Guyana Historical Journal -Vol IV & V,1992-93

. o(mnrs 1' V & lJ

~upana ~istorical 3f ournal
h GUYANA HISTORICAL JOURNAL is an interdisciplinary journal of Guyanese Histo
!hed ually by the History Society and the Department of History of the University of Gry, Pubis
e an n .d f f d. . . h. t .
l
1
uyana
Th
. f the JoumaJ is to prov1
e aim o
e a orum
_
or
. .
1ssemmatmg 1s
.al
onca and related inf or mat· bo -
1
ion a ut
G The Journal also seeks to publish ongma source maten s, reports and current resea h
b·bJ· uyana. h·c . . d O
. . A . . re and
1·nformation under ,ts Notes an ocuments section. rt1cles m the humanit,·es .
J 1ograp I . h" al d" . · S0C1a]
. d other disciplines m so far as they possess a 1stonc 1mens1on. are welcome for bi·
sCiences an . · . d Th h Id b PU 1ca-
. 0 1 arti·cJes in English will be accepte - ey s ou e double-spaced on white quart .
t1on. n Y al d bl o-s1zed
paper. an d should be of reasonable length. Notes, so ou e-spaced, should be included all tog
e
th
er
at the end of the paper .
ISSN: 1017 - 6659 . KEY TITI.E: Guyana Historical Journal.
TRUSTEES: Joycelynne Loncke, M. Noel Menezes. Winston Mc Gowan and David Chanderbali.
EDITOR: Winston Mc Gowan. ASSOCIATE EDITOR: James Rose .
COVER: The illustration: 'A Sunday Morning in Georgetown, Demerara' by Melton Prior, is taken
from The Illustrated London News, 31 March 1888. Photographed with the permission of the
University of Guyana Library.
CONTRIBIITORS: Anna Benjamin is a researcher in the Amerindian Research Unit and part-time
lecturer in History at the University of Guyana. David Granger is a graduate student and former parttime
lecturer in History at the University of Guyana. Henry Jeffrey is a lecturer in Political Science and
Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. University of Guyana. Basdeo Mangru is a former lecturer in
History at the University of Guyana. Joseph Theo Morris is a lecturer in Political Science at the
University of Guyana. Hazel Woolford is a lecturer in History at the University of Guyana.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The Editors gratefully acknowledge the generous grant for the publication
of Volume III (1991) from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) .
CORRESPONDENCE: General correspondence, contributions and enquiries about subscriptions should
be addressed to the Editors, Guyana Historical Journal, Department of History, University of
Guyana, P.O. Box 101110, Georgetown, Guyana. The cost of each issue of the Journal is US$9.00,
including postage.
~R_OD~CTION SERVICES: This Journal is published by the Free Press for the History Society,
mversity of Guyana. Typesetting and layout by Haseeb Khan. Printed by UNIPEN, Main St.,
Georgetown.
COPYRIGHT© D rt .
epa ment of History, University of Guyana,
1992. All rights reserved.

Volumes JV & V
d9upana J!,15,tortcal 3/ournal 1992-1993
ARTICLES
A Preliminary Look at the Free Amerindians and the Dutch Plantation System in Guyana
during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
by Anna Benjamin .. ............. ...... .... .... .......... ..... ........... ........... .... ..... .............. ........... 1
Hook-Swinging in Mid Nineteenth-Century Guyana
by Basdeo Mangru ... .... ......... ....... ..... .... ... ..... ........ ....... ..... ...... .... ........ ..... .... ........... 22
.
Bid for El Dorado (The Guyana-Venezuela Border Problem)
by Henry Jeffrey ...... ...... ......... ........... ....... ......... ...... ... .... ..... ..... ................. ............. 52
NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
A Bibliography of The Works of Professor Mary Noel Menezes , RSM
compiled by Hazel Woolford ...... ...... ......... ...... ...... .............. ..... ....... .............. .... ...... 68
Remarks made during a Residence at Stabroek Rio Demerary (LAT. 6 .10 N) in the Latter Part
of the year 1798 .. ... ..... ......................... ........... .... ......... ... .... ......... ..... ........ ...... ... .... . 72
·1
I REVIEWS
Colin Baber and Henry B. Jeffrey. Guyana: Politics, Economics and Society (London:
Frances Pinter Publishers. 1986)
by David Granger ............... ........... ............ ............ ........ ................... ..... .................. 82
Madan Gopal, Politics 7 Race and Youth in Guyana (San Francisco: Mellen Research
University Press. 1992)
by Joseph Theo Morris ..... .............. ......... ........ ...... ...... .......... .......... .... ... ... ....... ...... . 84

A pREUMINARY LOOK AT THE FREE AMERINDIANS AND THE
DlITCH PIANf A TION SYSTEM IN GUY ANA DURING TI-IE
SEVENTEENrn AND BGHfEENIH CENllJRIES
by
Anna Benjamin
..
For generations past, the An1erindians of Guyana have bee~ typecast in the
history texts as the policemen of the Dutch slave system. It is not that this assertion
is totally without merit· it is more that it represents far too simplistic a generalization
to be fully consistent with the evidence presently available to us. The world of the
Dutch colonial plantation, which is now being revealed from the records, is one of
infinitely greater complexity than was ever previously suspected. Some Amerindians_
did indeed fulfil the roles of slave hunters and traders but, at the same time, others
were also slaves in the true sense , sharing similar conditions to their Black counterparts,
and subject to the same punishments .
The early history of the Dutch settlement of Guyana is somewhat obscure,
and even the date for the foundation of Essequibo has never been established be­
Y,ond doubt. It was unquestionably a very small settlement, however , and most likely
ad its origins somewhere around l616. Subsequently, it became the property of
the Dutcb _West Jodia Compar:w.J.WIC}. Berbice was founded by Abraham ·van Pere
with 60 or 80 1 male colonists and six African slaves in 1627 . These Dutch settlers
. ,4Cok up residence amid an Amerindian population that is now believed to have been ·
/ comparatively numerous in the early contact period. Recent demographic studies,
I
for example suggest a figure of around 158,000 for Guyana, Suriname and French
Guiana in the 16th century. 2 In this situation, therefore, outright conquest of the
Amerindians was never an option for the Dutch; th?ir very survival would have depenaed
-on -avoiding the cruder forms of exploitation of the indigenous peoples.
Even as late as the mid-eighteenth century, it is likely that the Amerindian population
of Essequibo and Berbice outnumb~red the combined black and white population.
Around 1750, for example, the Moravian missionary, Schumann, estimated the
numbers of indigenous peoples domiciled in Berbice to be approximately 5,000-
6,000. 3 This estimate almost certainly would have excluded the Corentyne Caribs
and possibly the upper-river Akawaio as well but, even if that is not so, Indian

s still would have comfortably exceeded t~e plantation totals of
numbe d maybe three hundred-odd Whites. Perhaps abo
3,000 slaves an I.It
The first settlers would have encountered four major Ameri ct·
_ dd. . possibly to one or two minor
.
ones .
Of
t
h
e maJor
.
nar
n ian gro .
Up1ngs
m a 1t1on, , C .b h f ions th
s in overall terms were the an s' w o were ound mainly in Es , e most
numll erou the Corentyne· River. The Arawaks were located in the sequibo, as /
we as on h"I h I ower r"
f nearly all Guyana's waterways, w 1 et e upper Mazaruni Demer 1
verain
ar~as O rt of the Cuyuni were home to the Akawaios. The fourth nation ar~,hBerbice
ahn Dpat sh had extensive dealings were the Waraus, whose preferred hab~tt Whom
t e u c d I a Was th
swampier sectors of the low-lying coastlan s.
e
The isolation of t~e e~rly ~et!lers, who only rarely saw a s~ip frorn horn
P
ied with their numencal inf enonty, would have made them highly vu!
cou . A . d. h . nera be, le
d consequently very dependent on their menn 1an osts. Judging by the f · v
~ . . ~cl
aborted colonies in other parts of the Guianas, it may very well be that the Arnennd·
saved the early Berbice and ~se~uibo colonists from sta~ation - ?r at least pro~~:
essential supplements to their diet over an exten~ed pen~ of tune. What can be
said is that foodstuffs in one form or another constituted an important component of
Amerindian trade items bartered to the Europeans well into the Dutch period. Apart
from the inevitable cassava, there were also such delicacies as salted manatee,4 wild
hog, turtles, cinnamon, nuts 5 and crabs. 6 Above all else, however, there was salted
fish, which various nations supplied to the private planters of Essequibo in the seventeenth
century but which, in due course, became a particular specialty of the Waraus
in both territories.
Salt-fish rations for the West India Company slaves, and to a lesser degree,
private slaves as well, came from the fishery in Orinoco and environs, which was
sited in Warau country. 7 Much of the actual fishing may have fallen to this nation,
although the salting seems to have been undertaken by the Dutch themselves. s The
Spaniards periodically interfered with this fishery, the most serious interruption occurring
in 1769. 9
I~ Be~bice, the fishery was entirely in Warau hands, and was an annual event. 10
By.1.:!_artsi0ck s day, the exercise was preceded by a canoe race between Head Plantations
and sort Na~sau on the Berbice River. After the winner had been presented
with his jug of kilthum, the Waraus then moved to the Canje, where the creeks were
dammed and poisoned with hiarri, and large quantities of yarrow were retrieved to
2

e salted by the women. The men were paid in iron goods and the women in
beads. 11 Both the Berbice and Orinoco fisheries must have represented enormous
cost-savings for the Companies. which otherwise would have been obliged to import
stock-fish supplies.
i I Other than in the arguable case of the Orinoco fishery. no figures can really
/~ be give_n for the quantities of_ f~stuffs provided -to both the private and Co~pany
plantations by the free Amennd1ans. Certainly, the amount of cassava supplied by
the Amerindians must have diminished towards the end of the seventeenth century
because, by that time, the Company estates were cultivating their own 12 - at least
partly for the purposes of cassava bread production. The pattern is repeated in
Berbice where present direct evidence for the existence of bread gardens dates from
the eighteenth century. 13 It may be that, even with modest plantation development,
the Amerindians could not meet the increased demand, or were simply too erratic in
their deliveries. (From a gastronomic point of view, cassava bread was the
Amerindian's most useful contribution to plantation life. It became something of a
staple for the Dutch, and to a lesser extent, for the Black slaves as well. Wheaten
flour did not transport well in the ships of the period, and cassava bread must have
represented a vast improvement in the frequently mouldy and weevil-ridden hardtack
or ship's biscuit from the Netherlands.) In general, what can be gleaned about
Essequibo in the seventeenth century would certainly suggest that the plantations
and the fort relied fairly heavily on Amerindian food sources, 14 while, as suggested
earlier, the closure of the Orinoco fishery in the eighteenth century was regarded as
something of a catastrophe by the Governor. 15
Amerindian tolerance of European plantation settlements on their lands is no
doubt accounted for by their dependency on European manufactures. 16 The Guyana
Amerindian nations whom the Dutch first encountered would have been already
familiar with these, since the Arawaks of Guyana's western rivers have had trading
links with the Spaniards of Margarita which dated back to the mid-sixteenth century
.17 These links were severed finally in the early seventeenth century 18 and, for a
variety of political and other reasons, the Spanish settlement of Santo Thome could
not fill the void. The appearance of the Dutch, therefore, may well have been
welcomed by the nations of the lower riverain regions. In the eighteenth century, the
WIC was supplying them with such articles as axes, choppers, knives, adzes, razors,
scissors, hooks, pins, cassava chisels, trumpets, combs, mirrors and, of course, beads. 19
There is also a reference to the smithy at Kykoveral manufacturing iron arrowheads,
which must have been intended for the Indian trade. 20
3

However important these manufacturers w re to the nation~, it mu ~t he ~aid
that the Dutch in their turn probably were dependent for many decade on Am 'rindi·
trade for the economic viability of their colonies. Asid~ fron~ the foodstuff~ discuss:~
above. the Indians provided a varied selection of ot~ier item including hunting dogs,11
parrots / 2 crab oil. timber planks ,23 hammocks, conal~ and, above all else, letterwvo

detail. the overriding factors responsible were an absence of capital which in turn
contributed to an acute shortage of African slaves. 30 In plantocratic terms, Berbice
and Essequibo were very modest operations indeed. In 1720, Berbice recorded only
895 Black slaves 31 while, as late as 1762, the colony still had under 4,000, including
both private and Company -owned slaves.] 2 The situation in Essequibo was not very
different; around 1700 the colony had approximately 644 slaves, both Black and
lndian,:n and in 1762 there were 2,571. 34
At present, it seems very unlikely that owing to its lucrativeness the anatto
trade in its own right operated as an inhibiting factor to plantation investment. The
decline of this trade in Essequibo was not accompanied or followed by any exceptional
upsurge in plantation growth .
Much has been written about the role of the postholders in prosecuting trade
among the nations in early Essequibo but, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, the WIC did not rely on them alone. There are instances of Governors
sending representatives to encourage the Indians to trade 35 but, by and large, business
dealings with the interior peoples who did not come to the fort were conducted
through Black Company traders, both free and slave. They were never very numerous;
in 1700, fourteen of them are documented, 36 although this total had fallen to
eleven by 1702. 37 No doubt, the totals varied from period to period. They were
always Creoles, and the impression is given that they were a largely closed group,
whose skills were passed down from one generation to the next. The main qualification
required for the job was a fluency in some of the Indian languages, Carib and
Akawaio probably being the two most essential.
In the seventeenth century, their duties sometimes extended beyond mere
trading, since there are references to them being dispatched as mediators in wars
between the Amerindian nations. 38 The job was not without its dangers, however ,
and on occasion they did become the victims of Amerindian vengeance. Such an
incident occurred in 1680 when one of them was poisoned in the interior . 39 The
Caribs blamed the Akawaios for this act, an accusation that was apparently believed
by the other traders, who were afraid to have further dealings with that nation .
~ow ever, the background to this case is not known and, as far as can be established,
it appears to have been the exception rather than the rule.
. If traders did lose their lives at Amerindian hands on occasion, there is also
evidence that it was possible for them to establish a great degree of rapport and
5

tmJt.>t standing with their trading partners. There are references to the Black trader
Jottc1. for instance, whose father-in -law was Makourarawacke, a Carib Captain _4o It
m y very well be that he was not unique and that the WIC encouraged such marrit1ges
- at lea t where their free Black traders were concerned - in order that broomsti
k r IL1tions might serve as a stimulus to commerce . · ·
Sometime during the first half of the eighteenth centu_ry, the_ Black Company
trader begins to fade from the records. As the anatto business, m particular, declined.
then so, presumably, did the need for roving traders . By the middle of the
century, the Amerindian slave trade eclipsed all ~lse, and the WIC no longer attempted
to enforce its monopoly in any systematic. way · It was private enterprise
which controlled the slave trade. and the Company simply could not compete in that
area . By 1760. trade at the posts had been reduced to~ trickle. 4 1 Neither Cuyuni­
Mazaruni - once a mainstay for anatto - nor upper Essequibo gave the WIC any profit
worth speaking of. In contrast to the other areas , the Moruka district, through the
agency of the post, continued to be of som~ impo~ance to ~he Company in trading
terms , because it supplied items such as canals which were 1n heavy demand within
the colony.
Surprisingly, perhaps, there is a reference to an Amerindian Company trader
operating on the Orinoco as late as 1766. 42 What exactly he was doing is not made
clear but it is possible that he was purchasing horses, which were always in short
supply in Essequibo, or even letterwood and slaves. It might be noted that it would
have been impossible for a Black trader to have functioned in the Orinoco as late as
the 1760s without being picked up by the Spanish authorities.
At the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth.
thlerek ahre references to Berbice traders operating in Essequibo . 43 These were not
B ac . owever and by th th. d d d .
seems to have c d' Th e tr eca e of the eighteenth century, the practice
1bice
ease · ere do not ap t h b
itself. pos ·bl th pear O ave een any Black traders within
' s1 y
nage trade on the·
e area
G·
was suffic.
ten
ti
Y compact to a
II
ow the postholders to
Amerindian slav~rt 0 7· 1 ~:~ the fact that Berbice was not directly involved in
much longer there tha r~ eE, tra 1 ! 10 nal forms of exchange would have endured for
· n m ssequ1bo A I
m Canje wa instructed t ·
5
ate as 1756, for example. the Postholder
continued to prepare ana~o~~courage trade with the Indians and to see that they
Direct trade in th f
e orm of barter was something
that came well within the
6

~cono~ic experience of the nations, but the seventeenth century also saw the evolution
~ ~ more o~inous trend which was to facilitate the integration of some
~menndtan groups mto the plantation economy. Those who had very little or nothing
to exchange which the . Out c h wou Id accept, cou ld h· ire out their · services in one
f
orm or another, and receive the coveted iron goods, beads, salempore and kilthum
by way of payment.
In the 1670s, van Berkel makes reference to Amerindian droghers 45 but
th~re was also a wide range of other tasks which the nations performed both for the
~nvat~ planters as well as the. Companies. The case of the Orinoco and Canje
ftshenes has already been mentioned but, Amerindians hunted, fished and salted for
individual plantations on a much more informal basis as well. Clearing land for
planting also appears to have been another standard occupation, 46 while some groups
also were asked by the Companies to supply Indians on a regular basis to assist the
military at the brandwagts 47 (signal stations) and the posts. In addition. the Company
traders were dependent on Amerindian rowers in the interior. 48
Those whose access to European goods came primarily through labour, would
have become very much more dependent on the Dutch than those whose mode of
acquisition was through trade . At least in the seventeenth century, commerce could
be conducted at a distance if desired via the agency of the traders in Essequibo, or the
postholders in Berbice. but the provision of labour necessitated proximity to the
plantations. Over time, therefore, some Indians gravitated nearer to the estates,
where they took up permanent residence. The phenomenon was never very pronounced
in Essequibo. although there were some Akawaios living behind the
Essequibo. Mazaruni and Demerara plantations. 49 It was Berbice, however, which
boasted a genuine Amerindian plantation population, composed exclusively of Arawaks O
and Waraus. These Indians were particularly vulnerable to planter abuse, 50 but still\\:
settled near to the private holdings, partly on account of the abundance of kilthum
available there. 51 The Moravians, who established a mission station at Pilgerhut near
the Wiruni Creek in 1740, regarded them as very depraved owing to their contact
with Whites. 52
Even in Essequibo, where the opportunities for trade were greate~, a l~ck of
employment proved a source of anxiety to some members of the free nations 1n the
seventeenth century. In 1687, Commandeur Beekman reported that the new planters
in the colony hardly contracted the free Indians to work, and that these were
"getting bothered by it''. s3 By the second half of the eighteenth century, however,
7

. . . k lave hunters or in putting down upristngc;
the free nation.:; were f mdmg wor ~s 5 an the traditional forms of employment·
both of which were more rernuner ~tive t~ By the end of the Dutch period. thei;
for which the~ c.howed little e~thusiasm.come firmly locked into that of the plantaeconomic
survival and way of life had be
tion.
. h Companies in Essequibo and Berbice also
The provision of service~ to t :a leverage over the free nations which beallowed
the Governors to exercise ext The I
institution of the Captain was imper-
. f f d·rect 1 con ro. f .
came. over time. a orm o
1
ractical purpose o getting labour organized
tant to the Dutch. if only for the ~~re y !d the like. At a much later stage, Captains
for the Warau fishery. the po~tho ers s for military expeditions against maroons
· d. ff1cer corp ·
supplied the Amenn tan ° thing more in some instances than heads of ex-
Originally. they may have been ~o men when dealing with the Dutch but, whatever
tended families who acted a;;~J=t~onship and role among their own people after
the case. they took on a ~th . . nia of office by the Governors, and issued v.,ith
they had been inves~ed v.ll msitgthei·r followers. Recognition of status amongst
f d. t ·b tion amongs
presents or
15 n u h f e became contingent on recognition by the Dutch
h f th · nation t ere or • . · . ·
ot ers O eIT ·.od the authorities in Essequibo were 1nform1ng the nations
By the end of the pen , 1· d b th G ss
that they co uld on I Y se 1 ec t Captains from names supp 1e y e overnor.
Documentation for the very earliest period of ~utch colonization in Guyana
1s . ex t reme I y sp arse . However , it is unlikely that the first Dutch settlers . would . have
attempted to enslave members of nations amongst whom they lived - 1f only for
security reasons. It is true that the abortive 1613 Corentyne ~ettlement, destr?yed
by the Spaniards the folJowing year, had used Arawak slaves 1n the tobacco fields.
However. these Arawaks had been seized from Trinidad, ostensibly because they
were considered to have
.
operated in alliance with the Spaniards. 56
As early as 1645, a case was cited in the Zeeland Chamber of the WIC
concerning two persons who had "carried off certain Indians,, in Essequibo. The
meeting decided to refer the matter to the Nineteen (the governing body of the WIC)
so that "action could be taken". 57 This would certainly seem to suggest that a convention
was already in operation at that period whereby it was understood that those
Indians in contact with the Dutch should not be enslaved, but whether this applied to
specific nations, or simply to Indians living in particular locales, is really not known.
All the Dutch colonies on the mainland eventually cam'? to recognize the
8

.---- ----·- -
I
I
. . . I d dates back to
inherent freedom of particular nation ·. In Suriname. the ongma or er . 59
1686 and came to include the Arawaks, Waraus. Caribs and the Akuliu or Acuna .
However. no ·uch pub Ii hed order i · on re ord for any part of Guyana that is krto~nh
althoug~ Commandeur Beek~an did in titute a regulation i~ tha~:a me ~e~~ ;:;~i -
wa designed to prevent the 11l egal enslavement of free Indians. A simtla ·f
nance dating from 1688 exi ts for Berbice,''1 but neither enactment actually spe_ci ies
which Indians were designated ·free·. By the eighteenth century, however . it becomes
apparent that the free nation s in Essequibo. Berbice and, subsequently.
Demerara , were the Arawaks. Caribs, Waraus and Akawaios . The Akawaios were
not a protected nation 1n Suriname and could be - and sornetimes were - sold there
as slaves. The vendors were invariably Carib , although it s~ems_ that ther~ wer ~ 6
occasions when the Arawaks were not always entirely guiltless m this regard either.
Technically. any member of a nation. other than the four abovementioned,
could be legally held in slavery in the Guyana colonies. In practice , there were
nations such as the Panaca yes (Panacayos) who traded with the Dutch , or the Chaima,
who took refuge near the Moruka Post , 63 who were also granted protection , but
presumably this was a concession which operated according to · time and circumstance.
One of the factors possibly supplying an initial impetus for the slave trade
may have been a collapse in the Amsterdam anatto market in the 1680s. 64
The
WIC s response to this was to throw open the Essequibo and Pomeroon Rivers to
free trade for a time. 65 The market had recovered by 1690 , 66 but it is significant that
it is during the first part of this decade that the Commandeur begins to voice _ complaints
about the purchase of slaves ruining the traffic in anatto . 67
For economic reasons the anatto trade could not compete with the slave
trade in the long run . In the first place, slaves fetched far higher prices than did
anatto and, in the second, preparation of the latter commodity involved a great deal
of physical effort. It had to be made into little balls by the women, and then it was set
in crab oil in order to preserve it. Eventually, the women grew "listless about keeping
up one heavy work on the dye", 68 which was a contributory factor to the decline of
tne trade. Since for much of the period the Company officially operated a monopoly,
it would have been theoretically possible for them to have held dov.,'Tl the
price of slaves in order to boost anatto production.
In practice, however, as mentioned earlier, the monopoly was never really
9

