Fall 2015

JPI 

Fall 2015 

Journal of Political Inquiry 

Fall 2015 

New York University 

19 University Pl. New York, 

NY

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Citizenship in Colonial Africa 4 

An Overview of British and French Repertoires. 

Mark Sizwebanzi Mngomezulu 

A New Colonialism for Africa? 12 

Towards An Understanding of China-Africa Relations 

Karim Dewidar 

Conflict Escalation, Signaling and Screening 22 

Compatibility or Competition? 

Kazumichi Uchida 

Bordered Citizenship 32 

Why Distributive Justice Requires Republic Citizenship 

Ji Min Kim 

Issues of Legality and Legitimacy 43 

The Responsibility to Protect and NATO’s intervention in Libya 

Lesley Connolly 

JPI: Fall 2015 Issue 2

EDITORIAL BOARD 

MIREIA TRIGUERO ROURA Editor-in-chief 

XING LU Managing Editor 

JOSEPH LAVICKA Managing Editor 

JIMIN KIM Managing Editor 

CLARE CHURCH Editor 

LESLEY CONNOLY Editor 

HAORAN HE Editor 

DYLAN HEYDEN Editor 

ESME HELEN MONTGOMERY Editor 

DENA MOTEVALIAN Editor 

EUNSEONG OH Editor 

BRYNNAN PARISH Editor 

MORGAN QUINN Editor 

SUNGMI SONG Editor 

BRITTANY STUBBS Editor 

WILLIAM DE WOLFF Editor 

ZAINAB ZAHEER Editor 

KHOBAIB ZOHAIR Editor 


Citizenship in Colonial 

Africa 

An Overview of British and 

French Repertoires. 

Mark Sizwebanzi Mngomezulu 

O 

ne of the leading characteristics of 

the British and French colonial 

experience in Africa in the 20th 

century—a period often referred to as late 

colonialism—was the systematic imposition 

of colonizing interests on the territory, and 

the institutionalized separation of master and 

colonial subject. This meant that the majority 

of native Africans, under the auspices of the 

British and French empires, did not enjoy the 

same rights to citizenship as European-born 

or African-born whites. This resulted in a 

form of bifurcated citizenship that confined 

the majority of the population to second-class 

citizenship. However, between the two 

empires, there are important differences of 

citizenship conceptualization that ultimately 

led to diverging local experiences between 

British and French Africa. 

This paper aims to understand why 

the French and British empires applied the 

concept of citizenship differently in their 

African colonies. Scholars often argue that 

most Africans were denied citizenship in the 

French and British colonies for economic, 

political and social reasons. This reasoning is 

insufficient because the experiences within 

each empire are different. I argue instead, that 

historical experience led to distinct ways of 

understanding and deciding who was, or was 

not a citizen—producing a unique result in 

British and French African colonies. Chief 

among these historical experiences was the 

French revolution of 1789 that purported to 

equalize the rights of people before the law, 

and the lack of an experience of similar 

pretensions in Britain. This and other 

experiences had wider ramifications than 

could have been anticipated. 

Definition of Citizenship and Theoretical 

Framework 

Barbalet argues that citizenship 

“defines those who are, and who are not, 

members of a common society.” 1 This infers 

that citizenship is an exclusive concept. 

Waters further argues, “It allows one to 

participate in a community while enjoying 

certain rights and obligations.” 2 

To be a citizen of a country entails an 

individual’s recognition by the relevant 

authorities, as such. The status extends certain 

protections over the person granted 

citizenship; be it social, political and economic 

protections. In exchange for that, the citizen 

must abide by the rules of the constituted 

authority—the state 3 . The sharp distinction of 

who belongs, also entails defining those who 

do not belong to a particular state and these 

“outsiders may be defined and identified 

informally through the use of tacit and 

internalized classification schemes” and also 

formally through specific documentation, as is 

the case in modern states 4 . 

This understanding of citizenship has 

its genesis in Western Europe. It rose 

concomitantly, with the overarching theory of 

popular sovereignty in the 17 th Century— 

challenging the unchecked rule of monarchs 

and emperors, and advocating for the 

1 Barbalet (1988) cited in Ndegwa, S. 

“Citizenship and Ethnicity. An Examination of 

Two Transition Movements in Kenyan Politics,” 

American Political Science Review 91.3 (1997), 

599. 

2 Waters (1989), 160, as cited in Ndegwa, S. 

“Citizenship and Ethnicity. An Examination of 

Two Transition Movements in Kenyan Politics,” 

599. 

3 Young, C., “Nation, Ethnicity, and Citizenship: 

Dilemmas of Democracy and Civil Order in 

Africa,” in Making Nations, Creating Strangers: 

States and Citizenship in Africa, ed P. Nugent, et 

al. (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2007). 

4 Brubaker, R., Citizenship and Nationhood in 

France and Germany (Boston: Harvard 

University Press, 1992), 30. 


inclusion of common people in decisionmaking. 

Burbank and Cooper assert that there 

was never a clean break between the rule of 

empires, and the ushering in of nation-states 

and popular sovereignty, with the latter’s 

attendant principles of citizenship being 

extended to the vast majority of people. 

Nation-states and popular sovereignty were 

competing ideas in a world that was ruled by 

empires. 5 These novel ideas brought to the fore 

certain questions. One of which, as Burbank 

and Cooper note, was: “Would citizenship be 

‘national’—focused on a people who 

represented themselves as a single linguistic, 

cultural, and territorial community—or would 

it be “imperial,” embracing diverse peoples 

who constituted the population of a state?” 6 

Such a question was important in colonial 

Africa, as the French and British empires tried 

to assert their authority over vast expanses of 

land on the continent. 

History was to determine some of the 

answers to these questions. Writing on the 

salience of history in politics Marx, in the 

Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, explains 

“Men make their own history, but they do not 

make it as they please; they do not make it 

under self-selected circumstances, but under 

circumstances existing already, given and 

transmitted from the past. The tradition of all 

dead generations weighs like a nightmare on 

the brains of the living.” This highlights that 

every nation calls upon a collective memory to 

determine rules and norms. 

The methods that colonial powers 

used in Africa to subdue populations were not 

new. They had been used previously, and in a 

sense part of the repertoire of each empire, as 

Burbank and Cooper note. But the 

idiosyncrasies of British and French methods 

can each be traced back to a complex yet 

unique historical trajectory, from which they 

5 Burbank, J and F. Cooper, Empires in World 

History: Power and the Politics of Difference 

(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010). 

6 Ibid., 220. 

are selected. It is through this framework—a 

framework that privileges historical 

grounding— that the question of citizenship 

in the former colonies of France and Britain 

becomes clear. 

COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 

Historians often describe European 

colonization of the African continent in the 

late 19 th and early 20 th centuries as a “scramble 

for Africa”. Ushered in by the Berlin 

Conference, a meeting in which 

representatives of western powers gathered in 

Berlin to determine the colonial future of 

Africa, this era of colonialism was marked by 

competition among the industrializing west 

for land and resources. To accomplish their 

goal, western colonizers employed a regime of 

domination over indigenous people. 

Cooper 7 cautions against assuming 

colonialism in Africa as the natural step that 

Western Europe had to take toward Africa. 

He argues that there were competing ideas of 

how empires should extend their rule in 

colonies. Colonialism became a favored 

option because it had support from wellconnected 

individuals in the metropolis. 

Powerful entities in the metropolis, such as 

private companies, saw virgin territory as a 

bastion of natural resources to be extracted 

and an abundance of cheap labor for 

production. 

For Mamdani, colonialism in Africa 

was concerned about the “native question”; 

that is, “how can a tiny and foreign minority 

rule over an indigenous majority?” 8 Both 

empires looked into their repertoires for 

suitable strategies of domination. At the core 

of both became the de-humanization of the 

7 Cooper, F., Africa since 1940: The Past of the 

Present (United Kingdom: Cambridge University 

Press, 2002). 

8 Mamdani, M., Citizen and Subject. 

Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 

Colonialism (New Jersey: Princeton University 

Press, 1996), 16. 


African including the institutionalization of 

negative racial stereotypes. 

Cooper states that: 

Colonial empires differed from other forms 

of domination by their efforts to reproduce 

social and cultural difference. At some level, 

conquest implied incorporation: the loser 

had to be taught who the boss was and 

behave accordingly. But colonial conquest 

emphasized that the conquered remain 

distinct; he or she might try to learn and 

master the ways of the conqueror but would 

never quite get there 9 . 

Here we see that order—as conceived by the 

colonial power—was an important principle 

in the colonies. And the distinction by skin 

color and ethnicity played a great role in both 

French and British colonialism. 

Both empires saw the goal of citizenship as 

the preservation of the status quo balance of 

power that placed white European races on 

top of the social order. As the case study 

section will show, native Africans were later 

included, begrudgingly, as citizens—in a 

piecemeal strategy. The British, and to a 

greater extent the French, would eventually 

open the door for Western-educated Africans, 

but still a majority of uneducated Africans 

would remain excluded from legal citizenship 

status 10 . 

Events beginning after World War I 

and through World War II changed the 

course of history. After the first war—having 

gallantly participated in the war on the side of 

the allied forces—many African soldiers 

returned to Africa believing they had earned 

the right to become citizens. They began to 

demand the social, economic and political 

benefits of citizens, the majority of whom, at 

the time, were white 11 . Paralleling this were 

9 Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the 

Present. 

10 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject. Contemporary 

Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. 


Present. 

the rising voices of educated Africans 

criticizing the colonial system and its 

institutionalization of citizenship based on 

skin-color. In their demand for equal rights, 

particularly in French Africa, native Africans 

in the colonies would pull from ideas initially 

planted in each empire’s past, and seeking to 

avoid past mistakes, imperial powers pursued 

different appeasement techniques. 

CITIZENSHIP IN FRANCOPHONE 

AFRICA: ASSIMILATION 

The French revolution of 1789 was a 

watershed in the French empire because the 

assembly passed the Declaration of the Rights 

of Man and Citizen. This declaration “stressed 

equality before the law and representative 

government.” 12 

However, it was unclear how far 

equality of men, and by extension citizenship, 

should extend to colonial holdings, and the 

criteria that would be used to determine who 

qualified and who was not. The arguments 

ranged from theories of how citizenship did 

not apply to Africans and Asians, while others 

took a more inclusive stance, arguing that 

colonization was an indefensible practice 13 . 

Several years later, the revolution in 

the French colony, St. Domingue (now Haiti), 

complicated matters for the empire when 

black slave-owners toppled the French 

colonial structure and gained independence 

under the reasoning that “citizenship…should 

not be restricted by color.” 14 The events in St. 

Domingue resulted in “the 1795 constitution 

in France the colonies an ‘integral part’ of 

France. France became, for a time, an empire 

of citizens.” 15 Pandora’s Box had been 

opened. 

12 Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World 

History: Power and the Politics of Difference, 

224. 


History: Power and the Politics of Difference. 

14 Ibid., 226. 

15 Ibid., 227. 


Such events in the history of France 

influenced its colonial policy in Africa in the 

early to mid-twentieth century, especially 

when Africans began to demand their rights 

as citizens in the empire. They invoked the 

Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 

arguing they should be recognized as 

citizens—their voices bolstered by other 

critics of colonial rule. 

The French empire found itself in a 

conundrum because it desperately needed its 

colonies at this time to rejuvenate its economy 

that had been devastated by the wars, 

especially World War II. To maintain control, 

France appeased native African populations 

by offering them legal citizenship that was 

devoid of any rights that European French 

citizens enjoyed. As Young says, “the 

assimilative elements in French…colonial 

ideologies extended nominal citizenship to all, 

but not its full substance.” 16 The essence of 

the strategy was appeasement instead of 

recognition of Africans as citizens. However, 

this did not mean that Africans would not 

take such an advantage and use it to its fullest 

potential. 

By the 1940s, there were already 

African deputies representing the colonies in 

the French legislature. Most notable among 

them, was Leopold Senghor of Senegal, who 

was instrumental in the abolishment of 

“forced labor and separate administrative 

justice.” 17 One idiosyncrasy of the French 

conception of citizenship is that the Africans 

agitated for inclusion as citizens in the French 

empire, as opposed to charting a path 

independent of the metropole. Political 

realities and perceived economic gains played 

a major role in such a course of action. The 

idea of African colonies as provinces of one 

16 Young, C., “Nation, Ethnicity, and Citizenship: 

Dilemmas of Democracy and Civil Order in 

Africa,” 254. 

17 Cooper, F. (2011), “Restructuring Empire in 

British and French Africa,” Past and Present, 10, 

Supplement 6, 200. 

French empire, whose emphasis had increased 

over the years succeeding the Haitian 

Revolution, had influence on the thinking and 

strategizing of African natives in the colonies. 

Thus even though colonial rule was highly 

exploitative of natives, they still chose to be 

part of the empire. In addition, the colonies’ 

politics were intimately tied with that of 

France, as has been mentioned before that 

African deputies sat in the French legislature. 

This was unique because, as it will be 

observed in the British case, citizenship 

debates were territorially bound and rule was 

more indirect. Indeed, Cooper contends that 

it is historical experience that shaped the 

actions of the players at the time. 18 

Elkins argues, “France hoped to 

restore its international prestige and resist 

subordination to an emerging Anglo- 

American alliance through closer integration 

with its colonies.” 19 Its colonies presented the 

chance to counterbalance the ever-growing 

economic power of the British especially in 

world affairs. This further explains the 

nominal citizenship that France extended to 

residents of its African colonies: appeasement 

for the sake of buffering British power. 

Moves toward greater assimilation were 

reflected in the French constitution of 1946, 

which “proclaimed that inhabitants of all of 

these entities would now have ‘qualities’ of 

French citizens.” 20 AS Elkins writes, “The 

assimilationist principles upon which it (the 

French empire) was originally established” 21 

reaffirmed France as one with its colonies 

abroad. Yet, notwithstanding a constitution 


Present. 

19 Elkins, C., “Race, Citizenship, and 

Governance: Settler Tyranny and the End of 

Empire,” in Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth 

Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies, ed. C. 

Elkins, and S Pedersen (Kentucky: Routledge, 

2012), 211. 

20 Cooper, “Restructuring Empire in British and 

French Africa,” 200. 

21 Elkins, “Race, Citizenship, and Governance: 

Settler Tyranny and the End of Empire,” 211. 


extending citizenship to virtually all peoples of 

the French empire, there was ambiguity as to 

the full extent of the law and its practicality.” 22 

Again, we come to see how the 

French revolution and the early years after it 

led to a series of events that profoundly 

impacted France’s rule of its African colonies 

well into the mid-20 th Century. Burbank and 

Cooper capture the effects by emphasizing 

that: “In 1946, an African political leader, 

elected to serve in the French legislature in 

Paris, Leopold Senghor, invoked the moment 

150 years earlier when France recognized the 

citizenship of black slaves. He was trying to 

return to the promise of revolutionary France 

and make all subjects in the colonies into 

citizens, with the same rights as those of 

European France.” 23 Here, the values 

elucidated in the Declaration of the Rights of 

Man and Citizen were recalled and repurposed 

to advocate for the rights of French-Africans. 

Of course, granting citizenship to 

black subjects en masse had social 

implications that threatened the stability of 

the empire at the time, which is why the 

colonial authorities were circumspect in their 

policies. This was seen in the extension of 

nominal citizenship to native Africans and 

especially those in the cities. Increasing the 

number of citizens implied the extension of 

welfare programs to an unsustainable number 

of people. There was also the problem of 

whether “citizens of European or African 

France could quickly set aside habits and 

expectations of privilege and authority, of 

discrimination and denigration, built up in 

decades of colonial rule.” 24 Citizenship entails 

an ‘us-them’ dichotomy, and extending it to 

groups that had been historically 

disadvantaged, threatens the privilege of those 




History: Power and the Politics of Difference, 

229. 



who are citizens at the time. Most of the time, 

the latter resist such efforts. 

SUBJECTS OF THE BRITISH MONARCH: 

INDIRECT RULE 

The foremost difference between the 

British Empire’s conception of citizenship as 

applied to their African colonies and that of 

the French, was that Britain never considered 

granting citizenship to native Africans within 

its colonies 25 . Instead there was a preference 

for indirect rule—the strategy of ruling 

through chiefs. The British did not invent this 

strategy—having been employed by other 

empires in the past. 26 

Mamdani argues that indirect rule was 

not a benevolent process of respecting the 

customs of African ethnic groups, or letting 

them develop in their own way either. The 

African was seen as a “tribesperson” subject 

to “customary law.” Such a process of 

separate administration for Africans 

effectively meant that they had separate rights 

from Europeans, and existed in a different 

society from that of the British. 

One important reason for this 

fundamental difference in the techniques 

employed by the French colonial rule was that 

Britain never experienced a revolution that 

claimed to equalize the rights of people before 

the law. The only revolution that comes close 

is the Glorious Revolution of 1688, but this 

was mainly a tussle between Parliament and 

the monarchy concerning who was to wield 

more power. Hence, the British historical 

narrative did not have universal natures of 

freedom on which native Africans could base 

a case for demanding citizenship. This is not 

to argue that ideas of the Enlightenment 

period in the 20 th Century—popular 

sovereignty, equality, amongst others—did 

not affect the British Empire, but that it 


Present. 


History: Power and the Politics of Difference. 


ationalized such arguments differently, and in 

turn translated into unique colonial strategies. 

The notion of citizenship in British 

colonies is captured by Cooper, when he 

mentions that the, “ruling fiction was ‘selfgovernment’: 

each territory would follow its 

own path; there would be no representation 

of Africans in the London parliament.” 27 The 

authorities channeled African political activity 

in territorially bounded institutions, thus 

avoiding any calls for citizenship equality of 

natives and white people, since territories 

were “independent.” 

The fact that the British never 

considered Africans in the colonies to be 

citizens of Britain did not snuff out debates 

for equality and citizenship. Rather, it 

channeled them differently, especially after 

World War I through World War II. 

The British, unlike the French, never 

envisioned a possibility of Africans becoming 

citizens even nominally—let alone citizens 

with equal footing to the European settlers in 

the colonies, or those in the metropole. 

Mazrui disparages the British in these words: 

“I hope it is only a coincidence that the 

Anglo-Saxons….have been the worst 

offenders among the Westerners in 

institutionalized racism. The Anglo-Saxons 

were the architects of lynching and Jim 

Crow.” 28 The importance of racial thought in 

the mind of the colonial administrator was a 

great barrier. 

