyn, “Convicted Car Bomber and Likely Murdered Transferred<br />
from Gitmo to Saudi Arabia,” The Weekly Standard, 12 June 2009, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/<br />
TWSFP/2009/06/convicted_car_bomber_and_likel.asp, accessed on 14 May 2014 at 11:46am EST.<br />
362. Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe-the Afghan-Bosnian Network, op cit., 201. For more on Mamdouh Mahmud<br />
Salim, see Douglas Frantz, “US Based Charity is Under Scrutiny,” The New York Times, 14 June 2002, at http://<br />
www.nytimes.com/2002/06/14/us/us-based-charity-is-under-scrutiny.html, accessed on 22 May 2014 at 10:52am<br />
EST. Bosnian jihad veteran and Finsbury Park Mosque Imam Abu Hamza al Misri would later claim that the African<br />
Embassy bombings were retaliation for the arrest and deportation of several members of Al Qaeda’s Albanian<br />
cell. See his 2002 interview with PBS’ Frontline: In Search of Al Qaeda, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/search/interviews/almasri.html,<br />
accessed on 8 May 2014 at 1:17pm EST.<br />
363. See “Summary of Evidence for Combatant Review Tribunal-Al Nashiri, Abd Al Rahim Hussein Mohammed,” at<br />
http://www.defense.gov/news/ISN10015.pdf<br />
364. See R. Jeffrey Smith, “A Bosnian Village’s Terrorist Ties,” The Washington Post, 11 March 2000, A1.<br />
365. See “Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10015,” at http://www.defense.<br />
gov/news/transcript_isn10015.pdf, accessed on 25 November 2013 at 12:09pm EST.<br />
366. Bosnian jihad veterans Ibrahim al-Thawar, alias “Nibras,” and Hassan al-Khamiri were the two Saudi suicide terrorists<br />
who steered a small craft loaded with 270 kilograms of C-4 explosives alongside the USS Cole while it was<br />
in Aden Harbor, then detonated the bomb killing themselves and seventeen U.S. servicemen, and injuring another<br />
37. See Akiva J. Lorenz, “Analyzing the USS Cole Bombing,” Maritime Security Research Papers, 27 September<br />
2007, at http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/2007/12/27/analyzing-the-uss-cole-incident/, accessed on 11November<br />
2014 at 5:10pm EST. See also Ali H. Soufan, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against<br />
Al Qaeda (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 239<br />
367. Along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, other 9/11 participants who had fought with Izetbegović’s forces in Bosnia<br />
included Khalid al Mindhar and Nawaf al Hamzi. See Thomas H. Kean, et. Al., The 9/11 Commission Report, 154.<br />
368. See “Profile: Omar Saeed Sheikh,” available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1804710.stm, accessed on 22<br />
April 2012 at: 6:11pm EST.<br />
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369. Reda Seyam was an Egyptian suspected of helping to finance the October 2002 Bali bombings which killed over<br />
200 people. Seyam managed a rental-car agency in Sarajevo which was suspected of being a front for Saudi<br />
intelligence. A Spanish indictment against Seyam named him “Osama Bin Laden’s financier in Europe.” See John<br />
Crewdson (with Viola Gienger), “2 Firms Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudi Intelligence Agency,” The Chicago Tribune,<br />
31 March 2004, at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-03-31/news/0403310198_1_al-qaeda-saudi-arabian-mamoun-darkazanli,<br />
accessed on 7 February 2014 at 9:53am EST. For more on Seyam, see John Crewdson,<br />
Viola Gienger, Lilian-Astrid Geese, and Dewi Loevard, “A Couple’s Life Torn Apart by Islamic Jihad,” The<br />
Chicago Tribune, 26 November 2004, at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-11-26/news/0411260271_1_saudi-arabia-islamic-jihad-german-federal-prosecutor,<br />
accessed on 15 August 2014 at 8:23am EST.<br />
370. The May 2003 Riyadh bombings involved a coordinated triple car-bombing of several compounds housing foreign<br />
citizens in Saudi Arabia. Thirty-four people were killed in the attacks, including seven Americans. Bosnian jihad<br />
veteran Khalid al-Juhani was the mastermind of the operation. al-Juhani had assumed command of Al Qaeda<br />
operations in the Persian Gulf after the capture of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (also a Bosnian jihad veteran), who<br />
was suspected of involvement in the attack on the USS Cole (see above). See Richard B. Schmitt, Josh Meyer and<br />
Robin Wright, “High Terror Risk is Declared,” The Los Angeles Times, 21 May 2003, at http://articles.latimes.<br />
com/2003/may/21/nation/na-alert21, accessed on 10 November 2014 at 9:10am EST; Mark Hosenball, “Al Qaeda<br />
Strikes Again,” Newsweek, 25 May 2003, at http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-strikes-again-137523, accessed<br />
on 10 November 2014 at 9:18am EST.<br />
371. Bosnian jihad veteran Abdel Karim Al-Tuhani Al-Majati was a Moroccan Al Qaeda member involved in the May<br />
2003 Riyadh bombings. He was killed by Saudi security forces in April 2005. For more on Al-Majati, see “An Al<br />
Qaeda Love Story: From Morocco to Bosnia to Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, via New Jersey,” MEMRI Special<br />
Dispatch No. 984, 9 September 2005, at http://www.memri.org/report/en/print1471.htm, accessed on 11 November<br />
2014 at 4:08pm EST.<br />
372. Bosnian jihad veteran Habib Aktaş was the alleged mastermind of the Istanbul bombings that killed some 60 people<br />
in attacks on the British consulate, an HSBC bank in Istanbul, and two synagogues on November 15th and November<br />
20th 2007. Among the fatalities was the British consul-general in Istanbul. Turkish authorities believed<br />
that Aktaş was the head of the Al Qaeda cell in the country. See Karl Vick, “Al-Qaeda’s Hand in Istanbul Plot,”<br />
The Washington Post, 13 February 2007, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/<br />
AR2007021201715.html, accessed on 4 May 2013 at 8:24am EST; and “Istanbul Bombing Suspects Charged,”<br />
BBC News, 25 February 2014, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3486536.stm, accessed on 7 October 2014 at<br />
12:17pm EST.<br />
373. Luke Harding, Helena Smith and Jason Burke, “Istanbul Bombings: The Softest Target,” The Observer (UK), 22<br />
November 2003, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/nov/23/turkey.terrorism, accessed on 4 May 2013 at<br />
8:22am EST.<br />
374. See Fernando Reinares, “The Evidence of Al-Qaida’s Role in the 2004 Madrid Attack,” CTC Sentinel 5 Issue 3, 22<br />
March 2012, at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-evidence-of-al-qaidas-role-in-the-2004-madrid-attack, accessed<br />
on 26 July 2012 at 2:47pm EST; and Keith B. Richburg, “Plot Leader in Madrid Sought Help of Al Qaeda,” The<br />