. . h spasmodic efforts at enforcement
implemented over an extended penod. althoug
69
Effectively, the Essequibo auwere
made at the turn of the eighteenth century- f the colony to traffic unhinthonties
. ·
a
II
owe
d d
ea
I
ers
f
ram
be
yon
d the frontiers
ts 0
came to dominate the trade
dered, and fairly quickly, the Suriname sla~e :s~:~uibo counterparts,7° and had n~
They paid a higher price for slaves than their 71 As in the case of the private local
difficulty, therefore, in marginalizing the lda~er. laves difficult to obtain on account of
traders, the Company 1tsel
. f f
oun
d Arnerin tan
t be
s
noted, however, that of the Dutch
the competition from Suriname. 72 It_;~s market of sufficient size to absorb fair
Guiana holdings, only Suriname p~ovi_ et J previously, both Essequibo and Berbice
numbers of Amerindian slaves. As ind,~ e ·n need of large numbers of slaves who
were small plantocracies and were ~ar Y 1 rk 73
could not be utilized in heavy plantation wo ·
h. and mechanics of the trade in any detail
Without going into the ist~ry procurers of slaves - the Caribs. This was th~
something must be said about the mt amtematic resistance to Spanish settlement and
· h. h h d O ffered the mos sys I d '
v nation w 1c a
d ·t If the target of large-sea e re uctions by the New
in the eighteenth century, f~un . 15 ~ were those Caribs living in the vicinity of the
G d th 'f s The first victims
rena a au on ,e · rth f the Orinoco. 74 By 1757, the Spaniards were
Guarapiche Riv~r, to thhe no me~ts of the nation based on the south bank of the
ready to act against ot er seg d · h I 75
Onnoco . between t h e C aura and Caroni Rivers, an 1n t e mataca.
Carib survival. therefore,was closely bound up with the Dutch alliance, and
the nation showed no hesitation · in defending Essequibo from Spanish incursi?n
v h threat presented itself. 76 In the first half of the eighteenth century, Canbs
w en any . . . . . . . • h l
attacked both Jesuit and Capuchin m1ss1ons 1n the Onnoco with 1mpumty,
77
ng t y
perceiving them as the true instruments of Spanish penetration.
The slave trade alJowed the Caribs to become virtually the sole distributin.9
agents for European goods among the interior nations. But it also did something
else: it gave them access to guns, which, as in Africa, were an essential adjunct to
sJaving operations. These came mostly from private sources 78 but, at a later stage,
sometimes from Government when there was a slave rising or the like to be dealt
with. In 1762, the Director-General of Essequibo complained that the Caribs ~'can-.
not or will not fight without guns". 79 Firearms were critical weapons in their con-
~1 fr?ntation with the Spaniards, and the Spanish missionaries testified to their skills
with European battle tactics.
with these, and their familiarity
10

Initially, it was the Essequibo and Orinoco Caribs who monopolized the trade
but. as the Spaniards began to close off the Orinoco and reduce its inhabitants, the
Corentyne Caribs became mor e prominent in the business . Some Orinoco Caribs
took refuge in Essequibo 80 where they continued their involvement in slave comn1erce,
but they now obtained their victims from the Rio Branco and its environs
rather than the Orinoco basin. By the 1740s , both Spanish and Dutch sources were
noting that the sole source of livelihood for the Caribs wa the slave trade. 8 1 This
does not mean that other free nations - particularly the Essequibo Arawaks and the
Demerara Akawaios - did not sometimes barter slaves, but they were excluded from
participation to any significant degree: for the most part, they relied on other sources
of income .
Although Spanish and Dutch c01nments on the radical change in Carib occupation
date from the 17 40s , it is likely that the trend was evident twenty years before
this. when the Ca ribs successfully challenged the Caberre nation for control of the
slave trade in the Middle Orinoco 82 and succeeded in excluding the Manaos - a major
slave-trading nation of the Rio Negro - from operating in the Dutch territorial sphere. 83
The Caribs had been important suppliers of anatto 84 and their abandonment of its
production in favour of the more lucrative traffic in human beings was no doubt
something of an economic blow to the WIC. Other nations clearly did continue
producing anatto for considerably longer, but, as indicated above, the quantities were
much reduced.
Eventually, Carib priorities came to be adopted to a greater or lesser degree
by all four free nations. Although the Caribs attempted to protect their monopoly on
the slave trade itself, they eventually became far more amenable to working with
other nations in the preservation of their markets - i.e. the Dutch plantation system
in the Guianas. It is the evolution of this function that more or less obliterated the
already crippled trade in what had once been one of Essequibo 's major exports . By
that time, the WIC itself had lost interest in Amerindian export commodities.
It took time, before the Essequibo free nations were transformed from trading
partners to full guardians of the plantation. In the seventeenth century, it does
not seem as though the Indians were strongly identified (if at all) with a policing role.
Of the odd references to runaways in the Kykoveral Diary, none of the hunters is an
Indian. In the case of the nine runaways from the Company plantation of Nieuw
Middelburgh. it was "2 or 3'' Whites who were sent out after them, 85 while the "Old
~ Negro" , Big Jan. was dispatched to recover a female slave from the fort who had
I I

~
been abducted by a free fndian.86 If the WIC was not utilizing the Indians much as
slave hunt ers at this stage , it is unlikely that the private planter s were either. ,
It must be remember ed too that, at this period. the number of plantations
and slaves was very small. and from the planters· point of view, the problem of slave
control hardly wa critical as it later became._ T~e eighteenth cent~ry_, however, saw\ l
a substantial increase in marronage, the destination for the_ vast maJonty of runaways {
being the Spanish territory of Orinoco . The p~p.ular notion arnong the slaves was 1
that sanctuary could be had there provided a willingness to convert to Ca tholicism
was evinced . In practice, the validity of this notion depended on the caprice of the
individual Governor, one or two of whom even returned slaves to Essequibo . or sold
them to Spanish buyers. However, these interlude.s do ~ot seem to have acted as
much of a deterrent to would-be maroons. Stemming this flow from the Essequibo
{and later the Demerara) plantations became a major preoccupation of successive
administrations. and in this situation the Government turned first to the Caribs.
This was a function which the Caribs were only too willing to undertake
since , as already stated, their own self-interest was closely bound up with the security
of the Dutch plantation system. Possibly from the third decade of the eighteenth
century, or thereabouts, until the Berbice Uprising of 1763, the Caribs almost monopolized
slave-hunting for the colony of Essequibo. The Bari ma Ca ribs eliminated
the maroon community of 1744 (see below), while the Waini Caribs killed those
members of the Creole Island settlement who refused a Government pardon. 88 It
was the Caribs again whom the Director-General arranged to have guard the sea-
,/ coast to watch for runaways in 1760. 89 There is a mention of the Demerara Akawaios
functionin~ as slave hunters in 1752, 90 but this does not appear to have extended to
the Essequibo branch of the nation. It may be significant that, according to Bancroft ,
the Demerara Akawaios sold slaves. 91
·th· th
There
f·
are not all that
many ms
· t
ances o
f
maroons establishing themselves
WI
that
m e
.
con mes of
.
Esse
qui
·b t ·
1·n
8 O erntory. The only camp of any significance was
anma, mentioned abo d d -
were an exce r t · h . ve, an estroyed in 1744 . 92 The Caribs of this area
the Dutch- forp ion ° t e nation as a whole in the sense that they had been hostile to
· many years Th ·
by the destruction of the
8 . eir rapprochement with the Government was marked
93
maroons are to sm anma encampment. Such other references as exist to
11
Island community aw:r~u?s of runaways, with the arguable exception of the Creole
Creole Island itself mate h~n many r~spects w~s a s?ecial case. It .is possible that
Y ve been 1n Akawa10 territory, and not 1n Carib, which
12

would have offered the runaways some initial protection.
In general. it may be that until 1760 or so, maroon groups who stayed in
Essequibo might have had a modest measure of safety. for a tim~, ~rovided that t_hey
avoided Carib terrain - not necessarily an easy task given the ub1qu1ty of that nation.
Of those who chose to try and settle in hostile country, some of them might have had
a false sense of security if they already personally known to the Caribs. Such w~s
obviously the case with the 13 Company traders who ran away with two women tn
1706. 94 At this early date, however, the Caribs were not picking up runaways as yet,
although they did report the group to the Commandeur, who sent two old traders
and a 'malack' out after them . 95
What the case was with the runaways who settled themselves in the Carib
territory of Waini in 1751 % is not clear. It may be that the Caribs sometimes were
prepared to overlook individuals or very small groups, according to whim. In this
particular instance, the Moruka Postholder was instructed to bring two Caribs named
Jan de Mesi and Flora, who were supposed to know about the matter, to the fort, so
investigations could be pursued. 97
It must be said that the abduction of Amerindian slaves by members of the
free nations in the first half of the eighteenth century was hardly an unknown phenomenon.
98 The vast majority of Indian slaves on the plantations were women
engaged in cassava bread manufacture, 99 or perhaps in domestic work, and presumably
some were taken to become the wives of their abductors. In general, Amerindian
marronage appears to have been of very frequent occurrence throughout the eighteenth
century, and, as in the case of the Blacks, the destination was invariab\y the
Orinoco. 100 Sometimes, Indian slaves would desert in substantial numbers such as
'
when twenty-three of Pieter La Riviere ·s "red slaves" ran away together in 1726. 101
Even in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Caribs made no distinction be­
~een Black and Amerindian maroons. 102 In 1735, for example, they apprehended
six of the latter with their leader named Elias in the Pomeroon - most likely among
the Arawaks. 103 For a nation which earned its livelihood by slave-trading, one would
not have expected them to have made exceptions on grounds of race.
!he pattern in Berbice for the first six decades of the eighteenth century is
rfther different.from that in Essequibo. It has already been noted that there was no
~ve ~~de there a~? th~t the anatto trade also enjoyed a much longer life than in
sequi o. In addition. 1t was remarked that Berbice had a sizeable population of
13

plantation Amerindian s composed of certain Arawaks and Waraus. However, these
were not the only features which distinguished it from Essequibo . Of the bush nations,
the Berbice authorities dealt most frequently with the Arawaks , and very little
with the Caribs, who were based on the Corentyne River outside the jurisdiction of
the Berbice Government .
Unlike Essequibo too, it is thought tha Berbice had no private plgntations
until at least the 1720s and possibly not until the beginning of the J. 730s. Private
piantation development in the latter colony therefore. wct::s unusually rapid , occurring
within a very limited time-frame of no rnore than 10-20 years. By 1740 , there were
perhaps up to 100 plantations strung out singly along the river banks for a distance
of almost 100 miles upriver. 104 Although the number of slaves deployed on each of
these holdings individually was very tiny (the vast majority grew coffee , cotton and/
or cocoa) , nevertheless, their isolation and singular distribution gave rise to security
problems for the colony which it would not have encountered in the seventeenth
century, with its five or so estates and a good deal less than 900 slaves.
It is likely that , from the inception, one of the tasks which fell to the resident
plantation Amerindian population was the matter of estate security . Inevitably, the
services of the bush Amerindian - usuaJly Arawaks - would have been called upon to
deal with those runaways who escaped the plantation net. The twelve Company
slaves who revolted after being hired out to the Vernesobre 's in Canje in 1733, were
dealt with promptly by members of a bush nation which was almost certainly Arawak. 105
The fact that there were no successful maroon settlements in Berbice prior to the
great uprising is testimony to the effectiveness of the Amerindian screen. (The 1763 .
Uprising was partly made possible by the fact that large numbers of Amerindians had
./ moved out of the colony to escape an epidemic .) The better-informed Berbician
maroons , therefore, generally made for Essequibo or the Orinoco.
This does not mean to say that the Berbice nations always co-operated with
the Government and the planters on the matter of maroons . An interesting ordinance
of 1760 106 speaks of them hiding runaways in order to have them work for
/ ( ; them wh~le, in 1762, the free Indians flatly refused to wipe out a very small maroon
band which had established itself somewhere above the Akawaio Post ostensibly
blecause Governor van Hoogenheim would not issue them with guns. 107 It is not\
a together certain which t · . . . .
tf A . k . na ion was involved here, although most hke.ly again 1t was
t~e rawa s. It is known that subsequently the Akawaios went a step further , saving
e same group from starvation by supplying them with food. 108 It may be, however .
14

-
that the Berbice Akawaios were not normally involved in policing functions , since
they had little contact with the plantations. There is a case during the 1763 Uprising.
for example , when tvJo Akawaios assisted Coffy's forces.
The colony of Demerara was of late foundation and administratively came
under Essequibo jurisdiction for many years . Although no Caribs were resident there,
the Governors of Essequibo nevertheless tended to employ them in Demerara as
well. The Arawaks were probably the most numerous of the Demera~a· nations,
although the Akawaios too had a not insignificant presence , participating in the slave
trade and in plantation policing work at an early period, as has already been noted .
.. I
The great watershed in terms of the Amerindian role on the plantations of
Essequibo in particular , is the 1763 Berbice Uprising. It had no precedent in any
Dutch colony and , at one stage , threatened Dutch hegemony throughout the Guianas.
If the scale of the rising itself was unprecedented , then so was the number of
Amerindians who volunteered to deal with it. The Caribs were not slow to grasp its
implications for their long-term economic and political survival and, after some initial
delay, they came from all parts of Essequibo to be issued with firearms . Director- I 1
General Storm van 's Gravesande of Essequibo claimed he had never seen so many
Caribs in his life as mustered on that occasion, and was not aware that there were so
many of them domiciled in the colony . 109
(stk'
Notably absent from the Amerindian complement were the Berbice nations,
with the exception of the Corentyne Caribs and a few Arawaks. 110 (Most Arawaks
had evacuated the colony prior to 1763.) Apart from the Caribs , the Demerara
Akawaios 111 volunteered to go to Berbice (but not the Mazaruni branch of the nation),
as did the Wauwejans , or Arawak-Akawaios, also of Demerara , Some Arawaks
- possibly from Essequibo - agreed to fight under Carib leadership. As was acknowl-
..... ed ed at the time , the Amerindian contribution proved critical to the success of the
"/. Dutch operation to recover Berbice . At the end of the Uprising, Storm van 's
Gravesande remarked: 112
Our Caribs, both from these rivers and even from Barima , have loyally
done their best and are yet doing it, constantly roving about between
the two colonies and having, through the Lord 's blessing been
so successful in all their expeditions as to have lost none of their own
people, thus making them bold and beyond belief and expectation
enterprising, and even reckless; and these occurrences cause a great
15

crnbittennent betwee n the blacks and them , which , if well and reaonably
timulated, cannot fail to be of much use and service in the
future to the Colonie s.
While the importance of this psychological factor and the Dutch manipulation of it,
i not to be underestimated, there were other forces at work in the post-Uprising
perioo which sealed the fate of the free nations in all the Guyana territories . The first
of the ·e wa simply the expansion of the plantation system. Even before the Uprising.
Essequibo had begun the move of her plantations downstream to more fertile
soils and had experienced a modest increase in her slave complement. The process
began rather tentatively in Berbice after 1764 , but accelerated in the 1770s. African
-born slaves were imported to replace those lost during the Uprising and, by
1774. their total exceeded that of 1762 . 113
Even more dramatic was the rate of plantation development in the new colony
of Demerara which had been established in 1745 . Its slave population grew from
1648 in 1762, to 12,559, twenty years later. 114 Gradually , as the century wore on ,
the demographic balance began to shift away from the Amerindians in favour of the
Blacks . Plantation expansion and a greater number of slaves working in larger units
presented the Dutch with quite new custodial problems .
The second factor of some significance was the appearance of sizeable ma ­
roon communities, more especially those in Demerara . Although the earlier Essequibo
maroons had been a source of concern to the Dutch , they had never represented a
major threat because their numbers were insignificant and they were too far removed
from the plantations. However, the Demerara maroon camps were a different matter
entirely. In the first place , the encampments were fairly sizeable and, in the
second , they were all well within striking distance of the plantations. Not surprisingly
too, their residents were known to be in communication with the slaves. Even
Berbice acquired maroons on the Canje and Wiruni Creeks for the very first time .
Whether or not as a con sequence of these maroon camps desertion from
1
t~e ; states be~ame_so commonplace. both in Essequibo and Demerara at the end of
t e )utch penod, 11 _:, that in 1770, the Government instructed the Arinda Postholder
~est the Canb captain s to send a detachment. of fifty men to guard the e ·
::t;:.'f
At thi period the cola . I .
· ~ rna economy re ted squarely on the plantation system
16

and the Government's primary concern in all three colonies became the security and
maintenance of that system. In the days when there had been few plantations.the
Amerindians boosted exports by supplying anatto, balsam and letterwood, and reduced
imports by providing the Company and private planters with a wide range of
fooo items, among other things. The anatto trade was now dead, however, and the
number of plantations and slaves so increased that the impact of Amerindian food
production was virtually negligible. As an independent trader, the Amerindian had
become of marginal importance,and it was only in the role of colonial policeman that
v he assumed a value to the authorities.
· ns or se ments of
nations w 1c a enera en age in slave huntin · ods now
began to o so. In 1768, for example, the Waraus were paid for returning slaves 117
wh~n 1772. some of the Essequibo Akawaios agreed to help the Caribs in putting
down the rising on P.C. Hooft's Demerara plantation. 118 On that occasion, the
Director-General remarked that he had never seen this particular group come to the
Government's assistance with arms before; they were "good friends" but nothing )
else. 119 Illustrative of the general trend is the case of the Demerara Arawaks who
played a very prominent part in the war against the maroons at the end of the
eighteenth century.
Towards the close of the 1770s, the Essequibo authorities began to put more
direct p1.essure on the free nations by attempting to formalize arrangements with
them and spell opt their obligations with greater precision. In 1778, various Uils, and
Captains comprising two Mazaruaj Caribs, four Essequibo Caribs, three Arawaks,
one War au and two Cuyuni Caribs plus some of their followers were presented with
gifts and were asked to promise to give their assistance whenever required. Significantly,
they also agreed not to move away from their "present abode" . 120 This
?>
exercise was repeated with other Uils a few days later. 121 -
The new approach was applied even to nations which traditionally had never
been designated 'free', but which lived within the Dutch sphere. When the Arinagotos
(Arekunas) detained some runaways in 1778, the Court of Policy deemed them
"guilty of ill-faith", and the Caribs were dispatched to bring a few to Port Zeelandia as
prisoners to give account of themselves. 122 The terms of the contract,· it seems, had
now been enunciated, and the Dutch authorities were prepared to take measures
against any nation which acted in breach of them.
17

For their part. some of the free nations were not unmindful of their power to
blackn1ail the Government. In 1785, the Governor-General of Essequibo received
an unwelcome visit frorn tlie aribs who "were very insolent , and in the presence of
the negroes said that if they obtain no presents , they. if onc e aoain a revolt occurred,
would not alone abstain from helping the whites, but would assist the negroes and
1nurder the whites "_ 123 The Governor knew that he had no option but to "gratify''
--,
them . 124 By the time of the Demerara Maroon War of 1795, the process was complete;
the only function of the former free nations in the colonial system had become
that of plantation policemen . The 1793 abolition of Amerindian sJavery 125 did nothing
to alter that arrangement, although it dealt a severe economic blow to the Caribs,
and might have been responsible for them leaving the colony in some numbers at the
beginning of the nineteenth century . It was not until Emancipation .in 1838, however,
that the long-established association of the free Amerindians with the Guyana
plantation system was brought to an end , and they were set adrift to fend for themselves
economically .
Abbreviations
ARA Algemeen Rijksarchief (fhe Hague}.
BGB British Guiana Boundary . Arbitration with the United States of Venezue la.
BGBB British Guiana Boundary . Arbitration with the United States of Brazil.
GNA Guyana National Archives.
PRO Public Record Office (London).
USC United States . Report and accompanying paper of the Commi ssion appoint ed ··t · t· d
tḣ
d· · · I 1· ··· o mves tgate an report
upon e true 1vts1ona me between the Republic of Venezuela and British G · ..
Wlc D u t c h W '
est
I
n
d.
,a
C
ompany
u1ana .
1.
2.
3.
NOTES
The precise number of colonists who went to Berbice i .
General gives the figure of 80 althou h N t h I . s not certain at present . The Charter from the States -
colonies Essequibo, De~era !ndeBsc e~ c aims that only 60 left . See PM . Netscher, History of the
Ch_ronicle ··. 1929), p. 27. ry erb,ce ... translated by, Walter Roth . - (Georgetown : "Th e Daily
Neil L Whitehead, L Lords of the Ti . .
tions. 1988). pp. 38-39. ger Sp,nt (Dordrect, Holland and Providence, USA Fons Publica·
F Staehelin, Die Mission der B d
Jahrhundert (Herrnhut· Vi . f ru ergemeine in Suriname und Berbice i
4 8GB. Appendix I p 185. C erems ur Brudergeschichte. 1913), Vol II Pt 2 17 m achzehn ten
5 BGBB. Annexe I., p .. 19. f..xtom:nfandeur, Essequibo to West India Co~pa~v (WIC) 1681
6. BGB A d. . rac rom a Stock Book f th W . . . . . .
7 8GB. A::nd_,x NI, P 219. An Official Diary kept at~ k c ~, ~t India Company, 20 February 1721.
8 B ~ . n ix . p . 2. Director-Gen ~ . y over a . J uly 1699- 1701 .
GB. Appendix II. P 47 Com . d era!. Esseqwbo to WIC. 21 February 1769
' rnan eur, Essequibo to WIC, 7 December 1746. .
18