The aforementioned can help us 

understand the different policies of both the 

French and the British. Assimilation, at the 

basic level, means acceptance—a capitulation 

to inclusiveness. On the other hand, indirect 

rule evokes aloofness, a preference for 

separation among peoples. And that is what 

the British did. British culture was seen as 

almost naturally inaccessible to the native. 

Whereas in the French empire, an African 

could, with education and consumption of 

French culture, become a French citizen, the 

British had no such thing. 

Like their French counterparts, the 

British also faced the real problem of trying to 

retain its empire because of its economic 

importance. As Cooper states: “attempts to 

get educated Africans to focus their ambitions 

on local government quickly failed. The focus 

was not London…but the center of each 

territory.” The result was that ambition for 

equality by most African leaders followed the 

avenue opened by the master: “political 

parties in colony after colony demanded full 

participation in each territory’s legislative and 

executive institutions,” without demanding to 

sit in London. 29 

After having served in the European 

wars—World War I and World War II—most 

returnee Africans of British colonies flocked 

to urban centers and began lives that 

depended to a larger extent on Western 

goods. Their bad experience in the cities, 

stemming from repressive colonial policies, 

fueled their demands for a better life 30 . Also, 

the newly-formed educated class saw the 

contradictions of the colonial state—that it 

oppressed Africans in their native land and 

extracted its resources—and sought to 

challenge that. 

Instead of an incorporation of 

Africans as citizens in the empire, the British 

suggested a possibility of self-government in 

its separate colonies, in the future. To this 

end Cooper argues that, “the Nationalities Act 

of 1948 created something of an echo of what 

the French were doing—a second tier 

Commonwealth citizenship, derivative of the 

primary citizenship of the Dominions, but 


Present, 49. 

28 Mazrui, A., “Who are the Africans?” in Who is 

an African? Identity, Citizenship and the Making 

of Africa-Nation, ed. J. Adibe (London: Adonis & 

Abbey Publishers Ltd.: 2009), 32. 




Present. 


applied to colonies as well.” 31 This only 

allowed British Africans to gain access to 

British Isles—a far cry from recognition 

among citizens. Africans could be considered 

as citizens in the British Isles but not in 

Britain itself—an obvious hostility towards 

native Africans in the metropolis. 

In contrast to developments in the 

French empire around the same time, “in 

British Africa…the theme of equality 

surfaced, although without the same appeal to 

empire-wide citizenship and its norm of 

equivalence…in French Africa.” 32 

Such attempts by both colonial authorities to 

shape citizenship and the reaction of the 

subjects often degenerated into a violent 

process. This was more the case in settler 

colonies—colonies where Europeans were 

encouraged to settle in great numbers—where 

African populations were condemned into 

reserves. For example, the Mau Mau rebellion 

in Kenya in the around 1957 to 1960 was a 

reaction to the increasing brutality of white 

colonial settlers, as the Kikuyu people called 

for better treatment and rights 33 . 

Cooper opines that “repression may 

have well reflected the self-perceived 

openness to political reform: that some 

Africans rejected the political inclusion and 

economic development that was being offered 

them now struck officials as an affront, not 

the backward inclinations inherent in the 

nature of the African.” 34 Because of the power 

to set agenda for reform, the colonists 

perceived a rejection of that agenda as 

ungratefulness on the part of those over 

whom they ruled. Therefore persistence on an 

agenda unsanctioned by the colonial masters 

led to the repression of native Africans, 



32 Ibid., 205. 

33 Elkins, “Race, Citizenship, and Governance: 

Settler Tyranny and the End of Empire.” 



especially in the period preceding 

independence. 

CONCLUSION 

In the late 19 th and early 20 th Century, 

Britain and France were among the Western 

European nations that decided, without any 

input from representatives of the continent 

itself, to divide Africa into colonies in support 

of self-interested goals of industrialization and 

power. While France and Britain share a 

common Western European identity, the 

historical narratives that came into effect 

when each nation devised and employed its 

colonial strategy in Africa were quite different. 

And while scholars often combine the 

colonial experiences of British and French 

African colonies in their analysis, this is 

insufficient as there are major differences 

between them. 

This paper has shown how historical 

experience impacted the unfolding of events 

relating to calls for equality in the colonies by 

Africans, and relating to citizenship in 

particular. In part, this proves the 

interconnectedness of historical experience. 

Also, the empires used tools which they saw 

fit for that particular time, although they 

could not control how events would unfold, 

once they had chosen their policies. The 

policy of assimilation pursued by the French 

had a lasting effect on citizenship conception 

in its African colonies, so much so that native 

Africans saw their rights as intrinsically 

connected with France itself. A shift towards 

more territorially bounded units in French 

Africa arises in the late 1950s, influenced to a 

certain extent by the reconfiguration of the 

Third World, which was breaking away 

politically from Western powers and forming 

new states. On the other hand, the policy of 

indirect rule pursued by the British channeled 

citizenship rights to more territorially 

bounded units, and it could be said that this 

was the model that inspired the form of 

statehood that now prevails in Africa. 


Lastly, this paper has drawn fairly 

broad strokes of citizenship in colonial 

Africa—a heuristic contribution at best. Thus 

it suffices to add that there are numerous 

potential avenues for further research in this 

topic. For one, this essay has hardly made 

mention of the variation—if any—of 

citizenship understanding within countries of 

colonized by the same power, and implication 

on state formation processes. Also, it has not 

examined the dynamics between the colonizer 

and the colonized in shaping citizenship, and 

the subsequent states. These omissions are 

largely a product of the essay’s scope. Thus it 

behooves other scholars of Africa to delve 

into the particularities in order to understand 

deeper the impact of past understandings of 

citizenship on the present. 


A New Colonialism for 

Africa? 

Towards An Understanding of 

China-Africa Relations 

Karim Dewidar 

T 

he literature on China-Africa relations 

today is focused on the issue of 

imperialism and neo-colonialism, that 

is, are the Chinese exploiting the African 

continent like Western countries have done in 

the past? Chinese scholars are going to great 

lengths to attempt to show why the 

relationship is a “win-win,” and that China is 

not exploiting the African continent. 

Conversely, many Western analysts are equally 

as eager to show that China’s policy is 

exploitative and simply a form of neocolonialism. 

However, both sides get it wrong 

because neither paradigm alone is a correct 

characterization of China-Africa relations. 

China’s foreign policy in the African continent 

is neither benign nor neo-colonial. It is a 

pragmatic economic and political move by 

China, which is seeking greater economic and 

political cooperation with Africa. Though, it is 

taking a different approach from that of the 

West. 

China’s growing prosperity and 

increasing role in international affairs have led 

to an increase in Chinese foreign direct 

investment all over the world. As China’s 

economy grows so does its energy and 

resource needs, Africa will invariably become 

an area of interest by China. Also, Africa is an 

increasingly lucrative market for exports. 

Naturally, China seeks closer political, social, 

and military ties as well. This is evident with 

China’s foreign aid to Africa, peacekeeping 

missions, and other social initiatives by China 

in Africa. 

Though China’s engagement with Africa is 

not neo-colonial, China provides development 

aid, often in the form of infrastructure 

projects. This will improve Africa’s economic 

self-sufficiency. Most of the Chinese firms 

that operate in China are private firms and 

small or medium sized state owned 

enterprises. Also, China is building on its long 

relationship with Africa that has not been 

exploitative and based on mutual recognition 

of sovereignty. 

However, China’s new relationship 

with Africa requires scrutiny, as there are 

concerns China is using its influence to 

exploit African countries. Many of the 

infrastructure projects seem to serve the 

interests of Chinese firms operating in Africa. 

There is also relatively little “aid” given by 

China and the bulk of the money flowing into 

Africa are to fund private Chinese business 

ventures. China’s investment tends to favor a 

select group of African countries. These select 

countries tend to be natural resource 

exporters, whereas China mostly imports oil 

and other minerals from Africa. In addition, 

there is a trade deficit with Chinese 

manufacturers seemingly flooding African 

markets to the detriment of African 

producers. There are no real indications that 

China’s investments are yielding benefits to 

Africa overall. 

THE MYTH OF CHINESE COLONIALISM 

IN AFRICA 

Given the disparity between China’s 

economy and those of the various African 

countries it is investing, it has been accused of 

perpetuating conditions of neo-colonialism in 

Africa. The essence of neo-colonialism is that, 

“The State which is subject to it is, in theory, 

independent and has all the outwards 

trappings of international sovereignty. In 

reality its economic and thus its political 

policy is directed from outside.” 35 

Even though countries of Africa won 

their independence in the second half of the 

20 th century, the former European imperialist 

powers and other Western states like the U.S. 

35 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last 

Stage of Imperialism (New York: International 

Publishers, 1974), 4. 


have retained elements of old colonial 

arrangements. Many Western companies 

dominate the key African industries of 

mineral extraction and agriculture. Also, many 

African states remain dependent on aid and 

investment from Western countries just to 

provide basic services. Much of this aid places 

conditions on the recipients such as policies 

of economic and political liberalization. One 

of the most famous example being the 

“structural readjustment policies” that the 

International Monetary Fund imposes on 

African states that receive supports. Most 

former colonies rely solely on natural resource 

exports and cannot make the leap to more 

developed and self-sufficient economies. The 

end result is that former colonies, despite 

being “free,” remain no more independent 

now than as colonies. 

China’s interest in Africa is not new 

and has never included colonialism in the 

traditional sense. There are records of 

Chinese-African trading dating back to the 

Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618-907), but it was 

under the Ming Dynasty in the 13th century 

that saw Chinese penetration of the African 

continent. 36 Admiral Zheng led expeditions to 

Africa’s east coast on various occasions, 

primarily parts of modern day Somalia and 

Kenya. 37 These “Treasure Fleets,” which the 

Chinese emperor used to project China’s 

wealth and power. The early Chinese diaspora 

came neither as conquerors nor immigrants. 38 

Contemporary China-Africa relations are built 

upon these early interactions, which are 

36 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman , China 

and Africa: A Century of Engagement 

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 

2012), 17. 

37 Marcus Power, et al, China’s Resource 

Diplomacy in Africa: Powering Development? 

(Great Brittan: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 30. 

38 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China 



2012), 22. 

relatively benign when looking at European 

settlement of Africa. 

During the Cold War, China’s policies 

were guided both by their geopolitical struggle 

with the Soviet Union and a genuine interest 

in “south-south” solidarity. In the 1950’s 

China went on a “charm offensive,” which 

was guided by its 5 Principles of Peaceful 

Coexistence. Though at its core, China’s 

diplomacy emphasized the sovereignty of 

African nations that were targets for U.S. and 

Soviet Cold War interventions. Having 

suffered from foreign occupations during the 

Century of Humiliation, China especially 

sympathized with Africa, which was still 

largely colonized. By the 1960s, with the 

creation of the Afro-Asian Solidarity 

Organization, the continent had become an 

essential part of Chinese foreign policy. 39 All 

throughout the Cold War, China supported 

independence movements and revolutions 

such as: Algeria’s FLN, the Mozambique 

Liberation Front, and Angola’s UNITA 

(National Union for the Total Independence 

of Angola) in Angola. China’s foreign policy 

also included economic assistance. Egypt was 

offered a $5 million trade credit during the 

Suez Crisis 40 and in 1964 provided an $80 

million interest-free loan to cover the cost of 

Chinese goods and services. 41 China also 

funded the construction of a railway 

connecting Tanzania and Zambia in 1976. 42 

China’s African policies were not only 

motivated by ambition to overtake the Soviet 

Union as the leader of the Communist 

Revolution, but also by the desire to help 

liberate the oppressed. In 2006, President Hu 

Jintao articulated China’s Principles for 

engagement with Africa and is almost no 

39 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China 

and Africa: A Century of Engagement, 34. 

40 Ibid, 35. 

41 ibid, 230. 





different than the 5 Principles articulated by 

Premier Zhou Enlai in 1955. 

The winding down of the Cold War 

led to the U.S. and the Soviet Union to shift 

their attention away from the Sub Saharan 

region and more towards the Middle East. In 

1996, President Jiang Zemin visited Ethiopia 

and laid out China’s African policy approach. 

It was a 21 point proposal, but the key themes 

for China’s engagement with Africa were: 

respecting sovereignty, seeking of mutually 

beneficial economic development, promoting 

African cooperation-unity, and building a long 

term friendship. 43 In 2000, China’s Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs created the Forum on 

China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as a 

mechanism for facilitating this new 

relationship. 44 

Contrary to popular belief, the 

majority of Chinese firms that invest or trade 

abroad are privately owned and thus they are 

not just arms of the Chinese state that can be 

used to affect geopolitics. About 70% of 

China’s total outward foreign direct 

investments consist of joint ventures; 

collaborations between Chinese firms and 

private foreign firms. 45 That is, all the trade 

and commercial activities taking place are 

being facilitated predominantly by private 

firms on both ends. According to China’s 

Export-Import Bank, of the 800 large 

companies operating in Africa in 2006, 85% 

are privately owned. 46 Rather than collaborate 




2012) , 47. 

44 Larry Hanauer and Lyle Morris, Chinese 

Engagement In Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and 

Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C. : 

Rand Corporation, 2014), 20. 







2012), 129. 

to implement a grand strategy for China on 

the African continent, the interests of private 

firms vary as they compete for market share. 

Those accusing China of trying to dominate 

the African continent presume its trade is 

being carried out by large state owned 

enterprises. This assumption is wrong because 

most of the Chinese firms in Africa are “small 

and medium sized enterprises,” both private 

and government owned. 47 Companies run by 

provincial and local jurisdictions also invest in 

Africa. 48 Although encouraged by the central 

government’s “going out strategy” in the 90’s, 

these state owned firms are not merely pawns 

for the central government. They compete 

with other smaller state owned firms and 

ultimately are out to make money; they are 

not concerned with wider geopolitical 

objectives of the China central government. 49 

This fragmented and competitive 

environment for SMEs is a stark contrast 

from the perception that many have of 

Chinese enterprise in Africa, namely large oil 

companies like Sinopec. Chinese firms in 

Africa do not constitute a monolithic bloc of 

state owned enterprises. 

Another mischaracterization of China- 

Africa relations is the Chinese diaspora, often 

used to support the argument that China is 

undertaking some colonial venture in Africa. 

There are about one million Chinese natives 

in Africa today, many of them having come 

over during the last decade. 50 Although some 

are wealthy businesses owners or 

professionals, the majority are petty 

merchants, shopkeepers, and farmers. 51 They 

predominantly come from interior provinces 

47 ibid. 

48 Ibid. 




50 Howard French, China’s Second Continent: 

How A Million Migrants Are Building a New 

Empire in Africa (New York City: Vintage Books, 

2014), 4. 

51 ibid . 


like Henan or from coastal areas with tough 

job markets like Fujian and Guangdong. 52 

Many of those interviewed by journalist 

Howard French, who traversed Africa seeking 

to learn more about the Chinese diaspora, 

complained about being squeezed out of 

China, both economically and socially. 53 

French remarks that they are like ambitious 

frontiersmen. There is no evidence either to 

show that this is the result of a policy by the 

central government to encourage travel to 

Africa. 

IS CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH 

AFRICA REALLY A “WIN-WIN?” 

To decipher what China’s intentions 

are on the African continent, the Chinese 

policy of giving “aid” needs to be 

distinguished from its foreign direct 

investment. Both Chinese officials and 

Western critics alike talk about the two 

interchangeably, but they are distinct. Foreign 

aid, which comes from China’s Central 

government, has always been part of China- 

Africa relations. China officially provides 8 

types of foreign aid: complete projects, goods 

and materials, technical cooperation, human 

resource development cooperation, medical 

assistance, emergency humanitarian aid, 

volunteer programs, and debt relief. 54 

The problem is that the amount of aid 

given is relatively small. In 2012 alone, the 

U.S. provided $7.08 billion in development 

assistance to African countries. 55 This does 

not even include World Bank financing. As of 

2009, the cumulative-historical aid given to 

African countries by China was no more than 

52 ibid 25. 

53 ibid 31. 

54 ibid. 

55 George Ingram, “U.S. Development 

Assistance and Sub-Saharan Africa,” Brookings, 

3/20/2014, 

http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/ 

04/us-development-assistance-engagementafrica-ingram. 

$25 billion. 56 Between 2001 and 2007 alone, 

China invested $15.6 billion in Sub Saharan 

Africa’s oil and mineral sector. 57 To cover the 

economic imperative of its relationship with 

Africa, China frequently highlights its aid 

programs instead. Indicative of China’s 

tendency to pass off lucrative commercial 

endeavors as a form of aid are Special 

Economic Zones. These are geographic areas 

equipped with infrastructures and liberalized 

business laws to attract foreign investment. 58 

These privately managed free trade zones 

often cater to the needs of Chinese firms 

more than anything else. 59 

A misperception perpetuated by China 

is that it is interested in trading and with the 

entire African continent. Chinese policy in 

Africa is presented as an endeavor to benefit 

to Africa as whole. Take for example a 2006 

white paper on China’s African policy. One of 

the objectives it stated is, “Mutual benefit, 

reciprocity and common prosperity. China 

supports African countries endeavor for 

economic development and nation building, 

carries out cooperation in various forms in 

economic and social development, and 

promotes common prosperity of China and 

Africa.” 60 

Though in reality, trade is highly 

concentrated with just a few countries. 

China’s top African trading partners are: 

56 Fred Dews, “8 facts about China’s 

investments in Africa,” Brookings, 3/20/2014, 

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookingsnow/posts/2014/05/8-facts-about-chinainvestment-in-africa. 




2012) . 

58 Robert Rotberg, China into Africa: Trade, Aid, 

and Influence (Cambridge: Brookings Institution 

Press, 2008), 137. 

59 ibid 141. 




2012) , 50. 


Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria, and 

Egypt. 61 About 75% of China’s total imports, 

namely oil and minerals, come from Angola 

and South Africa alone. 62 Over 40% of 

China’s exports go to just three African 

countries: Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. 63 

The much-discussed Special Economic Zones 

are being set up in just 7 countries: Zambia 

[which is getting 2], Mauritius, Egypt, Zambia, 

Nigeria, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. 64 Thus, 

China’s trading partners make a small portion 

of the continents 54 countries. 