Washington Post, 12 April 2004, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2004/04/12/AR2005040206327.<br />
html, accessed on 8 May 2014 at 1:22pm EST. According to Zlatan Music, the report of the Spanish court prosecuting<br />
the Madrid train bombings mentioned Bosnia and the El Mujahedin unit in Bosnia three hundred times. See<br />
Music, “Encountering the Wahhabi Movement in Bosnia: The Benefits of Social Network Analysis in Intelligence<br />
Management and Police Harmonization,” (Budapest, 2012), 13. Available at www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/music_zlatan.<br />
pdf, accessed on 23 November 2013 at 6:28pm EST. Bosnian émigré Sanel Sjekirica had been a roommate of the<br />
ringleader of the Madrid bombers, Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet. Although he had been under investigation by<br />
Spanish authorities for his involvement in Islamist activities, he was ultimately cleared of personal involvement<br />
in the Madrid attacks; see “Madrid ‘ringleader’ dies in blast,” BBC News Europe, 4 April 2004, at http://news.bbc.<br />
co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3598219.stm, accessed on May 2014 at 11:31am EST, and “Three More Arrested in Spain<br />
Bombings,” The Associated Press (Dateline Madrid), 16 April 2004, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/04/16/<br />
three-more-arrested-in-spain-bombings/, accessed on 10 May 2014 at 11:37am EST. See also Zlatko Tulić and Ivica<br />
Milešić, “Sanel Sjekirica pripada drugoj generaciji školovanih bosanskih mudžahedina,” Slobodna Dalmacija<br />
(Split), 9 April 2009, at http://arhiv.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20040409/novosti02.asp, accessed on 10 May 2014 at<br />
11:13am EST.<br />
375. Abdelmajid Bouchar, a Moroccan suspected of involvement in the Madrid Train bombings, was arrested in a train<br />
after it had crossed the Serbian border in June 2005, travelling on forged Iraqi documents. Security officials believe<br />
Bouchar was transiting through Serbia trying to make his way to the Middle-East. See “Arrest May Indicate<br />
Balkans-Al Qaeda Link,” FoxNews, 29 August 2005, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/08/29/arrest-mayindicate-balkans-al-qaeda-link/,<br />
accessed on 19 November 2014 at 11:17am EST. Spanish officials said Bouchar’s<br />
fingerprints had been found at the rural home where the bombs used in the Madrid attacks were believed to have<br />
been assembled, and in the Madrid apartment where seven individuals suspected of involvement in the attacks blew<br />
themselves up during a confrontation with police. Bouchar had apparently also used Bulgaria as a hideout. See Al<br />
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Goodman, “Spain Seeks 3/11 Suspect in Serbia,” CNN.com, 26 August 2005, at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/<br />
europe/08/26/spain.extradition/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed on 19 November 2014 at 11:25am EST.<br />
376. For more on Bosnian jihad veteran Al-Muqrin, see “Profile: Abdul Aziz Al-Muqrin,” at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/<br />
middle_east/3821237.stm, accessed on 3 February 2014 at 12:35pm EST.<br />
377. According to Douglas Farah, see “London and the Possible Bosnia Connection,” 14 July 2005, at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2005/07/douglas_fah_london_and_the_p.php,<br />
accessed on 5 February 2014 at 2:35pm EST.<br />
378. In 2005, Italian investigators discovered a plot to bomb the funeral of Pope John Paul II which had originated in Gornja<br />
Maoča. The plot involved smuggling eleven rocket launchers, C4 explosives and detonators into Italy from a safe<br />
house in Zagreb using human trafficking channels through Trieste. Seid Redžematović, a member of the Aktivna<br />
Islamska Omladina (AIO) connected with the Gornja Maoča Wahhabi community, was arrested on the day of the<br />
Pope’s funeral, suspected of planning a suicide attack at the funeral. Several other individuals were arrested as<br />
well. See Fiorenza Sarzanini, “Commando con lanciarazzi: puntava all’ Italia,” Corriere della Serra, 26 August 2005,<br />
at http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Cronache/2005/08_Agosto/26/sarzanini.shtml, accessed on 10 December<br />
2014 at 5:09pm EST; “Terrorist Cells and Recruitment in Bosnia,” CSIS Transnational Threats Update 3 (No. 10),<br />
August/September 2005, 2; Rade Maroevic and Daniel Williams, “Terrorist Cells Find Foothold in the Balkans,”<br />
The Washington Post, 1 December 2005; Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad,<br />
op. cit., 316; Dženana Halimović, “Vehabije u Bosni: Od Bočinje do Maoče,” at http://www.slobodnaevropa.<br />
org/content/maoca_vehabije_selefije_akcija_svjetlost/1950070.html, accessed on 19 November 2013 at 10:38am<br />
EST; and Leslie S. Lebl, “Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies<br />
Institute (May 2014), 9. It is worth noting that despite the fact that a Bosnia-based plot to carry out an attack on<br />
one of the largest gatherings of world leaders in history had been uncovered, the OHR’s subsequent 28th and 29th<br />
Reports to the UN Secretary-General made no mention of this.<br />
379. Abu Hamza al-Masri was the imam of London’s Finsbury Park mosque, and considered to be the spiritual leader of<br />
the London 7/7 bombers. Abu Hamza fought in Bosnia in the 1990s, married a Bosnian war widow, and was granted<br />
Bosnian citizenship. In July 2005, Douglas Farah reported that Western intelligence officials had been warning<br />
that a large quantity of high-level plastic explosives had gone missing in Bosnia, and “if there were an attack in<br />
Europe, it would be very likely the materiel would have been obtained in Bosnia.” See Farah’s comments at http://<br />
counterterrorismblog.org/2005/07/douglas_farah_london_and_the_p.php, accessed on 7 February 2014 at 10:06am<br />
EST. In the aftermath of the 7/7 bombing, Scotland Yard’s investigation led to Sarajevo after it was discovered<br />
that one of the bomber’s relatives and three other UK residents had gone to the King Fahd mosque. According to a<br />
Bosnian police official, ‘Four British men were being watched in the UK and then we received word from British<br />
police that they were coming to Sarajevo. One of them was the relative of one of the July 7 bombers. They spent<br />
most of their time in the King Fahd Mosque, which is used by very extremist Muslims.’ Sarajevo’s King Fahd<br />
mosque has reportedly become a popular destination for second-generation Pakistani and Afghan youths in the<br />