-
9
BGB. Appendix rv. P 2 . ApD(!ndix rv. pp . 6 -7, Director-General, Essequibo to WIC. 15 March 1769.
10 Adriaan van Berke!. Adriaan van Berkel's travels in South America ... translated by Walter Roth
{Georgetown: The MDaily Chronicle ·· Ltd., 1948). pp. 68-9 .
11 J .J Hartsinck, Beschryving van Guiana ... (Amsterdam : Gerrit Tielenburg, 1770), Vol. I, pp. 291 -2 .
12 PRO. CO. 116/19. llnventory of Company Holdings and private Plantations] 20 August 1700.
The Inventory of slaves employed at the Fort Bread Gardens lists a total of fifteen, three of whom were unfit.
There were three Amerindian women and one boy among them . Th€ fort had had its own bread garden from
at least 1681, when the Amerindians were asked to clear an island in the Cuyuni for that purpose . (8GB
Appendix I. p . 185).
13 Sec. for example. ARA, Nauwkeurige Plaan van de EDI. Compagnie Plantage Weest Soeburg,
January 1752. where bread gardens are shown.
14. BGB, Appendix I, p. 185. Commandeur, Essequibo to WlC, 27 February 1683.
15 BGB Appendix IV, p. 2
16 Lawrence Keymis, ··S€cond voyage to Guiana . 1596", in list of extracts from printed books ([Lon·
donJ. le 1898]). pp. 20-21.
17 . See Arie Boomert, ·The Arawak Indians of Trinidad and coastal Guiana,ca 1500-1650~, Journal of Caribbean
History. Vol. 19, No . 2, 1984 ; A.J . Mc R. Benjamin, "The Guyana Arawaks in the 16th and 17th
centunes~. in Proceedings of the Conference on the Arawaks of Guyana, 14-15 October 1981
(Georgetown : Amerindian Research Unit, 1988) . ·
18. Ibid.
19 . BGBB, Annexe L p . 31. Extract from a Stock Book of the West Jndia Company, 13 January 1736.
20 . 8GB, Appendix I, p. 84 . An official diary kept at Kijkoveral 1699-1701.
21. PRO, CO 116/19. !Inventory of Ccmpany and Private Plantations circa 1700] .
22. BGBB. Annexe I. p. 19 . Extract from a Stock Book of the West India Company, 20 February 1721.
23 . 8GB, Appendix I, Commandeur, Essequibo to WIC, 2 July 1707.
24. P.M. Netscher. Geschiedenis van de kolonien Essequebo, Demerary en Berbice ... ('s Gravenhage :
Martinus Nijhoff, 1888). p. 376.
25. van Berke!, p . 95 .
26 . PRO. C.O . 116/18, Jacob de Jongh to Zeeland Chamber, Wl, 31 August 1688.
27 . S€e, for example, 8GB, Appendix I, p . 53, Kykoveral Diary; GNA Berbice Ordinances, Instructions to Postholder
in Canje, 1756 .
28. 8GB, Appendix I, p. 183, Commandeur, Essequibo to WlC, 28 June 1680; p . 185, Commandeur, Essequibo
to WJC. 27 February 1683 .
29. See, for example, USC, Extracts from Dutch Archives, p. 240; 8GB Appendix Il, p. 10, Proclamation made
by Commandeur, Essequibo 2 April 1730; 8GB, Appendix II, p. 202, Minutes of the Court of Justice. Essequibo
5 October 1761.
30. See Winston M

44 Op. cit
45 van Berk I. p . 29
46 . BGB, Appendix rv. Acting Postholder. Cuyuni to Director-General. Essequibo, 8 May 1769 .
47. USC. Extracts ~rom Dut h Archives. p . 617 . W.A.S . van Gro_vestin 's journal. 1794 ; GNA. Berbice Ordinanc'
. lnstrnctJon s to Postholder in Canje. 1756; Kykoveral Diary, P- o 7 ·
48 Kykoveral Diary, pp . 83, 85 .
49 . Charles A. Harr is and J .A.J de Villiers. Storm van's Gravesande: the rise of British Guiana
(London : Hakluyt Society. 1911), p. 340 .
50 . See GNA. Berbice Ordinances, 1688 , 1736. 1756.
51 . lneke Veiling , De Berbice Slavenopstand 1763 (M.A Thes is. Univer ity of Amsterdam, 1979), p . 69 .
52 . Staehelin , Vol. II. Pt. 2. p 11.
53 . Nctscher. Geschiedenis . p. 376.
54. Hartsinck. Vol. I. p. 270 .
55 . 8GB , Appendix rv. p . 188. Extract from report by the Manager of Duynenberg . 16 March 1778 .
56 Antonio Vaquez de Espinosa, Description of the Indies translated by Charles Upson Clark (Washington·
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1968). p . 77 ; 8GB. Appendix I. pp . 31-34 .
57 . BGB , Appendix f. p 131. Proceedings of the WIC (Zeeland Chamber), 1645 .
58 . A. Boomert. ''The Taruma Phase of Southern Suriname", Archaeology and Anthropol'ogy Vol. 4, Nos.
1 &2.1981.107 .
59 . C. Quandt. Nachricht von Suriname (Amsterdam: S Emme.ring, 1968) , p . 283 .
60 . Netscher, Geschiedenis , pp . 367-368
61. GNA. Berbice Ordinance , 1688 .
62 . J .C. Stedman. Narrative of five years· expedition ... (London: J . Johnson & J . Edwards. 1796) , Vol.
II, 192 .
63 8GB. Appendix II, pp l 21-2, Director -General , Essequibo to WIC. 9 September 1755.
64 . USC. Extracts from Dutch Archives , p. 269, Zeeland Chamber to Commandeur, Essequibo, 14 January
1686 .
65 Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67 . BGB. Appendix I. WJC to Commandeur. Essequibo, 6 December 1696 .
68 . 8GB , Appendix IL p. 25, Commandeur, Essequibo to WfC, 12 Januarv 1737 .
69 . 8GB, Appendix I, WIC to Commandeur. Essequibo, 6 December 1696: Netscher Geschiedenis. p . 373 :
USC. Extrac!s , p. 238; 8GB , Appendix I, p . 238 , Commandeur. Essequibo to WfC, 6 January 1714
70. BGB, Appendix 11. p. 61. Commandeur, Essequibo to WIC, 29 March 1749 .
71. Ibid ., Report of Commandant Laurens Storm van's Gravesande. 1750 .
72. Ibid .
73. Ibid ., Court of Policy. Essequibo to WIC. 14 July l 731 .
74 . See Whitehead. Lords of the Tiger Spirit .
75 Marc de Civrieux "L Ca lie I C ·
5 1976 880·· W'oh~ h n d s Y a onqu1sta de la Guayana Espanola ('Etnohistoria Kar'na')". Montalban.No .
· · P- . 1te ea . p. 126 .
76 · tGBf Appendix! II, PP- 99-100. Director-General, Essequibo to WIC. 26 November 1754
77. e. or exampe , Stnckland Documents d h .
ela and British G · · ~ an maps on t e boundary question between Venezuu,ana
J rom the Capu h · h · . .
Cooperativa Editrice, 1896). c '" arc ives '" Rome (Rome : Pnnted by the Unione
78. 8GB. Appendix 11. p. 67 Re ort f C
79. Ibid. Director-General E.s P . 00
° ommandant Laurens Storm van's Gravesande , 1750 .
80. Civrieux, p 881. I sequi to wrc, 28 August 1762 .
81. 8GB, Appendix II, p. 46, Cornmandeur Es .
Letter of Prefect of Missions to Co ' sequ1bo to WIC. 7 December 1746 : Appendix II. pp. 145-149.
82. W.H. Brett Leg d mmandant of Guiana.
w·11 Ga . en s and myths of th b . .
83 Bis rdner. f1880D. pp. 99-10] ea original Indians of British Guiana (London : William
GB. Appendix ll 2 M· .
. p. . inutes of Court of p
0
1· Es
icy, sequibo. 16 August 1724. Appendix II. p . 222 Director ·
20

,e1wrc1I. ls~cq11ih\,_) I WI . 22 F"'bt11,1rv I 7ld
S4 St!e. for cxc1n1plt•, B ·o. /\ ppc 11Ji x I. p . 2 1 :,. Kykoverc1I Di.:iry
ar: BGB. /\ prw ndi x I. l

HOOK-SWINGING
MID-NINETFENIH-CENllJRy GUVANA
by
Basdeo Mangru
Indian immigrant workers, introduced into Guyana under the iniquitous indenture
system (1838-1917) were recruited largely from the North-Western Provinces
and Oudh (modern Uttar Pradesh), Bihar and Bengal in North India. The
culture they brought to the Caribbean was a blend of various local practices and
beliefs, but the Bhojpuri tradition quickly became dominant. This tradition was epitomized
in language by the Hindi Bhojpuri dialect ,and in religion by two religious epics,
the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, which defined cultural ideals and values in the
Indian community. Smaller batches of Indian workers, too, were recruited from the
Tamil and Telugu districts of the Madras Presidency in South India. In comparison
with North India, the volume of traffic to the Caribbean frof'!l South India was small,
irregular and short-lived, as immigrant workers found more lucrative employment in
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Burma and in local government undertakings . Both Bengalis
and Madrasis 1 introduced a rich note of cultural differentiation in the Caribbean
largely through their language, beliefs, religious observances, dress, music and dance.
This brief article examines a predominantly South Indian religious ritual totaHy
neglected in the literature on the Indian diaspora in the Caribbean. The lack of
attention is due presumably to its comparatively brief existence and the insignificant
number of Indians who participated actively in it. Madrasis ref erred to the observance
as Chedalardtana or Shedal; others as the 'Charak-puja', 'khidi-mari', hook -
swinging or wheel form of worship. ~
Indian immigrant workers were introduced into Guyana to supplement the
truculent ranks of the local workforce following the abolition of slavery in 1834 and
full emancipation four years later. Accustomed to a mentality of coerced labour,
Guyanese ~ugar pl~ters sought to re-establish their control over labour through
lar~e-scale importation . What they desired most was a regular, docile .workforce
which ~ould b~ manipulated and used effectively under any pressing emergency .
The neighbouring. West Indian Islands, southern United States, Europe, Africa, the
Portuguese Atlantic Islands and Asia were tried with varyi·ng d f It
egrees o success.
22

was India, with its teeming millions in heavily congested areas, which fulfilled the
planters' needs. 2 The movement which commenced in.1838 was stopped t~ following
year; it recommenced in 1845, temporarily stopped three years later and
c~nuectu11it 1terrupted from 1854 to its demise in 1917.
The movement from India was not spontaneous. It was governed rather by
socio-economic factors, the persuasive force of the recruiters and by the annual
indents of the various recipient colonies. While famine and food scarcity were effective
recruiting agents in themselves, the euphoric promises held out to unsophisticated
Indian villagers by unscrupulous recruiters were difficult to resist. The inducements
were tempting indeed--light work at attractive wages, free accommodation
and medical care, wholesome and nutritious food, legislative protection from plant~r
tyranny and neglect, opportunities to remit money to families in India and free repa-:
triation following a stipulated period of industrial residence. 3 Intending emigrants
with daughters of marriageable age were assured that their children would find 'hand.._
some' husbands in the colonies . The most valued assurance, however, was the
privilege of practising their religion which was an inseparable part of the lives of
Indians. In time, religion became the most persistent form of resistance against the
harsh features of the plantation system. ,
I, '. -. •• ~ • •
Hook-swinging was largely an annual ritual practised extensively in the Madras
Presidency. In 1853, official reports from the Chief Magistrate and the Super-:
intendent of Police in that Presi _dency indicated that . the ritual was prevalent in
Trichinopoly, Salem, Ganjam, North and S0t:1th Arcot, Cuddapah, Masulipatam,
Vizagapatam, T anjore and Tennevelly. Hook-swinging was purely an Indian custom,
practised mainly by such low castes as Pariahs (untouchables), 1'allies and Pallars.
The patrons of the ,ritual were Lord Shiva and his wife, Mother Durga, who 'protected'
the Bhagtas or devotees from injury during the 'swinging' process. J.H
Powell alluded to the origin of the ritual:
• ~ . I
... Siva and Durga were not born as children, but came into the world
as grown man and woman, ifr a-place called Kailas-parbad. This
. supernatural arrival was made known oo.ly to a poor Brahman and
his wife .who were childless ... He (Shiva)· said that he was a god who
gav~ children and rice crops. Tqe..~rahman replied that if he would
give .him a child as well as ri~~ lie, would be his follower, to which Siva
consented,and told him that _ he ~ould have to perform the Charakpuja
('hook-swinging') according to the methods which he then showed
23

h 1m . ... The people of the village decided to make trial of Siva' s
power, so erected a staging and carried ?ut the i~structi?ns given as
regards hook-swinging, the Br~~an a~~1ng a~ pne~t wh1l~ the lower
castes of the people were being swung . While this was m progress
Siva appeared to the Brahman, with whom he was very angry for
having started the ceremony without his permission, wheret.Ipon the
Brahman asked forgiveness and pleaded ignorance, saying he did
not know when the god wanted the Puja (religious ceremony) to start
... Three days after this (performance of the puja foHowing Siva's
precise instructions) the Brahman 's wife gave birth to a child. 4
for three days prior to the ceremony, devotees must fast and observe certain
ritual purity. During the ritual the Bhagtas, adorned with garlands of flowers, and
with hooks impaled in the fleshy portions of their backs, were swung from the longer
end of the stout pole pivoted on a firmly planted upright thirty to forty feet above the
ground. The rotation usually lasted between two and five minutes accompanied by
music, particularly the flute. The ritual was intended to promote fertility among the
Bhagtas who were expected to father children "after carrying out Siva's instructions".
5 The touching of the ground by the chief operator , (who usually belonged to
the blacksmith or lohar caste) before inserting the two hooks , the circlets of bells
around the ankles of the devotees and the draught of sugar and water seemed to
indicate a fertility ceremony or propitiation of the 'Earth Goddess ' to ensure an
abundant rice-crop. Other reasons given for the performance included the honoring
of a village goddess, the fulfilment of a vow made in times of severe illness or the
expression of gratitude for benefits received.
Throughout the indenture period, Indian religion was viewed by the planters
and indentured immigrants from opposite ehds of the spectrum. To the latter, religion
constituted a form of protection , a unifying force in what was undoubtedly an
alien environment. Since the plantation system was geared to foster a feeling of
hel~lessness and dependence similar to slavery, it was psychologically necessary for
Indians to have some form of resistance to preserve their identity and prevent the
s~stem from reducing them to mere puppets . The planters, in contrast, saw Indian
~tuals as a counterpoise to discontent, a safety-valve through which pent-up aggression
coul~ be ,~eleased. By patronizing Indian religion, they hoped to foster a sense
~~longing.
rendering a residence popular and attractive to this invaluable class of
t~ . urers" · Some ~1~nters even encouraged Indians to recreate 'Village India ' on
eir estates by providing building materials either free of cost or at·a nominal charge.
24

The influential, absentee-proprietor, Quintin Hogg, underlined the importance of
facilitating Indian religion, " ... if we cannot make Coolies Christians let us build them
Hindoo temples", 6 an advice which became part and parcel of planter policy.
• l
Nevertheless, the "cruel nature " of the hook-swinging ritual was singled out
for particular attack right from its inception. The pro-planter Governor, Sir Henry
Barkly, seemed to carry out a personal crusade against it. Besides the "novel and
exciting nature" of the observance, Barkly perceived the reported "·drunkenness and
immorality" accompanying it to have an adverse effect not only on Indians but to
some extent on young creoles{those of African descent born in the colony), who
witnessed the spectacle in significant numbers. His despatch to Colonial Secretary,
the Duke of Newcastle, dated 14 April 1853 clearly indicated his disquiet over the
observance:
Though doubtless necessary from motives of policy in our vast Indian
Empire, to conciliate Native prejudices, even to the extent of
patronising the Pageants held in honour of the Hindu deities, however
barbarous or inhuman they may be, I do not suppose that, under
the very difficult circumstances in which the Indian immigrants are
placed in this Colony, it can be the wish of Her Majesty's Government
that such exhibitions should be carried beyond the fair bounds
prescribed by the spirit of toleration prevalent in British possessions,
or that they should be permitted to outrage the feelings or vitiate the .
principles of the remainder of the Population. 7 . ·
Barkly understood well the planters' dependence on Indian labour to ·resuscitate
the sugar industry and recognized the efficacy of patronizing Indian r-eligiori :· Yet
he doubted whether the British Government would tolerate a ritual which could only
have a negative impact on the population. His despatch was thus geared to test the
political waters, to ascertain whether the Home Government would object to the
suppression of the ritual. The failure or reluctance of the Colonial Office to address
the issue gave Barkly carte -blan·che to initiate action to suppress the observance.
Barkly found a determined ally in ~ever:end .E. Williams, Wesleyan Missionary
to the Indian immigrants. Williams had "an intimate knowledge" of Tamil, the
language spoken by the majority of Madrasis, and "a degree of proficiency" in
Hindustani spoken by Bengalis , and was thus able to 'establish considerable rapport
with Indian immigrants. He denounced vigorously · the "barbarous character and
25

• -=- - -
. . t dency"B of the ritual. His reports showed considerable 's,,,; .
demora I 1smg en f vvinmng '
. . . th Mahaica area on the East Coast o Demerara. Here, the ritual
act1VIty m e . h. h .od f . \.l,,ras
. b ed on a monthly basis and, wit 1n as ort pen o time, no fewer th
bemg o serv d ·1 d th h . l d" . an
Bh tas "had swung''. Williams eta1 e e p ys1ca con ibons of sorne f
1
;h:v~:vote:~: "One of these men we had seen at Melville with his back still swoU;n
at the part where the hooks had passed; anothe~ devotee, .a youth of about 13 or 14
f age of remarkable intelligence, and with a considerable knowledge of Enyears
o ' 20 d" . h h . ,
I
. h showed us his back, on which were 1shnct scars, e aving swung' no
g IS , · d 11 · th· C 1 .
f
er than five times, in five successive years, an a 1n 1s o ony, viz, once at
W
e . " 9
Cummings Lodge and four times at Supply .
Both Barkly and Williams launched a sustained anti-hook-swing ing campaign
or persuasion to terminate "this cruel and barbaric ritual". They adopted this policy
presumably to avoid any possible criticism from the powerful planting interests, the
Colonial Office or the Government of India. Through persuasion, the ten or twelve
individuals expected to 'swing' at Plantation Melville abandoned their design and
surrendered the iron hooks and poles prepared for that purpose. Concomitantly, a
'Government Notice' of 27 March 1853, written in English and Indian Language,
advocated its discontinuation. In a rather conciliatory note, it claimed that while
Indian observances generally did not demoralize the uneducated Black population ,
the Shedal was "calculated greatly to blunt their feelings, and strengthen them in
vice". The proclamation assured Indian immigrants that "no interference will be
exercised in reference to any observance but the simple 'swinging'" . 10 Thus by a ...
combination of persuasion and assurances hook-swinging was abolished in Guyana
in the mid-1850s. No evidence has been found in the documents indicating the reemergence
of this ritual in any part of Guyana . Although the ritual continued in
South India, reports in 1858 suggested that in such districts as Canara and Nellore
the observance was "gradually on the decline" .
. . That_ ~illiams should pursue such a vigorous role in suppressing hook-swing ­
!~g 1s n~t d1ff1culto u~~er~~and. He constantly complained that the mission of
1~structmg and evan~ehzmg Indians had met with "multiplied difficulties", disheartening
to any evangelical. Others later were to echo the same " .
hard as stones and as cold as icicles,,. i 1 Williams ad b c~~- Indian' s are a~
obstacles he had encountered i·s h1·s m· . . um rated the ·1nsurmo ntable
1ss1onary activity:
1.
the utter indifference of the Coolies
tion, and particularly to the I d gen~rally to all religious obligaru
es an duties of the Christian.,system.
26

2. the extreme difficulty, I may say, impossibility, of gathering together
on one estate those labouring on near or even adjoining plantations.
3. the paucity of readers. .,
4. the extent of country over which the immigrants are scattered. . ,
5. the difficulty of establishing schools arising from the lack of persons
acquainted with both their languages and English to act as teachers.
6. the hitherto frequent changes in the place of residence. .
7. the aversion natural to men, and particularly strong in the Hindu, to
cast away his own creed for that of strangers.
8. the multiple difficulties which would (still) in many cases be found on
their return to India to beset their path if they embraced Christianity
here.
9. the sadly demoralizing effect of intemperance.
10. the pernicious consequence of the great inequality in the proportion
of the Sexes . 12
A decade lat r, the problems encountered by Williams were echoed by Reverend
E.B. Bhose, a Christian missionary to the Indians. Bhose adumbrated a variety
of obstacles deterring Indians from embracing Christianity. Conversion to Christianity
meant to Indians the severing of family ties and connection and "the loss of
worldly prospects ". Bhose observed that although caste distinctions and religious
prejudices underwent considerable modifications, the Indian community generally
would ostracize those who were christianized. Besides, Indian immigrants perceived
themselves as "exiles in a foreign land" and were more anxious to claim their return
passage entitlements than in renouncing their faith. The fear among Indians that
they might be debarred from revisiting Ind·a was another powerful obstacle to their
reception of Christianity. An additio stumbling block, observed Bhose, was
.r
the
conspicuous increase in intemperance in the Indian camp which "undermines their
constitution and makes them indifferent workers ". 13 These impediments tended
collectively to frustrate missionary activities with the result that in the nineteenth
centu~ Christianity touched only the fringes of the Indian immigrant communy
The motives of Williams and Barkly were not too difficult to discern. To the
former, suppression of hook-swinging would undoubtedly help to alleviate some of
the obstacles to missionary activity. Barkly, on the other hand, was a merchant,
mortgagee and proprietor of sugar estates in the colony and his appointment as
Governor ( 1848-1853) was designed to buttress the interests of sugar. His role in
the suppression of hook-swinging would, therefore, seem inimical to the propriet ,.,
27

kl s apparently conversant with the far-reaching social
interes~s-. But ~ar Y ~:curring in mid nineteenth-century British India. In 18
~nd
humamtanGan re olrWm~11·am Bentinck abolished sati or the burning of widows on th~'
Governor- enera 1 1 . . h hod e1r
b d , funeral pyres despite opposition from t e ort ox supporters of th
hus ~n 5 E
1
. the Indian Government had outlawed Female Infanticide or the
practice. ar ier, . f . I d' e
ractice of killing girls at birth owing to (the paucity o young men ~n n ia and) the
P
I
f the 'evil' dowry custom. By Act V of 1843, the lnd~an Gov rnment
prevaence o . . . f d' · h . ·
abolished slavery, thereby liberating m1lhons o In _1ans wit out co?1pe atmg their
owners. In 1856, Governor-General Lord Dalhousie passed the W1 w Remarriage
Act enabling Hindu widows to remarry. 14
Prohibition of hook-s~inging was, therefore, compatible with the humanitarian
measures pursued by British administrators in India. There was little sustained
opposition in India because the reforms touched only the fringes of the Indian social
system. Correspondingly_, the suppression of hook-swinging affected only an insignificant
number of indentured immigrants in Guyana and as such opposition was not
vocal.
While the Wesleyans launched a campaign of persuasion against hook-swinging,
initially they seemed to adopt a laissez-faire attitude towards tadjah or muharram ,
a ritual which certainly impeded missionary activity. Tadjah was a Muslim festival
commemorating the martyrdom of Hussain and Hassan, grandsons of the Prophet
Mohammed. This ritual, which ended in a procession, had gradually "degenerated
into a . Saturnalia in which Hindus, Mohamedans, and Negroes mingle promiscuously,
and rum and ganjah add to the religious fervour of the processionists. " 15 It
was often accompanied by violence and death, as the processionists were armed
with sticks, guns and asegais (cutlasses attached to poles). Not infrequently the
procession would block the entire highway and Indians "under the influence of artificial
or natural excitement" would attack any estate official who failed to dismount
from his horse or carriage on approaching tadjah 16
Despite the frequent inter-tadjah clashes assault and battery of · t
l b'd· · · d h ' 1nnocen
aw-a 1 mg citizens an t e general lawlessness which prevailed th 1· '
tempt to suppress tadjah as was done in the case of h - . ., ere was l~~e. atagainst
tadjah became .vocal, the planter-dominated I ook ~wmging · When cnbc1sm
by regulating the procession and stipulating rt . ocal Je?1slature responded merely
law. There were perhaps th . ce am penalties for infringement of the
b
' , ree mam explanat· f h
0 servance in Guyana.
tons or t e continuation of tadjah
28