China has vigorously argued that it is 

not primarily interested in Africa’s natural 

resources, namely oil, though the numbers 

make a compelling case against them. By 2009 

80% of China’s imports from Africa consisted 

of petroleum products and metals, for 

example, copper. 65 Not surprisingly, 4 of 

Africa’s top 5 exporters to China primarily 

export oil and other minerals. Though oil 

makes up the largest proportion, accounting 

for 64% of China’s total imports from 

Africa. 66 China used to be an energy selfsufficient 

country, but in 1993 it became a net 

61 Christopher Alessi and Beina Xu, “China in 

Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4/27/2015, 

http://www.cfr.org/china/china-africa/p9557 . 




Rand Corporation, 2014) ,29. 

63 ibid 



Press, 2008),143-149, 

David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman , China and 

Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012) , 136- 

137. 




2012) , 117. 





importer of oil as its economy expanded. 67 

China is now the second largest consumer of 

petroleum and is projected to become the 

largest consumer by 2030, at which point it 

will be importing 60-70% of its crude oil 

supply. 68 Currently, China imports about 23% 

of its oil from Africa and this is expected to 

increase as it continues to secure more oil 

concessions and invests more in exploration. 

Although private business and SMEs 

are ostensibly overseeing China’s economic 

reproach to the African continent, the central 

government still plays an important role by 

financing and promoting Chinese-African 

business ventures. The central government 

provides aid such as concessional loans and 

grants to various African countries. This is 

done via China’s Central Bank and 

government funds such as: the China Export- 

Import Bank, China-Africa Development 

program, and the Agricultural Development 

Bank of China. 69 Beyond financial 

institutions, China’s Ministry of Commerce 

and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs are vital to 

the process as well; they liaise with African 

heads of state. Through loans, grants, and 

construction projects these agencies open up 

channels of investment and trade in African 

countries. The foreign aid offered at this part 

of the process, “to grease the wheels,” is what 

gets so much attention. This includes: loans 

for infrastructure projects, medical assistance 

programs, and grants. 

Perhaps China is not solely interested 

in extracting natural resources from Africa, 

but also the access to them. It has been part 

67 Christopher Alessi and Beina Xu, “China in 

Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4/27/2015, 

http://www.cfr.org/china/china-africa/p9557. 

68 ibid 




2012) , 134. 

Marcus Power, et al, China’s Resource 




of arrangements made with various African 

countries that were offered aid and 

development finance. The Chinese like to 

emphasize their “no strings attached” aid to 

Africa, which is in contrast to Western 

countries that provide aid, but have 

conditions imposed on the recipient. Though 

not agreed to openly, there is actually “tacit 

conditionality,” that comes with aid given to 

African countries. Often, it is concessionsaccess 

to oil or minerals. 70 This is what 

Chinese-African analysts have named the 

“Angola Model.” In 2004 Angola broke off 

negotiations with the IMF and turned to 

China for financial assistance, securing a $2 

billion loan with quite a generous interest 

rate. 71 By 2007 Angola had become China’s 

second largest oil supplier in Sub Saharan 

Africa. 72 Angola agreed to repay the loan in 

oil to China at a price not subject to market 

change. 73 In 2006, China’s state oil firm 

Sinopec won the bid for a lucrative offshore 

oil concession, “Block 18”. Later that year 

when China’s Premier Wen Jiabao visited 

Sudan he announced a supplemental $2 billion 

dollar loan. 74 This is not unique to Angola 

and this form of payment in resources is 

common as well for other African-Chinese 

agreements. 

China is quick to point out that their 

relations with Africa are not a colonial or neocolonial 

endeavor because it has no significant 

military installments in Africa to speak of. 

Strictly speaking, China does not have military 

bases, but it has a growing presence on the 

African continent. Estimates of PLA forces in 

Africa are as high as 5,000 and China has 

high-level military engagements with 43 






Press, 2008),119. 

72 ibid 118. 

73 ibid 119. 

74 ibid 120. 

African countries. 75 It is increasingly 

common for military personnel from various 

African countries to go train and study in 

Chinese defense colleges. 76 Now, China has 

an extensive network of defense attaché 

offices, used to coordinate military contacts, 

in 1 out of 3 African countries. 77 These 

offices are most concentrated in African 

countries where China has significant 

commercial interests such as: Angola, South 

Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa. 78 

China is set to begin building its first military 

base in the key coastal country of Djibouti. 79 

China’s military presence is also marked by 

their growing peacekeeping force, which are 

found in: South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, 

Western Sahara, and the Ivory Coast. 80 

China’s intentions need to be called 

into question despite the modest size and 

benign disposition of its armed forces in 

Africa. What Beijing does not mention is that 

China is also the largest arms supplier to Sub 

Saharan Africa, particularly small arms. 81 A 








77 Ibid. 




79 AFP,”China ‘Negotiates military base in 

Djibouti,” Al Jazeera, 5/10/2015, 

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/05/1 

50509084913175.html. 

80 Mohsan Ali, “U.S. vs. China: Footprints in 

Africa,” Al Jazeera, 6/2/2013, 

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/ 

07/20137117422885596.html. 

81 Colum Lynch, “China’s Arms Exports Flooding 

Sub-Saharan Africa,” The Washington Post, 

3/16/15, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/chinas-arms-exports-flooding-sub- 


steady flow of small arms into Africa over the 

years has fueled countless conflicts. China has 

no qualms about selling arms to questionable 

regimes either. China provides arms to 

Equatorial Guinea, a notoriously corrupt and 

cruel regime, even by Sub Saharan 

standards. 82 China has also been investing 

heavily in oil exploration in Equatorial 

Guinea. It even provided arms to South 

Sudan as it was carrying out its genocide in 

Darfur 83 and in 2011 they offered the Gaddafi 

regime weapons to help fight U.S.-NATO 

forces. 

ASSESSING CHINA’S INVESTMENT: 

LOOKING AT SOME FIGURES 

Both the Chinese and many of the 

their African partners claim their new 

relationship will help the African continent 

prosper, but the numbers show a complicated 

picture. Average annual growth was 5.7% 

from 2000-2010, when China began trading 

and investing substantially more with Africa. 

Average annual growth for the African 

continent over the last 2 decades has been 

4.4% according to the World Bank. 84 Most 

growth over the last decade has been mainly 

by oil and mineral exporters such as Angola: 

10.8% (2004-2013), Ghana: 7.6% (2004-2013), 

and Zambia: 7.1% (2005-2015). 85 For others 

that are not primarily oil exporters growth has 

not been spectacular despite being key trade 

saharan-africa/2012/08/25/16267b68-e7f1-11e1- 

936a-b801f1abab19_story.html. 





83 Mark Caldwell, “SIPRI: ‘China’s Arms Trade 

With Africa At Times Questionable,” Deutsche 

Welle, 3/16/2015, http://www.dw.de/sipri-chinas- 

arms-trade-with-africa-at-times-questionable/a- 

18319346. 

84 World Bank, Poverty and Equity: Sub Saharan 

Africa, World Bank 

http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/ 

SSA. 

85 Ibid. 

partners with China. During the last decade or 

so, growth for South Africa has been on 

average under 5% and for Egypt around 

4.3%. 86 However, poverty trends indicate 

modest improvements. In 1990, 56.6% of 

Africans were living under the poverty line 

subsisting on $1.25 or less per day. As of 2011 

it had decreased to 46.8%. 87 

EMERGING TRENDS AND HOW TO 

MAKE SENSE OF CHINA-AFRICA 

RELATIONS 

Chinese leaders have stressed that 

investments being made in the African 

continent are not just handouts, but rather for 

the purpose of helping to build up Africa’s 

capacity. China’s commercial investment and 

aid projects were supposed to offer both 

physical and human capital to the African 

continent. The FDI China provides is 

supposed to build up the African economy 

and increase self-sufficiency. Contrary to the 

claims of Chinese officials, the investments by 

design seem to perpetuate the conditions of 

Africa’s human and physical infrastructure 

that keep the continent impoverished. 

China’s policies have not helped 

employ or train Africans, nor provide the 

necessary infrastructure. Most firms, even 

those in low pay, low skill sectors such as 

construction or mining, are hesitant to hire 

Africans. 88 They claim that the locals are not 

qualified and they do want to train them 

either. Instead, contract laborers are brought 

in from China at 10 times the cost. 89 The 

86 World Bank: Africa Overview 2014, 

http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview 

#1. 

87 World Bank,Poverty and Equity: Sub Saharan 

Africa, World Bank 

http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/ 

SSA . 

88 Howard French, China’s Second Continent: 

How A Million Migrants Are Building a New 

Empire in Africa (New York City: Vintage Books, 

2014), 54. 

89 Ibid. 


Chinese firms are going out of their way to 

not hire Africans. As noted previously, little 

of China’s investment in Africa constitutes 

aid, thus there are less resources spent on 

educational and vocational training. Since the 

first FOCAC meeting in 2000, total number 

of job and education initiatives pledged are in 

the tens of thousands. 90 This does not put a 

dent into the hundreds of millions in Africa 

that are unemployed or are seeking 

opportunities to acquire new skills for higher 

paying jobs, at least $2 day. 

Many question if the infrastructure 

being developed is really intended for the 

benefit of Africa. It seems that the 

infrastructure built so far is just to help 

Chinese companies import their cheap goods 

for sale in Africa and for state owned 

companies to move natural resources out. 91 

China’s aid mainly finances the building of 

roads, railways, and ports that mostly serve 

the needs of Chinese firms. What Africa 

really needs are telecommunications and 

energy infrastructure --Electricity is a pressing 

social and economic need; according to 

USAID 70% of people in Sub Saharan Africa 

are without adequate power. 92 However, 

these kinds of projects are costly and do not 

provide fast returns for developers. Also, 

Chinese investment has been used to build 

lavish public buildings and sports arenas. 

These “white elephants” serve no practical 

purposes, but are popular and help politicians 

score political points. 93 It also remains to be 




2012) , 210,213. 



Press, 2008), 73. 

92 About Power Africa, USAID, 

http://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/about-powerafrica. 

93 Rachel Will, “China’s Stadium Diplomacy,” 

World Policy Institute, 2012, 

http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/summer2012/ 

chinas-stadium-diplomacy. 

seen how the Special Economic Zones are 

going to help, which are mainly in being set 

up near ports and resource extraction points. 

It is not clear what description best 

portrays contemporary China-African 

relations, but it is certain that it cannot be 

considered strictly exploitative and neocolonialism. 

Yes, China is interested in 

Africa’s natural resources, but China is 

purchasing it from African countries and even 

providing social assistance as well. This is 

distinctly different from European countries 

that robbed Africa of its resources and 

inhabitants. Furthermore, China does not 

exploit African labor, as Chinese firms go to 

great lengths to avoid using African workers. 

What we do know is that it is not a 

“win-win” relationship between China and the 

African continent. China has been adamant 

about respecting the sovereignty of its African 

partners, but the relationship it will have with 

its African partners is extremely asymmetrical. 

We must disaggregate our view of Africa. All 

54 African countries do not work together 

and coordinate their foreign policy with 

China. Rather, they all have varying amounts 

of resources and forms of leverage when 

dealing with China. However, ultimately 

China will get its way. This is not to say China 

will be exploitative, but it is hard to say no to 

China. Very few African governments, even 

those getting a raw deal, will push back. In 

2012, South African president Jacob Zouma 

spoke out about the asymmetry in trade with 

China. 94 South Africa has a large trade deficit 

with China and its textile industry has been 

decimated by cheap Chinese imports over the 

last decade. But little has changed and trade 

continues. 

Despite some incidents of social 

unrest, there are no pervasive feelings of a 

94 Ed Cropley and Michael Martina, “Insight: In 

Africa’s Warm heart, a Cold Welcome for 

Chinese,” Reuters, 9/18/2012, 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/usafrica-china-pushbackidUSBRE88H0CR20120918. 


“China problem” by Africans. There is little 

research on how Africans feel about the 

Chinese, but there is no evidence to support 

the claims by Western media and Chinese 

officials that anti-Chinese sentiments are 

common. 95 A 2007 study by Barry Suatman 

and Yan Hairong based on polling of 

university students in various African 

countries, showed that favorability of the 

Chinese varied markedly by country, that 

there was no “African consensus.” 96 Though, 

economic relations seem to be a good 

barometer for support. Polls show that those 

in African countries that have a trade deficit 

with China will more likely express anti- 

Chinese sentiments and vice versa. 97 

Although China’s economic influence 

in Africa has increased markedly over the last 

decade, it is still quite modest compared to the 

West. This needs to be considered when 

assessing whether or not Africa is becoming 

China’s colony. In 1990, trade with China 

represented just 0.75% of Africa’s total trade 

and today it less than 14%. 98 For China, trade 

with Africa accounts for less than 3% of its 

total trade. 99 China did not surpass the U.S. 

to become Africa’s largest trading partner 

until 2009, and even then, the total stock of 

Chinese commercial investments in Africa 

was $1 billion, compared to the U.S.’s $96 

95 Julia Strauss and Martha Saavedra, China 

and Africa: Emerging Patterns in Globalization 

and Development (United Kingdom: Cambridge 

University Press), 179. 

96 Julia Strauss and Martha Saavedra, China 

and Africa: Emerging Patterns in Globalization 

and Development (United Kingdom: Cambridge 

University Press), 186. 




Rand Corporation, 2014),61. 




2012) , 116. 

99 ibid. 

billion. 100 China’s numbers for foreign direct 

investment are quite low as well. China is 

investing on average $1.5 billion in Africa 

annually, but this is less than 3% of their total 

global FDI. 101 To put that in context, about 

70% of its FDI goes to Asia and 15% to Latin 

America. 102 

CONCLUSION-LOOKING FORWARD 

China’s contemporary engagement 

with the African continent is without 

precedent and it is too soon to tell how it will 

pan out. There are, however, some parts of 

the relationship that can have a significant 

impact down the line. China claims to adhere 

to a policy of “non-interference.” Though, its 

increasing military and peacekeeping presence 

is testing the limits of this policy. Another 

thing to watch for is the growing debt being 

accumulated by various African countries. 

Even mineral rich countries like Angola may 

have problems paying back debts if 

commodity prices drop. So far no evidence 

exists that they are too burdensome, but the 

historical precedence of African countries 

being indebted to foreign creditors is hard to 

ignore. What will China do then? 

It is hard to draw a parallel between 

China’s resource trade with Africa today and 

the resource extraction undertaken by 

European empires throughout history that 

colonized Africa. This was done through 

slavery of the indigenous population and 

appropriation of natural resources without 

any compensation. Though at the same time 

we must also recognize that China’s interest in 

Africa’s natural resources is exploitative and 

self-serving. 

100 Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and Firoze Manji, 

China’s New Role in Africa and the South: A 

Search for a New Perspective (Nairobi, Kenya: 

Fahamu-Networks for Social Justice),93. 




2012) , 133. 

102 ibid . 


Moreover, China is trying to highlight 

its differences from its Western predecessors, 

attempting to avoid the replication of the 

paternalistic view the West has of Africa. For 

centuries the West has been trying different 

strategies to civilize, modernize, and develop 

Africa. Investing in Africa and developing the 

continent’s infrastructure should be seen as a 

means by China to help increase Africa’s selfsufficiency. 

China does not seem to be 

interested in trying to export its politicaleconomic 

model or to “sinify” Africa. 

Ultimately, it is seeking an economic 

partnership with Africa that is based on their 

long history of solidarity. 

This phase of Chinese-African relations is still 

quite new and the mixed signals economic 

indicators give make it hard to gauge the 

impact of China’s investments. It is and will 

continue to be difficult to decipher China’s 

motives for providing aid and assistance to 

Africa. Though, if this relationship does yield 

mutual economic benefit and increasing 

political cooperation then does China’s 

motives really matter? Further research on the 

impact all this investment and cooperation is 

having on Africa is needed. 


Conflict Escalation, 

Signaling and Screening 

Compatibility or Competition? 

Kazumichi Uchida 

INTRODUCTION 

W 

hat is the cause of war under 

conditions of asymmetric 

information?Some argue that 

war is caused by states’ failure in 

deterrence of preemptive attacks, while others 

argue that it is caused by states’ fear of other 

states’ intention. By focusing on how states 

exchange their resolves to resort to military 

forces designed to prevent preemptive attacks, 

this study explores the causes of war under 

conditions of asymmetric information. 

States need to deter its neighbors 

from aggressive actions; however, they also 

need to relieve them at the same time. If a 

state puts too much stress on deterrence, it 

may frighten the neighbors, which encourages 

them to attack preemptively. Thus, it is 

difficult for all states to declare their 

intentions in a proper manner under 

conditions of asymmetric information. 

The Gulf War in 1990-91 provides a 

good example of the central issues. Before 

invading Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam 

Hussein made a variety of demands of 

Kuwait. 103 However, neither Kuwait nor the 

United States ever tried to determine the 

concession point at which Saddam would 

have been satisfied by making increasingly 

generous offers. 104 As a result, they failed to 

deter Saddam’s invasion. In this sense, the war 

was caused by their failure of deterrence. 

In the meantime, Washington also 

failed to reassure Saddam through the 

103 Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and 

Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: – A Failed or 

Impossible Task?,” International Security, 17 

(1992): 147-7. 

104 Ibid, 159-60. 

signaling of benign intentions. In those days, 

Saddam regarded America as an imperialist 

power bent on economic warfare against the 

Arab world. Washington, however, sent 

ineffective signals that increased Saddam’s 

suspicion of the United States’ intention. 105 As 

a result, the United States failed to reassure 

Saddam and encouraged him to invade 

Kuwait. In this sense, the war was caused by 

their failure of reassurance. 

Today, states have developed a 

variety of techniques to overcome asymmetric 

information. Some might declare their 

determination by taking costly actions such as 

arms buildups, while some might test their 

neighbors’ limits by making proposals. The 

most important point of those techniques is 

to interchange their resolution with each other 

in a proper manner. This paper seeks to 

clarify under what condition states can 

transmit their resolves effectively and address 

the problem, and under what condition they 

fail in transmission and war is likely. 

This article proceeds as follows. 

First, I review previous studies and their 

deficiencies, and propose ways of correcting 

these defects. Second, I present a basic model 

that makes it possible to consider the 

compatibility of both signaling and screening. 

Based on this model, I clarify several findings 

regarding when war is more likely and when it 

is less likely. 