UK. See Nick Pisa, “Terror Hunt for 7/7 Bomber’s Relative in Bosnian Mosque,” The Mail on Sunday (London),<br />
12 February 2006, 23. (Original in the author’s archive.) Among Abu Hamza al Masri’s other acolytes were<br />
would-be shoe bomber Richard Reid, and 9/11 “20th Hijacker,” Zacarias Moussaoui.<br />
380. See Evan Kohlmann, “Bosnia Suicide Bomb Plotters Found Guilty,” 10 January 2007, at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/01/bosnia_suicide_bomb_plotters_f_1.php,<br />
accessed on 5 February 2014 at 2:16pm EST. A<br />
raid on the apartment used by the plotters discovered suicide vests, 65 pounds of high explosives and explosive<br />
bullets, a machine pistol, and martyrdom statements. A subsequent raid netted another 22 pounds of explosives<br />
kept by an accomplice in a forest near the town of Hadžići, outside Sarajevo. See Nicholas Wood, “Police Raid<br />
Raises Fears of Bosnia as Haven for Terrorists,” The New York Times, 3 December 2005, at http://www.nytimes.<br />
com/2005/12/03/international/europe/03bosnia.html?ei=5099&en=e0e1466f0bb188f3&ex=1134190800&adxnnl=<br />
1&partner=TOPIX&adxnnlx=1133586686-oKfynmL95HY2Roh6Wumt+w&_r=0, accessed on 13 February 2014<br />
at 9:11am EST. Mirsad Bektašević has been reported to have “maintained close ties” with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,<br />
the former leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. See William J. Kole, “Are Terrorists Recruiting ‘white Muslims’?”<br />
Associated Press (Dateline Sarajevo), 18 April 2006, at http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2002936760_balkans18.html,<br />
accessed on 13 February 2014 at 9:39am EST.<br />
381. On 12 February 2007, Bosnian émigré Sulejman Talović opened fire on shoppers in Salt Lake City’s Trolley<br />
Square Mall, killing five people and wounding four others, including a pregnant woman. Police said he had a<br />
backpack full of ammunition and his intention was “to kill as many people as possible.” During the attacks he<br />
was wearing a necklace containing a miniature Quran. Three years earlier Talović’s school had already alerted<br />
police that he was looking at weapons on the internet and boasting that his grandfather “was in the jihad.” The day<br />
before the attack, Talović had told a friend that “tomorrow will be the happiest day of my life, but it will happen<br />
only once.” Some witnesses claim to have heard Talović shouting “Allahu Akbar!” during the attack. See Paul<br />
Sperry, “Could the Kenya Attack Happen Here? It Did.” The New York Post, 12 October 2013, at http://nypost.<br />
com/2013/10/12/could-the-kenya-mall-attack-ever-happen-here-it-already-did/, accessed on 20 September 2014<br />
at 11:12am EST. An FBI report on the Trolley Square Massacre found that Talović “may have thought about<br />
committing a shooting attack for years,” and “held prejudicial beliefs against Serbs, homosexuals, and African<br />
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Americans.” See Nate Carlisle, “FBI Found Talovic Had a History with Trolley Square,” The Salt Lake Tribune,<br />
25 June 2009, at http://www.sltrib.com/ci_12382259, accessed on 20 September 2014 at 11:25am EST.<br />
382. The Fort Dix Bomb Plot involved six Muslim men (three of whom were Albanians from Macedonia who had entered<br />
the U.S. illegally, and one Albanian from Kosovo) arrested for planning to kill military personnel at Fort Dix,<br />
New Jersey. During the course of a 15-month investigation, the FBI “taped them training with automatic weapons<br />
in rural Pennsylvania, conducting surveillance of military bases in the Northeast, watching videos of Osama bin<br />
Laden and the 9/11 hijackers and trying to buy AK-47 assault rifles.” See David Kocieniewski, “6 Men Arrested<br />
in a Terror Plot Against Fort Dix,” The New York Times, 9 May 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/<br />
us/09plot.html?pagewanted=all, accessed on 25 June 2014 at 8:57am EST; and Kareem Fahim and Andrea<br />
Elliot, “Religion Guided 3 Held in Fort Dix Plot,” The New York Times, 10 May 20017, at http://www.nytimes.<br />
com/2007/05/10/nyregion/10plot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed on 25 June 2014 at 8:51am EST; and<br />
Kareem Fahim, “In Transcripts, Tough Talk by Terror Suspects, and Informant,” The New York Times, 31 March<br />
2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/nyregion/31dix.html, accessed on 25 June 2014 at 10:06am EST.<br />
383. On 1 October 2007, Asim Cejvanović, a Bosnian living in Austria, was arrested after he tried running through a<br />
metal detector at the entrance to the US Embassy in Vienna with a backpack full of explosives and nails. At his trial,<br />
he claimed that Mehmed Djudjic, another Bosnian tied to the Wahhabi movement, had given him the backpack.<br />
Cejvanović was sentenced to fifteen months in prison for illegal possession of explosives. See “Vienna‘Embassy<br />
Bombing’ Foiled,” BBC News, 1 October 2007, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7022522.stm, accessed on<br />
20 September 2014; Jeffrey Imm, “Attack on US Embassy in Vienna Foiled,” Counterterrorism Blog, 1 October<br />
2007, at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/10/vienna_attack_foiled.php , accessed on 20 September 2014 at<br />
10:32am EST; and “Bosnia: Vienna Calling,” ISN Security Watch, 7 October 2007, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/<br />
Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=53864, accessed<br />
on 12 July 2012 at 8:05pm EST; and Teri Blumenfeld, “Are Jihadists Crazy?” Middle East Quarterly (Spring<br />
2012), 9.<br />
384. A suspected plot to bomb the Catholic cathedral in Sarajevo, the Franciscan monastery of the Holy Spirit outside<br />
of the town of Fojnica, and to sabotage electricity supply stations to EUFOR bases in Bosnia and attack<br />
EUFOR Liaison and Observation Teams in the country was disrupted in March 2008 with the arrest of the<br />
above group. Among the items police discovered were explosives hidden in books (designed to explode when<br />
they were opened). This group was particularly interested in attacking EUFOR teams whose members came<br />
from countries with soldiers deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. One member of the group, Edis Velić, had<br />
participated in jihad in Chechnya. See Damir Kaletovic and Anes Alic, “Terror Plot Thwarted in Bosnia,” ISN<br />
Security Network (Zurich), 28 March 2008, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail//?ots591=-<br />
4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=52023, accessed on 13 February 2014 at 10:29am<br />
EST.<br />
385. In August 2008, an illegal Albanian émigré living in the UK, Krenar Lusha, was arrested after police raided his<br />
