TECHNOLOGY AT WORK

February 2015
Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions
37
• Sea – Often overlooked, unmanned maritime systems are used above and below
the surface for ISR, mine-hunting and strike.
Figure 22. Silver Marlin
Source: Military Technology
Dr Alex Leveringhaus
James Martin Fellow
Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed
Conflict, Oxford Martin School
Concerns on military automation revolve
around the extent to which the automation of
targeting processes is legally and ethically
defensible
Automation of targeting processes is not
illegal, but it must be shown that the weapon
can identify the correct target
Ethical and Legal Considerations of Military Automation
Automation within the military is increasingly significant, and particularly
controversial. It is easy to see why automation is attractive to the military; it
potentially increases the speed of warfare, allows fighting from greater distances
and shields soldiers from physical harm. Military automation is not a new
phenomenon; automated missile defence systems have existed for over half a
century. Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS), often known as ‘drones’, are already
partially automated in their flight and surveillance functions.
Yet with advances in Artificial Intelligence programming techniques, the automation
of military systems could become more sophisticated in the future, raising concerns
about the legality of automated systems as well as their compatibility with
fundamental ethical principles. In RPAS, for instance, it might be possible to further
reduce the role of the pilot to a point where an operator merely pre-programmes the
machine so that, once deployed, it can carry out a mission independently.
The debate on military automation primarily concerns the extent to which the
automation of targeting processes is legally and ethically defensible. For a legal and
ethical assessment of automated military systems, it is important to draw three
distinctions. Firstly, it is crucial to distinguish between military systems that are
classifiable as weapons — meaning that they have been designed to carry and
deliver a ‘payload’ aimed at a specific target — and those that are not. A bomb
disposal robot, for example, could be automated to a high degree, yet it is not
designed to apply force to a target. Secondly, within military systems classifiable as
weapons, it is vital to distinguish between the automation of functions that are not
directly related to targeting and the automation of targeting functions; the flight
functions of an RPAS could be automated, but this does not mean that its targeting
functions should also be automated. Finally, it must be recognised that the
automation of targeting functions is a complex undertaking. It is important to
distinguish between the partial automation of the targeting process and automation
of the whole targeting process.
It is noteworthy that the potential automation of targeting processes is not illegal.
Nevertheless, the legal threshold for the deployment of a weapon with automated
targeting functions, especially when these are fully automated, is high. In particular,
it must be shown that its deployment complies with the principle of distinction, which
© 2015 Citigroup