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 

Prevention of the Preemptive Attacks 

In existing literatures on the causes 

of war, many have argued that the main cause 

of war is the gap between distribution of 

power and distribution of benefit, meaning 

that the greater the disparity between 

distribution of power and distribution of 

benefit, the more likely war will occur. 106 If a 

105 Ibid, 161-65. 

106 Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: 

States and Strategies in International Politics 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 6; 

Suzanne Werner, “The Precarious Nature of 


state feels that it is not getting its fair share of 

benefits, it has an incentive to change the 

status quo, and that includes use of force. 

The relevant diplomatic policies for 

the prevention of such calamities combine 

Deterrence and Reassurance. 107 Deterrence 

here is defined as the use of threats to 

dissuade an opponent from undertaking 

damaging actions in the future. 108 The origin 

of bargaining theory in international relations 

can be found in James Fearon’s Rationalist 

Explanations for War. 109 Assuming that a state’s 

resolve is based in asymmetric information, 

Fearon has attempted to elaborate the causes 

of war by observing whether it can send 

proper signals to deter other states. 110 Thus, 

war could be regarded as the failure of 

deterrence. 

In contrast, Reassurance is defined as 

the communication of benign and 

unaggressive intentions by the defender to the 

prospective challenger. 111 Hence, deterrence is 

designed to use aggressive intentions to 

dissuade the opponent from preemptive 

attack, while reassurance relies on the 

demonstration of benign intentions. Robert 

Powell’s In the Shadow of Power developed the 

theory by starting with the rigid assumption 

that the gap between the distribution of 

benefits and the distribution of power causes 

Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the 

Settlement, and Renegotiation the Terms,” 

American Journal of Political Science, 43 (1999): 

929. 

107 Richard Lebow, “Deterrence and 

Reassurance: Lessons from the Cold War,” 

Global Dialogue, 3 (2001): 128. 

108 Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: 

Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War 

(Washington, DC: United States Institute of 

Peace Press, 1991), 5. 

109 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations 

for War,” International Organization 49 (3): 379- 

414. 

110 James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy 

Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1): 68-90. 

111 Lebow, “Deterrence and Reassurance: 

Lessons from the Cold War,” 432. 

war. 112 Powell thus argued that the failure of 

concessions that states make to other states is 

the decisive cause of war. If states succeed in 

making concessions to other states properly, 

they can settle disputes. In other words, the 

failure of reassurance could cause a war. 

Asymmetric information 

Then, why do states fail to take those 

measures against preemptive attacks? The 

main reason is that every state has an 

incentive to misrepresent its resolve under 

conditions of asymmetric information. 113 

Hence, every state questions the credibility of 

other states’ discourses, and needs a way to 

make their messages credible in order to reach 

agreements with other states and avoid 

unnecessary wars becomes paramount. There 

are two potential means of making messages 

credible: Signaling and Screening. Signaling is 

defined as taking action to make threats to use 

force credible. 114 For example, if a state leader 

decides to expand troop numbers or to 

declare publicly that the state will resist if 

attacked, it can declare its resolution more 

strongly to other states. 115 

Screening is defined as the 

identification of how much degree an 

opponent is resolved through the use of 

increasingly generous proposals that facilitate 

112 Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and 

Strategies in International Politics, 86 – 104. 

113 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations 

for War,” International Organization, 49 

(1995) :379- 414. Recent studies have tended to 

emphasize the Commitment Problem as an 

explanatory cause of war. However, the analysis 

of that factor requires a firm basis in Fearon’s 

first explanatory variable, Asymmetric 

Information, which I thus focus on as the cause 

of war in this study. 

114 Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: 

Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” 69. 

115 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political 

Audiences and the Escalation of International 

Disputes,” American Political Science Review, 

88 (1994): 577- 92. 


settling early with the weakly resolved types. 116 

For example, if a state suggests a rigorous 

proposal on some issue to an opponent and 

the opponent accepts it quickly, it can be 

assumed that an opponent is not resolved so 

Signaling Screening 

Deterrence Fearon (1997) × 

Reassurance × Powell (1999) 

much to fight over the issue. 

Therefore, in this section, two main 

points could be drawn: First, states fail either 

in deterrence or reassurance due to 

asymmetric information. Second, states 

overcome asymmetric information by means 

of signaling and screening. 

Table 1. Diplomatic Policy and its Techniques 

In previous studies, many scholars 

have looked into conditions and success 

factors for either signaling or screening 

separately, but not together. However, wars 

have occurred because these two techniques 

have not been compatible. 117 This study 

assumes that it is important to examine the 

compatibility of signaling and screening and to 

find the conditions under which we can 

achieve both at the same time, and thus clarify 

the cause of war. 

Convergence of States’ Beliefs 

How can previous research be 

modified in order to address the problem? As 

mentioned, signaling and screening need to be 

examined in combination in order to analyze 

the causes of war. In addition to Powell’s, 

Slantchev (2003) argues that even though 

there is a great disparity in capability among 

states, a weaker state may threaten to provoke 

a war in order to induce a stronger state to 

offer better terms. 118 Therefore, expectations 

need to converge not only with respect to the 

distribution of power, but also the resolve of 

states, in order to prevent preemptive attacks 

from weaker actors. 

The next section will examine how 

and under what conditions states’ 

expectations about both the distribution of 

power and the resolve of states converge. And 

this convergence is necessary in order to 

prevent preemptive attacks. 

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 

Assume that two states in 

international system argue over strategic 

resources such as oil, coal, or territory. The 

total amount of resources is normalized as 1. 

In addition, let us assume that state 1 is a 

defending state, while state 2 is a challenging 

state. 

Let π ! be the expected utility of state 1, let p 

(0 ≤ p < 1) be the probability of winning of 

state 1, let v ! be the war value of state 1, and 

let c be the cost of war. To put it simply, I 

assume that if they win, they gain everything, 

while if they lose, they lose everything. 119 

π ! = v ! ∙ p ∙ 1 + 1 − p ∙ 0 − c 

= p ∙ v ! − c 

In the same fashion, we can express the utility 

of state 2 as, 

π ! = q ∙ v ! − c (where p + q = 1). 

Note that p also stands for the 

balance of power in this international system 

or how resources are shared among states. 

This is because the distribution of resources 

among states is determined by the probability 

of winning wars. 

116 Scott Wolford, Dan Reiter, and Clifford 

Carrubba, “Information, Commitment, and War,” 

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55 (2011): 567. 

117 Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of 

Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” 

American Political Science Review, 97 (2003): 

626. 

118 Ibid. 621-32. 

119 This model is consistent with those of Fearon 

(1997) and Wagner (2000) in the sense that it 

takes war to be a costly lottery. Harrison 

Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” American 

Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000): 470. 


Figure 1. Conflict Resolution and Escalation 

q 

RESOLUTION 

Reaction Function of 

State 1 

q 

and amount to peaceful resolution. The lower 

bound of this range is a signaling point, while 

its upper bound is a screening point, and they 

stand respectively for the minimum and 

maximum bounds necessary for convergence 

of belief. From here forward, I deduce those 

two points, which must be compatible to 

achieve their diplomatic purposes in this 

model. 

q ∗ 

p ∗ 

p ∗ 


State 2 

ESCALATION 


State 1 

As shown in Figure 1 above, I define 

the resolution of conflict as the convergence 

of beliefs about the probability of winning a 

war, while I define the escalation of conflict as 

the divergence of beliefs in that regard. The 

reason why we can define conflict as shown 

above is because if their beliefs converge, they 

have no incentive to change the status quo; if 

they diverge, they do have an incentive to 

change the status quo. The same rule is 

applicable to states’ resolve, according to the 

explanation by Slantchev (2003). 

There is some latitude in states’ 

actions within which their beliefs converge 

p 


State 2 

p 

q ∗ 

Proposition 1 

Let p = ! v ! 

! − 2v ! + 2α (where α is a real 

number). 

In the equilibrium, if p > p, the conflict is 

resolved, while if p < p, the conflict is 

escalated. 

Proof: See Appendix. 

This proposition has several 

implications. First, p stands for the signaling 

point, meaning the minimum amount by which 

state 1 should demonstrate its resolve through 

activities such as increasing or deploying 

troops in order to make its message credible. 

If state 1 demonstrates resolve to less than 

this degree, other states will think that state 1 

is not resolved and will be tempted to take 

advantage of it. Therefore, if state 1 seeks to 

make its signal credible, it should go at least to 

the degree p, which leads to conflict 

resolution. This is because its belief in p 

converges with the equilibrium point, and no 

other states take action. 

Proposition 2 

Let p = ! 

! ! !! ! 

− ! ! v ! ! + ! ! v ! ! + 2v ! v ! + 

v ! − β ∙ v ! . 

In the equilibrium, if p < p, the conflict is 

resolved, while if p > p, the conflict is 

escalated. 

If we let A= v ! + v ! , we can get p = ! ! A + 

!! ! 

! ! !!! !! 

! 

(where β is a real number). 

Proof: See Appendix 


This proposition also has several 

implications. First, p stands for the screening 

point, meaning the maximum degree by which 

state 1 should demonstrate its resolve in the 

effort to make its message credible. The 

reason for regarding the maximum point as 

the screening point is that it is necessary for a 

state to determine the maximum amount it 

can gain in searching for an opponent’s 

resolve. If it crosses the limit, other states will 

get cautious and take some action against it. If 

state 1 wants to make its discourses credible, 

it should go at most to this point because here 

beliefs in p converge. 

Proposition 3 

In the equilibrium, if p 

is resolved; otherwise, it is escalated. 

Proof: From the two propositions above, we can 

deduce that this proposition is inevitable. 

The most striking aspect of this 

proposition is that just by putting p at any 

point within this range, state 1 can make its 

messages credible and conflicts among states 

will be resolved. This is because any point 

within this range is Nash Equilibria: everyone 

will think that state 1 has no incentive to 

misrepresent its resolve within this range. 

Now we can think about three cases. 

In the first case, the range between p and p 

expands. In this case, it becomes easier for 

states to put p within this range and to resolve 

conflicts. More formally, if p ≡ ! v ! 

! − 

2v ! + 2α decreases and p ≡ ! A + ! 

!! ! 

! ! !!! !! 

increases, it becomes easier to 

! 

converge expectations. I call this area the 

security zone. 

The second case we will consider is 

one in which the range between p and p 

shrinks. In this case, it becomes more difficult 

for states to put p within this range and 

resolve conflicts. More formally, if p ≡ 

! 

! v ! − 2v ! + 2α increases and p ≡ ! ! A + 

!! ! 

! ! !!! !! 

decreases, it becomes more 

! 

difficult to converge expectations. I call this 

area the danger zone. I represent these two areas 

graphically in Figure 2 below. However, I 

omit two variables, α and β, from the 

calculation for simplicity. 

Figure 2. The Security Zone and the Danger 

Zone 

Finally, let us consider a case in which p goes 

ahead of p and there is no room for states to 

take any measures to prevent war. More 

formally, if ! ! v ! − 2v ! + 2α > ! ! A + 

!! ! 

! ! !!! !! 

! 

v ! 

Security Zone 

1 

4 

0 

1 

2 

Danger Zone 

, that is, if 

v ! = v ! 

! 

 

v ! 

v ! = 1 2 v ! 

v ! < ! !! !! ! !! ! !! 

, ! !! !! ! !! ! !! 

< v 

! 

! 

! , 

the expectations of states never converge. 

This indicates that if the resolve of state 1 is 

either too much or too little, they have no 

choice but to go to war. 

Based on this analysis, we can 

deduce several findings. The main finding is 

that war is more likely if the resolve of a 

challenging state exceeds half that of a 

defending state, while war is less likely if the 

resolve of a challenging state falls short of half 

that of a defending state. Note that ! : ! ! ! 


equates to 2: 1, which represents the 

proportion of defending states and 

challenging ones. 

In addition, war is less likely only 

when the resolve of both states is positive; 

and the resolve of defending states should be 

neither too high nor too low; paradoxically, if 

defending states are too resolved, they are 

significantly damaged as well. 

TESTS OF THE THEORY 

The theory above will be tested 

according to two criteria. 120 First, what 

predictions can be inferred from the above 

theory? Second, how much history does this 

theory explain? 

Predictions and Tests 

The theory’s predictions derived 

from its primary hypothesis. Namely, that war 

is more likely if the resolve of challenging 

states exceeds half that of defending states, 

while war is less likely if the resolve of 

challenging states falls short of half that of 

defending states. The following two 

predictions based on this theory are tested in a 

case study of the Gulf War of 1990-91. The 

outcomes vary sharply across time, creating a 

good setting for multiple within–case 

comparisons tests that contrast different 

periods within the same case. 121 

Defending states succeed in 

prevention of preemptive attacks if the 

resolve of challenging states’ does not exceed 

the proportion. 

Defending states fail in prevention of 

preemptive attacks if the resolve of 

challenging states’ exceeds the proportion. 

Test 1: Failure in Prevention 

120 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for 

Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 1997); Stephen Van 

Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of 

War,” International Security, 22 (1998): 22. 

121 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for 

Students of Political Science, 58-63. 

Just before he decided to invade 

Kuwait, he assumed that the outcome of the 

Iran-Iraq war had propelled Iraq into the 

leadership of the Arab world in the post-Cold 

War era. This outcome imposed upon Iraq the 

duty to deter both Iranian hordes and Israeli 

adventurism, which spurred Iraq to 

reconstruct its economy and to expand its 

industrial-technological infrastructure. This 

could only be achieved by means of its oil 

revenues. 122 

At the end of May 1990, during an 

Arab summit meeting convened in Baghdad, 

Saddam denounced the Arabs of the Gulf 

who were keeping the price of oil artificially 

low by producing beyond their OPEC quotas 

- to such an extent that the price in certain 

instances had plummeted to $7 per barrel, 

although the agreed-upon price was $18 per 

barrel-, and thereby engaging in economic 

sabotage of Iraq. 123 In a memorandum dated 

July 15, addressed to the Secretary-General of 

the United Nations, Iraqi Foreign Minister 

Tariq Aziz explicitly named Kuwait and the 

United Arab Emirates as the two “culprits” in 

overproduction. 124 To make matters worse, 

during the hostilities with Iran, Kuwait was 

drawing more than its allotment from the 

shared northern Rumaila oil field, whose 

122 Walid Khalidi, “Iraq vs. Kuwait: Claims and 

Counterclaims” in The Gulf War Reader, ed. 

Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf (Ithaca, NY: 

TimesBooks /Random House, 1991), 60-61. 


Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91 –A Failed or 

Impossible Task?,” International Security 17 (2): 

147-179; Walid Khalidi, “Iraq vs. Kuwait” in The 

Gulf War Reader, ed. Micah Sifry and 

Christopher Cerf (Ithaca, NY: TimesBooks 

/Random House, 1991), 63. 

124 Bishara A. Bahbah, “The Crisis in the Gulf: – 

Why Iraq Invaded Kuwait” in Phyllis Bennis and 

Michel Moushabeck, eds., Beyond The Storm: – 

A Gulf Crisis Reader (New York: Olive Branch 

Press, 1991), 52-3; Walid Khalidi, “Iraq vs. 

Kuwait,” 63. 


southern tip straddled the border inland from 

the Gulf. 125 

On July 16, at Saddam’s request, 

Aziz sent a memorandum to Kuwait 

demanding $2.4 billion in compensation for 

oil that Kuwait had pumped from the 

disputed Rumaila oil field; $12 billion in 

compensation for the depressed oil prices 

brought about by Kuwait’s overproduction; 

forgiveness of Iraq’s war debt of $10 billion; 

and a lease on the strategic island of Bubiyan 

that controlled access to Iraq’s only port, 

Umm Qasr. 126 Irrespective of the mediation 

efforts of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, 

President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and King 

Hussein of Jordan, on July 24, two Iraqi 

armored divisions moved from their bases to 

positions on Kuwait’s border. 127 

While the crisis was intensified, 

Washington’s signals to Iraq were ambiguous 

and contradictory. 128 On July 25, Saddam 

asked to meet with Ambassador April Glaspie 

within the hour, in response to the U. S. joint 

military exercises with the United Arab 

Emirates the previous day. Glaspie assured 

Saddam that the United States should express 

no opinion on the Kuwait issue, and that the 

issue was not associated with them. She then 

asked Saddam about the intention of Iraqi 

troop movements to the border with Kuwait. 

He informed her that he had just asked 

President Mubarak to assure Kuwait that they 

would do nothing until they held meetings. 

125 Walid Khalidi, “Iraq vs. Kuwait,” 63. 



Impossible Task?,” International Security 17 (2): 

147-179. 

127 “Kuwait: How The West Blundered”, in The 

Gulf War Reader, ed. Micah Sifry and 

Christopher Cerf (Ithaca, NY: TimesBooks 

/Random House, 1991), 104; Janice Gross 

Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 

1990-91 –A Failed or Impossible Task?,” 147- 

179. 



Impossible Task?,” 147-179. 

He added that if there were any hope in 

negotiations, nothing would happen, while if 

they were unable to find a solution, it would 

be natural for Iraq not to accept death. 129 This 

statement was designed to satisfy Ambassador 

Glaspie. Her assumption was that the Iraqi 

tanks were meant to intimidate Kuwait at the 

negotiating table, and that they would 

probably succeed in doing so. She found it 

tolerable. 130 

We can assume from the 

appearances that the resolve of Iraq was 

intensified day by day, while the United States 

was not resolved at all, which made war more 

and more likely. Saddam also thought that the 

United States would not wage war due to their 

Vietnam complex and the low tolerance of the 

American public to U.S. causalities. 131 Early in 

the morning on August 2, two Iraqi armored 

divisions spearheaded the attack against 

Kuwait. 

Test 2: Success in Prevention 

At the first full National Security 

Council (NSC) meeting after the Iraqi 

invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1991, 

Schwarzkopf outlined two military options for 

the U.S. response: (1) punitive air strikes by 

carrier-based aircraft, and (2) a detailed 

existing contingency plan, Operation Plan 

(OP) 90-1002, which called for deploying 

more than four divisions and three aircraft 

carriers, for a total of 100,000 to 200,000 U.S. 

troops. The key divide in this August 3 

meeting was between National Security 

Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of 

Defense Richard Cheney, who favored an 

expansive response, and Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, 

129 “Kuwait: How The West Blundered”, 104-5; 

Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and 


Impossible Task?,” 147-179. 

130 “Kuwait: How The West Blundered,” 105. 