home and discovered 72 liters of petrol, documents called “Ragnar’s Detonators” and “The Bomb Book,” and<br />
videos entitled “Hezbollah Military Instructions Manual,” and “Mobile Detonators.” Also found in Lusha’s home<br />
were fourteen mobile phones and videos of live beheadings by Islamist extremist groups. Lusha was in the process<br />
of downloading other Hezbollah materials at the time the police raided his home, including a video on how to use<br />
mobile phones as bomb detonators. During the trial the prosecutor revealed that the Hezbollah materials included<br />
information on how to make missiles and suicide vests. Lusha had also claimed on dating websites that he was a<br />
“terrorist” and a “sniper” and that he “loved” watching Americans and Jews get killed. Remarkably, despite being<br />
an illegal alien in Britain, he had been given a 100% mortgage by a British bank. See “NatWest handed Al Qaeda<br />
terrorist 100% mortgage to buy ₤93,000 he turned into a bomb factory,” The Daily Mail (UK), 16 December 2009,<br />
at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1236301/Bank-blasted-giving-Al-Qaeda-terrorist-100-mortgage.html,<br />
accessed on 16 October 2014 at 1:22pm EST; and Duncan Gardham, “Albanian ‘terrorist’ caught with bomb-making<br />
materials in his home, court hears.” The Telegraph (UK), 17 November 2009, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/<br />
news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6591313/Albanian-terrorist-caught-with-bomb-making-materials-in-his-homecourt-hears.html,<br />
accessed on 16 October 2014 at 1:28pm EST. Lusha was implicated in a larger plot involving<br />
four other individuals who allegedly intended to assassinate UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and former prime<br />
minister Tony Blair. See “Fifth Man Facing Terror Charges,” BBC News, 9 September 2008, at http://news.bbc.<br />
co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7606384.stm, accessed on 16 October 2014 at 1:32pm EST.<br />
386. See “QI.L. 264.08. ZAKI-UR-REHMAN LAKHVI,” Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267<br />
(1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities” 9 March 2009, at http://<br />
www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI26408E.shtml, accessed on 10 February 2014 at 10:11am EST.<br />
387. In July 2009, Bosnian native Enes Subašić and Kosovo native Hysen Sherifi were arrested as part of the “Raleigh<br />
Group” suspected of being involved in a “multi-year conspiracy to murder persons abroad and provide material<br />
support to terrorism.” Sherifi was also charged with planning to attack U.S. soldiers at the Marine base in Quantico,<br />
Virginia. See “North Carolina Resident Anes Subasic Sentenced for Terrorism Violations,” http://www.fbi.gov/<br />
charlotte/press-releases/2012/north-carolina-resident-anes-subasic-sentenced-for-terrorism-violations, accessed on<br />
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15 September 2012 at 11:47am EST.<br />
388. Bosnian émigré Adis Medunjanin was one of several conspirators planning attacks on the New York subway<br />
system. According to prosecution documents, Medunjanin travelled to Pakistan along with other conspirators and<br />
trained at Al Qaeda camps. The plot involved Medunjanin and two other terrorists strapping on backpacks and<br />
carrying out suicide attacks on NYC subways. On the verge of being arrested, Medunjanin made a 911 call saying<br />
“We love death more than you love life,” and proceeded to drive his car into another vehicle on the Whitestone<br />
Bridge in a failed suicide attack attempt. In November 2012, Medunjanin was convicted of conspiring to use<br />
weapons of mass destruction, to commit murder abroad, and of providing material support to Al Qaeda and receiving<br />
military training at an Al Qaeda camp. He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 95 years. See Mosi Secret,<br />
“Man Convicted of a Terrorist Plot to Bomb Subways is Sent to Prison for Life,” The New York Times, 12 November<br />
2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/nyregion/adis-medunjanin-convicted-of-subway-bomb-plot-getslife-sentence.html?_r=0,<br />
accessed on 17 November 2014 at 7:16pm EST; see also Tom Hays, “Medunjanin Got Al<br />
Qaeda Training,” Associated Press, 9 January 2012.<br />
389. “Tahir” was the alias of an U.S. military Vietnam veteran who became an Al Qaeda operative in both Bosnia and<br />
Somalia. See J. M. Berger, “Al Qaeda and the U.S. Military,” Intelwire, 5 December 2011, at http://news.intelwire.<br />
com/search/label/Bosnia, accessed on 13 February 2014 at 9:00am EST.<br />
390. See Arbana Xharra, “Kosovo: radikaler Islam als “tickende Bombe,” Der Standard (Vienna), 28 January 2013, at<br />
http://derstandard.at/1358304927258/Radikaler-Islam-als-tickende-Bombe-im-Kosovo, accessed on 5 February<br />
2014 at 1:29pm EST.<br />
391. See Esad Hećimović, “Gaza Flotilla Official Was Foreign Fighter in Bosnia War,” Intelwire 13 June 2010, at http://<br />
news.intelwire.com/2010/06/gaza-flotilla-official-was-foreign.html, accessed on 13 February 2014 at 8:41am<br />
EST. Atalay fought in Izetbegović’s “7th Muslim Brigade” (in which the mujahedin units were incorporated) from<br />
1992-1994, after which he became head of the IHH office in Sarajevo. For more on how Islamic charitable organizations<br />
such as IHH provide logistical support to terrorist groups, see Marc Champion, “Aid Group, Israel Primed<br />
for Clash, Flotilla Review Shows,” The Wall Street Journal, 7 July 2010, at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB<br />
10001424052748704535004575349031510961398, accessed on 19 June 2014 at 8:03am EST.<br />
392. On 27 June 2010, a bomb exploded in the police station of the central Bosnian town of Bugojno, killing a police officer<br />
on duty and wounding six others. The subsequent investigation revealed that the perpetrators were a militant cell<br />
of Wahhabi extremists including Haris Čaušević, who had a couple of years earlier been suspected of an arson<br />
attack on the Orthodox church in Bugojno, and another Wahhabi extremist, Naser Palislamović, who also had a<br />
significant criminal dossier, being earlier suspected of domestic violence, possessing explosives, and theft. The<br />
attack was believed to be in retaliation for the earlier arrest of another Wahhabi militant Rijad Rustempašić, who<br />
had been arrested on terrorism charges in 2008 in connection with the earlier plot to bomb Catholic churches in<br />
Sarajevo (see above). See Anes Alic, “Police Targeted in Bugojno Terrorist Attack,” International Relations and<br />