firstly, the planters were apprehensive that any undue interference With the
religious practices of Indian immigrants would impact adversely on the prosperity of
the sugar industry. Interference could result in recruiting obstacles in India or the
stoppage of immigration, which was perceived as "a matter of life and death importance
to the Colony" . 17 Secondly, although the planters viewed the violence with
increasing disquiet, they realized that the aggression displayed during the ritual tended
to contribute to the control which estate management sought to exercise over labour
after Emancipation. It was claimed that, following the observance, workers became
more easily manipulated. Thirdly, even if the authorities were disposed to take
action against tadjah, the hundreds of spectators and participants, comprising Bengalis,
Madrasis, Chinese, Creoles, West Indians and Portuguese, demonstrated that it was
a national event and therefore difficult to abolish.
The suppression of hook-swinging, on the other hand, would not pose any
serious problems as participation was limited, mainly because of the extremely small
Madrasi population in the colony. The importation of Madrasis commenced in January
1845 and by 1848, the heyday of this immigration, a total of 6,417 had been
introduced in Guyana. The report of the Colony's Immigration Agent-General for
1858 showed that, of 26,779 emigrants despatched from India in the two decades
1838-1858, only 8,247 or 32.5 per cent were Madrasis. 18 By 1873, Madrasis
comprised a mere 4.8 per cent of the total workforce on the Guyanese sugar plantations,
owing to repatriation and a gradual movement away from the estates to seek
profitable employment in the urban areas.
The comparatively small importation of Madrasis was due mainly to planter
prejudice against their eating habits and~l eged indolence. The stereotype of the
Madrasis was that they frequently dishonoured their labour contracts and adopted a
life of vagrancy and drunkenness, that they were "idle, sickly and beggarly, filthy in
their food and habits, living often on putrified offal and carcasses rescued from the
vultures, covered with ulcers and inveterate itch". 19 These · alleged t~ ies coupled
with the fact that they were manifestly less docile than the Ben galls ·were traits considered
undesirable on estates, where the profit motive was paramount and labourers
regarded merely as animated machines . Consequently, some planters refrained from
employing them on any terms, while others would only engage thei~ces when
an alternative labour supply was not obtainable . .
This prejudice, however, seemed misguided for there were two distinct classes
of Madrasi immigrants. In fact, those resident at Plantations Albion, Paradise and
~
29

ere decidedly superior to those imported between 1845-184 7. 20 G
E nmore W h Be
ally Madrasis were less successful as labourers t an nga 1 ts . b u~, once acclirnatizect
ener­
any
became invaluable labourers and were generalJy employed m work of an aq .,
m
nature. Although Madrasi immigration
·
ceased tn
· 1863
, sma
JI b
atches did arrive.
uatic:
1886 and 1913 and they seemed to provide satisfactory service on the plantatio in
One District Immigration-Agent described them as "an intelligent lot of peop~:·
hardworking and amenable to discipline". 21
'
That the suppression of hook-swinging in Guyana elicited little resistance
could hardly be disputed. The comparatively small Madrasi importation and the
rather insignificant number of them resident on estates tended to blunt any concerted
action or vocal protest for its continuation . The planters, too, who depended
exclusively on Indian immigration to resuscitate the sugar industry, adopted an indifferent
attitude to hook-swinging even though restriction on Indian cultural activities
could prove a poor advertisement to emigration in India. Additionally, the
discon~inuation

11.
] 2.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
See R.J. Moore, 'East Indians and Negroes in British Guiana'. (Unpublished Ph .D. Thesis, University of
Sussex, 1970), pp . 345-353 .
P.R.0., C.O . 111/294, Williams to Barkly, 20 January 1853 .
The Royal Gazette, 21 April 186-S.
See R.C. Majumdar et al., An Advanced History of India, (Delhi, 1967), pp . 815-820 .
The Argosy , 28 February 1885.
For details of the socio-political effects of this ritual, see B. Mangru, "Tadjah in British Guiana. Manipulation
or Protest?", forthcoming in Indenture and Abolition (Toronto South Asian Review, 1993).
See H.V.P. Bronkhurst , The Colony of British Guiana and its Labouring Population (London,
1883), p. 128.
P.R.0 ., C.O. 111/321, Immigration Agent-General to Govt. of B.G., no. 133, 28 October 1858.
P.R.0 ., C.O. 111/250 , Ught to Lord Grey, No. 10, 11 January 1848 .
See Parliamentary Paper, 1851, XXXIX, (624). Colonial Land and Emigration Commission to Colonial
Office, 26 September 1850, pp. 431-432.
See Report of the Immigration Agent-General for 1914-1915.
31

GlN ANA'S GOIDEN AGE:
THE DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH
GUIANA, 1880-1930
by
David Granger
The years 1838 to 1938, constituted a century of continuous change and
crisis in the economic history of British Guiana. 1 During that era, the liberation of
over 80,000 ex-slaves from the Apprenticeship System, and the entry of over
340,000 2 Asians, Africans, Europeans and West Indians into the economy under
the Indentureship ~tern, drasti@lly altered the demographic composition of the
Colony, laid the basis for a large free populace and transformed the economy. Recurrent
crises and rising competitiveness in_ the !nternational commodity markets
triggered small booms and big depressions 3 which fractured the monocultural structure
of the Guyanese economy; they initiated a chain of events which created new
spatial patterns of land use, new avenues and institutions of enterprise, and new
modes of production.
It is in the context of such internal change anqjRternational crisis in the
nineteenth century that the economy of Guyana must be examined. For about fifty
years, from 1880 to 1930, several factors combined to intensify the rate and direction
of change . This paper seeks to discuss the major attempts made to diversify the
economy, largely between 1880 and 1930, in order to ascertain their causes and to
determine their extent. In attempting to account for these economic changes, the
paper argues that the challenge to the traditional sugar economy by a new diversified
econom~ was_ ~ad~ possible mainly by an indigenous middle class. This class incre~sed
its pohtical influence i~ the colonial polity as a result of constitutional changes
which challenged the ~lanters c~n_trol of colonial resources through the legislature .
By 1928, when a relatively restrictive constitution was introduced to limit th
1·rcal
power of the Creole elite, the thrust of diversification of th
e po 1 I
was blunted and many of the new a ti ·t· . e non-sugar economy
c vi 1es went into decline. .
To make sense, economic development and diversification m~st be seen as
32

more than mere short-term increments or quantitative alterations in the volume and
variety of economic output. Economic development is taken to be "... a process
whereby the material welfare of the people of a ... country is improved consistently
and substantially over long periods of time. " 4 In the same way, economic diversification
should be regard as a process whereby the monocultural structure of a typical
plantation economy could be significantly modified by the cultivation, extraction or
manufacture of a variety of commodities. In diversifying its economy, therefore ,. a
country could avoid sharp or sudden changes in revenue which might accompany
the fluctuations likely to occur by producing for a single market , such as Britain.
Equally, it could achieve a real improvement in the distribution of income among the
majority of the country 's people and make a permanent impact on their livelihood.
Historically, Guyana has been described as a plantation economy. This plan-
. ~
tation mode of production was characterised by a speculative outlook, a low level of
inves ent and technology, the high specificity of capital, production for export to
the world market, absentee ownership and the drain of surplus which superseded
reinvestment in the Colony . 5 Such a mode of production prevented the emergence
of a free, local market which could rival the export economy. In effect, Guyana was:
... little more than a geographical extension of the British economy
with the bulk of its revenues flowing directly out of the colony in the
form of remitted profits, interests on borrowed capital, rent and payments
for externally supplied estate inputs. 6
The idea of economic diversification , therefore , should be seen on the one hand ,
against this backdrop of preserving the plantation mode of production . of sugar for
export and. on the other hand, as aiming at the objective of building up a non-sugar
sector to satisfy domestic needs. Given the limited labour and, to a lesser extent,
land and capital resources of the Colony, the emergence of rival sectors implied that
there would be fierce competition within the local economy. To all ap _ earances, this
competition intensified with the thr?at to sug.ar during _ the 'Great Depression' in
Britain and declined, to some degree, about the time of the ' russels Convention ' in
1903. . . .
The second phase coincided with World War I during which Britain underwent
another depression ; it ended during yet another Great Depression ' of 1929,
1
soon afte; Guyana reached a level of constitutional and economic stagnation. The
gist of the argument of this . paper is that, during these · two phases, the domestic

"
diversification process was dependent, to a great degree, on the performance of th
plantation-export economy, which, in turn, was susceptible to external shocks cause~
by falling commodity prices. Once stability was restored , the diversification process
seemed to falter.
In the early years after the liberation of Africans from the Apprenticeship
System, and later when European and Asian labourers were freed from the
Indentureship System, a free peasantry had started to develop as the advance guard
of diversification. That free peasantry collided with the unfree plantation : "... where
one was strong the other was weak, and the plantations ' strength depended mainly
on sugar. " 7 In British Guiana, as elsewhere in the British Caribbean, the plantation
was more than an economic system of commodity production ; it was also a political,
social and cultural system of domination in which a small group of British officials,
planters and managers held sway over a large group of non-British labourers. Although
some planters were ruined by the changes which took place in the industry in
the middle of the nineteenth century, sugar was still regarded as the greatest potential
source of profit and many planters did remain , determined to prosper. The
planters, rightly or wrongly, considered their success, or survival, as depending on
their monopolistic control over the factors of production, particularly tractable labour
and empoldered land which were always in short supply in Guyana.
The labourers longed to escape from the harsh regime of plantation discipline
and the relentless cycle of planting and harvesting the sugar canes , and preserving
or extending the arable land; this meant quitting the fields if they had a choice.
The ambitions of the planter-class were therefore invariably in opposition to the
aspirations qf the labouring class. It was this underlying antagonism which governed
planters' approach to any significant form of economic activity, other than sugar
cane cultivation, which was likely to compete for scarce labour and land.
I
I
. The reasons, the rate, and the results of diversification, and indeed all other
maJor econ~mic activities in the Colony during this period therefore were regarded
as ~spect~. of the rivalry wit~ sugar: sugar planters and the plantatio~ system . Para ­
d~x1call~, 1t was. ou! of the 1mplanhng of a large immigrant population, installin an
ohgarch1c constituhonal order, and preserving the monocultural econorn f g
that the strongest reasons for diversification emerged.
y o sugar
One of the_most obvious factors wh· hf 'I' . . . .
graphic nature of the coastland D ·t . IC ac1 itated d1vers1f1cation was the geo-
. ~spt e its great extent, there were severe artificial
34

and natural obstacles to access to the land and the success with which it could be
used. The perennial problem of protection from the sea, and the recurrent_ cycle of
drought and flood, 8 demanded a complex network of dams, dykes, kokers and canals
which required skilled engineers for their construction, a centralised authority for
their management and enormous expenditure for their maintenance. They could
not easily be .. altered for other purposes, and the cost and conditions of purchase of
such improved lands were made deliberately prohibitive. These were all beyond the
resources of the impoverished peasants, many of whom were forced to seek new,
but less fertile, areas further away from the coastal markets. There , they produced
goods and crops which did not demand the same degree of investment and management
as sugar, if only to survive. 9 This was a 'push' factor away from the coast and
from sugar; they were obliged to diversify or die.
Another factor was the demographic transformation of Guyana . One of the
chief consequences of the termination of Apprenticeship was the accelerated growth
of villages:
Labour was free to move, free to choose betwee·n residence upon the
old plantation or settlement upon new land, free to use its time upon
plantation land, or upon its own plots, free to bargain for wages in
exchange for its own services. 10 . . ~:
Within the dramatic ae.cade (1838-1848), 44,456 ex-slaves bought 15,462.5 acres
of 'land at a cost of $1; 038, 000. 11 Secondly, and as a consequence of the first, there
was a significant shift of population from the plantations to the villages, a sudden
surge in wage labour, and a significant plunge in the relative size of the export sector
work force, from 88 per cent to 42.6 per cent of the employed population. 12 Thirdly,
there was relatively large-scale immigration of indentured labourers from Europe,
Africa, Asia and the West Indies. As soon as the immigrants , short contracts expired,
many chose to remain in Guyana, but not on the plantations; they decided, or
were forced, to fend for themselves in new occupations. Within ninety years, from
1841 to 1931, the population trebled from 98,154 to 302,585. The land had to
provide a living for over 200,000 more persons . 13
J
This demographic surge led to pressure on useful lands as· farms, settlements,
villages and towns were founded along · the coastland. It also led to occupational
differentiation , as people pursued divers~. economic ·interests. Most of all, these
movements had an expansionary effect on the growth of the internal . market by
35

oducing substitutes for imported consumer goods, by extending the systern f
~:tribution with travelling pedlars and petty shopkeepers, by expan~ing the rnon~y
economy through increasing the level of estate wages, and by creating basic infrastructure
in the form of the construction of. hou~~s, ~hurches , shops·, bridges anct
roads. All of these activities stimulated the d1vers1f1cabon of the economy.
Deriving from this demographic factor was the element of ethnic diversity. In
the pursuit of their commercial self-interest, the large non-planter majority of the
population embarked on new areas of endeavour. Between Emancipation in 1834
and 1891, about 228,800 immigrants entered Guyana, of whom fourteen per cent
were (Madeiran) Portuguese, six per cent were Chinese, six per cent were Africans
and seventy-four per cent were East Indians. 14 The Portuguese, who started coming
from as early as 1835, quit the fields as soon as they could and, by the 1840s, took
over dominance of the retail trade from the Africans and even cha11enged the bigger
merchants in the wholesale business. As a relatively cohesive community , they became
a dynamic entrepreneurial element not only in commerce but also in farming
and manufacturing. The Chinese , who came from 1853, followed suit, and after a .
shaky experiment in land settlement, became entrenched in the commercial sec~or.
Many of the East Indians who left the plantations remained in agriculture, but producing
non-sugar commodities such as rice, coconuts and cattle on a commercial
scale. Amerindians were increasingly marginalised from the plantation economy,
but were involved in the non-sugar economy, where they were employed for their
skills in logging, mining and river navigation, and as guides in the hinterland. Africans
spread most widely across the coastland and hinterland. Most remained as
peasant farmers in the rural areas, but many moved into urban occupations in the
service trades or as skilled artisans, and pioneered the development of hinterland
settlement and employment. 15 The sundry origins of these people , their diverse
interests, traditions and skills and their occupational differentiation were an impetus
to the diversification from the pre-existent monoculture.
36

Government, constitutional reforms were introduced in 189l1 6 which ned the
po itical grip of the planters on the apparatus of the state . The gradual infiltration of
r;presentatives of the new indigenous professional elite into the legislature was able
to bring about the relaxation of restrictive controls over Crown lands, 17 thereby fa_silitatin~~:upatioA
af IM1d for facroiog and cattle-rearing on the coastland, and for
fogging and mining in the hinterland.
The constitutional order of the day was the main determinant of the distribution
of power since the planters, who formulated policy in the Court of Policy, also
influenced fiscal policies and dominated the statutory boards which regulated public
works. 1s In this way, they impeded activities which hindered, and improved the flow
of funds to activities which helped , sugar production . The capture of political power
through constitutional reform was, therefore, a prime objective of non-sugar in~r ­
e~ring the last uarter of the nineteenth century. It would have -been im ssible
to pursue any serious programme o economic 1versification in the face of the
planter opposition without acquiring a secure platform of political power.[f he political
victory of the new business elite over the old planter elite was the ref ore one of the
reasons for economic diversification because it broke-the opposition to change , opened
access to land and allowed greater mobility to labour.
The logical consequence of control of the legislature was the capacity to
make laws which reflected the class intere.sts of the lawmakers. One of the main
causes of the demise of the African Village movement had been the 'l~islative encirdement'19
engineered by the planter elite io the Court of Policy. There ,the law
was used methodically as a weapon of coercion , by· means of various fiscal devices,
to obstruct the acquisition of land and t 1 of working people. 20 Hence ,
once cons 1 u 1ona change had been effected, and politica power assured , some of
the legal obstacles erected by the planters , particularly in relation to the sale of Crown
lands and the inequitable distribution of taxes, were dismantled.
A variety of social factors facilitated diversification. In particular, the introduction
of compulsory primary education in 1876 21 accelerated the acculturat ion
process r amongst the polyglot immigrant community and aided their assimilation of
new techniques and technology . It is not without significance that each extension of
the electoral franchise , and . the adoption of technical · innovations in industry or agriculture,
followed educational advances . In addition ~ the · several social, professional,
political and religious institutions which emerged terided to reinforce ethnic or social
particularism. This led to the eruption of political agitation, ethnic conflict ·and labour
37

th ne hand O
unrest on e · 22 They . . also fostered . the d formation h b · of ethnic-based . 1 and-
J t Schemes limited liability companies an ot er usmess groupings wh·
sett emen , , t·t d t .b t d ich
eroded the monopoly control of the old planter e t e an con n u e to diversification,
on· the other hand.
Technological improvement stimulated eco~omic div~rsific~tion in several
ways. New equipment and more efficient processing techn~iues mtr~uced into
sugar factories released many workers for other employme~t. Inventions such as
the telephone, telegraph and electricity and improvements tn transport such as the
railway and steamer, demanded new skills and provided new occupational opportunities.
The industrial progress of Europe and North America created markets for
hitherto unexploited commodities such as rubber, balata and bauxite. 24 In order to
satisfy the needs for these new skills and commodities, there had to be a shift away
from the narrow limits of the monocultural economy.
The economic depression in Europe was probably the single most important
d immediate reason for diversification. There were two asJ?gcts - international and
internal. In e irst case, ritain's population and industrial capability had made it a
v9racious cons1 iroer of raw material from the underdeveloped areas of the world. In
its shift toward free trade ver Britain all but stripped away the preferential tariff
un er w 1c ar indust en·o ed a rivileged, protected, if
not prosperous, existence. Caribbean cane sugar gradually lost its share o the
market during the second half of the nineteenth centu to both the -sugar
pr:oducers from tro ic areas sue as razil and Cub s to th

established as a m~jor _source of staple food production and a manifestation of agricultural
diversification m the Guyanese economy.
The final important reason for diversification was the opportunity afforded
b the conjuncture of discoveries in the second half of the century. They furnished
tie 'pull' factor of labour into other industries, just as the depressi~n furnished the
. ush' factor out of the sugar industry. The chief discovery was thafof gold, 2 8 which
fttracted new classes of investors, owner-managers and labourers, provided a_ valuable
export commodity, stimulated the rise of a variety of small market-oriented
industries (such as foodstuff and transport), and opened the way for_ other forest.
activities. During this time also, the revelation of the usefulness of balata (1859), ~P~ .
discovery of bauxite (1896), and the international demand for green_heari logs '(c.·
1850s) all pointed to the possibility of exploiting local resources, establishing exportoriented
products, and further diversifying the economy.
•
~
Of these reasons, it was the collapse of sugar prices in the mid-1880s which
did the greatest dcimage to the economic dominance of sugar and the political position
of the pJantocracy. The crisis convinced Guyanese of all races and classes, and
even the British Government which appointed a Royal Commission , 29 of the dangerous
f oily of relying · too heavily on a single crop for their subsistence. The crisis
accentuated the social and political contradictions within th accelerated tne
movement for constitutiona re orm
e
largely expatriate lanter {upper) class and the indi enous mercantile and profess10nal
(middle) class. 30 n s ort, the competition between the sugar and the nonsugar
sectors of the economy for land, labour and capital was exacerbated. There
was, therefore, not one single reason, but several reasons, why economic diversification
was sought.
In some measure, it was the outcome of the struggle between the two elites
which would determine the degree of that diversification over the next half-century.
Economic diversification extended into several service and productive areas of activity.
Some activities were supportive of the economy, others were directly p~9(iuctive.
They all developed side by side, however, and should be seen as .separate
components but of the same process.
The most elemental change was the rapid expansion of administrative services
and public utilities which themselves were the harbingers of economic transf ormation.
Prior to Emancipation, slaves were privately -~wned and thus were the re-
39

sponsibility of their masters; since they repre:ented over eighty per cent of the Population
Government's responsibility was confined to a small ~umber of persons. Aft
Em
' ancipation however Government became charged with responsibility for la"·
er , , . I h 31 d . d vv
enforcement, administration of justice, welfare, heat , e ucahon, an later, a variety
of public works such as the pure water supply, sewer~ge and sea defence systems
for the entire population. There was also need for coinage to make payments of
wages of the expanding labour force and for postage stamps to facilitate local and
international correspondence.
These services and utilities furnished the foundation and framework without
which other forms of economic activity could not take place efficiently. They were
so complex and costly, and required such a level of cooperation and expertise, that
they could be undertaken only by a competent central authority such as the Government.
The immediate economic consequence was a sudden surge in central Government
expenditure which increased fivefold from 1833 to 1842. 32
;. Another area of innovation and diversification was in communications and
transport. In communications, cable messages were exchanged between Georgetown
and London in 1871, the telephone was introduced in 1884 and wireless telegraphy
in 1909. In transport, the first railway (East Demerara) was opened for traffic in '·
1848, 33 the Georgetown electric tramway in 1901, and the coastal steamer service ,
and aeroplane flights were inaugurated in 1913. A network of roads - main, branch
and village and estate - was developed, and fair-weather hinterland roads were opened
in the North to Wanaina, in the South to the Rupununi and in Central Guyana, to
Kangaruma. 34 The economic impact of such infrastructure was the improvement of
access to information and to new areas. It was important enough for entrepreneurs
of hinterland activities to demand the equitable distribution of expenditure on similar
services as the coastland enjoyed. 35
'
. An i1:1portant area of diversification was in building construction, especially
1n ."':'ood, which reached its apogee. Almost all of Georgetown's most impressive
edifices - the Supreme Court (1887} the City Hall (1889) and St G ' C th
d l ( 89 . · . ' , . eorge s a e-
ra_ 1 .2) - which added endunng elegance and grace to the urban skyline rose
dun~g this era. They called forth new professional ·expertise in a h't , .
neenng and craftsmanship and stimulated I ·n . . re t ecture, eng1-
use of, and demand for focal woods 36 Thoggi g and sa~rrulhng enterprises by their
expansion of constructi~n in wood th f e growth of villages -and towns, and the
sification. ' ere ore extended the scope of economic diver-
40