131 Bishara A. Bahbah, “The Crisis in the Gulf,” 

54. 


who remained more cautious about 

committing U.S. military power and 

advocated the more limited goal of defending 

Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. In 

Powell’s view, which became known as the 

“Powell Doctrine,” the military was to be 

used as a last resort, and only then in an 

overwhelming fashion. By this time, however, 

President Bush had already begun to lean 

toward OP 90-1002, the “rollback” option 

over the more limited goal of 

“containment.” 132 

The official Saudi “invitation” for 

U.S. military intervention came on August 

7. 133 The next day, August 8, a Defense 

Intelligence Agency officer informed Prince 

Bandar of what had happened during the 

Kuwait invasion and how Saddam was 

massing the same elite force of eight divisions 

on the Saudi border. 134 

From then on, the U.S. was 

strengthening their signals to deter Iraq from 

invading Saudi Arabia, but at an incremental 

rate in order to reassure Iraq rather than 

encourage a preemptive attack. The first signal 

was sent on August 17 by U.S. officials 

including Defense Secretary Cheney. They 

intentionally leaked word to the Associated 

Press that the U.S. was preparing for a “long 

commitment” in the Gulf. 135 They also leaked 

the real number of troops up to 250,000 to 

the press. 136 The next signal was the 

Pentagon’s exponentially inflated troop 

projections needed to “defend” Saudi Arabia 

against an Iraqi attack. On August 22, the 

president called up an initial 40,000 members 

132 Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett, 

“Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990- 

91 Gulf War,” International Security, 19 

(2010):498-503. 

133 Steve Niva, “The Battle is Joined,” in Beyond 

The Storm: – A Gulf Crisis Reader, ed. Michel 

Moushabeck and Phyllis Bennis (New York: 

Olive Branch Press, 1991), 57. 

134 Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 278. 

135 Steve Niva, “The Battle is Joined,” 59. 

136 Bob Woodward, The Commanders, 297. 

of military reserve units, and by September 6 

the number of troops in Saudi Arabia had 

reached 100,000. On September 15, U.S. 

officials announced they had established a 

credible defense and were now building up 

their offensive capability. 137 Finally, on 

September 21, U.S. intelligence claimed that 

Saddam‘s forces were digging in, moving into 

even more defensive positions. This made an 

offensive attack by Saddam into Saudi Arabia 

less likely. 138 

In those days, when air power was 

not as well recognized, it was ground troops 

more than airstrikes what showed the 

governments’ resolve. Saddam had moved his 

eight divisions, an estimated 100,000 men, to 

the Saudi border while the United States went 

public with the concrete number of troops 

who would be sent to defend Saudi Arabia 

and then put the plan into practice. What is 

important in this study is the fact that when 

Saddam recognized that the United States put 

twice as many troops as his on the Saudi 

border, he gave up invading Saudi Arabia. 

This corroborates the prediction that 

defending states succeed in both deterrence 

and reassurance when their resolve exceeds 

twice that of challenging states’. 

CONCLUSION 

This article argues that war is more 

likely when the resolve of challenging states 

exceeds twice that of defending states. With 

respect to the causes of war, states cannot 

achieve both diplomatic policies, namely, 

deterrence and reassurance, at the same time 

unless they combine the techniques of 

signaling and screening. 

Based on the assumption that war 

can be represented as the divergence of state 

beliefs about the probability of winning and 

state resolve, I establish the minimum and 

maximum points necessary for their beliefs to 

converge, which can be defined as signaling 

and screening points. I then assume that if 

137 Steve Niva, “The Battle is Joined,” 59. 

138 Bob Woodward, The Commanders, 297. 


those ranges expand, it becomes easy for 

states to determine the points that are 

necessary for the settling of disputes, and vice 

versa. This enables me to present the 

hypotheses mentioned above. 

I deduce several predictions from those 

hypotheses, which are tested with the case of 

the Gulf War of 1990-91, which is rich in 

both political success and failure. I then 

demonstrate that these predictions correlated 

with what happened in the Gulf. 

This study leaves many themes of 

remaining research. The first topic we need to 

tackle is how to deal with the influence of 

state growth, which is categorized as a 

commitment problem. In order to complete 

the research, we need to consider a dynamic 

version of this model by introducing new 

variables such as the growth rates of states. 

Some previous research has already tackled 

this problem with distinguished 

implications. 139 What we need to do next is to 

combine these achievements with the findings 

of this research in order to improve the ways 

in which states can achieve their diplomatic 

purposes, even when there is a great disparity 

in growth rates among states. 

APPENDIX 

Proof of Proposition 1 

Consider the Cournot Equilibrium. 

The reason why I consider the Cournot 

Equilibrium is because in equilibrium both 

actors’ beliefs about the probability of 

winning war are supposed to converge. 

Thus, I start with both actors’ reaction 

functions so that their beliefs will converge as 

a result of their profit maximizations. 

Assume that state 1 is a defender, 

and its reaction function is q = p, while state 

139 Robert Powell, “The Inefficient Use of Power: 

Costly Conflict with Complete Information,” 

American Political Science Review, 98 (2004): 

231-41; Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment 

Problem,” International Organization, 60 (2006): 

169-203. 

2 is a challenger, and its reaction function is 

q = a ∙ p + α (where α is a real number). 

In this case, the condition of equilibrium at 

point t is p ! = a ∙ p !!! + α.In addition, in 

equilibrium, p ∗ = a ∙ p ∗ + α . 

If we assume that ∆p ! ≡ p ! − p ∗ , we can get 

∆p ! = a∆p !!! = ⋯ = a ! ∆p ! . (where a is a 

real number). The important point in this 

equilibrium is that the condition of conflict 

resolution is a < 1. 

Because the reaction function of state 1 is 

q = p, we can get !! ! 

= p − q = 0. 

!" 

Therefore, π ! = ! ! p! − q ∙ p + β = p ∙ 

! 

! 

p − q + β (where β is a real number). 

Since we assume π ! = p ∙ v ! − c, we can get 

v ! = ! p − q. Moreover, since p + q = 1, we 

! 

can get 1 = ! p − v ! 

!…1 . 

On the other hand, because the reaction 

function of state 2 is q = a ∙ p + α, we can 

get !! ! 

= ap + α − q = 0 . 

!" 

Therefore, π ! = − ! ! q! + ap + α q + γ = 

q − ! q + ap + α + γ(where 

! 

γ is a real number). 

Since we assume π ! = q ∙ v ! − c, we can get 

v ! = − ! q + ap + α . 

! 

Now, since p + q = 1, we can get 1 = 

2a + 1 p − 2v ! + 2α…2 . 

Because 1 and 2 should be compatible, 

! 

p − v ! 

! = 2a + 1 p − 2v ! + 2α . 

Therefore we can get 

a = −v ! + 2v ! − 2α 

2p 

+ 1 4 . 

When a ≥ 0, the condition of a < 1 is 

−v ! + 2v ! − 2α 

2p 

+ 1 4 < 1 . 

Therefore, we can get p > ! −v ! 

! + 2v ! − 

2α . 

When a < 0, the condition of a < 1 is 

− −v ! + 2v ! − 2α 

2p 

− 1 4 < 1. 


Therefore, we can get p > ! ! v ! − 2v ! + 

2α . 

Q.E.D. 

Proof of Proposition 2 

Consider the Bertrand Equilibrium. 

The reason why I consider the Bertrand 

Equilibrium is because in equilibrium both 

actors’ beliefs about the war values are 

supposed to converge. 

Thus, I start with both actors’ reaction 

functions so that their beliefs will converge as 

a result of their profit maximizations. 

Assume that state 1 is a defender and 

its reaction function is v ! = v ! , while state 2 

is a challenger and its reaction function is 

v ! = a ∙ v ! + β (where β is a real number). 

The equilibrium at point t is v !! = a ∙ 

v ! !!! + β, while in equilibrium, v ! ∗ = a ∙ 

v ! ∗ + β . If we assume that ∆v !! ≡ v ! ! − v !∗ , 

we can get ∆v !! = a∆v !!!! = ⋯ = a ! ∆v !" . 

(where a is a real number). The important 

point in this equilibrium is that the condition 

of conflict resolution is a < 1. 

Because the reaction function of state 1 is 

v ! = v ! , we can get !! ! 

!! ! 

= v ! − v ! = 0. 

Therefore, π ! = − ! ! v ! ! + v ! ∙ v ! + γ = v ! ∙ 

− ! ! v ! + v ! + γ(γ is a real number ). 

Since we assume π ! = p ∙ v ! − c, we can get 

p = − ! ! v ! + v ! . 

Because S = p ∙ v ! + q ∙ v ! , we can get 

S = − ! ! v ! ! + v ! ∙ v ! + q ∙ v ! ・・・1 

(I assume that S stands for the supply of 

public goods provided by those states). 

On the other hand, the expected utility of 

state 2 is v ! = a ∙ v ! + β; hence, we can get 

!! ! 

!! ! 

= a ∙ v ! + β − v ! = 0. Therefore,π ! = 

− ! ! v ! ! + a ∙ v ! + β ∙ v ! + δ = 

v ! − ! ! v ! + a ∙ v ! + β + δ (where 

δ is a real number) . 

Since we assume π ! = q ∙ v ! − c, we can get 

q = − ! ! v ! + a ∙ v ! + β . 

Because S = p ∙ v ! + q ∙ v ! , we can get 

S = − ! ! v ! ! + a ∙ v ! + β v ! + p ∙ v ! ・・ 

・2 

Now, both 1 and 2 should be compatible, 

such that − ! ! v ! ! + v ! v ! + q ∙ v ! = 

− ! ! v ! ! + a ∙ v ! + β v ! + p ∙ v ! . 

Therefore, we can get a = ! ! ! 

− ! ! 

− p ∙ 

! ! ! ! ! 

! 

+ q ∙ ! − β ∙ ! + 1 . 

! ! ! ! ! ! 

When a ≥ 0, the condition of a < 1 is 

! ! ! 

− ! ! 

− p ∙ ! + q ∙ ! − β ∙ ! + 1 < 1. 

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 

Therefore, we can get p > − ! ∙ v ! 

! + ! ! 

∙ 

! ! 

! 

v ! 

! − q − β . 

When a < 0, the condition of a < 1 is 

− ! ! ! 

− ! ! 

+ p ∙ ! − q ∙ ! + β ∙ ! − 1 < 

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 

1. Therefore, we can get p < ! 

− ! v ! ! !! ! ! 

! ! + 

! 

v ! ! ! + 2v ! v ! + v ! − β ∙ v ! . 

Since we need to find the upper bound of p, 

we should assume that a < 0. 

Therefore, we should also assume that a < 0 

in proposition 1.Q.E.D. 


Bordered Citizenship 

Why Distributive Justice 

Requires Republic Citizenship 

Ji Min Kim 

T 

he degree of permeability of state 

borders continues to weigh upon 

liberalist accounts of citizenship. The 

liberal value of equal moral worth of every 

individual promotes universal concern and 

respect for an individual’s well being. Then, 

the liberal citizenship should in theory grant 

freedom of movement if it enhances 

individuals’ autonomy and welfare. However, 

such notion of cosmopolitan citizenship is yet 

to be widely accepted by the democratic states 

since citizenship is traditionally defined within 

the context of the territorial nation-state, 

limiting the applicability of liberal values and 

obligations only to those legally recognized 

within the borders. The discrepancy of liberal 

citizenship is most problematic in the context 

of distributive justice, especially concerning 

the gross global inequality between wealthy 

(developed) and impoverished (or underdeveloped) 

states. To liberals who endorse 

cosmopolitan view of citizenship, erecting 

impermeable state boundaries is nothing short 

of feudalism, granting morally arbitrary 140 

birthright privileges to a lucky few but failing 

to indiscriminately protect the liberty and 

equality of all people. 

In Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open 

Borders, Joseph H. Carens tackles this difficulty 

and calls for major revisions to conventional 

border restrictions. He argues that our most 

deeply rooted liberal value, of the equal moral 

worth of every individual, necessitates an 

open border. This cosmopolitan vision of 

140 Carens argues that one’s natural citizenship 

in a wealthy democratic state is a morally 

arbitrary privilege since it was granted as a 

birthright rather than earned. In other words, 

one’s citizenship in a country depends on one’s 

luck rather than on logical moral standards. 

distributive justice, Carens believes, is morally 

required because it is the only way to 

guarantee equal opportunity to individuals in 

poor and failed states, thereby alleviating the 

grossly unequal wealth distribution around the 

world. Carens contests the claim that 

wealthier states owe distinct obligations to 

their citizens and legal aliens. By rejecting 

exclusive citizenship nestled by restrictive 

state borders, he offers one of the most 

inclusive accounts of transnational citizenship. 

In this essay, I argue that Carens’s 

open border policy falls short from 

formulating distributive justice, not only 

failing to solve global inequality but also 

endangering the guarantee of equality within a 

state. Contrary to the theory, only republican 

citizenship that depends on restrictive borders 

can secure distributive justice within a state. 

The argument does not propose that the 

equality of fellow countrymen is more 

valuable than that of outsiders; however, the 

political and social institutions, as well as 

social values, that citizens share within a 

nation state create a special obligation to their 

particular political community. In other 

words, the liberal principle of distributive 

justice is only applicable to individuals who 

practice republican citizenship, accepting the 

liabilities inherent in the coercive networks of 

state governance. 

First, I will examine Carens’s 

argument that transnational citizenship is 

necessary to foster global distributive equality; 

Then, I will argue that in order to achieve any 

kind of distributive justice, states need to 

adopt republican citizenship. Finally, I will 

argue that republican citizenship cannot be 

achieved with open borders. 

CARENS’S PROPOSAL OF OPEN 

BORDER 

Carens rejects the conventional view 

that a state is morally entitled to control its 

borders. He argues that border control is 

incompatible with liberal principles of basic 

rights and equality for all people. In 


challenging the conventional view, he makes 

an analogy that citizenship in Western 

democracies is the modern equivalent of 

privileges in feudal society. This privilege is 

arbitrary granted based on birth yet greatly 

enhances one’s quality of life. On the other 

hand, less fortunate individuals born in poor 

or failed states are as strongly bound to their 

impoverishment and insecurity as serfs were 

bound to their lord’s estate. The inequality 

between these states is further aggravated by 

legal restrictions on mobility across their 

borders. Regardless of how talented they are 

or how hard they work, parochial borders 

make it extremely difficult for those born into 

socially and economically disadvantaged states 

to overcome that misfortune. Extending the 

analogy, Carens argues that the assumed 

injustice of feudal system should ring an alarm 

to the current conventional practice of border 

control that passively upholds birthright 

privileges. 

In proposing for an open border, 

Carens identifies three underlying interrelated 

assumptions: 

First, there is no natural social 

order. The institutions and 

practices that govern human 

beings are ones that human 

beings have created and can 

change, at least in principle. 

Second, in evaluating the 

moral status of alternative 

forms of political and social 

organization, we must start 

from the premise that all 

human beings are of equal 

moral worth. Third, 

restrictions on the freedom of 

human beings require a moral 

justification. 141 

141 Joseph Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The 

Case for Open Borders” in Theorizing 

Citizenship, Vol. 49, No. 2, ed. Ronald Beiner,. 

(Spring, 1987), 226. 

Carens believes that these basic principles 

claim moral legitimacy to every contemporary 

democratic regime. Accordingly, these three 

basic assumptions function as the basic pillars 

to Carens’s proposal for open borders. The 

first assumption implies that the institutions 

and practices that are currently in place are 

not an end result of an inevitable natural order 

but rather a dynamic social construct that can 

be changed. This assumption that gross global 

inequality is produced due to prioritization of 

national interests over moral obligation 

toward weaker states allows Carens to argue 

that the current world structure needs to be 

redressed. The inaction of the wealthier 

democratic states in the face of such 

inequality is incompatible with the deeply 

rooted liberal value that all human beings are 

of equal moral worth. Equal moral worth 

should render the same equality and freedom 

to every individual not just to the lucky few. 

Carens does acknowledge that states cannot 

be completely free from all restrictions, but he 

argues by the third assumption that states’ 

practice of discretionary power over 

immigration without providing a moral 

justification for restricting it is a deep 

injustice. 

Based on the assumptions, he 

provides three prima facie interrelated reasons 

why open border is necessary to achieve 

moral global equality. First, he argues that a 

state’s control over freedom of movement 

undermines individual autonomy. Under the 

premise that freedom of movement is a 

prerequisite to other freedoms such as 

freedom to live as one chooses and freedom 

from coercion, open borders will contribute 

to individual autonomy. This leads to the 

second reason for open borders: freedom of 

movement is essential for equal opportunity. 

An individual’s entitlement to equal 

opportunity stems from the second basic 

assumption that all human beings are of equal 

moral worth and therefore deserve equal 

access to political and social organization that 

do not impede their chances for a better life 

based on a morally arbitrary standard such as 


an inherent birthright. This notion of equal 

moral worth and the individual’s entitlement 

to equal opportunity entails the final reason: 

they are a means of realizing equal freedom 

and equal opportunity and also desirable end 

in itself 142 . In other words, if the global poor 

avail themselves of such opportunity by 

moving to the ‘wealthier’ states such as the 

United States, then permitting universal 

freedom of movement would substantively 

alleviate global inequality. 

THE PROBLEM WITH CARENS’S OPEN 

BORDER POLICY 

The three reasons raise interrelated 

questions that cast doubt on the capability of 

open borders to generate equality within and 

across borders. The problem with Carens’s 

view of citizenship is that, by dominantly 

focusing on individual autonomy and only 

guaranteeing a chance of equal opportunity, it 

fails to generate any obligation for realizing 

distributive justice. 

In order to arrive at this conclusion, 

the first question should be: why are rich 

states obligated to uphold the individual 

autonomy of those outside their jurisdiction 

above privilege of their own citizens? Put 

differently, it is hard to see how open borders 

could solve the problem of global inequality 

by respecting absolute individual autonomy. If 

prioritizing the individual autonomy of 

outsiders does not serve the interest of 

citizens within a state’s border, should the 

state still honor the ideas of individual 

autonomy and freedom of movement? In 

arguing for individual autonomy, Carens 

argues that when a political community as a 

whole has dominion over immigration, the 

right and liberty of its citizens and aliens alike 

are critically limited. He provides a case to 

illustrate how border restriction infringes the 

autonomy of both citizens and non-citizens: 


Case for Open Borders,” 228. 