Security Network (Zurich), 12 June 2010, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=118664<br />
Accessed on 25 November 2013 at 11:32am EST; “’Terrorist Attack’ in Bosnia Kills One, Injures Six,” BalkanInsight,<br />
27 June 2010, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/terrorist-attack-in-bosnia-kills-one-injuressix,<br />
accessed on 25 November 2013 at 11:35am EST; Anes Alic, “A New Generation of Extremists Threatens<br />
Bosnia,” at http://eurasia.ro/?p=39758 Accessed on 25 November 2013 at 11:44am EST. Predictably, in October<br />
2014 an appellate court in Bosnia dismissed the original court’s guilty verdict against Haris Čaušević and Naser<br />
Palislamović. See “Ukinuta presuda Harisu Čauševiću osuđenom za teroristički napad u Bugojnu,” Oslobođenje<br />
(Sarajevo), 21 October 2014, at http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/ukinuta-presuda-harisu-causevicu-osudjenom-za-teroristicki-napad-u-bugojnu,<br />
accessed on 28 October 2014 at 1:22pm EST, and “Optuženi saradnik<br />
Harisa Čauševića, Naser Palislamović pravosnažno oslobođen,” Saff (Sarajevo), 23 October 2014, at http://saff.ba/<br />
optuzeni-saradnik-harisa-causevica-naser-palislamovic-pravosnazno-osloboden/#.VE_S81eOqSo, accessed on 28<br />
October 2014 at 1:34pm EST.<br />
393. For an excellent analysis Mevlid Jašarević’s October 2011 attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, see Chris Deliso, “Attack<br />
on US Bosnia Embassy Not Seen as a Major Security Concern, Despite Precedents and International Links,”<br />
Balkananalysis.com Special Report, 28 November 2011, at http://www.balkanalysis.com/bosnia/2011/11/28/<br />
attack-on-us-bosnia-embassy-not-seen-as-a-major-security-concern-despite-precedents-and-international-links/<br />
Accessed on 21 March 2014 at 10:30am EST. Jašarević’s companion on the day he attacked the US Embassy, Emrah<br />
Fojnica, was killed in an abortive suicide bombing attempt in Iraq in August 2014.<br />
394. In January 2012, Kosovo émigré Sami Osmakac was arrested by the FBI in Tampa, Florida, for planning attacks<br />
in Tampa which were to include a car-bombing and hostage taking. Osmakac had already acquired an AK-47 and<br />
what he believed to be actual explosives. He had told and FBI informant that “We all have to die, so why not die<br />
the Islamic way?”, and in a martyrdom video he made shortly before his arrest he claimed he was acting out of<br />
revenge for American “wrongs” towards Muslims. See “Kosovo Native Plotted Bombings, Bloodshed in Tampa,<br />
Feds Say,” CNN, 9 January 2012, at http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/09/justice/florida-terror-arrest/ Accessed on 26<br />
June 2012 at 10:17am EST. Osmakac had apparently become radicalized on visits to Kosovo, during which he met<br />
with local Islamist extremists. See “Official: Fla. Bomb Suspect Met Radical Islamists in Kosovo,” USA Today,<br />
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11 January 2012, at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/story/2012-01-11/kosovo-florida-bomb/52501430/1, accessed<br />
on 26 January 2014 at 10:29am EST. The FBI charges against Osmakac are available at “Florida Resident<br />
Charged with Plotting to Bomb Locations in Tampa,” at http://www.fbi.gov/tampa/press-releases/2012/florida-resident-charged-with-plotting-to-bomb-locations-in-tampa,<br />
accessed on 26 June 2014 at 10:23am EST.<br />
395. In February 2011, a native of Kosovo, Arid Uka, approached a group of US servicemen waiting at a bus terminal<br />
at Frankfurt Airport, asked if they were going to Afghanistan, then began shouting “God is the Greatest,” and<br />
shooting his weapon. During the attack Uka killed two US servicemen and wounded two others. He was about to<br />
attack a fifth soldier when his gun jammed. See Souad Mekhennet, “Gunman in Germany Wanted ‘Revenge’ for<br />
Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 4 March 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/world/europe/05germany.html?ref=europe,<br />
accessed on 30 June 2014 at 2:22pm EST. At his trial, Uka claimed that he had been radicalized<br />
by jihadi videos on the internet. See “Frankfurt Airport Gunmen Jailed for Life,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16984066,<br />
accessed on 30 June 2014 at 2:12pm EST.<br />
396. On Orthodox Easter, April 2012, five ethnic Macedonians were murdered by a lake on the outskirts of Skopje.<br />
Their bodies had been lined up and they appeared to have been killed execution style. In June 2104, six ethnic Albanians<br />
from Macedonia whom the police had alleged were members of an Islamist extremist cell were convicted<br />
of the crime. See Sinisa Jakuv Marusic, “Six Albanians Jailed for Macedonia ‘Terror’ Murders,” BalkanInsight, 30<br />
June 2014, at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-mass-murder-trial, accessed on 30 June 2014 at<br />
1:35pm EST. Materials found on the computer of one of the defendants included videos that glorify jihad, promote<br />
the establishment of an Islamic state, and call for the execution of Christians in “revenge killings.” See Sase<br />
Dimovski, “Macedonian Ethnic Terrorism Motives Verdict Revealed,” BalkanInsight, 28 October 2014, at http://<br />
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-ethnic-terrorism-verdict-details-revealed, accessed on 28 October<br />
2014 at 9:27am EST.<br />
397. In the summer of 2012, Australian police investigated a radical group composed of émigré Bosnians in Melbourne.<br />
Among those arrested was Adnan Karabegović, who was found to have been collecting the Al Qaeda magazine<br />
Inspire, including an edition which recommended bombing the Sydney Opera House. The group was led by Harun<br />
Mehičević, a radical cleric who had left the mainstream Bosnian Islamic community in Melbourne several years<br />
earlier to form a more extreme Salafist group. See Cameron Stewart, “How Informer’s Fears Triggered Terror Raid,”<br />
The Australian, 15 September 2012, available at http://alfurqan.com.au/home/307-how-informers-fears-triggeredterror-raids,<br />
accessed on 19 June 2014 at 8:18am EST. Upon his arrest, Karabegović was also in possession of<br />
a USB stick that “contained a number of electronic document files titled “Plans”, including information on how<br />
to construct a semi-automatic machine gun and grenade, how to make tear gas and knock-out drops, and a guide<br />
on sniper weapons . . . During the search of Karabegovic’s home, police found a small piece of paper hidden in<br />
the back of a picture frame with the words “Nitric acid 2 gal” and “Amoniem nitret 1.5t”, as well as handwritten<br />
notes on sniper tactics, two imitation handguns, large hunting knives, a laptop computer and two USB devices.<br />