Another area was that of commerce , and the ancillary wholesale and retail
trades. The expansion of the free population and the creation of a wider domestic
market encouraged the demand for locally-prcx:fuced focx:f as a substitute for imports.
Initially, the value of imported food, drinks and tobacco fell. 37 The importation of
foreign clothing and other commodities, however, continued and swelled the inventories
of consumer gocx:fs available to the public. As a result, shipping increased and l \
brought about a rise in the number of warehouses, shops , markets, hucksters and
pedlars. Economic diversification was achieved by the increase in the va,riety of
employment opportunities of a greater part of the population into the money economy ,
the utility of the foreign hardware imported , and the prcx:fuctivity of local farmers and
artisans for the market. On the other hand, the continued importation of some
items of foodstuff hampered local prcx:fuction of substitutes and limited the extent of
diversification. ·
There were major changes in the availability of banking services, credit, capital
and investment finance . The 'Colonial Bank of the West Indies' and the 'British
Guiana Bank ' had been granted their charters since 1836 and were well established.
As a result of instability in agriculture, they were expressly prohibited from pr.oyiding
credit to such enterprises, particularly sugar. 38 Fire and Life insurance servi~es had
developed in response to the frequent and devastating fires to which the wooden
buildings of Georgetown were often subject. 39 lh~y too became reservoirs of capital.
·
The money accumulated by the . banks and insurance companies , however,
was used only to a limited extent for investment in productive industries. The bulk of
their capital was tied up in bonds and deposits. 4 ° Capital for business credit was
precarious, and in the highly speculative atmosphere of nineteenth-century Guyana,
credit Wq~,grpnted for extremely short periods of sixty to ninety days, too short for a
satisfacton,i return on investine~t, and precluding long-term enterprise . As a result,
when principal importers demanded cash payment for goods, small dealers would
tumble into bankruptcy . This had the effect of hindering the development of new
industries and limiting the extent of diversification .
The most successful field of diversification was in farming and, to a lesser
degree, in livestock-rearing. Six crops (apart from sugar-cane and rubber) were grown
with some success - rice , coconuts, cacao, coffee, citrus (limes in particular), and
ground provisions. Further attempts at diversifying farming by growing cotton , kola
nut, and nutmeg on a commercial scale, yielded very indifferent results, but fruit,
J
41

t~bacco and ginger survived on some small farms. 41
Several factors favoured the few crops which flourished: they were all Oriented
to the export market; they were grown on lands which had formerly been used
for sugar-cane and therefore had improved irrigation and drainage; labour had easy
access to the fields, and the level of capital investment was low· On the other hand,
production was hampered by poor selection of sites and soils (for example, the heavy,
; wet conditions on the coast were unsuitable for the cultivation of cacao and coffee),
poor transportation to the market from outlying and riverain areas, and the proliferation
of plant diseases due to ignorance of new crops or lack of research or resources
to deal with them. 4 1 At another level, some commodities such as cotton, coffee and
rubber were produced at too high a cost, and in too low quantities, to compete
against producers such as Brazil and the U.S .A., on the international market. Further,
once the local sugar industry recovered from the recession , it was able to restrict
the transfer of redundant labour and land to new crops, and tried to regain ground
Jost to other crops.
The predicament of livestock-rearing demonstrates the difficulty of diversification
in the shadow of the sugar estates. Most of the animals were reared as
·appendages to some other form of farming, such as paddy cultivation, where they
could be grazed after the harvest but, while the paddy grew, the animals had to be
kept away, frequently in water-logged fields 'aback', severely affecting their health
and worth. Livestock made a breakthrough both for territorial and commercial diversification
in the Rupununi savannahs. But here again, inefficient husbandry, inferior
pasturage and the long distance from coastal markets impeded the growth of this
enterprise. 43
. A~other endur~n~ fiel~ of diversification was in forestry, where logging was
the most important activity. ~ imber was established as an export industry as early as
the 18?0s when the construction of canals, piers, ports and docks in the industrialised
co~!ne: of the world created a demand and outlet for greenheart 44 The local
building industry also provided good markets and by the 1880 th .
two steam -powered saw mills operating to meet those needs . s, ere were already
Salata production enjoyed a brief flor
London in 1859 and its gutta h 1· . escence after samples were sent to
20 000 lb perc a qua tbes were reve l d Th
, ,! , • s .. were being exported. but the fled I' . a e · ree years later,
ep 110. ic .Jf mismanagemenf4S c~us db dg ing industry was plagued with an
e Y cru e bleedin 9 an d careless preparation
42

of the product. Rubber fared no better, despite a brief boom; the indigenous species
were found to have a low commercial value. Although an attempt was made to
switch to the more prolific Hevea Brasi/iensis grown successfully in the Amazon
region, 46 local output could not maintain a profitable foothold on the foreign market
which was flooded with cheaper Brazilian rubber. Other for est products, such as
gums and nuts, 47 were collected in small quantities but never became established as
major exports.
The earliest attempts at industrialisation were in manufacturing and milling;
the latter was an adjunct of agriculture, namely in sugar cane, copra and rice milling,
and of forestry in sawmilling, and reflected a small degree of technological advancement.
Commercial manufacturing achieved some measure of import substitution
and, by 1930, there were already aerated water bottling plants, biscuit and bread
bakeries, boot factories - one on the East Bank and one on the West Bank, Demerara
- a soap factory, a castor-oil factory, a tannery, distilleries, a woodworking factory, ·
chemical works and plants for the production of candles, cigars, citrate of lime, ice ·
and macaroni. 49 The bulk of manufactures was consumed locally, but a few items,
such as coconut oil, citrate of lime and hides were exported. ,-
Mining was an almost entirely new field. The brightest spot belonged to
gold, the discovery of which was first announced in 1863 in the Cuyuni. Commercial
mining was sporadic but a real gold rush began in the 1890s, the decade 1893-
1903 being Guiana's 'golden age' of mining. 50 The major portion of prcxluction
came from placers worked by individuals or small groups of tributers. Capitalists
formed several companies and introduced quartz mining (1890), hydraulicing (1902)
and dredging (1906) techniques. In 1890, the discovery of diamonds was also reported
and extraction took place alongside gold mining; it is therefore possible to
speak of gold and diamond mining as a single industry.
The economic importance of these precious minerals was enhanced during
the 'Great Depression' as local banks were able to use gold as a stable medium of
exchange for commcx:lities from Great Britain. 51 Gold also became the basis of the
wealth of some members of the middle class and a significant area of employment of
African labour. -.. As with other 1 bush' activities of this petiod,-however, g9!dmini_!}g
was a poorly-mana ed busin es ite the bi profits -of the boom ears. l he cost
of · ue to o erate m anical e uipment rose; the danger and difficulty· of penetratin
furt er into bush attenuated the rai transport and logistical resources; abour
remained seasonal and itinerant, and capit investment was low and speculative,
----
43

The mining of bauxite start!::_d after the registration and establisbroeot althe
Oemerara Bauxite Campany ( J 9 J 6), a s11bsidiarv of the Canadian Northern Aluminum
Company. The mineral was discovered at Akyma (1896) and output rose ~ery
slowly because of the backward technology. At fir~t, work was done witb'+)icks,
shovels, wheelbarrows an - rts. 53 Exports reached 4,199 tons by 12) 8
and b -21 · n rose to n . In the post-war depression of the
,l
late 1 :c---Os
'
over two-thirds of the workers were laid-off and output stagnated until its
.
recovery during the Second World War. The industry, nevertheless, became wellestablished
during this period.
1
Historically, the diversification of the economy of British Guiana started in
the 1850s. The process moved very slowly because of the strength of the sugarexport
economy, the power · of the planter class to prevent factors of production
from.being moved out of the sugar sector, the absence of an entrepreneurial class to
promote new enterprises and the lack of knowledge .or means to exploit previously
underutilised resources .
. ' . I
·· ·By the mid 1880s - 1890s, all this had changed. Sugar exports had been
reduced and prices had fallen in the crisis of 1884; the constitutional grip of the
planter class had been loosened by the reforms of 1891, and redundant land and
labour could more easily be deployed to other fields; an articulate middle class had
emerged, and inventions and innovations from industrialised countries and the discoveries
of : deposits of natural resources in Guiana made commercial exploitation
possible.
The diversification process had three principal effects on the economy of
B~itish Guiana. These were~ 'the creation of an indigenous business elite and the
reinforcement of the trend towards an ethnic division of labour~'1,{e consolidation of
c;1 landed peasantry and the _oper:iin~ up of the hinterland~\nd the formation of a
large, free domestic market. · ·
Many Portuguese and Chinese went into the capitalist. strata of business, in
44

insurance, commerce, manufacturing and in the formation of limited liability companies
for mining and the extraction of forest products. Many Africans became prof essionals
or entered the service trades. They joined the small but growing public
service in jobs such as clerks and policemen or became artisans in urban services and
trades; with the Amerindians, they also provided the main labour force for mining
and the forest industries. Many East Indians became entrenched in rice and coconut
cultivation and cattle-rearing on the coastland. -
The extensive hinterland was penetrated, though not effectively settled except
in a few spots, by gold-miners, loggers, and balata-bleeders. Tenuous communications
were established with the Rupununi; coastal steamers crossed the estuaries
of the great rivers, and aeroplane flights were started.
The value of non-sugar goods exported from the Colony soared. The domestic
market was enlarged by the increased production, and distributive trades carried
goods to all parts of the Colony.
The extent of this economic diversification could thus be measured by the
vast area under cultivation and the variety, value and volu,me of goods which Guyana
became capable of producing and exporting. The evidence shows that between
1903 and 1923, acreage under rice, coconut, cacao and coffee increased, while that
under sugar declined. Although initially the exports of agricultural commodities gradually
increased, towards 1930 (except for timber, rice and provisions), they all were in
a state of decline . The same is true for gold, though not for diamonds. 54 In the last
analysis, diversification was manifested in the changing patterns of land use, occupational
differentiation and resource allocation in the colony. By 1930, however, in
the face of yet another world-wide depression, this time precipitated in part by the
stock market crash in the U.S.A ., the diversification process had reached a plateau.
The diversifi~ation of the economy was the result of several factors which
had been held in check by the near-absolute powers ·wielded by the plantocracy in
the monocultural economy under the system of slavery. The monopoly control over
labour was ~haken by the depression of the 1880s which forced the retrenchmen t ·of
resources . The monop o ly pr'oduction for export was broken by the collapse of sugar
prices when · the planters were obliged to encourage domestic production for consumption.
The monopoly of political power in the legislatu~e was broken ~y the
Constitutional Reform of 1891. The monopoly of Crown _lands was relaxed . . Out
of all this· arose a new elite which sharpened the struggle between the closed planta-
45

· rt-economy of sugar and the open diversified economy.
tion expo
During the first phase of this study, from 1~80 !~ 1903, when the sugar
sector declined, the production of gold soared and the d1v~~s1f1ed sector of t_h econorny
became fairly well-established. External market conditions for sugar improved in
1903 after the Brussels Convention, 56 but fell during the years of World War I and
finally started to rise again in the early 1920s, 57 probably in response to the restoration
of imperial protective tariffs. 58 During the second phase (1904-1930), with few
exceptions, many of the industries which had been established or reintroduced went
into decline or stagnated. The relative languor of the diversified sector could be
compared with the renewed vigour of the sugar sector. 59 It would therefore be useful
to draw some conclusions on the major factors which limited the extent of the diversification
of the economy of the Colony.
Some of the new industries and agricultural enterprises had been established
in the hinterland or in riverain areas which were relatively difficult to reach. The
construction of adequate infrastructure, particularly of transport and communications,
was too costly to bear either by Government or the private companies which
were formed. As a result, access and delivery of produce became expensive and
unreliable. The further into the bush or upriver activities moved, the worse the
problems of logistics became. Inevitably, many of these industries were plagued by
an epidemic of mismanagement. Workers were often required to function on their
own with meagre resources and without supervision; techniques of husbandry were
careless, if not reckless; the level of technology was low and professional knowledge
was scant. 60
Despite the early establishment of investment, finance institutions such as
banks and insurance companies, and the profits from the gold industry, credit to new
enterprises seemed to be of a limited and short-term nature. It was therefore unable
to ~ustain the large-scale, long-term development of estate crops or new enterprises
which took lo~ger to show returns on investment. · In fact, in an era when the sugar
sector was bemg treate~ as an organized business activity, the diversified sector was
regarded as a speculative venture with 'mushroom' companies be" f d d
n -· · t b kr 1ng orme an
co. ~psmg m O . an uptcy thereafter. Due to the instability of the · war ears the
efficiency and size of larger low-cost international commocJ.·ty od y d ' l
because of the smatl-scale hi h cost d . 1 pr ucers, an part y
produced by 'hit-and-miss' 'me(hod an unreliable suppli~s of Guyanese goods
s, export markets could not be maintained.
46

Most of aIJ the opposition of-the planter class to the development of the
h·nterland and the 'emergence of rival industries never relented. As during th~ sec 1 -
1
ond half of the nineteenth century, this economic strugg
l
e_ was wa
ged vicanous
. . tuthrough
the legislature. The result was that, in 1928, a relatively b~ckw~rd .consti ,
Y
tion was imposed on the Colony designed, in part.to safeguard the .special interests
of the sugar sector of the economy. 61 At this juncture, the political position of the
professional elite was weakened and the process of the diversification of the economy
slowed noticeably.
The local entrepreneurial elite itself was perhaps unwilling to look beyond
quick commissions and short-term investments, or unable to bear the burden of
major economic development. It did not have access to capital, technology, shipping
and overseas markets as the new transnational corporations had in the sugar
industry. The diversified sector seemed doomed to stultification after its 'beginner's
luck' ran out, and its initial investments were exhausted. By 1930, it was still speculative
in its outlook, primitive in its technology, and exploitative in its relations with
workers, just as sugar had been a hundred years earlier.
It could be said, therefore, that the diversification of the economy of British
Guiana up to 1930 was only a limited success. By the end of this period, no single
industry had been able to supersede sugar in terms of extent of land under cultivation,
value of commodity exported, or size of labour force employed. The material
base of commodity prcxluction in the Colony nevertheless had been significantly
expanded, the domestic consumer market had been enlarged and the variety of
goods extended far beyond what prevailed fifty years earlier in 1880. Although
there had been sporadic fluctuations, and a general pattern of decline had already
become evident in the late 1920s, there was no complete collapse, abandonment or
reversal of the diversification process as a whole. It was clear that change had been
substantial and widespread over a reasonably long period of time, . and the lives of a
significant part of the population of all races ·had been affected, if not impr(?v~d.
By 1930, the drive towards diversification had slowed; there was disillusionment
caused by economic distress which, later that decade, degenerated into violent
industrial disturbances and political dissatisfaction. Diversification had failed to dethrone
'King Sugar' in the economy. Its enduring legacy, however, was to demonstrate
to posterity, the enormous but still unexploited physical potential of the Colony
and the wide scope of human endeavour arid enterprise to create a broad-based, selfreliant
economy.
47

l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
16.
NOTES
Gu . , p to 26 May 1966 when it became independent
·s T h ,ana u ' ·
Guyana was known as n ,s. . S stem l 834 -1838 : A Leap in the Dark." History Gazette
2
M.N. Menezes! 'The App~entic;s7ip /vary, one being as high as 90 ,000 . But mak)ng provisions fo/~~:88 ),
8. The figures f~r emancipate s_ a~:ce table. See also, Dwarka Nath , A History of Indians in Gu ildren
anddeat~s .. ~h~ figu~~ of 80 ,00Jo~ - Th~ Author, 1970), pp . 219-220 . The figure 341,599 is un\ikeli~ttQ.
Second Revised ~itton . (L~n d f rsons whose entry was recorded by the Immigration Departrn be
accurate since this was calcu ated ;om ~ . An Economic History of Britain since 1"750.

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 57 .
20. James Rose, 'The Taxation Policy of Sir Henry light, 1838-1848', History Gazette, 38, (1991), pp. 2-3 .
21. Hazel M. Woolford, 'The Introduction of the Compulsory Denominational f.ducatlon Bill, 1876', History
Gazette, 9, (1989).
22. There was serious friction between the Africans on the one hand, and the Portuguese, the Chinese and the
East Indians, as separate groups, on the other. During this time also, East Indian (1918), Chinese (1920) and
African (1922) ethnic Associations were established and political proto-parties were created. The Royal Agricultural
and Commercial Society, a planters' association, was formed .(1844) and the Chamber of Commerce
was incorporated (1898). The British Guiana Labour Union was the first trade union to be registered (1922).
23 . Richard A Lobdell, 'Patterns of Investment and Sources of Credit in the British West Indian Sugar Industry,
1838-97'. Joumal of Caribbean History , 4, (1972), 34. These included ploughs, boilers, steam engines,
hydraulic lifts and mechanical cane and megass carriers. See also Mandie, pp. 61-62 .
24 . These will be discussed later in this paper .
25 . W. Beachey, The British West Indies Sugar Industry in the Late 19th Century . Reprint. (Westport:
Greenwood Press Publishers, 1978), p . 50 .
26 . Ward, p. 18.
27. M. Shahabudden . From Plantocracy to Nationalisation: A Profile of Sugar in Guyana .
(Georgetown: University of Guyana, 1983), p. 232 . See also Adamson, pp. 258-259.
28 . Moehr, 'The Discovery of Gold ... · 61.
29 . Great Britain, Report of the West India Commission (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1897).
Although this Commission recommended that the sugar industry should be saved from collapse, it also advocated
the development of the hinterland, and the diversification of the economy, by opening communications
and introducing new crops.
30. Francis Drakes, 'The Middle Class in the Political Economy of British Guiana, 1870-1928 '. History Gazette,
11, (1989), pp . 4-5 . See also Moohr, ''The Discovery of Gold ... " p. 65. The reason for this confrontation
was that the planters had invested in sugar and the professionals had invested in gold and other 'new'
products.
31. Moohr, 'The Economic Impact of Slave Emancipation .. ', 592 . As a result, Government had to build jails and
asylums and employ an entirely new and wide range of official personnel to carry out these functions.
32. Ibid ., 593.
33. A.R.F. Webber, Centenary History and Handbook of British Guiana (Georgetown: The Argosy
Company Limited, 1931), p. 224 et seq.
34. British Guiana Handbook, 1922, p. 17. . . .
35. Moehr, "The Discovery of Gold ... ," 66. It was realised then, as later, that efficient communications are an
essential prerequisite to any form of economic development in the hinterland of Guiana. The Balata Company
bought a seaplane in 1925 to reduce travelling time to its hinterland locations. See H.S. Burrowes. Fifty
Years of Flying in" British Guiana. (Georgetown : Guyana Graphic, 1963), p. 5.
36. Rodney, pp. 94-95 . }
37. Moohr, 'The Economic Impact of Slave Emancipatioh ... · 597 . .
38. J. Van Sertima, Th_e British Guia,na Bank: Brief Hi tory.' Timehri, 3, ·Inird Series (1913), 9. See also,
Lobdell, p. 37.
39. Webber, p . 270.
40. Adamson, p . 260 .
41. Edgar Beckett, 'The Minor Industries,' Timehri, 2, Th'rd Series (1912), 73 et seq . .
42 . Ibid ., pp . 73-78 . Most of the commercial crops were ,seriously affected~ disease . ~oco~uts s~ffer~d from
'bud rot' cocoa and coffee were infected by the dang~rous fungus called witch broom which still existed on
old estat~s, and plantatio~s were affected by 'moko' disease, for example. • . .
43. Harry Everard Turner , The Rupununi Development Company, Limi~ed: ThefEarldly f!•;io~.
(Georgetown: Autoprint, 1972), p. 9. Contrary to the ~)aims by Moohr,. The Discovery o Go ... , , t e
savannahs do not make ideal grazing lands.
44 . Rodney, p. 92. There was also a local need for fuel (charcoal and logs) and for other products such as staves
and shingles for roofing .
49

45.
46 .
47 .
48 .
49.
50.
51.
52.
53 .
54 .
55 .
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
George C. Benson, 'The Balata Industry .' Timehri , 2, Third Series (1912), 81
F.A. Stockdale, 'The Indigenous Rubber Trees of British Guiana,' Timehri, 1, New Series (1 912
British Guiana Handboo~ 1922, p . 99 . }, 21
Ibid ., p. 154. See also Khayum, p . 6.
Many of these items found their way overseas .
James Rodway, History of British Guiana From t~e 1:"ear 1668 . Volume III. (Georgetown, 18
9
217-227 passim . Vide Table 4 which shows the dechne m the second phase .
1·94),
Rodney, p. 98 .
Alan Lancaster, · An Unconquered Wilderness : A Historical Analysis 1919' (M.A. Thesis, University of Guy
1977). See also Rodway, 218. ana,
Ralph Prince, 'Demba Completes 50 Years in Guyana ·. The Chronicle Christmas Annual, 19 66
77. . ' p,
Vide Tables 3 and 4 which ill1:15trate inter ~l_ia the signifi~a~t improve~ent in_ the export potential of the
colony of its agricultural and mineral commod1ttes. T~bl~ 1 md1cates th~ change m l~nd use and Table 2, the
livestock population . The variety of exportable goods 1s hsted at Appendix 1. It provides evidence of the Wid
scale of commodities which were actually produced, although, admittedly , some of their quantities were palt e
and their prominence was transitory .
ry
Moohr, 63-65.
Beachey , p . 165. This was an agreement among European producers to suppress bounties for beet sugar on
the one hand and to eschew preferential tariffs for cane sugar on the other .
Ward. p 47. See also Table on p . 9 .
Ibid ., p . 47 .
Lobdell, 53, and Thomas, p. 24 . During this period, the sugar sector in Guyana was taken over by large TNCs
which applied enormous capital , modern technology and efficient techniques to transform the plantations into
businesslike enterprises.
Turner. p. 9, and Benson , p . 81.
Harold A. Lutchman , Some Aspects of the Crown Colony System of Government with Special
Reference to Guyana . Mimeo (Georgetown : Critchlow Labour College , 1970), p. 23 .
•' .,
APPENDIX 1
TABLE 1: ACREAGES UNDER CULTIVATION: 1903, 1913, 1923
I
SUGAR coco- PRO-
YEAR CANE RICE NUTS CACAO COITTE RUBBER LIMES V\SlONS
1903 78,860 17,500 3,950 1,530 15,748
1913 72,685 33,889 14,177 1,863 3,166 4,018 941 17,580
1923 57,814 34,965 22 ,970 1,903 4,096 2,080 800 11,924
TABLE 2: LIVESTOCK ON COASTI.AND: 1914, 1918, 1923
YEAR HORSES MWLES OONKEYS CAITLE BUFFALOES GOATS SHEEP SWINE
1914 1,010 "2,000 6,000 79,500 100 14,800 19,700 11,600
1918 1,002 2,359 5,332 77,108 176 11,136 20 ,611 12,532
1923 800 1,790 5,440 56,670 264 7,940 15,130 11,134
,
50