Suppose a farmer from the 

United States wanted to hire 

workers from Mexico. The 

government would have no 

right to prohibit him from 

doing this. To prevent the 

Mexicans from coming would 

violate the rights of both the 

American farmer and the 

Mexican workers to engage in 

voluntary transactions 143 

According to this example, states’ exclusive 

immigration policies interfere with both an 

outsider’s freedom of movement and an 

insider’s economic freedom to hire any 

worker of their choice. Libertarians are right 

to suggest that a state’s discretionary control 

over immigration is inconsistent with 

individuals’ having unlimited rights in this 

domain. However, border controls concern 

the interest of political community as a whole, 

not just benefit a few individuals. An 

individual would have the right to freely move 

across borders or hire foreigners if individual 

rights were always general and absolute, but a 

person’s right to free movement does not give 

one the absolute right to another person’s 

house without permission. Applied to states, 

why should it be assumed that freedom of 

movement gives an individual the right to 

enter a country’s territory without first getting 

the permission from that political community? 

In an attempt to answer this challenge, 

Carens concedes that freedom of movement 

should be constrained at some point. He 

claims, however, that “restrictions on freedom 

of movement require some sort of moral 

justification, that is, some argument as to why 

the restriction on freedom is in the interest of, 

and fair to, all those who are subject to it” 144 . 

Although a state’s obligation to provide 


Case for Open Borders,” 226. 


Case for Open Borders,” 277 


justification for its restrictive actions toward 

its own citizens is usually presumed to be a 

legitimate demand, why is a state required to 

provide such service to non-members, 

especially if they are uninvited outsiders? Also, 

it is not hard to find cases that illustrate the 

reasons for restrictions are valid only under 

condition that they serve the interest of the 

lawful residents --citizens. For example, 

imagine that two intruders want to enter a 

house and help themselves to the food inside. 

It seems odd to argue that the owner of the 

house would have to first provide a moral 

justification before repelling them. In 

extension, why must a state morally justify its 

attempt to keep uninvited foreigners out of its 

political community? One defense could be 

that the citizens of a state have no tangible 

(literal) ownership over the state’s territory 

unlike the legitimate owner of a private 

property. However, this response fails to hold 

at the counter argument that a state’s 

constituents possess the relevant (figural) 

moral dominion over their political 

community. The point of this argument is that 

if individual autonomy of aliens cannot be 

justified as superior to the state’s interest in 

restricting its borders, then it logically follows 

that the state is not entitled to provide equal 

opportunity to aliens when such policy does 

not serve its interests. 

This leads to the second question: are 

open borders capable of achieving global 

equality? I argue that it is insufficient to 

generate global equality because open border 

itself holds no power to implicate equal 

opportunity provided by redistributive system. 

Carens argues that restrictive border controls 

undermine the equal moral worth of 

individuals by securing privileges to the 

citizens of wealthy states while impeding 

citizens of poor states from escaping their bad 

fortune. One has to be free to move to where 

the opportunities are in order to take 

advantage of them. Therefore, freedom of 

movement is a prerequisite for the equality of 

opportunity. Carens seems to believe that 

freedom of movement will make all privileged 

opportunities available to everyone around 

the world who chooses to move, therefore 

achieving the kind of universal distributive 

justice required to address global inequality. Is 

Carens’s definition of equal opportunity 

sufficient to match the importance he places 

on the protection of equal moral worth of 

individuals? If his definition of equal 

opportunity provided by open borders is 

insufficient, then, his argument falls apart. 

Open borders cannot effectively 

address the fundamental problems of 

entrenched poverty that causes people to 

migrate. Global inequality should be to 

address by focusing on underlying conditions 

and expunging extreme poverty entrenched 

within poor states. Open borders provide an 

escape route from poverty rather than fixing 

the root problems. 

In his defense, Carens claims that the 

argument for open borders makes a crucial 

contribution to the advancement of 

international equality because it makes it 

harder for rich states to claim that they bear 

no responsibility for the persistence of 

inequality and the plight of the poor. Open 

borders are important because they force rich 

states to abandon passivity and inaction 

towards global inequality and meet the 

necessary distributive justice. However, if it is 

passivity and inaction of the states that are 

supposed to be redressed toward global 

inequality, it is doubtful that open borders are 

sufficient as the sole mechanism for 

distributive justice. The inequality within rich 

states can be as large as the inequalities among 

states. With persisting and gross inequality 

within the state, merely letting outsiders freely 

enter the country in question will not solve 

the problem of lack of equal opportunity. 

Rather, it could only exacerbate the inequality 

within the border. 

Even if not, then does it really take 

away the problem of passivity and inaction? 

In The Lost Immigration Debate, Mae M. Ngai 

provides an example of open border 

exacerbating the problem of inequality. With 

relatively flexible border controls, the 


American Southwest became a frontier zone 

where Mexicans were welcomed as cheap and 

disposable labor but not as members of the 

United States polity. If the government fails to 

or is unwilling to support immigrants from 

falling into further poverty or being subject to 

exploitation, the claim that open borders 

uphold individual autonomy and equal moral 

worth cannot be substantiated. In order for 

the state to escape blame upon its passivity 

and inaction toward global inequality and 

uphold individual autonomy towards a 

universal distributive justice, then, the state 

needs to do a lot more than just to open its 

borders. Without extensive welfare and liable 

policies, border policies cannot generate the 

distributive justice that is essential to 

achieving any kind of equality. 

The best form of equal opportunity 

that can be generated from such a 

commitment would be a laissez-faire system in 

which every man stands for himself. 

However, the purpose of distributive justice is 

not to foster free markets but to attend to the 

need of the less well-offs. The fact that those 

who avail themselves of freedom of 

movement end up being disposable labor 

force within the adopted market, or are 

confined to undesirable jobs brought in by 

international capital, speaks against the idea 

that the market will work towards a corrective 

moral force. Considering the moral 

importance Carens advocates, the choice 

between indentured servitude abroad and 

sweatshops at home are not the kind of 

equality he envisions. This invokes more 

extensive commitments concerning global 

justice, towards world federalism. And a new 

question arises: are states obligated to institute 

global distributive justice policies even at the 

expense of the significance of borders that 

bind citizens together as a collective that 

facilitates distributive justice within the state? 

The question underlies the problem that open 

borders might be in conflict with distributive 

justice. Carens vaguely hints at the conflict: 

I was wrong. I have found that, 

faced with the choice between 

extending the right of free 

movement across borders and 

challenging the moral status of 

internal free movement as a 

human right, some people are 

willing to throw internal 

freedom of movement under 

the bus. They say… that 

perhaps freedom of movement 

within the state is not so 

important after all, not really 

something worthy of 

designation as a human rights 

145 

Here, Carens regretfully admits that 

democratic citizens who are committed to 

liberal principles may choose to revise their 

pledge when pushed to accept the premise 

that the norm they are already committed to 

entails open borders. Most troubling of this 

phenomenon is that by revising their 

commitment to the principles, citizens may 

reject the obligations to their fellow 

countrymen in extension. Although the quote 

is about people’s reluctance to view fellow 

citizens’ right to free movement as a 

legitimate right when challenged to accept the 

free movement of aliens as a basic human 

right, this can be applied to distributive 

justice. In The Moral Dilemma of U.S. 

Immigration Policy, Stephen Macedo argues that 

over the last forty years, American 

immigration policies and practices have 

become more accommodating to the less 

well-off abroad by instituting relatively flexible 

border policies. It could be argued that it has 

caused a significant cost in terms of social 

justice at home, including worsening income 

disparities in the United States. Steven A. 

Camarota argues that recent immigration 

contributed to employment loss among 


Case for Open Borders.” 


Americans 146 . He points out that labor force 

participation among African American males 

with low levels of education, the major group 

in job competition with unskilled immigrants, 

has fallen steeply correlated with (but not 

necessarily being caused by) higher 

immigration rates. Furthermore, it might be 

argued that high levels of immigration by 

unskilled laborers may also have lowered 

public support for social welfare. When 

pushed to recognize that liberal principle of 

moral equality and individual autonomy calls 

for an open border for equal opportunity and 

global equality, citizens may wholly reject the 

importance of distributive justice to escape 

from such commitment. 

In summary, although Carens’s 

demand to prioritize equal moral worth 

adheres to the liberal principle of individual 

autonomy, considering that border policy 

serves not just the interest of a few individuals 

but that of the society as a whole, its absolute 

applicability deems unwarranted. Also, even if 

a state opens its border under the recognition 

that individuals are entitled to freedom of 

movement, open border is insufficient to 

provide equal opportunity beyond the scope 

of the opportunity to reside in the state; this is 

clearly illustrated by the vulnerability of aliens 

to economic exploitation. Therefore, if Carens 

desires to provide an institutional and social 

mechanism that can guarantee equal 

opportunity that honors equal moral worth of 

every individual, a much more extensive and 

coercive set of policies is needed. Such 

policies, however, place too much burden and 

unwarranted obligation on citizens of the 

wealthy states. This may lead to complete 

rejection of redistribution itself. In 

conclusion, open borders fail to achieve 

equality because, in order for equality to be 

realized, distributive justice is required and 

distributive justice cannot formulate among 

cosmopolitan citizenship. 

WHY DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE REQUIRES 

REPUBLIC CITIZENSHIP 

As illustrated through the criticisms of 

open borders, liberal cosmopolitan citizenship 

not only fails to legitimatize distributive 

justice at a global level, it also endangers 

distributive justice within states. It can be 

concluded that the realization of distributive 

justice and the pursuit for equality depend on 

the right kind of citizenship and the proper 

degree of obligations and rights it entails. In 

order to achieve distributive justice, 

republican citizenship is a necessary 

condition, as defined by David Miller and 

Stephen Macedo 147 . Republican citizenship 

demands distributive justice for compatriots. 

The discussion of these points strengthens the 

case for the need for a bordered republican 

citizenship in order to achieve any kind of 

distributive justice. 

Miller’s republican conception of citizenship 

In arguing that practice of citizenship 

must be confined within the boundaries of 

national political communities, Miller 

challenges that transnational or global forms 

of citizenship have failed to meet the 

conditions under which genuine citizenship is 

possible. His ultimate challenge against the 

more cosmopolitan forms of citizenship is 

that while they adhere to the liberal 

conception of citizenship focused on citizen 

rights and state obligations, they disregard the 

republican conception of citizenship. 

Republican citizenship requires an active 

citizenry that “takes part along with others in 

shaping the future direction of his or her 

146 Steven Camarota, “Immigrant Employment 

Gains and Native Losses, 2000-2004” in 

Debating Immigration, ed. Carol M. Swain 

(Cambridge University Press: Cambrdige, 

2007). 

147 Macedo does not refer to his view of 

citizenship as republican citizenship, but the 

similarity of Miller’s and Macedo’s views make 

their models compatible with each other. For 

simplicity sake’s, “republican citizenship” here is 

an umbrella term. 


society through political debate” 148 . The 

responsibilities of republican citizenship 

extend beyond the liberal conception of 

citizenship in that it requires a sufficient 

measure of what the older republican tradition 

describes as the “public virtue.” Miller claims 

that there are four components of republican 

citizenship. The first two pertain to liberal 

conception while the second two are 

distinctively republican: 

First, the republican citizen 

securely enjoys a set of equal 

rights, which are necessary both 

in order to carry out private aims 

and purposes and in order to play 

her public role … Many rights 

have this dual aspect: rights to 

property and free speech, for 

instance can be seen both as 

enabling people to pursue their 

individual plans of life and 

personal ideals, and as 

preconditions for active 

citizenship. Second, 

corresponding to these rights is a 

set of obligations: to respect the 

law…to pay taxes in the interest 

of social justice, to serve on juries 

when called on to do so, and so 

on. 149 

While the rights and obligations outlined by 

the first two components involve some 

requirement for public roles, they are 

predominantly focused on guaranteeing 

individual liberty and equality at the expense 

of minimal public obligations. However, 

republican citizenship requires much more 

arduous commitments than passive 

compliance: 

Third, being willing to take active 

steps to defend the rights of 

148 David Miller, “Bounded Citizenship,” in 

Cosmopolitan Citizenship, 62. 

149 Ivi. 

other members of the political 

community, and more generally 

to promote its common 

interests…under this heading, the 

citizen is someone who is ready 

to volunteer for public service 

when the need arises...Fourth and 

the last, the republic citizen plays 

an active role in both the formal 

and informal arenas of politics. 150 

The last two components are demanding in 

that they require citizens to actively perform 

political and sub-political tasks. Even if such 

actions lack personal incentives, citizens 

should be motivated to act accordingly for the 

sake of commitment to the community and 

their citizenship. Furthermore, such 

expressions should aim at promoting the 

common good. Motivation to achieve the 

common good involves a will to set aside 

personal interests and ideals in the interests of 

achieving democratic consensus. His 

argument for active political participation in 

the later two argument focuses on fostering 

common good and mutual interest. This 

logically necessitates a mechanism for 

redistribution that fosters a level of equality 

among its members. Political communities’ 

commitment to distributive justice leads to 

the establishment of “standards to regulate 

the major institutions of taxation, inheritance, 

social provisions, wage policies, education, 

and so forth that help determine over time the 

relative level of income, wealth, and 

opportunity available to different groups” 151 . 

Such system of redistribution achieves far 

greater equality and opportunity for the 

society as a whole than Carens’s open 

borders, which focus on individual autonomy 

for the sake of equal moral worth 

150 Ibid., 63. 

151 Stephen Macedo, “The Moral Dilemma of US 

Immigration Policy,” in Debating Immigration 

ed. Carol M. Swain (Cambridge University 

Press: Cambridge, 2007), 69. 


guaranteeing only superficial (or laissez-faire) 

definition of equal opportunity. 

Macedo’s civic view 

Elaborating on Miller’s account of 

citizenship, Stephen Macedo examines how 

the moral obligation of citizenship fostered 

through co-participation in governance of a 

bounded political community compels 

distributive justice. He coins the term “civic 

view” to justify his conception of citizenship. 

The cosmopolitan conception of citizenship 

emphasizes the moral arbitrariness of borders 

and the universality of states’ obligation to 

globalization’s have-nots. On the contrary, 

civic view argues that borders do hold moral 

significance that generates special obligations 

toward its citizens. Borders carry moral 

significance because they constitute a 

bounded system of collective self-governance. 

Although Macedo does not refer his “civic 

view” to republican citizenship, his meaning 

of citizenship also highly depends on the 

practice of public virtue, making the view 

compatible with the republican citizenship 

outlined by Miller. 

Macedo argues that all individuals are 

born into a political community composed of 

various associations including religious 

communities and families. These associations 

shape individuals’ interests, identities, 

relationships and opportunities. Through 

engagement with various associations, 

members of the political community 

collectively create, coercively impose, and live 

within the political order. In turn, the political 

order provides the basic values that 

pervasively shape the lives of those who 

reside within it. The mutual bilateral 

relationship between the state government 

and its members allow the government to 

function as a self-governing political 

community. Citizens, as collective agents, 

bestow legitimacy unto the government so 

that its actions would reflect and represent the 

policy decisions of the citizens as a whole. As 

a legitimate government, the state is trusted to 

exercise an authoritative role in resolving 

conflicts and making decisions on behalf of 

the citizens. These functions include “entering 

into treaties, making alliances, declaring war, 

and conducting various undertaking under 

[citizens’] name” 152 . Governmental legitimacy 

as representative of its citizens is significant in 

that it underlies a strong sense of shared 

obligation for mutual concern and respect. 

Citizens collectively govern each other for the 

common good., and create binding political 

institutions that determine distributive 

patterns of opportunity and reward for all. 

This sense of mutual governance creates 

binding obligation to the welfare of fellow 

compatriots. 

Returning to the challenge posed by 

cosmopolitan citizenship discussed above 

regarding the injustice of repelling outsiders 

without moral justification, distributive justice 

requires some form of republican citizenship 

that holds individuals responsible for 

fostering active political community from the 

meanings and significance of citizenship 

discussed by Miller and Macedo. The liberal 

conception of citizenship endorsed by Carens 

only focuses on the individual autonomy and 

right to equal privileges, and hence fails to 

promote a commission to the mutual 

governance of citizens and the advancement 

of common welfare in a political community. 

As Macedo argues, every individual is born in 

a political community: one cannot act with 

absolute freedom and demand for unearned 

rights, as if one lives in a arbitrary state absent 

of mutual concern for others who actually 

hold governing power over their shared 

territory. A political community generates a 

communal concern and special obligations 

amongst its members, which in turn promote 

a strong commitment to distributive fairness. 

REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP CANNOT BE 

ACHIEVED WITH OPEN BORDER 

152 Macedo, “The Moral Dilemma of US 

Immigration Policy,”74 


In order to achieve any kind of 

equality, duty to distributive justice must be 

generated through republican citizenship. 

Carens’s prescriptions fail to achieve this. 

Cosmopolitan citizenship cannot formulate 

distributive justice because international 

governance fails to present “a comprehensive 

system of laws and institutions that regulate 

and shape all associations,” which in turn 

promotes civic obligations 153 . Although there 

are multilateral institutions such as the United 

Nations that do provide some norms of 

international governance, the subject covered 

by such institutions are limited and do not 

hold individuals accountable for each other’s 

public virtue. Macedo concludes that it is 

unreasonable to make “people responsible for 

the welfare of others without also making 

them responsible for their governance” 154 

In the view of traditional republican 

polity, the importance given to cultivating 

public virtue that places public responsibilities 

before private interests unusually required a 

fairly small city-state to foster strong patriotic 

loyalty. In the Discourse on Political Economy, 

Rousseau argues: 

Do we want people to become 

virtuous? If so, let us begin by 

making them love their 

homeland. But how will they 

come to love it, if their 

homeland means nothing 

more to them than it does to 

foreigners, and if it grants to 

them only what it cannot 

refuse to anyone? 155 


Immigration Policy,” 69. 


Immigration Policy,” 74. 

155 Rousseau, Jean Jacques. “Rousseau 

Rousseau's Political Writings: Discourse on 

Inequality, Discourse on Political Economy, On 

Social Contract”. (Norton: New York, 1987), 

70. 

Rousseau claims that a state cannot ask its 

citizens to love their country if it does not 

provide special benefits and rights exclusive to 

its people. While Rousseau envisioned citizens 

gathering around a round table face-to-face, 

expressing their commitment to the general 

will, 156 his demand for a mechanism that 

fosters and accommodates citizens’ duty to 

their state and fellow compatriots is still valid. 