Nitric acid and ammonium nitrate are both precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives.” For more<br />
on the circumstances surrounding Karabegović’s arrest, see Mark Russell, “Terror Accused had bomb-making<br />
formula, court hears,” The Age (Victoria), 6 December 2012, at http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/terror-accused-had-bombmaking-formula-court-hears-20121206-2ax8s.html,<br />
accessed on 19 June 2014 at 8:26am EST. During the course of its<br />
investigation into the Mehičević-Karabegović group, Austrialian police recorded the latter discussing preparations<br />
for jihad, plans to poison water supplies, and making bombs to kill Australian non-Muslims. See Shannon Deery,<br />
“Melbourne Man Accused of Terrorism-Related Charges, Including How to Make a Bomb to Spark a Bushfire,<br />
Court Hears,” The Herald Sun, 8 April 2013, at http://www.heraldsun.com.au/leader/south-east/melbourne-manin-court-accused-of-terrorism-related-charges-including-how-to-make-a-bomb-to-spark-a-bushfire/story-fngnvmhm-1226614962839,<br />
accessed on 19 June 2014 at 8:33am EST. Karabegović was also recorded discussing his<br />
plans to go to Bosnia for training. See “Adnan Karabegović htio na obuku u BiH?”, Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 8<br />
April 2013, at http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/adnan-karabegovic-htio-na-obuku-u-bih, accessed on<br />
19 June 2014 at 8:49pm EST. In September 2014, Numan Haider, an Afghan émigré in Australia who had attended<br />
lectures at Melbourne’s Al Furqan Mosque (run by Harun Mehičević), was killed after stabbing two police officers.<br />
See Emily Crane, “Teen Terrorist Suspect Shot Dead by Police Once Belonged to a Radical Muslim Group<br />
Targeted by Police in 2012,” The Daily Mail (UK), 24 September 2014, at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2767515/Teen-terrorist-suspect-shot-dead-police-belonged-radical-Muslim-group-targeted-terrorism-raids-2012.<br />
html, accessed on 29 September 2014 at 6:02am EST.<br />
398. See Nebi Qena, “Kosovo Police Arrest Six Terror Suspects,” Associated Press (Dateline Priština), 12 November<br />
2013, at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/kosovo-police-arrest-terror-suspects-20862708, accessed<br />
on 13 November 2013 at 8:48 am EST; Linda Karadaku, “Kosovo Moves Against Islamic Extremists,” The<br />
Southeast European Times, 13 November 2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/<br />
setimes/features/2013/11/13/feature-01, accessed on 23 November 2013 at 6:41pm EST; and Linda Karadaku,<br />
“Facing a Threat, Kosovo Seeks More Information About Terrorist Group,” The Southeast European Times, 14<br />
November 2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/11/14/<br />
feature-02, accessed on 23 November 2013 at 6:45pm EST; “Xhemati i Xhihadit” kërcënon me sulme Policinë e<br />
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Kosovës” Koha Ditore (Priština), 12 November 2013, at http://www.koha.net/?page=1,13,165321, accessed on<br />
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399. See Besar Likmeta, “Turkey Arrests Albanians after ‘Terror’ Attack,” BalkanInsight, 21 March 2014, at http://<br />
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400. See “Kosovar Blerim iz Ferizaja (Uroševac) izveo samoubilački bombaški napad na iračku vojsku,” Saff (Sarajevo),<br />
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accessed on 9 April 2014 at 1:40pm EST.<br />
401. On 7 August 2014, Bosnian extremist Emrah Fojnica was killed in a suicide-terrorism attack in Baghdad which<br />
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402. As cited by Ahmetasevic, “Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia,“ op. cit.<br />
403. See Ikanović’s statements in “Selefije u ‘svetom ratu’: eksluzivna ispovijest bh. džihad ratnika u Siriji,” op. cit.<br />
404. See the statements by “Nermina” (pseudonym), a former Bosnian Wahhabi who left the movement, as quoted by<br />
Ahmetasevic, “Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia,” op. cit.<br />
405. See Xharra, “Kosovo: Radikaler Islam als ‘tickende bombe’,” op. cit., and Xharra, “Fissures in the Faith: Rise of<br />
Conservative Islamists Alarms Kosovans,” op. cit.<br />
406. See Stephen Schwartz, “Kosovo Radical Islamists In New Political Offensive,” t, 13 February 2013, at http://<br />
www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/kosovo-radical-islamists-new-political-offensive_701196.html?page=1, accessed<br />
on 10 March 2013 at 11:30am EST.<br />
407. See the comments by Krenar Gashi of the Institute for Development Policy in Priština in “Fear of Jihadis in Balkans<br />
Lacks Some Perspective,” Monitor Global Outlook, 25 November 2013, at http://monitorglobaloutlook.com/<br />
news-story/fear-of-jihadis-in-balkans-lacks-some-perspective/, accessed on 30 June 2014 at 2:34pm EST.<br />
408. “Vehabija sve više i u Makedoniji,” Nezavisne Novine (Banja Luka), 4 August 2010 at http://www.nezavisne.com/<br />
novosti/ex-yu/Vehabija-sve-vise-i-u-Makedoniji-65294.html, accessed on 23 April 2013 at 11:46am EST.<br />
409. See Misko Taleski, “Law Enforcement Re-examines Islamic Groups in the Balkans,” The Southeast European Times,<br />
6 May 2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/05/06/feature-02,<br />
accessed on 23 November 2013 at 6:36pm EST.<br />
410. State Department cable entitled “Radical Islam in Montenegro,” op. cit., ftn. 87.<br />
411. See Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten (Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 8 April 2005), 24.<br />
412. See The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics & Society, op. cit.<br />
413. The World Factbook lists “Muslims” and the Sufi order of “Bektashis” as separate categories. For simplicity’s sake<br />
they are aggregated in this calculation.<br />
414. The World Factbook does not provide a breakdown of the religious demographics in Kosovo, so percentages are<br />
taken from a Wikipedia article entitled “Demographics of Kosovo,” which cites information based on official census<br />
data in Kosovo. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Kosovo<br />
415. The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics & Society, op. cit., Q89, 216.<br />
416. Ibid., Q92c, 220.<br />
417. Ibid., Q92d, 221.<br />
418. Ibid., Q92b, 219.<br />
419. See Verfassungsschutzberiicht 2014 (Wien: Bundesamt fűr Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung, 2014), 36.<br />
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Terrorism Monitor, 23 March 2007, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_<br />
ttnews[tt_news]=1048<br />