TABLE 3· . EXPORTS OF AGRJCULnJRAL COMMODIDES: 1900-1930 (BY VALUE-G$)
PROcoco-
YEAR TIMBER RJCE NUTS CACAO COFFEE SALATA CITRUS VISIONS
1900-01 87,374 N.A . 1,340 2,444 - 94,007 N.A . 809
1915 53,383 642,678 31 ,280 8,508 18,238 766 ,089 N.A. N .A.
1930 139,647 1,090,385 1,845 N.A. 22,400 390,292 10,885 16,872
TABLE 4: EXPORTS OF MINERALS: 1903-1930
(BY VALUE-G$)
MINERAL 1902-1903 1906-1907 1910-1911 1914 1918 1922 1926 1930
GOLD 1,789,587 1,532 ,266 946,7777 1,114,007 391 ,467 179,070 98,263 89 ,581
DIA - 97,710 32 ,627 29 ,573 87 ,196 164,230 3,859,357 3,300 ,952 1,431 ,364
MONDS
Sources : British Guiana, Annual Reports of the Heads of Departments
Reports 1894 to 1930.
1880 to 1896 Administrative
Appendix 2
GENERAL UST of PRINCIPAL EXPORTS of DOMESTIC PRODUCE c.1917
Class I - Food, Drink and Tobacco.
( 1) Cattle, horned
(2) . Coffee, raw
(3) Coconuts
(4) Lime Juice
(5) Indian Corn or Maize
(6) Rice
(7) Farinaceous Preparations
(8) Salt, fine
(9) Nutmegs
( 10) Bitters
(11) Rum
(12) Sugar, unrefined
(13) Molasses
(14) Vegetables (fresh)
(6) Copra
(7) Oils - Coconut
(8) Lumber
(9) Timber
{10) Firewood
Class Ill - Articles wholly or mainly Manufactured
(1) Molascuit
{2) Charcoal
(3) Citrate of Lime
(4) Glue
{5) Oils - Essential (of Llmes)
(6) Starch
(7) Railway Sleepers
(8) Shingles
Class II - Raw Materials and Articles
mainly Unmanufactured
(1) Diamonds
(2) Salata
(3) Rubber
(4) Hides
(5) Bauxite
Class IV - Miscellaneous and Unclassified
(1) Asse.s
(2) Horses
(3) Mules
Class V - Bullion and Specie
(I) 'Raw Gold ·

BID FOR EL DORADO:
THE GUYANA-VENEZUELA BORDER PROBLEM
by
Henry Jeffrey
Guyana, whose rich feet are mines of gold. Whose forehead
knocked against the roof of stars. Stands on her tip-toes ·at fair
England looking. Kissing her hands, lowering her mighty breast.
And every sign of submission making to be her sister and her
. daughter .both. Of our most sacred maid.
George Chapman · (Adamson &. Folland, 1969: 232)
Sir Walter Raleigh so believed in the legend of El Dorado, ruled by the Emperor
El Dorado, that he spent his entire fortune fitting out expeditions bound for its
imperial city, Manca. The Spanish conqu~st of the Aztecs and Incas and the treasure
which flowed into the Spanish treasury dazzled the minds of European monarchs.
Raleigh observed that the Spanish wealth consisted mainly of silver; therefore,
he speculated, America's gold existed elsewhere.
The Empire of Guiana is directly east from Peru. It hath more
abundance of gold than any part of Peru, and as many or more great
cities than Peru had; it is governed by the same laws, and the people
obey the same religion and the same form of policies in Government
as was used in Peru not differing in any part. (Ibid: 236)
This Raleigh knew even before he left England. He had come into contact
with persons who told stories of tons of gold, and a few of his contacts had even
visited the "imperial city"! Whatever the genesis of this story, the .truth,9f the matter
is that El Dorado did not exist and Raleigh, Berrio, and others suffered in vain.
(Naipaul, 1973: 25-109) Nonetheless, that area in which the imaginary city of gold
became best associated continues to give rise to controversy. At the end of the last
century, war between Great Britain on.the one hand and the United States of America
and Venezuela on the other was narrowly averted and today that controversy
52

still exists.
Guyana, the only British colony on the mainland of South America, won its
. d pendence from Great Britain on 26 May 1966. It has a population of about
~S:, 4 00 (1990 Estima~e} and it~ total land area is 214,97_0 sq. km. The country is
d. ·ded into three counties: Berb1ce, Demerara and Essequibo. Venezuela claims the
e:re proportion of Guyana west of the Essequibo river: some 70 per cent of the
country.
Venezuela was a Spanish colony on the mainland of South America which
on 5 July 1811 proclaimed its independence from the Spanish Crown. It has a
population of about 17 million and a total land mass of some 912,050 sq. km. On
the south it is bordered by Brazil, on the west by Colombia, on the north by the
Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, and on the east by Guyana. The country can
be divided into six natural regions: ·tlite Lake Maracaibo Basin, the Venezuelan Andes
and Coast Ranges, the Llanos, the Guyana Shield or Southern Highlands, the Orinoco
Delta and the Coastal Island.
The Colonial Claim
The Guyana Shield of Venezuela and the Essequibo region of Guyana constituted
the main hunting ground of those who sought El Dorado and it is this region
which is still in dispute. This paper seeks to place the modern controversy between
Guyana and Venezuela in its broader context. ·
It is said that Alonso de Ojeda first sailed into Guiana up the Essequibo in
1499. In December 1596 the first European settlement was founded by Antonio de
Berrio at San Thome de la Guayana on the Southern Bank of the Orinoco. (BPP,
1896: 1290} Somewhere between 1616 and 1617, Sir Walter Raleigh destroyed
the Guayana settlement which was later rebuilt. A Charter from the Government of
the Netherlands to the Dutch West India Company in 1621 (reaffirmed in 1637)
gave the limits of the Dutch West India Company as the Orinoco. (Ibid.) According
~o eyeWitnesses, in 1637 the Dutch were in the Amacura, Essequibo and Berbice.
t rom a secret report to the King of Spain, it would appear that by the mid seven­
;enth century Dutch settlements extended to the neighbourhood of the Barima and
macuro rivers. (Ibid.)
The Treaty of Munster (1648) put an end to the war between Spain and he
53

Netherlands and allowed for the Dutch and the Spaniards to possess what th
and to own:
ey hac1
such Lordships, citie~, castles, fort~esses, ~ommerce and countries in
the East and West Indies, and also tn BraZII and on the coasts of Asia
Africa and America respectively, as the said Lords, the King and th~
States' respectively, hold and possess, comprehending therein particularly
places and forts which the Portuguese have taken from the
Lords, the States since the year 1641; as also the forts and the places
which the said Lords, the States, shall chance to acquire and possess
after this, without infraction of the present treaty. (US Com., 1:75)
In 1664, Father Flaurie, who visited ~uiana to set up a Jesuit mission, reported
the province abandoned by the Spanish. In 1669, the Dutch West Ind·
Company granted to Count Fedrick Casimir, 30 Dutch miles on the coast of Gui~ ia
100 Dutch miles inland and as many more as might be required and occupied at 0 ;'
time or another from their territory of Guiana situated between the River Orinoc~
and the River Amazon. This grant was made openly and was published in the same
year without protest from the Spaniards. In the 1730s Marquis d_e TomiJ:luera claimed
that the Dutch were occupying lands from the Orinoco to Surinam, from '318 1/2
degrees to 324 degrees longitude. (Ibid.)
In 1781, the Dutch colonies were captured by the English and in the following
year the French took them from the English. J3y· the Treaty of Versailles, 1783,
the col_o_nies were returned to the Dutch. In April 1796, during the Napoleonic wars,
the Bntish captured the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice. Under the
terms of the Peace of Amiens, March, 1802, Great Britain returned to the Dutch the
captured G uiana · co I onies. · A year later · the · Treaty of Ami ens was a piece of paper.
In September 1803 the B n ·t· 1s h once again · took the colonies never again to return
t h em
.
They we
r~ c??
f
irme
d
in
.
their
.
possession by
·
the Treaty
'
of London, August
1814
In 1827, an official rep rt C .
jamin D'Urban gave th b d O . on rown lands by Lieutenant Governor, S1r Bensea-coast
from the rno~th 0 ~~ar~: of the colonies as follows:· "Out to the North the
Orinoco. On the west ? e i~er Abary to Cape Barima near the mouth of the
a 1 me running rth d · · ·· th
interior". (Ibid.) In l 93S th . . no an south from Cape Barirna mto e
8
grap~ical Society to explo;e it: c~i:~h Gover.nment gave a grant to the Royal Geo·
Y of Guiana. The Society selected one Robert
..
54

urgk to do its work and in 1839 he called attention to the need for an early
5cho~ation of the boundary between Guiana and Venezuela. In 1840 the Governdernr
employed Schomburgk to revisit Guiana to map out the boundary and the
~::ezuelans immediately objected to the line he began to draw. (Times, 14.1.1896)
The evidence presented so far enunciates the British case, according to which
B ·rsh possessions comprised of the territories bounded by the Orinoco, the Rio
N:;ro, the Amazon, t~e waters joining the Amazon and the Rio Negro and the
Atlantic Ocean. According to the Venezuelans, the proper boundary between Guiana
and Venezuela was the Essequibo River.
In 1844, the Venezuelans published their first formal statement on the question.
According to this, Spain first discovered the New World and this discovery was
recognised by the Papal Bull of Pope Alexander Vl. However, this was definitely an
argument of convenience. In their Manifesto to the World published in 1811, the
year of independence, the Venezuelan Government declared:
Those who conquer and obtain possession of a country by means of
their labour, industrious cultivation, and intercourse with the natives
thereof, are they who have preferable rights to preference ... and
transmit it to their posterity born therein (Manifesto, 1811)
The remainder of their presentation was intended to show that from a very
early date, the Spanish had explored and occupied the Orinoco and the territories
about the Barima, Maruco and Pomeroon rivers; that at the time of the Treaty of
Munster the Dutch had no possession in Guyana; and that Spanish domination
extended as far as Essequibo and any possessions of the Dutch West India Company
on that river were usurped and not recognised by the Spanish Government. They
quoted some geographers who claimed that the Essequibo was the boundary of
Venezuela and British Guiana.
Like the British, the Venezuelans were able to make out a plausible case for
their territorial claim. Dr. Raphael Segio, a Venezuelan jurist, cited General P. Melscher
(a Dutchman) who in his "History of the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and
Berbice", published in 1785, stated that the Netherlands did not extend to the
Amacuro, not even to the Barima. (Ibid.) Both sides to this quarrel had taken time
: 0 .collect large a~ounts of evidence in support of their claim. It is not the purpose of
his paper to decide where the line should have been drawn. That was done by the
55

Arbitration Tribunal in 1899 which took into consideration "long continued occupation
and possession as far as could be established on either side". (Documents
1981) '
Great Britain had two claims, one within the boundary drawn by Schomburgk
line and another "extreme claim" going right to the Orinoco. Her Majesty's Government
stated that it was willing to take that proportion of its claim outside the
Schomburgk line to arbitration , but was not prepared to discuss territories within the
line which it regarded as undisputedly its own. Venezuela did not agree to this
limitation and Britain's refusal to yield this area to arbitration brought the United
States of America into the dispute .
THE MONROE DOCTRINE
In 1823 President Monroe of the United States stated:
The occasion had been judged proper for asserting a principle in
which the right and interest of the United States are involved, that the
American continents by the free and independent condition which
they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered
subjects for future colonialisation by any· European power ... We
owe it therefore, to candour and to the amicable relations existing
between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should
consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any
proportion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety
.·.. it is important therefore , that we should not behold such interposition
in any form with indifference . {Heffner, 1965 :89)
This is what became known as the Monroe doctrine, the essence of which was to
debar European states from extending their colonial possessions in the Americas.
In October 1894, Venezuelan forces crossed the border into British Guiana
and established a post; the British colonial police and magistrate left without putting
up any resistance. (Times, ,1894) In December 1895 the President of Venezuela
:tated in an address to Congress that "The doctrine {M~nroe) upon which we stand
is strong ··· ~n~ cannot become obsolete while the republic endures". He pointed
out that the ms1stence of Great Britain on extending its border was "dangerous to
our peace and safety". Britain had argued that the Monroe doctrine "has no prin·
r
56

ciple of internati.onal law, and ~o nation, however powerful, has the right to insert a
code of international law that 1s not recognised by any other country". The President
of Venezuela stated that his country claimed the doctrine as its right. Insofar as
he was concerned, Great Britain was bent upon increasing her territory in the hemisphere;
it was therefore incum~nt up~n the United States of America to determine
the correct border between Bntish Guiana and Venezuela after which,it must resist
by every means at its disposal every new and wilful "aggression upon its rights and
interest". (Times , 14.1.1896)
The entire business was coming to a head . In 1895, President Cleveland of
the USA asked Congress for appropriation to set up a Boundary Commission. The
duty of the Commission would not be to denote "the utmost limits claimed by Great
Britain as a matter of right, but a line ... in consideration of convenience and expediency".
(rimes , 14.1.1896) In 1897, with the USA at its side, and sensing that
Britain was under pressure to arbitrate, Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with
Britain, began to give out concessions on land claimed by the British, and struck
across the border into British Guiana in an attempt to occupy as much of the area as
possible. (Schoenrich: 1949)
Before the US Boundary Commission could finish its work, Great Britain
agreed to take the entire issue to arbitration. A Treaty of Arbitration was signed in
Washington on 2 February 1897 and the US Boundary Commission was dissolved
on 27 February. In Venezuela the incident passed without much comment, for no
one wished to be reminded of the "dangerous controversy which could have led to
war." (Times, 4.2., 1897) But was the Monroe doctrine at stake?
Both parties accumulated large amounts of evidence supporting their claims
and counter-claims as to prescriptive rights, long-continued occupation and possession
by their predecessors, etc. It was never a question of conquering new lands and
the Monroe doctrine was not intended to apply to things in existence. Chas D. Daly
argued that the facts as presented by cartographers and geographers showed that
the territory claimed by Venezuela was regarded as belonging to the Dutch. (Daly:
1869) Whether or not the conclusion drawn by Daly and others was correct, the
British did present a plausible case. Therefore, regardless of what one thought of the
Monroe doctrine, Britain could not logically have been accused of transgressing it by
seeking unilaterally to extend its territory. After Britain agreed to arbitration in
1897, Dr. Adlof Ernst, an expert on Venezuelan history, said the agreement was "no
victory" for the Monroe doctrine, for the conditions which rendered it (the doctrine)
57

necessary "have long passed. " (Times, 8.6. 1897)
World opinion, however, was against Britain. She was envisaged as a "Slogg
Bill", twisting the arms of her weaker opponent. (Thurston, 1896) So long as t~r
United States did not get involved, the disparity in strength between the claimant~
was such that Venezuela could only have recourse through peaceful means.
THE AWARD OF 1899 . ,
The award of the Tribunal of Arbitration given in Paris on 3 October 1899
stated that the four Arbitrators (the Right Honourable, Lord Russell of Kiliowen, the
Right Honourable, Sir Richard Henn Collins, the Honourable Melville Weston Fuller
and the Honourable David · Josiah Brewer) · had selected his ExceJiency Frederic de
Martens ;i L.L.D; -(Cambridge and Edinburgh), Privy Councillor and Permanent Member
of the ·Council of-the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia, to be the fifth Arbitrator.
(Documents, 1981:8)
The role Frederic de Martens played in the -award of the Tribunal is most
important. He is seen as the man who did a "deal" with the British. The Venezuelans
described him as a theorist of Russian colonialism, and pointed to his 1897
work, "Russia and England in Central Asia" ;.(1897), where he referred constantly to
the "special mission" granted by : heaven to both powers to civilize the semi-barbarous
nations of Asia. (Affairs, 1965:4) · So far as the Venezuelans were concerned,
Martens was ideally suited to concoct a colonialist "deal" .
., .
How did Martens, the · "colonial .theorist", become involved in the affairs of
the Tribunal? The Venezuelans argued that Great Britain made it clear that "no
English Arbitrator could sit side-by-side with a creole or a coloured jurist". (Ibid.)
Therefore, this made it impossible for them to choose one of their own people.
Even if this is true, the Venezuelans placed great faith in the United States and two
renowned US justices represented their interest on the Tribunal. In any case Great
Britain would never have accepted a Venezuelan chairman and vice versa. The
chairman had to be someone acceptable to both parties, and only the name of
Frederic de Martens appeared on the lists of . jurists submitted by both countries.
(Times, 14.10. 1897) The -Tsar of Russia only sanctioned Martens ' appointment to
the Tribunal upon the insistence of both Governments. -{Ibid.·, 27.12.1897) What·
ever the Venezuelans might. think of Martens today, at the time of the arbitration
they rated him highly.
58

The Tribunal of Arbitration awarded to Britain almost all of the territory within
5chornburgk line. Her extreme claim, or that outside the Schomburgk, was
the d d to Venezuela. The line drawn by the Tribunal was as follows:
aware
Starting from the coast at Point Playa, the line of boundary shall run
in a straight line to the River Barima at its junction with the river
Maruruma, and hence along the mid-stream of the latter river to its
source and from that point to the junction of the River Maiowa with
the Amakuru, and hence along the mid-stream of the Amakuru to its
source in the Imataka Ridge, and thence in the south -westerly direction
along the highest ridge of the spur of the Imataka Mountains to
the highest point of the main range of such Imataka Mountains op- ·
posite to the source of the Barima, and hence along the summit of
the main ridge in a south-easterly direction of the lmataka Mountains
to the source of the Acarabisi, and hence along the northern bank of
the River Cuyuni westward to its junction with the Wenamu, and
hence foil owing the mid-stream of the Wenamu to its western-most
source, and in a direct line to the summit of Mount Roraima, and
from Mount Roraima to the source of the Cotinga, and along the
mid-stream of the river to its junction with the Takutu and hence
along the mid-stream of the Takutu to its source, thence in a straight
line to the western -most point of the Akarai Mountains to the source
of the Corentyne called the Cutari River. (Documents, 1981: 12-14)
The Venezuelan and British Governments
accepted this line as "a full, perfect and
final settlement". {Ibid. Article XIII) It was not until 1904, after the British and
Venezuela Com mi sioner s had demarcated the actual boundary, that the people of
British Guiana were told officially where their border with Venezuela lay. Formal
agreement with rega rd to the mapping of the boundary was signed in Georgetown
on 10 ,Januar\) 190 5.
PREVOST'S DEAL: SOME QUESTIONS
Mere the story rest for the next sixty years until August 1962 when Venezuthe
Un it d Nat ion that she wa s no longer prepared to accept the
~I;, d(J I( red
do.(i' i Jn of th Tribuna l of 1899. (Question De Limites, 1967 :24-26) The reason
Oiv~n f 1r thi" dr matic tep was that , fou nd within the paper s of Mr. Mallet-Prevost ,
wh mr,m .ent

60
. which he accused Russia and Britain of .
was a rnernorandurn 10 1
of "very extensive and important terntory1:!1aking a "ct
which deprived V~n~zui~ 00 right. (Schoenrich 1949) Prevost left ~ "'hich, i~
opinion, Great B~t~;ath. Absurd as it may seem, the entire modern e Pai:>er to Q
published after his ·marily on this one piece of paper which th G~Yana/\; ~
I d . ute rests pn ·d h' h l e Wnte eti.
ezue a 1sp . h hen he was alive, an w 1c on y came to light h r Was
1 I'\
prepared to pub ~s wi~h the arbitration were dead!
.. VJ en au th~
closely connecte .
d
. tely after the ' award on 3 October, 1899, Prevost and
Imme ia d t t t R ' G
f , 'enezuela ma e a sta emen o euter s correspo d enera\
H
. lawyers or v 1 ' n ent h
arnso~, . "victory" for the Venezuelans, went on to argue that the line \lJ ich,
after c~a1m~g was one based on diplomatic compromise instead of legal ~:a~~
the Trd1~unt th m Venezuela had gained much but should have gained mp ihnc 1p\es.
Accor mg o e ' ·1 d t d bl fr uc rno
·1d 1950) Such sentiments are east y un ers an a e om attorneys wh d· re.
(Chh~'
ll they wanted for their clients and it .should be remembered that 0 th td not
ac 1eve a bed h p ·d t Cl l e Ven
I G nment was not distur w en res1 en eve and ordered h·
ezue an over . " . . 1s
Bo -
undary
Commission to find a line based upon convenience and expediency" and not on
"right".
The Mallet-Prevost story · is incon~istent. He stated that in January 1899 he
and Justice Brewer stopped over in London on their way to the Tribunal meeting
Paris. While there, he met Lord Chief Justice Russell and in the course of their
conversation he ventured to express his opinion that international arbitration should
be based on legality. According to him, _Lord Russell disagreed and stated that in his
opinion international arbitration should take into consideration questions of international
policy. As Mallet-Prevost commented, "From that moment 1 knew that we
could not count upon Lord Russell to decide the boundary question on the basis of
strict rights". (Schoenrkh, 1949) On the occasion when ·Mr. Mallet-Prevost met
with Lord Russell, the latter ·was in no way connected with the arbitration. 1n Janu·
ary 1899 Lord Herschell and Justice Collins were the British Justices on the panel. It
was not until 16th March , 1899 that Lord Russell of Killowen was confirmep a? an
arbitrator in place of Lord Herschell who died suddenly . (Times, 17 .3. 1899)
.· Secondly, Mr. Prevost ~uccumbed to the very· line of argument he considered
H
irrelevant
. ,· Accord·
tng
t
o
h
1m,
. ·
t
h
e reason he agreed to the
"
dea
l"
was
Genera
. .
l
arnson 5 observation: "Mallet-Prevost if it ·s.hould ever b~ known that we had it 10
~:~J;wer to save for Venezuela th_e m~uth of the Orinoco and failed to do so w~
never be forgiven" · (Schoen·rich, 1949) · What ·was · this if not consideration°

international policy?
Prevost also claimed that at first, Lord Justice Collins's attitude gave the
·on that he was leaning towards the side of the Venezuelans. He came to this
~~ .
clusion because, according to him, Justice Collins asked numerous questions
:ch were critical of the British case. However, according to Prevost, after two
eks holidaying in England, the Judge changed noticeably; he asked very few ques­
::ns and his whole attitude was different. (Ibid.) The records show that taking his
marks as a whole, Lord Justice Collins gave no tangible indications that he was
~aning towards the Venezuelans' side. After the break, as indeed before, he asked
as many questions as Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer (Child, 1950).
Prevost leaves the impression that the Venezuelan case was overwhelming.
This is understandable since he was partly responsible for putting that case forward -
but a British agent, Sir George U. Buchanan, Britain's Minister at the Hague and
British Agent before the Tribunal, reported to his home office that the Tribunal had
not, in his opinion, been very profoundly impressed by his (Mallet-Prevost' s) performance.
Buchanan wrote: "The speech which Mr M.P. thus brought to a close has
not, I believe, made any real impression on the Tribunal. It has attacked the British
position too much in detail, any success which he may have obtained has been of a
purely negative character". (Ibid.) Of General Harrison's statement, Buchanan reported
that notwithstanding its force and eloquence, the contention that Venezuelan
as successor to Spain had prior title to the territory in dispute failed to impress the
Tribunal. (Ibid.)
Of all the fifteen volumes of paper in the British Foreign Office, and all the
documents found in St. Petersburg, there is not a single indication of a "deal". Even
the movements of the Arbitrators do not indicate how a "deal" could have been
made (Ibid.) What appeared uppermost in M. de Martens's mind as the Tribunal
:me to a ~lose was the philosophical and practical place of Arbitration in internanal
conflict. Having noted that in cases where a majority verdict was given there
Were always d. t· . . .
. 1ssen 1ng op1n1ons which could provide the basis for conflict, he sought
a unanimous d . . S
down b . ecis1on. o
f
ar as De Martens was concerned, the boundary line laid
judges : the Judges was based on justice and law. However, he agreed that the
q """sti adhbeen actuated by a desire to establish a compromise in a very complicated
~ on t e · · f .
Obid.) ' ongin o which must be looked for at the end of the fifteenth century.
61