Although this extreme view of public virtue is 

neither practical nor desirable, modern 

societies must also generate a sufficient degree 

of trust and loyalty that republican citizenship 

requires through active civic engagement and 

distributive justice. Then, it logically follows 

that state borders are morally significant in 

producing republican citizenship. In other 

words, republican citizenship and distributive 

justice cannot be achieved with an open 

border policy. 

Michael Walzer insists that states, by 

nature, depend upon closure in order to 

protect the sense of relatedness and mutuality 

that a membership community requires 157 . He 

rejects that distributive justice can be operated 

through open borders since values are shared 

within particular political communities, not 

across them. A country is understood to 

operate with common meanings and shared 

ways of life, which its members are entitled to 

preserve. Hence, he argues that social goods 

should be distributed according to criteria 

internal to their social meanings, and these 

shared social meanings are located within a 

particular political community. However, the 

problem of Walzer’s view is that he weighs 

156 Rousseau’s political society is one in which 

every individual gives themselves fully to the 

community, body and soul, in order to invent a 

true body politics: the General Will. A discussion 

of the General Will is beyond the scope of this 

argument; it is stated here merely to illustrate the 

need for a mechanism that would accommodate 

loyalty and trust amongst citizens in order to 

realize republican citizenship. 

157 Michael Walzer, “Exclusion, Injustice, and the 

Democratic State,” Dissent, vol. 40:1 (1993) 


too much on the maintenance of cultural 

distinctiveness and prevalent shared 

meanings. Shared meaning is a goal of public 

argument and deliberation to sustain a 

political system rather than the cause for 

political obligation to whom citizens owe 

justice. That is, only by sharing a system of 

binding law, one can be admitted as a member 

of political community with whom citizens 

create a shared meaning or publicly justified 

principles of justice. Rather than extending 

distributive justice only to those who share 

meanings, people who share a system of 

binding law that works toward shared 

meaning through deliberation and public 

argument reserve the right to distributive 

justice. Although Walzer develops a strong 

argument for a closed border based on the 

notion of shared national identity, his 

emphasis on a shared national identity based 

on existing distinct characteristics evades the 

essence of republican citizenship. 

Nonetheless, Walzer’s argument is critical in 

providing an insight to why republican 

citizenship can be achieved with restrictive 

borders. Applied to republican citizenship, 

Walzer’s argument makes a strong case in 

which individuals who share the strong 

commitment to creating binding political 

institutions based on obligation of mutual 

concern and respect should determine the 

distributive patterns of opportunities and 

reward for all. 

Citizenship depends on reciprocity. 

Although minimal domestic protection of the 

rights of the citizen is required by the liberal 

concept of citizenship that endorses open 

borders, it is illustrated through the argument 

that citizenship is better served by active 

public engagement and mutual obligation 

within states’ borders than the creation of 

transnational bodies who are likely to dilute 

the quality of republican citizenship. “Free 

citizenship” undermines the mutual trust and 

assurance that make responsible citizenship 

possible. 

CONCLUSION 

Distributive justice requires republican 

citizenship through several steps. Carens’s 

open border policy is incapable of justifying 

the importance of individual autonomy over 

the interest of citizens as collective agents. 

Although the liberal concept of citizenship 

endorsed by Carsens rightly addresses that 

equal moral worth of individuals requires 

universal concern and respect, it is hard to see 

why the interest of non-members should be 

given the same degree, or even a priority of 

concern as that of citizens, especially when 

borders concern the welfare of the political 

community in question. Therefore, states do 

not hold an obligation to uphold absolute and 

indiscriminating concern for individual 

autonomy, especially when it is against the 

interest of its citizens. In adhering to the 

protection and promotion of their citizens’ 

welfare, states should be able to enforce 

border controls even if it is against the interest 

of the hopeful migrants. States are rarely 

responsible to grant moral justification for 

such border restrictions. Furthermore, simply 

opening up the borders is insufficient to 

address the global inequality. An open border 

does not automatically grant equal 

opportunity to those who have crossed that 

border. In order to effectively address the 

problem of global inequality and equal 

opportunity, a system of redistribution is 

required. Open border may grant the freedom 

to engage in the free market. However, such 

laissez- faire opportunity will not solve the 

initial problem of eliminating morally arbitrary 

privileges of the well-offs to promote more 

equality. The concept of citizenship cannot 

solely be defined based on economic 

framework. If obligation to distributive justice 

is pushed to the international level it might 

become weary of the magnitude of their 

responsibility, the citizens of the rich states 

might throw their commitment to 

redistribution under the bus even for their 

fellow compatriots. Re-conceptualizing 

Carens’s claim that natural citizenship in a 


developed state is a morally arbitrary privilege, 

the need for distributive equality should not 

demand ‘the lucky few’ to pay for their good 

fortune by compensating for the other’s bad 

fortune, whom they do not share social, 

political and/or economical interests. 

Therefore, open borders not only fail to 

resolve global inequality, but also endanger 

citizens’ distributive obligations. 

Distributive justice requires republican 

citizenship, something that Carens’s open 

borders fail to set an obligation for among a 

state’s citizens. Republican citizenship, as 

discussed by Miller and Macedo, states that 

citizens share strong common obligations to 

civic engagement and public virtue based on 

mutual concern, respect, and justification. 

Under republican citizenship, the 

responsibility for others’ governance and 

special obligation for fellow citizens forms a 

strong commitment to distributive justice. 

Rousseau and Walzer’s proposals for 

closed borders further illustrate that 

republican citizenship cannot be achieved by 

an open border. Although Rousseau and 

Walzer’s arguments are not without their 

flaws, they provide strong arguments that 

open borders endanger the mutual trust and 

assurance that create responsible citizenship. 

In sum, the discussion strengthen the 

argument that only republican citizenship can 

formulate distributive justice and that 

republican citizenship cannot be achieved 

with open borders, but can only be achieved 

with relatively restrictive border controls. 

On a final note, distributive justice 

pertaining solely to a bordered political 

community does not claim that fellow 

countrymen is more valuable than that of 

outsiders, but only that political and social 

institutions formulated by republican citizens 

create a special obligation to their particular 

political community. Restrictive borders are 

not necessarily in conflict with liberal 

obligation to alleviate global inequality. The 

problems of universal injustice can be 

addressed through different means, such as 

charity work or collaborative action through 

multilateral governance. It is possible that 

states may attend to the need of the outsiders 

upon first strengthening citizenship and 

inculcating civic virtue within national 

boundaries. 


Issues of Legality and 

Legitimacy 

The Responsibility to Protect 

and NATO’s intervention in 

Libya 

Lesley Connolly 

T 

he United Nations (UN) Security 

Council Resolution 1674 of 2006, the 

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, 

represented a significant development in 

humanitarian intervention and international 

diplomacy. By passing this resolution, the UN 

affirmed, “each individual State has the 

responsibility to protect its populations from 

genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 

crimes against humanity.” 158 Before such a 

resolution, the international community was 

legally bound by the grip of Article 2(7) of the 

UN Charter, which stipulated “no 

interference in the domestic affairs of 

member states.” 159 

This change took place at a time when 

there was a transforming power balance 

within the International Community. With the 

end of the Cold War came the rise of interstate 

conflict and warfare, including violence 

within the borders of countries such as 

Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. There was a 

widespread disagreement over how states and 

international organizations should react to 

these situations. 160 There was a growing 

public discontent with the increasing disregard 

for international humanitarian law by many 

heads of states, as well as of the direct 

158 The United Nations General Assembly, 2005 

World Summit Outcome, A/60/L.1, Article 138, 

15 September 2005. 

159 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, 

Article 2(7) 

160 Global Centre for the Responsibility to 

Protect, “Implementing the Responsibility to 

Protect, The 2009 General Assembly Debate: 

An Assessment”, GCR2P Report, August 2009. 

targeting of civilians and relief personnel, and 

in general, the increasing use of force to fuel 

conflict. 161 As the former Secretary-General 

of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, stated, 

“We are witnessing what is probably an 

irreversible shift in public attitudes towards 

the belief that the defense of the oppressed in 

the name of morality should prevail over 

frontiers and legal documents.” 162 The 

passing of the R2P utilized the notions of just 

warfare and enabled states who felt morally 

responsible to stop the committing of 

widespread violations of human rights against 

people in a nation, whether it be their nation 

or another sovereign state, to take action. 

The application of R2P in the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

intervention in Libya in 2011 was the first 

time the R2P had been used publically. 

However, this intervention, allegedly based on 

the notions of ethical warfare, has been 

criticized for stretching the application of the 

R2P doctrine to serve ulterior interests. The 

central question this paper is looking at is 

whether the application of the R2P to the 

NATO intervention in Libya was both legal 

and legitimate and if it has positively furthered 

the debate on humanitarian intervention. This 

paper will evaluate the legitimacy of the 

NATO intervention in terms of whether it 

was acceptable in terms of the standards and 

expectations held for actions undertaken by 

international actors within the international 

community. 

The Responsibility to Protect 

In 2001, The International Commission on 

Intervention and State Sovereignty Report, 

entitled The Responsibility to Protect, declared 

that: “Sovereign states have a responsibility to 

protect their own citizens from avoidable 

catastrophe- from mass murder and rape, 

161 Thomas G Weiss, “Principles, Politics and 

Humanitarian Action,” in Ethics and International 

Affairs, Vol 13 (1999). 

162 Christopher Greenwood, “Is there a right of 

humanitarian intervention?” The World Today, 

Vol 43, No 2 (1993). 


from starvation- but that when they are 

unwilling or unable to do so, that 

responsibility must be born by the broader 

community of states. ” 163 164 This report 

emphasized that prevention is the key to 

avoiding humanitarian disasters, and, with this 

end in view, it urged states to consider a range 

of less coercive measures before resorting to 

force. 165 Four years later, at the 2005 UN 

World Summit, the R2P doctrine was adopted 

by the UN as Security Council Resolution 

1674 of 2006. The heads of states and 

governments unanimously affirmed that “each 

individual State has the responsibility to 

protect its populations from genocide, war 

crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 

humanity.” 166 They further agreed that the 

international community should assist states 

in exercising that responsibility and in 

building their protection capacities. When a 

state fails to protect its population from the 

four specified crimes and violations, it is 

confirmed that the international community 

was prepared to take collective action in a 

timely and decisive manner through the 

Security Council and in accordance with the 

Charter of the UN. 167 

There are three pillars to the process 

of R2P. Pillar I: the protection and 

responsibility of the State; Pillar II: 

International assistance and capacity-building, 

and Pillar III: Timely and decisive response. 168 

163 The Security Council Resolution 1674 of 

2006 

164 It is this mandate which reaffirmed the 

provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 

Responsibility to Protect Report. 

165 The Security Council Resolution 1674 of 

2006 

166 Ibid. 

167 Ibid. 

168 The three pillars of the responsibility to 

protect, as stipulated in the Outcome Document 

of the 2005 United Nations World Summit 

(A/RES/60/1, paragraphs 138-140) and 

formulated in the Secretary-General's 2009 

Pillar I refers to a state’s responsibility to 

protect its population and country from 

genocide, war crimes, crimes against 

humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Pillar II is the 

commitment of the international community 

to assist states in meeting the obligations of 

protection of its people from genocide, war 

crimes, and crimes against humanity. It seeks 

to draw on the cooperation of member states, 

regional and sub- regional arrangements, civil 

society and the private sector, as well as on 

the institutional strengths and comparative 

advantages of the UN system. Prevention, 

building on pillars one and two, is a key 

ingredient for a successful strategy for the 

responsibility to protect. Pillar III refers to a 

situation where a state has failed to protect its 

citizens from mass atrocity and peaceful 

measures are not working. When this 

happens, the international community has the 

responsibility to intervene at first through 

diplomacy, and then through coercive means 

but only use military force as a last resort. 169 

The issue of intervention- both 

humanitarian and military- is a contentious 

one within the debate over R2P. The R2P 

doctrine is not merely a new name for 

humanitarian intervention and is not a 

sanction for the immediate use of force. 

Humanitarian intervention is about the right 

of states to act coercively against others to 

stop atrocities whereas the R2P doctrine is 

about protecting civilians. 170 The doctrine 

endorses the use of force in extreme 

situations only and there is a set of criteria, 

drawing from the Just War Theory, which 

need to be fulfilled. These principles states 

that there must be: 

Report (A/63/677) on Implementing the 

Responsibility to Protect. 







An Assessment,” GCR2P Report, August 2009. 


Just Cause Threshold must be employed. 

Military intervention should only be 

undertaken for human protection purposes 

and is an exceptional and extraordinary 

measure. To be warranted, there must be 

serious and irreparable harm occurring to 

human beings, or imminently likely to occur 

such as large-scale loss of life and large scale 

‘ethnic cleansing.’ 171 

The Precautionary Principles state that 

intervention must have the purpose of halting 

or averting human suffering. The use of force 

must be the last resort. Military intervention 

can only be justified when every non-military 

option for the prevention or peaceful 

resolution of the crisis has been explored, 

with reasonable grounds for believing that 

lesser measures would not succeed. Lastly, 

proportional means must be employed. The 

scale, duration, and intensity of the planned 

military intervention should be the minimum 

necessary to secure the defined human 

protection objective. 172 

The Right Authority must endorse the 

intervention and the Security Council is the 

supreme body to authorize and authorization 

should in all cases be sought prior to any 

military intervention action being carried out. 

173 

However, when the R2P was passed these 

criteria were not formalized as part of the 

doctrine and therefore, at present, the official 

guideline to justify military intervention is that 

the use of force should only be used in the 

most extreme cases. 174 However, the United 

Nations Charter does stipulate guidelines on 

the use of force and military intervention. 

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 

171 The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, Report 

from the International Commission on 

Intervention and State Sovereignty. 

172 Ibid. 

173 Ibid. 

174 Gareth Evans, “UN targets Libya with 

pinpoint accuracy,” The National Times, March 

24, 2011. 

establishes that states should not use or 

threaten force against other states: “All 

members shall refrain in their international 

relations from the threat or use of force 

against the territorial integrity or political 

independence of any state, or in any other 

manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 

United Nations.” 175 There are some 

exceptions to this provided in Chapter VII 

Articles 39 and 51, which state that the 

collective use of force is allowed, and is 

controlled entirely by the UN Security 

Council and should only be used in Selfdefense 

- in response to an attack. 176 

The use of force in the NATO 

intervention in Libya was the first application 

of the R2P doctrine, but has been very 

contentiously viewed. The main issue of 

contention is that the application of R2P was 

seen, by the international community, as being 

stretched to justify the use of force when 

other means had not been ruled out. 

The military intervention in Libya 

The 2011 Libyan Civil War was an armed 

conflict in the North African country of 

Libya, between Colonel Muammar Gaddafi 

and the liberation forces. The conflict 

officially started on February 15, 2011 with 

approximately 200 people demonstrating in 

front of the policy headquarters in Benghazi 

following the arrest of human-rights activist 

Fathi Terbil. The protest grew to 800 and was 

eventually violently broken-up by the police. 

This was the start of what turned into a 

nationwide revolution to oust the Gaddafi 

government. 

On February 26, 2011, days after the 

first attack on Bengazi by the Gaddafi forces, 

the UN passed UN Security Council 

Resolution 1970 which invoked that ''the 

Libyan authorities [had the] responsibility to 

protect its population”, condemned the 

violence against civilians, demanded it to end, 

175 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, 

Article 2(4) 

176 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, 

Article 36 & Article 51 


and enforced sanctions, an arms embargo, and 

the threat of International Criminal Court 

prosecution for crimes against humanity upon 

the Gaddafi regime. 177 

On March 12, the Arab League met 

with the UN and asked them to pass a ‘no-flyzone’ 

over Libya and recognize the rebel 

movement as the legitimate government in 

the country, as an attempt to try to stop the 

violence and attacks on civilians. The Arab 

League hoped the move would increase the 

pressure on the United States and European 

nations to act in response to the conflict that 

had erupted in the country. 178 As a result of 

this call for help, on March 17, 2011, the UN 

Security Council passed UN Security Council 

Resolution 1973. The resolution was adopted 

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and 

demanded the immediate establishment of a 

ceasefire in Libya and a complete end to the 

violence and attacks against civilians. 

Originally the resolution imposed a no-fly 

zone 179 over Libya, strengthened the arms 

embargo already placed upon the country, 

imposed a ban on all Libyan-designated 

flights, imposed an asset freeze on assets 

owned by Libyan authorities, and established 

a panel of experts to monitor and promote 

sanctions implementation. However, the 

United States of America (USA) refused to 

ratify the resolution until it went further than 

just a ‘no-fly-zone’ alone, and only ratified the 

resolution once it included the clause “all 




An Assessment”, GCR2P Report, August 2009. 

178 Richard Leiby and Muhammad Mansour, 

“Arab League asks U.N. for no-fly zone over 

Libya”, The Washington Post, March 12, 2011. 

179 A No-Fly Zone is an area in which aircrafts 

are not permitted to fly. Such zones are usually 

set up in a military context and usually prohibit 

military aircrafts of a belligerent nation from 

operating in the region. 

necessary measures to protect civilians and 

civilian-populated areas.” 180 

On March 19, 2011, a multi-state 

coalition implemented this resolution with the 

start of a military operation in Libya. This 

coalition was initially made up of primarily 

UK and French forces with the command 

shared with the USA. However, it soon 

expanded to include 19 states, among them 

Belgium, Canada, and Spain. NATO took 

control of the embargo on March 23, 2011, 

named Operation Unified Protector. This decision 

was taken after a meeting of NATO members 

to resolve the disagreements over whether 

military action should include attacks on 

ground forces. The decision of using NATO 

created a two-leveled power structure 

overseeing the military operations. A NATOled 

committee was in charge over politically 

overseeing the situation, whilst NATO alone 

was responsibility for the military action. 181 

The NATO military intervention 

included patrolling the skies over northern 

Libya, which would limit, if not completely 

eliminate, the regime’s ability to employ 

airpower against its population. Air-to-air 

missions included executing combat air 

patrols to counter Libyan air force assets. The 

exact number of serviceable aircraft is 

unknown, but the general assessment was that 

most were in various stages of disrepair. 182 It 

was questioned, by the international 

community, whether to institute a ‘no-drivezone’, 

however, it was felt that it would be too 

hard to identify who was part of the pro- 

Gaddafi regime and who was against it, thus it 

was not used. 183 

As of March 31, 2011, the intervention 

encompassed all international operations in 

180 CBS News, “CF-18 jets to help enforce Libya 

no-fly zone’, CBC News Online, March 17, 2011. 