Alić, Anes, and Tracy, Jen. “Training for an Islamic Bosnia.” Transitions Online, 26 April 2002,<br />
available at: http://www.tol.org/client/article/4246-training-for-an-islamic-bosnia.html<br />
94
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
Binder, David. “Alija Izetbegovic, Muslim Who Led Bosnia, Dies at 78.” The New York Times, 20<br />
October 2003.<br />
Cohen, Roger. “Bosnians Fear a Rising Tide of Islamic Authoritarianism.” The New York Times, 10<br />
October 1994.<br />
Deliso, Chris. “Attack on US Bosnia Embassy Not Seen as a Major Security Concern, Despite Precedents<br />
and International Links.” Balkananalysis.com Special Report, 28 November 2011, at http://<br />
www.balkanalysis.com/bosnia/2011/11/28/attack-on-us-bosnia-embassy-not-seen-as-a-major-security-concern-despite-precedents-and-international-links/<br />
de Krnjevic-Miskovic, Damjan. “Obituary: Alija Izetbegovic, 1925-2003.” The National Interest,<br />
22 October 2003. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/article/obituary-alija-izetbegovic-1925-2003-2458<br />
de Quetteville, Harry. “US Hunts Islamic Militants in Bosnia.” The Telegraph (UK), 26 July 2004.<br />
di Foschini, Giuliano, and Tonacci, Fabio. “Bilal Bosnic: ‘Ci sono italiani nell’ls, conquisteremo il<br />
Vaticano.” Repubblica (Rome), 28 August 2014, at http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2014/08/28/<br />
news/bilal_bosnic_ci_sono_italiani_nell_is_conquisteremo_il_vaticano-94559220/<br />
Flottau, Renate. “Balkan Mujahedeens: Fundamentalist Islam Finds Fertile Ground in Bosnia.”<br />
Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 9 November 2007, at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/balkan-mujahedeens-fundamentalist-islam-finds-fertile-ground-in-bosnia-a-516214.html<br />
-----“Weiße Qaida in Bosnien: ‘Mit Motorsägen zerstückeln’.” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 3 December<br />
2006 at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/weisse-qaida-in-bosnien-mit-motorsaegen-zerstueckeln-a-451729.html<br />
Hedges, Chris. “Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies.” The New York Times, 2 September<br />
1996.<br />
Michaletos, Ioannis. “Southeast Europe 2014: Emerging Security Threats.” Balkananalysis.<br />
com, 14 December 2013, at http://www.balkanalysis.com/greece/2013/12/14/southeast-europe-2014-emerging-security-threats/<br />
Jovanovic, Ivana; Brajshori, Muhamet; and Ciocoiu, Paul. “Radical Islamist Threatens Balkans<br />
with Terror Attacks.” SETimes, 8 October 2012<br />
Kaletovic, Damir, and Alic, Anes. “Terror Plot Thwarted in Bosnia,” ISN Security Network (Zurich),<br />
28 March 2008<br />
Kohlmann, Evan. “Bosnia Suicide Bomb Plotters Found Guilty.” Counterterrorism Blog, 10 January<br />
2007, at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/01/bosnia_suicide_bomb_plotters_f_1.php<br />
Kurop, Marcia Christoff. “Al Qaeda’s Balkan Links.” The Wall Street Journal (Europe), 1 November 2001.<br />
Latin, Ena. “Suspicious Islamic Missionaries: Active Islamic Youth,” The Southeast European<br />
Times, 30 June 2003, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2003/06/030630-ENA-001<br />
Maroevic, Rade, and Williams, Daniel. “Terrorist Cells Find Foothold in the Balkans.” The Washington<br />
Post, 1 December 2005.<br />
Mayr, Walter. “The Prophet’s Fifth Column: Islamists Gain Ground in Sarajevo.” Der Spiegel<br />
(Hamburg), 25 February 2009<br />
95
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Ninković, Vladimir. “From YouTube to Jihad: Balkan Volunteers in Syria.” Transconflict, 18 July 2013,<br />
at http://www.transconflict.com/2013/07/from-youtube-to-jihad-balkan-volunteers-in-syria-187/<br />
O’Connor, Mike. “Spies for Iran are Said to Gain a Hold in Bosnia.” The New York Times, 28 November<br />
1997<br />
-----“Police Official’s Methods Raise Ethnic Fears in a Region of Bosnia.” The New York Times,<br />
16 June 1996,<br />
Pyes, Craig, Meyer, Josh, and Rempel, William C. “Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary<br />
for Terrorists.” The Los Angeles Times, 7 October 2001.<br />
Risen, James. “Iran Gave Bosnia Leader $500,000, CIA Alleges.” The Los Angeles Times, 31<br />
December 1996.<br />
Roane, Kit R. “NATO Links Bosnia Government to Training Center for Terrorists.” The New York<br />
Times, 17 February 1996.<br />
Schwartz, Stephen. “Kosovo Radical Islamists In New Political Offensive.” The Weekly Standard,<br />
13 February 2013,at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/kosovo-radical-islamists-new-political-offensive_701196.html?page=1<br />
-----“How Radical Islam Infiltrates Kosovo.” The Weekly Standard, 30 August 2012, at http://www.<br />
weeklystandard.com/blogs/how-radical-islam-infiltrates-kosovo_651173.html?nopager=1<br />
----- “Defending Bosnia-Herzegovina from Radical Islam.” 11 June 2011, at http://www.islamicpluralism.org/1810/defending-bosnia-hercegovina-from-radical-islam<br />
-----“Wahhabism and Al Qaeda in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism<br />
Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 20, 20 October 2004, at http://www.islamicpluralism.org/1270/wahhabism-and-al-qaeda-in-bosnia-herzegovina<br />
-----“Islamic Fundamentalism in the Balkans.” Partisan Review LXVII (October 2000).<br />
Smith, R. Jeffrey. “A Bosnian Village’s Terrorist Ties.” The Washington Post, 11 March 2000, A01.<br />
Soloway, Colin. “Kosovo Reckoning: Bin Laden Casts a Shadow over Sarajevo Summit.” The<br />
Independent (UK), 29 July 1999.<br />
Taleski, Misko. “Law Enforcement Re-examines Islamic Groups in the Balkans.” The Southeast<br />
European Times, 6 May 2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/05/06/feature-02<br />
Toshkov, Veselin; Niksic, Sabina; Stojanovic, Dusan; Semini, Llazar; Qena, Nebi; Becatoros, Elena.<br />
“Radical Islam on Rise in Balkans, Raising Fears of Security Threats to Europe.” Associated<br />
Press (dateline Skopje), 18 September 2010<br />
Trajkovski, Miki. “Balkan Countries Create Deterrent for Citizens Fighting in Syria.” The Southeast<br />
European Times, 21 January 2014, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_<br />
GB/features/setimes/features/2014/01/21/feature-03<br />
-----“Experts on Guard against Extremism in Macedonia.” The Southeast European Times, 17<br />
August 2013, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2013/08/17/feature-01<br />
Trajkovski, Miki (with Remikovic, Drazen). “Experts Warn of Spread of Extremism in Balkan Prisons.”<br />
The Southeast European Times, 12 February 2014, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/<br />
setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2014/02/12/feature-01<br />
96