f h . f "deal" was uppermost in de Martens ' s tnind h
erpetration o a f t 11 h d , e n
I
·
t e P
Ived
A erican judges. In ac , a e nee ed to have d eed
the two rn . B ·t · , f one w
not have mvo .. h . dges for a decision m n am s avour. Judge Sch ils
to vote with the tw~I Bn;s JUst's document, claimed that the Award of the ~~ch,
h who d published ted "genera Ma el t- surprise
re~o and disappointment" and that "students of the 1.2 enezu UnaJ
elan a cr~a side o f t h e con tr ° versy were shocked at the excessive grant of territory" to -
Britain. (Schoenrich, 1949} ·
It has been pointed out that Mallet-Prevost and Judge I:Iarrison themselves
k O
f the decision as a "victory", although they attacked 1t as being Without
spo "f e dation". They went on to boast t h at " every f oo t" o f th e t emtory · to which
G;e~~ Britain made claim in her "extreme claim" had been awarded to Venezuela.
From Caracas the British Minister reported that the news had been received With
"indifference by the public". He had not seen a newspaper artide-an the .subject
and, as if to counter Schoenrich's claim, he stated that: "Venezuelans .of,el:lucation
... regretted extremely that the Barima has been awarded to them as now they can
never hope for'the wealth and prosperity of the region of the Orinoco which would
have (Child, resulted 1950) from that river being opened to our (British) commercial influence".
"d ea 1 ,, came
Anot~erthpiecfe
m e orm of of evidence an try produced . th d" by Venezuela in support of Prevost's
Russell , Mr R.J. Block. 0 M e~ m · e iary of the Private Secretary to Lord
"Venezuela: Martens's ·o~r ~~e~Y, 2 ~cto~r 1899, Block entered in his diary:
the next day the Tribunal gave~t Victor. (Question De Llmites , 1967) On
ud:
I s Ver ICt.
. All Parties agreed that the 1· d
mise For d M t me rawn by the 1i "b
" deal ·,, (1f . one e cares) ens h to d t get be the two s1 "d es to agree t rt unaJ Was one of compro-
O
possible that d M rt a canvassed. Mallet p O a compromise position, a
e a ens who wa - revost sp k ·t .
sion had made a simila 'th s most concerned With O e as 1 it was not
' r reat to the B T h . · · reaching , .
a detailed and useful historical 1 . n is JUdges. Ced . J a unanimous dec1-
Prevost allegation that the awa:;a Ys1s ~f the dispute, totau:c _oseph, Who has made
sion ... that it was not a truly iudic~~~c~s~is~t of a diplonia~~l~~te~ both the Malletof
the evidence presented by both sides ton hJosep~, 1968, 72)al ~d the conclusettlement
had to include a degree of c t e _arbitration, an .

Apart from the two British Judges, Chief Justice Fuller Brewer of the United
States Supreme Court represented the Venezuela_ int~rest on the Tribunal. Venezuela's
e was put by a battery of four lawyers which included an ex-President of the
cas United States o fA menca, · B en1am1n · · H arnson, · an d an ex-Se
cretary of War of the
United States of America, General Benjamin S. Tracy . Mallet-Prevost was a relatively
junior member of this team, but except for his allegations, none of these outstanding
men is known to have indicated that a plot took place which robbed Venezuela
of its lawful right. What is also most coincidental is that Mallet-Prevost accepted
a Venezuelan national award, the "Order of the Liberator", one month before
he penned his story of a "deal ".
ATTEMPTS AT SOLUTIONS
In November 1962, after the Venezuelans ' assertion that a "deal" was done '
Great Britain said that she was ready to arrange with the Government of Venezuela
and the Government of the colony of Guiana , a tripartite examination of the historical
documents. (Times, 14.11.1962) One day before this statement by the British
Government, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister had claimed that "the disputed area
has never ceased to belong to us." {Ibid.) The British Deputy Permanent Representative
to the United Nations made it clear that Britain's offer to examine the records
was "in no sense an off er to engage in substantive talks about revision of the frontier".
He insisted that if it was possible to open a case that was closed for· so many
years on the evidence put forward by the Venezuelans, "there will be no frontier
agreement that cannot be questioned." He was certain that when the Venezuelans
had examined the British papers, they would come to the conclusion that there was
no need to reopen the case. (Guyana/Venezuela Relations, 1968: 9)
Venezuelan experts visited British archives and British experts visited Caracas.
From the British standpoint the experts did not find a shred of evidence in support of
~e Venezuelan contention. However, in 1964, the British Government announced
i~s Willingness to engage in discussion with the Venezuelan Government at a ministenal
l:~el on the findings of the experts. These talks commenced in London with the
Participation of the British Guiana Government, but they were inconclusive.
At the end of 1965 the three Governments agreed that another meeting
should take place in Geneva' in the early months of 1966 . This time arrangements
Were made for the signing of the Geneva Agreement which provided for the setting
up of a G I\ , · ·
uyana1 venezuela Mixed Commission . The Comm1ss1on soug h t a " sa t· 15 f ac -
63

.
1
ttlernent of the controversy between Venezu \
I'
f the pract1ca se t, l t . ea r\"'
o solution or . h has arisen over the venezue an con ention that the A :--1 •cl .J
t ryUnitedKingdomwhic d ·d" (Documents, 1981:12-19) rb1trQ\ r
the 899 ... is null an vo1 . .
Award of 1
. quarters that the Geneva Agreement made an .
It was argued 1 ~ ,5orne lans by raising their "spurious claim" · to the t 1 rnPar-
. to the venezue . h G s atus f
tant concess10~, Hubbard 1967:5-6) However, 1t wast e uyanese and Bri _a
a ·· controversy · ( . th t the agreement merely sought to establish hsh
t , contention a d rt p , lllec:ha
Governmen s . h th r evidence existe to suppo revost s contentio T -
nisms to deteri:nmde; e 7ssion expired in 197 0 without resolving the contr n he
terms of the M1xe om.m . on was hamstrung over the correct interpretatio oversy.
The work of the Commfiss~erence. The British and Guyanese held that then to be
·ts terms o re d h"l th , , contraplaced
upon t he validity of the 1899 Awar , w I e e ve~ezuelans Wished
versy concerned \ 1
l"ty of the 1899 award was already established. to
proceed as if the t ega l
ultation between the Governments of Venezuela and Gu
After furtherrtcof~;pain was signed on 18 June 1970 in Trinidad & To~ana,
p t col of Po -o f . od f tw l ago
the ro o ut the dispute in abeyance or a pen ~ eve years, during Which
The Protocol PG undertook not to make any claim on the other's territory
' , eJa and uyana b ld be . 1 t
venezu . II ewable after the twelve years, ut cou terminated if eith
automat1ca y ren 24) Th f· er
~as . d . t b (Documents, 1981: 21- e irst twelve-year period of th
side wishe it o e. . ll . b e
Protocol ended on 18 June 1982. and . was automabticfa y rle8newa le unless either
party notified the other of its intention not to renew e ore December 1981. ln
April 19 81, the Venezuelan Government inf or med the Guyana Government that it
did not intend' to renew the Protocol. ·. :
The Geneva Agreement provided other peaceful means by which the dispute
might be settled. These are specified in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter
which provides for negotiations, enquiry, mediation and conciliation. Venezuela and
Guyana were deadlocked on the means to be employed to settle the controversy.
Guyana was in favour of a legal resolution, while Venezuela supported some kind of
negotiated settlement. It was finally agreed, in keeping with the Geneva -Agreement,
that the Secretary-General of the United Nations be asked to identify the means by
which the dispute should be solved. (Burnham, 1983) In 1989, with the agreement
~f .the parties, the for mer Caribbean . Community Secretary-General, international
civil servant and present Vice Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, Mr.
Alyster McIntyre was appointed by the UN Secretary-General to use his good office
to reach agreement on the means to be used in solving the . problem. Here the
110
d
64

-
modern story rests.
p0UTICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES
In September 1966, Guyana reported that the Venezuelans had occupied
the Guyana half of the island of Ankoko, in one of the border rivers. The Venezuelans
claimed the entire island to be theirs. (Ankoko Affair, 1966) Guyana also
accused the Venezuelans of excluding them from the Organisation of American States,
of which they eventually became a member in 1991. (Guyana/Venezuela Relations,
1968: 6-7) Venezuela was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Guyana
through the subversion of a number of Guyana's indigenous Amerindian communities
and of contravening the conventions of Laws of the Sea, when on "9th July of
this year, ( 1968) the President of Venezuela issued a decree in which he purported to
annex as part of the territory of Venezuela, and to assert a right to exercise sovereignty
over, a nine mile belt of sea extending to within three miles of the coast of
Guyana and contiguous to Guyana's territorial waters". ( Guyana/Venezuela Relations,
1968: 20-24) Venezuela placed advertisements in the London Times warning
investors away from the disputed territory and urged the World Bank not to
support a loan for the Upper-Mazaruni Hydro-Power Project which the Guyana
Government was then attempting to build in the region. (Burnham, 1981: 16}
The Guyana Government argued that by these actions, Venezuela breached
the Protocol agreement between the two countries, "that each Government would
abstain from any statement, publication or other acts which could be detrimental to
the economic development and progress of the other State" . (Affairs, 1965: 3)
Over the years there has been much talk about Venezuela's intention to seize all, or
a large proportion of, the territory and there has been reported movements of Brazilian,
Venezuelan and Guyanese troops in the border area. No such invasion has
taken place, but the Venezuelans continue to notify investors of their claim to the
Essequibo region, although in recent years relations between the two countries have
been relatively friendly.
CONCLUSION
Few can fail to see the tenuous nature of the Venezuelan claim and, as 'a
result, other reasons have been given as to why the Venezuelans embarked upon this
venture. The area under dispute is said to be mineral rich. The Venezuelans claimed
that the Award of 1899 gave them land that was not worth £5 Sterling, but gave to
65

British Guiana 60,000 square miles of land gold mines and forests Re ~
, ' · cent surv
have shown strong indications that oil, in marketable quantities, may well exist in :is
area and the Venezuelans may have felt that they have an opportunity to capt e
some o f th 1s . potent! ·a1 wealth .
Ure
Then there is the suggestion, promulgated mainly by the People's Progressive
Party of Guyana (PPP), that the dispute was conjured up by the USA to provide
grounds for intervention into Guyana if that Party attempted to introduce Marxist
policies when in office. (Hubbard, 196 7, 32 -41) In the 1960s , when the dispute
arose anti-communism was rife in America and the PPP was viewed as a Marxist
'
party . The PPP argued that ''The Venezuelan question thus is in abeyance for the
time being until the next General Election in Guiana or until a Government in office
takes a line which the US State Department does not like''. (Ibid .) Indeed , after the
ruling People 's National Congre ss (PNC) began to dabble with Marxism in the second
half of the 1970s , the border issue flared again and in his address to the fourth
Biennial Congress of the PNC, its leader and President of Guyana , Forbes Burnham,
implied that the border dispute might have been revived as part of a process to press
Guyana into giving up its socialist course . (Burnham , 1981) Wider political implications
have been placed upon the Venezuelan claim. There are those who believe
that Venezuela had imperialist designs upon parts of the Caribbean region. (Williams,
1975) Moreover, ever since its 1962 claim, maps of Venezuela include the
Essequibo region of Guyana as a part of Venezuela . Generations of Venezuelans
have grown up believing Essequibo to be a legitimate part of their country . This is
bound to complicate the negotiation process.
The Guyana Government said that it is determined to develop the resources
of the disputed area and to settle the controversy peacefully. A measure of progress
has been made and there is hope that with goodwill between the parties , an amicable
solution will be found which wilI alJow the peoples of these two countries co-operatively
to pool their resources for the common good . Nonetheless ., it is possible to say
of Venezuela and Guyana exactly what was said at the end of the nineteenth century
of Britain and Venezuela: "The disparity of the strength of the claimants is such that
Guyana could only have recourse through peaceful means ". It matter s not how
absurd
" .
it may ap
pear,
·t · h ft
1,, remains true t at a er over one hundred years of wrangling,
the B1d for El Dorado is not yet dosed.
66

REFERENCES
Adamson, Jack H , & Folland , I: ~rold (1969) The Shepherd of the
British Governm ent , (1896) British Parliamentary Pape (BPP) ( Ocean (Boston: ambit)
Burnham. L.F.S. (196 8) GuyancvVenezuelan Relations· r;t t London· HMSO}. ·
f G (Ge · a ement by
Minister o uyana
the H bl
orgetown : Mini stry of Foreign Aff airs) o no ura e L F.S. Burnham /J .
Burnham , L.F.S. (19 8 1) Organise f or Production and Def · (G ' nm~
Burnham , L.F.S. (198 3) Will to Survive (Georgetown : Off~c:c\ t: o~get~wri: Office of the President)
Child, Clift on (1950) "The Venezuela-Briti sh Guiana Bound aryoA b~t rt~stdenft).
r t ra ton o 1899" Th
International Law, (LXN , 4) . , e American Joiirnal of
Guyana, Documents on the Territ_orial Integrity of Guyana (198 1) (Gear etown· . . .
Guyana, GuyancvVenezuela Relations (196 8) (Geo rgetown : Mini stry of tt ·A~l~ tSlry of Foreign Affairs).
1
Guyana. The Ankoko Affa ir!i. Not es on Guyana's Protest (1966) (Geo
trna M. 3 1 '.s).
Heffner. Richard , D. (1965) A Docum entary History of the United Statr 9 5'\rw~ tn~try of Foreign Affairs).
Hubbard, H.J .M. (1967) The Venezuelan Border /.,;sue (Georgetown · p=~ple?snPon: ~ntopr Bookc;)
h Ced . (1968) "Th ', I . . . . . rogres:,1ve arty).
Josep . · nc e v enezue a-BntJsh Guiana Boundary Arbitrati on of J 899· . · . 1
,. C .
Studies, (X, 4). · an appraisa , aribbean
Naipaul, V.S. (1973) The Last of El Dorado (London : Penguin) .
Schoenrich. Otto (19 49) "The Venezuela - Briti sh Guiana Border Dispute .. , The American Journal of lnterna
tional Law, 43.
"The Times" Ti mes New spaper, London .
Thurston, Herbert (18 96 ) "The Venezuelan Border Qu estion" The Month , ,June.
US. Report of the United S tates Commi s.5ion on the Boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana (US
Com .) (1899) (Washington) . 4 Vo ls.
Venezuela, lnf orme Que Los Exporto s Venezolanos Para la Question De Limites Con Guayana Britanica
Prescntan Al Gobiem o Nacional (1967), (Caracas: Mini stry of Extern al Relations).
Veneiuela, Manifesto to the World by the Conf ederation of Venezuela in Soutf, America (1811) (Caracas:
Venezuelan Go vernm ent) .
Venezuela, The Affair of the Boundaries between Venezuela and British Guiana (1965) (Caracas: Venezuelan
Covernm~nt).
Williams, [ rlc (197 5) "The Threat to the Caribbcc,n Comm unity" (Port -of Spain: People's National Movement).
67

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
BOOKS
A BmUOGRAPHY OF WORKS BY MARY NOEL MENEzES~
by
Hazel Woolford
British Policy towards the Amerindians in British Guiana, 1803-18 73
(Q -~ ~
Clarendon Press, 1977). ·
Goodall's Sketches of Amerindian Tribes, 1841-1843 (London : BritL \
Publications, 1977).
-..
A Guide to Historical Research (Georgetown : University of Guyana. 19 8).
Editor, William Hilhouse, Indian Notices (1825) (Georgetown: National C ~..P.i=~sion
for the Recovery and Acquisition of Research Material on Guyana. 19- _
The Amerindians in Guyana, 1803-1873. A Documentary History (Londo : Fran.I\
Cass & Co., 1979):-- - --
The Ameri-ndians and the Europeans (Glasgow: Collins , 1982).
Amerindian Life in Guyana (Georgetown: Ministry of Education Soc·a1 Deve
ment and Culture, 1983) - reprinted in 1992.
&enes from the History of the Portuguese in Guyana (London: Sister M.N. lenezes
R.S.M., 1986). ·
How to do Better Research (Georgetown: Demerara Publishers Ltd., 1990).
ARTICLES/REVIEWS
"The Dutch and British Policy of Indian Subsidy: A Syst~m of Annual and Tri
68

\ Presents", Caribbean Studies, XIII, 3 (October, 1973), 64-88.
Review Article: Gabriel Stedman 's Narrative of a five years Expedition against the
Revolted Negroes of Surinam in Guiana. Journal of Latin American Studies , VI,
2 (November, 1973), 341-2.
"The Christianised Amerindian : Who Is He?", Kaie, (July, 1979), 55-64 .
"Amerindian Captains and Constables : A System of Alliance for Security and Control,"
Release , 6 & 7 (October, 1979), 55-67.
"Quest for Peace and Truth : Gandhi's Message of Non-violence," Indian and Foreign
Review (1-14 February , 1982), 13-15 .
"From Protection to Integration: The Amerindians of Guyana vis-a-vis the Government,
1803-1973, " in Caribbean Societies, I, Collected Seminar Papers , 29 (London:
University of London, Institution of Commonwealth Studies, 1982) , 93-112.
"Some Preliminary thoughts on Portuguese Emigration from Madeira to British
Guiana," Kyk-Over-Al, 30 (December, 1984), 43-46 .
"Guyana" Research Guide to Central America and the Caribbean (Wisconsin:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 360-363 .
"The Three Guianas {British, French and Dutch) from . . . . . 1800 to the Present,"
The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America and the Caribbean (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985).
"Amerindian Jurisdiction and the Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Issue in the 18th and
19th Centuries, " A Selection of Papers presented at the Twelfth Conference of
the Association of Caribbean Historians (1980). Edited by K.O. Laurence (St.
Augustine, Trinidad: Association of Caribbean Historians, 1985).
'-'The Coming of the Portuguese: From Canefield to Counter," The Sunday Chronicle,
28 April , 12, 19 May 1985.
"The Intellectual Legacies of Elsa Goveia" in Proceedings of a Commemorative
Symposium in honour of Professor Elsa Goueia and Professor Walter Rodney
{Turkeyen: Department of History, University of Guyana, 1985), pp . 16-21.
69

70
R ' View Article, Peter Riviere's Individual and Society in Guiana (Cambrid .
bridge University Press, 1984) and Jacques Ligol's Tales of the Yanoma~~ -· Ca~­
Life in the Venezuelan Forest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, {·9~~'!Y
Hispanic American Historical Review, 66 (November, 1986), 806 -808. ) 1 n
"The Portuguese Benevolent Society in British Guiana, 1872-1888 ," A tlant·
Journal of Madeiran History (1987).
ico-
"The Madeiran Portuguese and the Establishment of the Catholic Church in B . .
d M . ·t·
Guiana, 1835-98," Immigrants an znon ,es,
S
pecia
· I I
ssue,
7
,
1
, (March, 198B
ntish
57-78. ),
"The Amerindians of Guyana: Original Lords of the Soil," America lnd igena, XLVII!
2 (April-June, 1988), 353-376. '
"Music in Portuguese Life in British Guiana," Kyk-Ouer-Al, 39 (December, 1 988 ),
65-75.
"The Apprenticeship System 1834-1838: A Leap in the Dark, " History Gazette, 2
(furkeyen, November 1988), 20 pp.
"Portuguese Drama in Nineteenth Century British Guiana, " Kyk-Over -A/ , 40 (December,
1989), 66-71.
"The Winged Impulse: The Madeiran Portuguese in Guyana. An Economic, Socio­
Cultural Perspective," Guyana Historical Journal, 1 (1989), 17-36.
"The Legend of Arthur James Seymour," Joint Issue of BIM, 19, 73 and Kyk-Over ­
AI, 41 (June, 1990), 80-82.
"The Background to the Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Dispute ," History Gazette,
21 (Turkeyen, June 1990).
"The three Guianas (British, French and Dutch) from c. 1800 to the Present," Revised
article for the second edition of The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America
and the Caribbean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1991).
MONOGRAPHS
Guyanese Documents in U.K. Archives (f urkeyen : Department of History, Univer -

•
sity of Guyana, 1978).
Annotated List of Colonial Office Documents - C.O. 111/1, Governors ' Dispatches ,
British Guiana. Selected Years 1781 -1871 - C.O. 111/384 and C.O. 884/ 1-19
(Turkeyen: Department of History, University of Guyana, 1978).
The State of Research in Guyana (Turkeyen: University of Guyana, 1981) .
THESES
"A Comparative Study of the French and Spanish Negro Slave Policy in Colonial
Louisiana, 1700-1803 " (M.A., Georgetown University, 1965).
"British Policy Towards the Amerindians in British Guiana," (Ph.D., University of
London, 1973).
UNPUBLISHED PAPERS
"Relations between the Vatican and the Third Reich, 1933-1939 ," (May, 1965).
"The Syncretism between the Aztec and Christian Religions."
"Juarez and His Role in Mexican History ."
"The Role of the Church in Education in Sixteenth Century Mexico."
"University of Guyana, 1963-1970."
"The First Twenty-Five Years of Madeiran Emigration to British_Guiana, 1835-1860 .''
"A Brief Survey of the Historical Background to the Venezuela-Guyana Border Dispute,"
(1971).
"The Role of the Churches in the Civilization of the Amerindians in British Guiana ,
1803-1873," (197 4).
"The Historical Background to the _ Venezuela-Guyana Border Issue - A Case in Diplomacy
1841-1981."
• ..
~
71

.,..,
~~::~s
1
798.
MADE DURING A RESIDENCE AT STABROEK RIO
RY (IAT. 6.10 N) IN THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR
.
This document is an account by an American visitor, Thomas Pierronet, of
his experience in the colony of Demerara , especially in its c;apital, Stabroe~ (renamed
Georgetown in 1811). It is one of the earliest accounts in English of the
colony, especially after the British occupation in 1796. A manuscript version exists
in the holdings of the John Carter Brown Library in Providence, Rhode Island, in the
United States of America. The first publication of the document appeared in the
Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1st series, Volume VI, Boston,
1800. It is the earliest known published account of Demerara by an American.
DOCUMENT
A traveller finds himseif in an awkward situation, in journeying in this country,
to find that , in every house, it is expected that he shod [should] furnish his own
hammock for the night. This principle is so extensive, that no one expects to provide
spare beds, or even hammocks, any farther than one absolutely necessary for
the use of his own family; and every inhabitant , whose business may call him out,
always carries one in his pegall.
Ants
The Ants here are exceedingly troublesome; they are very small and do not
sting, but are the most rapacious vermin in the colony. They are remarkably fond of
Sugar, which can hardly be placed out of their reach. The only method , yet discovered,
of evading their visits, is by suspending it to a cord, round wh. lich] a tuft of
cotton being tied, presents them an obstacle their dexterity cannot surmount.
These insects infest every part of the house alike, the ground and attic stories
being equally the objects of research; and no method has as yet been discovered to
extirpate them.
. ~he sting of the merribunter, or wild bee is very pain£ ul. An immediate
application of any oleaginous substance has been found the most efficacious
remedy .
The common fly abounds in some houses and scarcely ever visits others .