181 Jason Hanover and Jeffrey White, “U.S. and 

NATO Intervention in Libya: Options, Risks, and 

Benefits”, The Washington Institute, February 

28, 2011. 

182 Ibid. 

183 Ibid. 


the country. NATO support was vital to the 

rebels’ victory over the forces loyal to 

Gaddafi. The operation officially ended on 

October 31, 2011, after the rebel leaders, 

formalized in the National Transitional 

Council, declared Gaddafi dead on October 

20, 2011 and Libya was officially liberated on 

October 23, 2011. 

The legality and legitimacy surrounding the 

application of R2P in Libya 

This section will unpack the 

intervention in terms of what was stipulated in 

the UN Resolution 1973, the principles of the 

R2P, and the guidelines within the UN 

Charter for the Use of Force looking at both 

the legality and legitimacy of the actions. In 

terms of the legality of the intervention, this 

paper evaluates to what extent it upholds UN 

Resolution 1973, what is dictated by the R2P, 

as well as what is upheld by the UN Charter. 

This is a relatively straightforward application 

of the facts behind the NATO intervention 

and the laws in place. 

The question of legitimacy is much more 

challenging to define and measure. John 

Locke defines legitimacy in his Second 

Treatise of Government in 1689 as a type of 

authority that is wanted, chosen, and seen as 

right in the eyes of the people of that country. 

184 

However, in regards to humanitarian 

intervention, the same definition of legitimacy 

does not necessarily apply. In regards to 

humanitarian legitimacy, there is a dominant 

discourse among humanitarian actors of what 

is considered correct. One could even say that 

the Code of Conduct for the International 

Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement 

and the NGOs Disaster Relief could be 

considered the dominant code of 

humanitarian legitimacy. Not every NGO has 

signed this code, however, the principles it 

embodies are considered plausible, important, 

and not deeply controversial. 185 The difficulty 

184 Alan Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and 

Democracy” Ethics, Vol 112, No 4 (July 2002). 

185 Jennifer Rubenstein, “The Distributive 

Commitments of International NGOs”, in 

is that the notion of legitimacy is an evolving 

and changing dimension and it changes 

depending on the situation one is in, therefore 

often an organization has to define what is 

legitimate in that situation specifically. 

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 

The Responsibility to Protect stipulates 

that when “national authorities manifestly 

[fail] to protect their populations from 

genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 

crimes against humanity,” 186 the international 

community should step in, and this is, in 

theory, what the NATO-driven intervention 

did. However, when we unpack the criteria 

for intervention, we find more challenges to 

the legality and legitimacy within this 

application. 

Just Cause Threshold 

The just cause threshold stipulates 

that military intervention should only be 

undertaken for human protection purposes 

and is to be used only in exceptional and 

extraordinary measures. To be warranted, 

there must be serious and irreparable harm 

occurring to human beings, or imminently 

likely to occur such as large-scale loss of life 

and large scale ethnic cleansing. 187 In the case 

of Libya, there is no contention that the 

Libyan people were under threat by the 

Gaddafi regime. The International Committee 

of the Red Cross concluded that “it is 

apparent that Libya is now in a state of civil 

war.” 188 The UN stated that the conflict 

Humanitarianism in question: politics, power, 

ethics, ed. Michael N. Barnett, Thomas George 

Weiss (United States of America: Cornell 

University, 2008). 







188 Richard Leiby and Muhammad Mansour, 

“Arab League asks U.N. for no-fly zone over 

Libya”, The Washington Post, March 12, 2011. 


already had killed more than 1,000 people and 

forced more than 250,000 people to flee the 

country 189 and even Gaddafi himself directly 

threatened Benghazi’s residents, saying that 

the army was on its way and that “we will 

show no mercy and no pity.” 190 It cannot be 

denied that international aid was needed. In 

addition, it was the Arab League who called 

for the intervention and, according to the 

British Ambassador to the UN, Sir Mark Lyall 

Grant, “If you get a regional organization 

pressing for a particular course of action in 

the council, then that has a disproportionate 

influence.” 191 Based on this, one can believe 

there a legal just cause for the intervention 

into Libya. 

However, there are several issues of 

contention with how the international 

community reacted to the situation in Libya, 

which raises questions about its legitimacy. To 

start with, Patrick Stewert, a Council of 

Foreign Relations specialist, has argued that 

the international community has not applied 

the principles of intervening under a just 

cause when there is a threat to people 

universally. There has been no intervention in 

countries undergoing great human 

catastrophes, such as in the Ivory Coast in 

2011, or in response to the violent and bloody 

protests in Yemen, Bahrain, and most 

controversially no united, Security Council 

endorsed, intervention in Syria since the 

conflict emerged in 2012 192 . Likewise, the 

resolution was not implemented to stop Israel 

from bombing Gaza in late 2008 and early 

2009, which resulted in a loss of at least 1,400 

Palestinian lives, mostly civilians. 193 Thus, as 

much as the intervention may have been 

executed with just cause of protecting a 

threatened people, one has to question if there 

were ulterior intentions behind the decisions 

to invade in this case. 

The notion of an ulterior reasoning 

for the intervention has been raised several 

times by the world oil and business press 

suggesting that a central motivation was oil. 

Libya is the 12 th largest exporter of oil in the 

world, and the largest supplier in Africa. 194 

Several of the world’s major oil companies 

have invested in Libya, including ENI of Italy, 

Total of France, Conoco-Phillips of the US, 

and BP of Britain, among many others. At the 

time of the popular uprising against Gaddafi, 

there was considerable anxiety in oil circles 

about the possibility of generalized political 

breakdown and chaos, with attendant threats 

to oil supplies and investments and this 

concern was noted repeatedly in the world oil 

and business press. 

Further, as time passed, there was a 

growing sentiment within the United Nations 

that the civilian protection operation in Libya 

had been expeditiously co-opted by Western 

supporters of regime change. It was felt that 

NATO was no longer acting solely as a 

defensive shield for populations at risk, but as 

the Libyan rebels’ air force. India’s 

Ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh 

Puri, described NATO as the “armed wing” 

of the Security Council and argued that the 

objective in Libya had shifted from protecting 

civilians in Benghazi to overthrowing the 

regime in Tripoli. 195 

189 Ibid. 

190 Simon Adams, “Libya and the Responsibility 

to Protect: Results and Prospects” Global Policy 

Online, March 28, 2014. 

191 BBC World News, “Why the UN acted over 

Libya and Ivory Coast- but not Syria”, BBC 

World News, May 15, 2011. 

192 At the time of writing this paper, there had 

been no international intervention endorsed by 

the United Nations in Syria. 

193 Marjorie Cohn, “Stop Bombing Libya”, The 

Huffington Post: World Edition, March 21, 2011. 

194 Christoph Hasselbach and Nicole Goebel, 

“Disruption to Libyan oil supply highlights need 

for EU energy diversification”, DW Online, 3 

January 2011. 





This argument seems to uphold 

further when one looks at what was requested 

by the Libyan opposition when they originally 

called for intervention. Originally, what the 

Libyan opposition, as well as the Arab League, 

asked for was a “no-fly-zone” which 

Resolution 1973 did provide. However, it is 

hard to argue that the Arab League wanted a 

foreign military intervention. In fact, the Arab 

League criticized the definition of protecting 

civilians that NATO used. “What has 

happened in Libya differs from the goal of 

imposing a no-fly zone and what we want is 

the protection of civilians and not bombing 

other civilians,” Arab League secretary general 

Amr Mussa stated. 196 The intervention did 

not meet the expectations that Libyan people 

had - it was more severe and caused more 

harm and destruction than was necessary. 

Thus, looking at the legality of a just 

cause principle, on paper there was a just cause to 

protect the people of Libya and the 

intervention, although destructive, did save 

lives. However, whether this was the real 

motivation behind the intervention and 

whether the international community acted 

with full transparency about their motives, 

makes the legitimacy behind the just cause 

questionable. 

The Precautionary Principles 

The Precautionary principles stipulate that a 

military intervention must have the purpose 

of halting or averting human suffering. The 

use of force must be the last resort. Military 

intervention can only be justified when every 

non-military option for the prevention or 

peaceful resolution of the crisis has been 

explored, with reasonable grounds for 

believing lesser measures would not have 

succeeded. Lastly, proportional means must 

be employed. The scale, duration, and 

intensity of the planned military intervention 

should be the minimum necessary to secure 

196 Zesham, “Arab League criticizes NATO 

strikes on Libya”, Zesham Blogspot Online, 

March 20, 2011. 

the defined human protection objective. 197 

This is further stated in the UN Charter, 

which states that the use of force should only 

be used as a last resort and must be endorsed 

by the United Nations. 

In terms of the justification behind 

the use of force in Libya, there has been wide 

criticism throughout the international 

community. Former Australian Foreign 

Minister and a principal author of the 

Responsibility to Protect concept, Gareth Evans 

argues that “the international military 

intervention in Libya is not about bombing 

for democracy or Muammar Qaddafi's head.” 

Evans suggests, “it has only one justification: 

protecting the country's people.” 198 However, 

Evans goes on to say that, “military action 

expressly designed to kill Gaddafi or force 

him into exile, to ensure rebel victory in a civil 

war, or to achieve a more open and 

responsive system of government in Libya is 

simply not permissible under the explicit legal 

terms of UN resolution 1973. Nor is it 

permissible under the moral first principles of 

the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.” 199 

However, it is true that the removal of 

perpetrators of mass atrocities can be a 

permissible outcome, but this motivation 

should not become the objective of such 

interventions. The R2P is mandated to protect 

civilians and this is what was intended with 

Resolutions 1970 and 1973 permitting 

intervention into Libya. However, this notion 

was stretched to justify actions, which were 

not necessarily imagined under the intentions 

of the resolutions. 200 

Furthermore, it is clear that the use of 

force was not a last resort measure. Marjorie 

Cohn argues that ‘all necessary measures’ 




198 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The 

Responsibility to Protect”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 

81, No, 6 (December 2002). 

199 Ibid. 

200 Ibid. 


should first have been about exploring 

peaceful measures to settle the conflict and, in 

the case of Libya, these peaceful means were 

not exhausted before western powers began 

bombing Libya. 201 In Libya, a peaceful 

agreement between parties had not been 

sought; sanctions had been applied, travel 

bans placed, and assets frozen, but 

negotiations had not been tried. In fact, 

NATO actually dismissed a delegation of 

African Union members 202 sent to start 

negotiations with Libya from the country 

before they could have achieved any results. 

203 

To elaborate on this point, this article 

argues there are a series of other measures, 

which could have been used prior to force in 

Libya. These include opening borders and 

appropriate facilities to allow Libyan civilians 

to flee regime violence. Considering various 

governments created exit routes through 

charter flights and land crossings for their 

own citizens, it should have been, not only 

possible, but also morally correct to create an 

exit mechanism for Libyans. Second, all 

available means for providing direct 

humanitarian assistance on the ground to the 

Libyan population should have been utilized, 

including aid convoys to eastern Libya 

through Egypt and to western Libya through 

Tunisia. Third, Gaddafi’s assets and those of 

remaining elements of the regime should have 

been frozen and later used to promote 

reconciliation and development of the future 

government. Fourth, governments with ties to 

Libya should have immediately severed all 

military ties, withholding delivery of material 

and cancelling all outstanding contracts. 

Finally, an arms embargo should have been 

imposed preventing the sale or delivery of 

military equipment or personnel (including 

201 Marjorie Cohn, “Stop Bombing Libya,” The 

Huffington Post, March 21, 2011. 

202 This delegation was made up from South 

Africa, Mauritius, Uganda, Mali and the 

Democratic Republic of Congo 

203 Marjorie Cohn, “Stop Bombing Libya.” 

foreign mercenaries) to the Libyan state 

security forces. Sanctions that targeted 

military material, services, and the movement 

of reinforcements from among foreign 

mercenaries should have been used. Sanctions 

that go beyond these aims would run the risk 

of causing more harm to civilians than to the 

regime. 204 Yet, instead of trying these tactics, 

the R2P was used as a justification for rapid 

military intervention. 

Lastly, the notion of proportionality 

has been another area of contention in the 

case of Libya when looking at “does the ends 

justify the means,” or, in other words, was the 

attack and suffering proportional to the force 

used. The NATO intervention and sevenmonth 

conflict left Libya with thousands of 

people dead, material damage, completely 

destroyed towns, and left the country without 

a functioning government. 205 In the sevenmonth 

conflict, NATO had launched 9,700 

strikes in an attempt to “dismantle the pro- 

Qaddafi military and militias.” 206 As can be 

expected, within these strikes, there were a 

significant number of civilian casualties. 

NATO admitted “a missile strike hit a civilian 

home in the Libyan capital of Tripoli today, 

killing a number of civilians including at least 

two toddlers. Though far from the first strike 

to kill civilians in the Libyan War, it is the first 

that NATO officials have admitted to.” 207 It 

is unknown the total number of civilians killed 

in the air strikes, but many questions have 

204 Ash Bâli and Ziad Abu-Rish, “On International 

Intervention and the Dire Situation in Libya”, 

Jadaliyya Online, February 23, 2011. 




206 C.J. Chives and Eric Schmitt, “In Strikes on 

Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Toll”, New 

York Times, December 17, 2011. 

207 Jayshree Bajoria. “Libya and the 

Responsibility to Protect”, Council for Foreign 

Relations, March 24, 2011. 


een asked about the targets of the NATO 

strikes. 208 

The country, as it stands, has no functioning 

government and approximately 370,000 

people of concern, including internally 

displaced persons, refugees, and migrants as 

of December 2014. 209 The migration crisis 

plaguing Europe at the moment is a result of 

the intervention in Libya which lacked a longterm 

strategy for improving the lives of the 

Libyan people. As stated by Chives and 

Schmitt, “in Libya, NATO’s inattention to its 

unintended victims has also left many 

wounded civilians with little aid in the 

aftermath of the country’s still-chaotic change 

in leadership.” 210 

Considering the use of force in the 

intervention was not a last resort nor did it 

seem in line with what the Libyan people 

wanted or was executed with as minimal 

damage as possible, the legality and legitimacy 

of the use of force are questionable within 

this intervention especially. 

THE RIGHT AUTHORITY 

The R2P resolution states that the 

right authority must endorse the intervention 

and the Security Council is the supreme body 

to authorize and authorization should in all 

cases be sought prior to any military 

intervention action being carried out. 211 It is 

clear that the United Nation endorsed the 

intervention into Libya. As noted above, there 

is contention over the application of the use 

of force and interpretation of the mandate, 

but, in essence, the ‘right authority’ did 



York Times, December 17, 2011. 

209 “Libya Country Page”, 

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485f36.html 

[accessed 09 November 2015]. 



York Times, December 17, 2011, 




endorse the intervention. However, one issue 

is the fact that even though the UN was asked 

to intervene in the conflict in Libya, it is hard 

to tell who exactly asked for this intervention 

and who was against it; there was very little 

clarity in the situation about who the enemy 

was. In addition, the request to intervene did 

come from Libya, as stated above, but the 

strategy of the intervention was not in-line 

with what was requested - a no-fly zone and 

relief for humanitarian suffering. 

Thus, when reflecting on all these 

points and the language behind the UN 

Resolution 1973, the legality and legitimacy of 

the intervention does come into question. The 

intervention, as endorsed by the United 

Nations, should have been driven by 

humanitarian intentions, aiming to save the 

people from being further harmed by Gaddafi 

forces. The idea of regime change and the 

removal of a leader was not within the 

mandate from the UN nor was the use of 

force explicitly mentioned. It is clear that the 

intervention and conflict has left the country 

destabilized and destroyed to a large extent. 

Overall, it is also apparent that the 

legality of the intervention does meet some of 

the conditions of a legal intervention, but 

certain aspects of its application are 

questionable. However, in regards to the 

legitimacy, it is clear - the intervention was 

illegitimate and the actions taken were not in 

line with the best interest of the Libyan 

people or to prevent a destabilizing 

humanitarian situation, but were taken to 

remove a leader and incite regime change. 

CONCLUSION 

Ultimately, it is fair to conclude that 

the intervention in Libya was more legal than 

it was legitimate, but the legality of the use of 

force is questionable at best. Added to this, 

the legitimacy of the intervention in terms of 

upholding principles of honesty and 

transparency in action is lacking entirely. As 

Patrick Stewert argues, “there is bound to be 

selectivity and inconsistency in the application 


of the responsibility to protect norm given the 

complexity of national interests at stake in 

U.S. calculations and in the calculations of 

other major powers involved in these 

situations.” 212 

There has been widespread criticism 

of the intervention, especially given the 

current status of the country and lack of a 

long-term strategy from NATO. Gaddafi was 

killed on October 20, 2011, the war was 

officially declared over on October 23, 2011, 

and NATO forces left Libya on October 30, 

2011, and yet there is growing lawlessness and 

deadly disputes between fractious militias in 

the country. 

More immediately, however, the 

contrast between the Security Council’s 

response in Libya and its inability to take 

timely and decisive action with regard to mass 

atrocities in nearby Syria has been an issue of 

contention. The application of the R2P in 

Libya was thought to set a precedent for 

intervention to save people persecuted by 

their own state and allowed the international 

community to avoid situations such as 

Rwanda in 1994. However, its application has 

not been consistent and the current lack of 

intervention in Syria to protect the Syrians is 

an illustration of how the NATO intervention 

has not contributed to the development of 

good norms and practiced in humanitarian 

intervention. 

Ultimately, it can be concluded that 

the NATO intervention did take advantage of 

the UN Resolution 1973 and did manipulate 

the scope of the Responsibility to Protect. 

However, the intervention has contributed to 

the debate on effective humanitarian 

intervention by raising some serious questions 

for the international community about how 

and when to apply the Responsibility to 

Protect as well as when force can be 

authorized and the necessity for long-term 

strategies to any intervention. 

212 Jayshree Bajoria. “Libya and the 

Responsibility to Protect”, Council for Foreign 

Relations, March 24, 2011.

Fall 2015

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?