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
----- “Radical Islam an Increased Threat in the Balkans.” The Southeast European Times, 10 December<br />
2012, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2012/12/10/reportage-01<br />
Trofimov, Yaroslav. “Seeds of Hate: In Postwar Bosnia, Militant Islam Turns US Allies to Enemies.”<br />
The Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2002.<br />
Wilkinson, Tracy. “Muslim Regime Says Bosnia is No Place for Santa Claus.” The Los Angeles<br />
Times, 28 December 1996<br />
----- “Sarajevo Leaders’ Acts Demonstrate Enduring Bigotry,” The Los Angeles Times, 5 May 1996<br />
Wood, Nicholas. “Police Raid Raises Fears of Bosnia as Haven for Terrorists.” The New York<br />
Times, 3 December 2005<br />
JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessments (chronological order, by reference name)<br />
-----“Abu Zubaydah.” Internment Serial Number (ISN) US9GZ-010016DP (S).<br />
Date: 11 November 2008<br />
----- “Tariq Mahmud Ahmad.” ISN US9EG-000535DP. Date: 30 September 2008<br />
-----“Mustafa Ait Idr.” ISN US4AG-010004DP. Date: 30 June 2008.<br />
-----“Ahmed Zeid Salem Zohair.” ISN US9SA—000669DP (S), 12 May 2008.<br />
-----“Muhammad Ibn Arfad Shahin.” ISN US9TS-000168DP (S). Date: 4 November 2007.<br />
----- “Abdullah Almatrafi.” ISN US9SA—0000005DP(S). Date: 25 October 2007.<br />
-----“Abdu Ali Sharqawi.” ISN PK9YM-0001457DP. Date: 7 July 2008.<br />
----- “Faha Sultan.” ISN US9SA-000130DP. Date: 21 April 2007.<br />
-----“Khalid Shaikh Muhammed.” ISN US9KU-010024DP (S). Date: 8 December 2006<br />
-----“Ramzi Abdullah Mohammed Bin al-Shihb.” ISN US9YM-010013DP (S). Date: 8 December 2006.<br />
-----“Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammad Abdah al-Nashiri.” ISN US9SA-010015DP. Date:<br />
8 December 2006.<br />
----- “Jum’a Muhammad Abd al-Latif al-Dosari.” ISN US9BA-000261DP. Date: 28 July 2006<br />
-----“Maji Afas Rahfaz Al-Shimri.” ISN US9SA000181DP. Date: 25 July 2005.<br />
U.S. State Department Diplomatic Cables (in chronological order)<br />
“Bosnia: BiH Federation Police Search Benevolence International.” Embassy Sarajevo: Cable No.<br />
00934. Date: March 2002<br />
“Bosnia: Terrorist Suspects will be Indicted at State Court.” Embassy Sarajevo: Cable No. 000732.<br />
Date: 6 April 2006.<br />
97
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
“Bosnia: Wahhabism Threatens Traditional Bosnian Islam.” Embassy Sarajevo: Cable No. 000650.<br />
Date: 23 March 2007.<br />
“Bosnia: Sadovic Politicizes Ministry of Security.” Embassy Sarajevo: Cable No. 001071. Date:<br />
17 May 2007.<br />
“Macedonia: Macedonian Islamic Leaders on Wahhabism, Denationalization, and Fiscal Challenges.”<br />
Embassy Skopje: Cable No. 000412. Date: 23 May 2007.<br />
“Macedonia: A/S O’Brien Visit Highlights Terrorism Financing Issues.” Embassy Skopje: Cable<br />
No. 000695. Date: 22 August 2007.<br />
“Macedonia: Identifying ‘Credible Voices’ in Muslim Communities that Reject Violence.” Embassy<br />
Skopje: Cable No. 000739. Date: 11 September 2007.<br />
“Bosnia: YouTube, former Bosnian commander Delic, and the Mujahedeen.” Embassy Sarajevo:<br />
Cable No. 001990. Date: 19 September 2007.<br />
“Macedonia: Leadership Crisis in Islamic Community of Macedonia Quiets at Start of Ramadan.”<br />
Embassy Skopje: Cable No. 000559. Date: 4 September 2008.<br />
“Bosnia: Gaza Reaction Reveals Ugly Side.” Embassy Sarajevo: Cable No. 000040. Date: 12<br />
January 2009.<br />
“Bosnia: Reis’ing Toward Trouble.” Embassy Sarajevo: Cable No. 000226. Date: 24 February 2009.<br />
“Bosnia: Reis Ceric Calls for ‘National Bosniak State.” Embassy Sarajevo: Cable No. 000507.<br />
Date: 21 April 2009.<br />
“Montenegro: Radical Islam in Montenegro.” Embassy Podgorica: Cable No. 00000171. Date: 10<br />
July 2009.<br />
“Bosnia: High-Profile Prisoner Disappears.” Embassy Sarajevo: Cable No. 000946. Date: 3 August 2009.<br />
Documentaries/Recorded Sermons/Videos/YouTube Spots<br />
Bosanski Lonac (“The Bosnian Kettle”). Belgrade: TV B92, 2009. Producer: Petar Ilić Ćiril. Available<br />
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QAzcRjXGVWw<br />
Bosnić, Bilal. Obračanje povodom vijesti o pogibiji mudzahide Usame Bin Ladena (“An Address<br />
on the Occasion of the News of the Death of the Mudzhaid Osama Bin Laden”). Audiofile available<br />
at http://www.spasenaskupina.com/download/viewdownload/6-bilal-bosnic/20-bilal-bosnic-obracanje-povodom-vijesti-o-pogibiji-mudzahida-usame-bin-ladena<br />
Kerameti Bosanskog Đzihada (“Miracles of the Bosnian Jihad”). Sarajevo: Studio FotoHile, 2014.<br />
Producer: Čavčić, Hifzija. Narrated by Nezim Halilović-Muderis. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wumhr0RrzNw<br />
Odred El-Mužahedin Bosna (Production: Unknown). Available at http://www.youtube.com/<br />
watch?v=kngioq0TK0I<br />
Šejh Nusret Imamović i Bilal Bosnić—Lukavac (Video of a 2011 public seminar in Tuzla). Available<br />
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KPfn8PR3DCE<br />
Teror vehabija u srednjoj Bosni (“The Terror of the Wahhabis in Central Bosnia”). Sarajevo:<br />
98
From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
<strong>SEERECON</strong><br />
FTV 60 minuta episode, aired on 14 February 2009. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/<br />
watch?v=s1XRXcCupYo<br />
The Martyrs of Bosnia (The Jihad in Bosnia, 1992-1995). London: Azzam Productions, 2000.<br />
Available at: http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f49/jihad-in-the-balkans-49119/<br />
Sarajevo Ricochet. Oslo: Fenris Film, 2010. Directed by Ola Flyum and David Hebditch.<br />
Treći Pohod (“The Third March”). Zagreb, Interfilm, 2010-2011. Producer: Višnja Starešina.<br />
Vehabije (“Wahhabis”). Radio-Televizija Crne Gore: Emisija Pečat (date unspecified, but appears<br />
to be November 2011). Reporter: Nataša Baranin. Author: Tanja Šuković. Available at http://<br />
www.youtube.com/watch?v=vw4qw9BSG8g<br />
Vo Centar: Mudzahedini na Balknot. Skopje: Produkcija Eftov, 2013. Narrated by Vasko Eftov.<br />
99
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From the Balkans to ISIS<br />
Forthcoming <strong>SEERECON</strong> Special Reports<br />
• The Energy Sector in Southeastern Europe (scheduled publication date June 2015)<br />
• Russian Policy in Southeastern Europe, <strong>SEERECON</strong> Security and Intelligence Series Special<br />
Report No. 2 (scheduled publication date December 2015)<br />
• The Airline Industry in Southeastern Europe: Problems and Potentials (publication date June 2016)<br />
• The Future of NATO in Southeastern Europe, <strong>SEERECON</strong> Security and Intelligence Series<br />
Special Report No. 3 (scheduled publication date December 2016)<br />
100