The bat inf e ts old houses in flocks and by their screaming and croaking are
very trouble ome and disagreeable during the night.
The Mosquito is the most venomous insect in Guyana to strangers who
uffer very severely by their stings· many have suffered amputation, and even the loss
of life, by means of large ulcers which have been caused originally by their bite. But
per on used to the colony are scarcely ever bitten by them· and when they are, they
feel no inconvenience from their attack.
The centipede is rare the cockroach very numerous. The firefly which emits
a brilliant light in the evening , abounds in the environs of Stabroek. The Bug frequently
extinguishes candles by flying against the wick.
The frog , whose croaking is remarkably loud and hoarse , abounds in the
trenches and dykes.
The land-crab, which, by continually perforating the dams, causes vast trouble
to the planters ; and by letting the water flow into the plantations through a thousand
almost invisible sluices.
Some snakes are of an enormous size; they have been met with from twentyfive
to thirty feet in length; they have been known to attack and kill an ox, and are
not penetrable by a ball, except in the head, their scales completely defending their
bodies.
The soil agrees with the greater part of the vegetable tribe; it assimilates
particularly with the spice trees. Cayenne has lately exported a considerable quantity
of doves, nutmegs and cinnamon.
The bread fruit tree flourishes in different parts of the colony. Cinnamon. of
a superior quality, has been produced in the garden of Mr. Grenet and nutmegs from
that of Mr. St. Ursel; but the Dutch Government has always prohibited their increase ,
other than as an object of curiosity
Pineapples are plenty in sandy beaches and tracts. Plantains, the banana
and coconut trees thrive very much.
Town
A Stranger from the Northward sees, with surprise, a town without chimney,
73

uni , it b one h re and there erected in a Dutch Kitchen. The common ~
ooking is to make a fire on the ground, in an outhouse, and let the smoke shift for
it-elf.
It ha been observed by the Barbadian Emigrants, that the Dutch colonists
hav built their privies as near the house , and the Kitchen as far distant, as possible.
Their oppon ents report that the places alluded to, one infinitely cleaner and less
offen ive than a Barbad~s kitchen. They have truth, at least, on their side.
Scarcely a single glass window is in the : own· Their place is supplied by
shutters and among those of higher rank. by Bhnds, nevertheless, the houses are
infinite!~ su;rior in point of appearance, to those of Barbados . A scantiness of
furniture is very ~sible in the large rooms. Magnificence, and even elegance, are
very little known in Demerary ...
The burying ground of Stabroek and the adjoining dependencies of New
Town La Bourgade, and Bridgetown, contains 16 acres, in the centre of which a
church is to be built at some future period.
The Town of Stabroek consists of abt [about] 250 houses, whose rents are
from 3000 to 1200 guilders. It consists of a main street, and two others , parallel to
the dams, which all meet the river at right angles. The two dams are called North
and South in respect to their situation to the Town and bound two Canals, or Trenches,
that are of great use in boating heavy articles before every house. They have likewise
a trench, over which is thrown a wooden bridge, besides a number of smaller ones,
cut in various directions. The sickly season commences when those ditches stagnate
in the dry season , they being out of reach of common tides and continues during the
months of July, August, September, October, and sometimes pt [part] of November,
when the rains setting in again diminish the Mortality; but of late years the seasons
have been very precarious , the rain failing by intervals the whole of the time ...
. The rain here, in common with other tropical countries, generally descends
m torrents , and diminishes gradually to the end of the storm .
Wells and pumps are not used. The muddiness of the soil and brackishness
of the water preclude the use of them, altho' you meet with water generally at two
feet beneath the surface.
The roads , which are of stiff clay, have been formed by the soil thrown out of
th
' wea er are very good; but on the least shower, they become ,
t h e dams and in dry
74

from their slipperiness and adhesive quality, almost impassable. They are obliged to
batten their wooden bridges on this account, which otherwise would prove excessively
dangerous. They have, however, this good quality, that an hour 's sun will dry
them, even after the most violent storm.
The only paving to be met with, is a Brick path, that runs the length of the
Town, from 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile, which was laid by Mrs. Espinasse, a former
Governor's Wife. It contains several hundred thousand Bricks. No one can roll a
Barrel or ride a horse over it, without incurring a penalty, it being the only walkable
path in wet weather. Since the British have held the place , it has been suffered to run
to ruin in many places.
The value of the houses , ..... are in no proportion to their rents. The very
best may be obtained at 10 years purchase, while others will not bring in above one
third of that value. The supposed cause of this depreciation is the great repairs
which are here always necessary, arising from a principle of decay inherent to the
climate, and to the great value of money in a country where speculation knows no
bounds.
The Troops now in Stabroek may be estimated as follows:
The remains of (the] 39th Regt., 200
The Black corps, formerly an assessment
of every 50th slave on all plantations
possessing more than that number 7 00
The Militia, composed of all the King's
natural born subjects 200
The Dutch Troops 150
1250
The Duty of a Burgher is simply the defence of the Town, in case of a Negro
insurrection. They are obliged to furnish themselves with a musket, bayonet, sabre,
and 40 rounds of Ammunition. They are composed of those Hollanders who refuse
joining the militia, Germans, French, Swiss, ..... and a few Americans. This corps
are not obliged to take arms on any occasion, except the forementioned one, even
were a French fleet to ascend the river.
No other water is made use of but rain water, preserved in Casks, and sometimes,
altho' rarely, in cisterns. A continual supply of rain is, therefore, necessa~ for
the Inhabitants who suffer extremely during the dry season, when they are obliged
'
75

to obtain their water many miles up the river, at an expensive price.
The insects are very destructive of Lumber, whi_ch_ is the ~eason that a Lumber
yard
.
has not yet been established in the Colony. It 1s 1mposs1ble to guard aga·
inst
their ravages while the boards lay on the ground .
Rio Demerary , from being a small stream , has incre~sed to a mile in breadth,
one half of which, however, is shoal. In conseque~ce of this encroachment, several
Estates have been entirely washed away, the vestiges of whose works may yet be
seen at low water, and others are daily decaying. It is with the greatest difficulty the
preserve the foundations of the fort. This river is navigable far above the Loo Pia;
tation , which lays 100 miles up ; and it has been said, that at the height of 500 miles
it takes its source from a lake.
Others assert , that the whole province of Guyana is formed by the junction of
the Amazons with the Orinoco ; but with what truth, I cannot determine ...
Rio Essequibo is 60 miles wide at the mouth, and contains nearly 300 Islands
Its Banks are rocky; it abounds in subjects of natural History; its forest is superior to
that of Demerary , and its Sugar Plantations of a far better quality ...
The quantity of Mud is astonishing, as well as the extent of it. On the coast,
you strike soundings in mud banks in 5 fathoms, out of sighfo(-the Land. It continues
increasing until it forms vast shoals, which are · intersec _ted·by the mouths of the
rivers. Of these, Poumaron. [Pomer6 -6nJ, -Essequibo~ Derrierary, Berbice, Quarantin
[CorentyneJ, Surinam and Cayenne are fhe 'mosftonsiderable; ·'the lesser ones are
called creeks, and are frequently · of an extreme depth ~ and ri~rro; ·_ - Many of these
are pellucid, whereas the others are replete with muddy particles ...
The Number of Plantations
East Coast .
From the Fort in Demerary to Mahaica Creek 80
From [lvtahaica Creek) to Mahaicona [Mahaicony] 30
- Mahaicona to Abary Creek . 13
· - Abary to Rio Berbice 90
212
. 76

W• t
fr 1n Ith l W. P int f Rio D m r ry to
Bon i rr in Ri ·s quibo 45
From Sup n n1 r k Rio I quibo] to
Ri P urn r n [Porn roon] 2
165
I land in Es equibo
L gun
Wak nam , 40 . Tiger Island 5
In the oth er islands, 20
45
110
In all. 487 Plantation s, which , at 3 Whites, the average Number in each, are
equal to 1461 White Inhabitants, exclusive of those on the River Plants [Plantations]
and those contained in the Towns.
The Number of Coloured People are upwards of 250,000.
Great quantities of different ores are discovered among the rocks and mountains.
A shaft was sunk at Piera, belonging to Mr. Haslin, from which some ore was
extracted, which was pronounced to be gold; but, for some reasons of the government,
it was discontinued . Minerals are very abundant, particularly the red and
yellow ochres . Farther back are large hills, which from the description of their
brilliancy must be composed of talc. or pe.rhaps spar, intermixed with quartz.
No European flowers will flourish in the rank soil of Demerary not even a
colly flower - the soil is so rank that they exhaust themselves before the time of
blossom.
There are scarcely any flowering plants peculiar to the country but of shrubs
the greate st variety and of the most elegant kinds which are planted in what they call
the gardens altho ' Horticulture be here in its most uncouth form .
The interior will probably never be brought to a state of cultivation owing to
the want of drainage or at least the tract sixty miles from the sea which is a vast
drowned swamp . All the improvements have been hitherto made on the Sea Coast
77

and on the banks of the rivers and very rarely has a plantation been carried farther
back - the labour in for ming a new plantation is immense and can only be estimated
by those who have been spectators thereof .
..,_
The produce of these settlements are Coffee , Cotton and Sugar - of these
Cotton is supposed to be the most precarious crop . Too much rain rots it and a
succession of dry weather causes it to blast. Coffee on the contrary has nothing to
fear except from too much wet. Several Estates make a good revenue from their
plantain walks a bunch of which previous to the importation of 60,000 slaves by the
English into the Colony was sold for 2 1 /z Stivers now fetches 121/2.
Many Persons make a great deal of money by pr~c~ring ti_mber for the colony
but the Jabour used to obtain it must be immense when 1t 1s considered that a square
foot of some kinds weighs frequently 100 lbs. - they take a gang of negroes from 12
to 20 and sometimes more and go up a river until they meet with the species they are
in quest of _ they then land; the head of the gang strikes into the woods and marks
the trees as nearly in line as possible until he has provided a sufficient number to
make his raft - in the meanwhile the slaves are busy in constructing huts and making
their little arrangements by the time the master returns which sometimes happens
after he has penetrated from 2 to 3 miles in the for est - they then immediately begin
failing the trees which are often of a great thickness . This thickness is reduced by
squaring until it be reduced to a size proportioned to the strength of the crew who
are to remove the log.
When they have squared the Whole they then begin opening a road - for this
purpose they cut down all the growth between the farthest stick and the stream to
the breadth of 3 or 4 Yards taking care to throw the trunks across the road that they
~ay answer the purpose of rollers . The then affix a rope to the several pieces of
timber and by main strength haul it to the river 's side.
. D~ring this time a boat is perpetually employed in fetching plantain~ etc . for
their subsistence and is generally 5 Days on its voyage .
d
?wn
After the raft is prepared it is slung over the sides of a large punt and towed
the stream where a part is sawed up into boards which are sold from 5 to 6
shvers per superficial foot and the block in proportion .
h !he most. valuable woods are the Determa, Wallaba Crab Wood Greeneart,
S1sseree, Sirrabaillee, Callibaillie etc. , '
78 .

J
•
Animal labour is totally excluded unless it be that of the horse when used for
the saddle or chair - this is not so much to be wondered at when it is considered that
the low country does not provide even a pebble. A team of Oxen or horses with a
heavy draught would destroy the best road in Demerary in the rainy season. As for
the interior the soil is so swampy that an animal of burthen would sink to its belly at
every step. However, the colonists contrive to intersect the country with such a
multitude of canals that the heaviest articles are delivered them at a very cheap rate.
The cutting of grass is very laborious and tiresome and as it is the only herbaceous
food of the horses it is necessary to secure great quantities of it. The only way
used here to obtain it is by sending out the neg roes with a knife who by this tedious
operation at length collects a bundle which may weigh 80 lbs. which he binds like a
wheat sheaf and carries off - it is remarkable that the scythe sickle flail plough waggon
or even hand barrow are absolutely unknown in the Colony.
The grants of Plantations allow them to run 7 50 rods back; if a Planter would
push farther , he was obliged to make an application to the grand Council in Holland
who rarely ref use his request.
Negroes
The negroes are subsisted at a very easy rate; a bunch of plantains, which will
last them a week , and a little salt fish, form their delicacies. As for their cloathing
[sic], the far greater part of them have only a narrow strip of bunting to bind round
their middle, while many of the younger classes have not even this ornament. However,
in some families they are comfortably cloathed [sic], and fed with scraps which
have reached the second day - their lodgings are , however , on the bare floor where
they generally lay promiscuously.
They are punished very severely; altho ' it depends very much on the disposition
of their owners , whether they go thro' a constant whipping, or whether they
experience a milder fate. Theft and desertion are generally left to the fiscal, whose
agents apply from two to five hundred lashes (according to their sentence) with a
long whip which lacerates them horribly . These lashes are always applied on the
bare breech , and the culprit prevented sitting thereon for three months .
Crimes of greater magnitude are extenuated by the rack and subsequent
decapitation .
The Negroes are allowed the priviledge {sic} of ~e Sunday, when they come
79

. L ,
into the Town 'th t . ,,..
, e1 · er o work m deaning out the trenches etc. or Withal d
or vegetabl
. es,
h · h h . ' ' oa of f ·
W 1c t ey dispose of for their own emolument. After the rtut
receiv~d the amount of their perquisite, they either lay out the money in pr Y h~ve
~ome httle necessaries , or otherwise in drinking, gambling, and dancing; and ~~~~g
is generally concluded by one or more battles.
Y
A negro funeral is conducted with a mock solemnity which is truly farcical
While the funeral service is performing , a number of t~em form a dance, in whi~h
they are joined. after the internment, by those who assisted thereat.
Bucks
The Bucks or native Indians are wandering Tribes. They seldom stay ve
Jong in a settlement or at most until the Death of one of their tribe when th~
immediately decamp.
Their huts are open at the sides and covered at the top with Trulee leaves·
they light fire in the area in the evening previous to their sleeping in their hammocks'.
the smoke of which greatly conduces to keep off the insects.
They are exceedingly phlegmatic and cannot be easily provoked unless by
taking liberties with their women.
They are generally short and thick but by no means muscular and destitute of
the energy and vivacity of the North American tribes.
These people are under the protection of the Dutch Government who find
them the only barrier against the desertion of their Negroes who are frequently
apprehended by the Bucks.
i
• •
Their ingenuity is tolerably dis plaid in the manufacture of lines, twine and
hammocks of the bark of a tree besides very fine cotton hammocks extremely well
spun and wove (which sometimes sell as high as 80 Dollars). Pegals which are
double baskets of a square form and impenetrable to the rain being made of cane
and stuffed with plantain leaves: Cassava sieves, Baskets - Brick Pots etc .
. -t •
Several of them are domiciliated with the whites and make good servants -
they likewise will often work in clearing Plantations for-a 'trifling recompense.
They have a favourite practice of painting themselves red with the juice of a
80

.., .
plant called rocou. They go entirely naked having only a small strip of cloth round
their middle. The women wear a small apron curiously wrought with beads. Some
of these tribes are named as follows: Waraous, Capissahns, Cabissees, Pariahnes ,
Quapissans , Tigres , Arawcas or Arouacs.
It appears that the Bucks, who were the principal means of suppressing two
insurrections , were defrauded of the reward promised them for bringing in the right
hands of the bush or maroon negroes , for which they were to receive 300 florins
each. Whereas on bringing in one hundred of these hands , they were presented with
a few dollars only. The consequence has been that they have declared themselves
neutrals on every future occasion of that kind, which may be productive of fatal
consequences to the colony on some future day.
The Bucks and Buckines frequently hold an intercourse with the negroes ; the
children produced thereby are called Caribogres and are generally an active and
intelligent race .
The increase of rice here is astonishing ; 5,000 pounds per acre have been
gathered from some of the uncultivated islands in Essequibo, which are covered at
every spring tide ; yet notwithstanding this fertility, its culture is very little attended to,
although it sometimes fetches five stivers per pound .
\ ,. -:~
81 . .
;. ..

ii7W
BOOK REVIEWS
Colin Baber and Henry B. Jeffrey, Guyana: Politics, Econorn.
and Society (London: Frances Pinter (Publishers}, 1986), xvii, 203 P~~s
The editor of this multi-disciplinary series about 'Marxist Regimes' hailed th·
volume as ' ... the first comprehensive boo k on G uyanese po I 1bcs, . . economics and
lS
society'. The series, he wrote, was envisaged as 'textbooks ' and each volume deals
with a separate country and was prepared by scholars who had first-hand knowledg
of the country concerned. Its aim was to show that, depending on a wide variety 0 ~
national factors, the pursuit of Marxism has produced different forms.
The authors of this book set thernselves the task of studying the political
transformation which took place in Guyana up to 1985. Research for this book
seems to have concluded in August 1985, the same month as the death of President
Forbes Burnham . This event gave the authors the unique opportunity to evaluate
the foregoing twenty years of Burnham ' s tenure of off ice and to speculate about the
future under his successor, Desmond Hoyte .
In many respects, the central focus of the book is Forbes Burnham himself
who , the authors argued:
'... believed that fortune had placed him in a unique historical situation
which would allow him to construct socialism, even radical socialism,
on the American continent. ' (p.2).
Hence, from a methodological point of view, the authors adopted from the start,
various levels of analysis - national, institutional and individual - in their approach to
this subject. The task they faced was made lighter by a very sensible organization of
the book. It is well-served by an explanatory series' editor 's preface, authors ' introduction
and sufficient supplementary material - political map, statistical tables, data
charts - to satisfy the average reader. The chapters are logically arranged, starting
with the geographical and historical setting and continuing with discussions of the
background political and social issues. The main body of the book is taken up with
the People 's National Congress - the ruling party - the constitution, central and local
government, mass organizations and political dissent, the economy, and domestic
82

and foreign policies. The final chapter looks at 'Guyana; Beyond Burnham'.
On the surface, this arrangement accounts for the most important aspects of
the study but, on closer reading , it becomes clearer that the book neither analyses
Guyana from a Marxist perspective as the editor promised, nor covers the subject of
the country's politics, economics and society comprehensively. The former deficiency
is understanable since , in spite of the series title, 'Marxist Regimes' , it would
be futile to persist in using a Marxist measuring rod on a regime that was not Marxist
at all. The latter deficiency , however, is unforgivable in a would-be textbook.
In place of a textbook study of Guyana , the authors have produced what
amounts to an inquiry into the People 's National Congress (PNC) regime, simpliciter.
One entire chapter (Chapter 4), for example , is devoted to that Party's structure and
operations, which are described in rather tedious and unnecessary detail. The book
ignores the dozen or so other political parties, and numerous mass and non-governmental
organizations which sprang up during this period. These were never controlled
by the PNC , but surely must have played a part in the evolving polity in that
period. Similarly, very little mention is made of ethnic groups other than the East
Indians and Africans and of their place in the society or economy and the roles of
their socio-cultural organizations. As a result of these shortcomings , the direction
taken by the authors diverged markedly from the objectives described by the series'
editor.
A striking weakness of this book arises from the different styles of writing and
use of language by the authors. Two chapters, in particular - Chapter 5 'Constitutional
Arrangements ' and Chapter 8 'The Guyanese Economy ' - are coherent and
well-structured with short sentences written in lucid language; they are broad in scope,
well-argued and apply to Guyana as a whole . By and large, the other chapters are
poorly written ; sentences are long, stringing together a variety of ideas clumsily
connected by conjunctions. Compared with the crisp style of the previously mentioned
chapters, the language is loose, bordering on the colloquial, and the meaning
is often vague.
This uneven treatment of the subject has affected the coherence of the book
as a whole. As the PNC is the main focus, it is impossible for the reader to form a
truly comprehensive picture of Guyana's 'politics, ·economi~ and society'. Part of
the problem may have arisen out of the slender source matenal used. R~ferenc~ to
local newspapers and party publications are Sijrprisingly ~ant , conveying the 1m-
83

pr n that some of the conclusions were arrived at by hunches or insider kn
dg_ . -~!though this lends a refreshing tone of authenticity, it also heightenso;~
subJ chvity and bias so evident throughout the book.
~
The ambitious promise to provide a comprehensive account of Guyana .
' I rt ·t lS,
t h er~ f or , . unfulfilled. Like Mr. Jones s egg, some pa s are qui e excellent', but
alas. bias, poor presentation and unconvincing arguments, weaken this book. It'
usefulness lies in its attempts to account for the causes of the crisis in Guy,ma unde~
Forbes Burnham and to predict the course of development under his successor
Desmond Hoyte. In this regard, it has made a modest contribution to the writing of
the contemporary political history of a particularly diffic~lt ~ericx:l by penetrating the
political apparatus of the PNC more than any other pubhcahon heretofore has done.
In this respect, therefore , the book is timely and well-conceived. And, even if
the authors' execution has fallen short of the editor 's ambitions and the readers'
expectations , it has succeeded in throwing some light on the dark processes which
brought Guyanese politics, economics and society to the state they were in by August
1985.
David Granger
MADAN GOPAL: POLITICS, RACE AND YOUTH IN GUYANA
Mellen Research University Press, San Francisco, 1992.
Having come to political power through a coalition with the small, businessoriented
United Force in l 964 ~ and having led the colony to political 'independence'
in 1966 (with the : complicity. of Anglo-American imperialism in a series of political
events quite richly documented in Dr. Cheddi Jagan 's The West on Tria~, the
People 's National Congress (PNC) came to rely heavily on a combined strategy of
fraudulent elections and political repression to maintain control of the Guyanese
state. After generai elections in 1968, the fairness of which were widely disputed,
the party was able to discard its coalition partner through the individual claim to
55.6o/i) of the national votes (as compared to 40% in the previous national elections
in 1964). ·In local government elections held in 1970 the PNC was again able to
gain ascendancy through corrupt electoral practices, and through a consequent boy-
84

- .
cott by its main political rival, the People 's Progressive Party (PPP), in the final
stages. By 197 4 the PNC was advocating its own paramountcy over the institutions
of the state, and in a series of nationalizations in 1971, 1975, and 1976, brought
under its control the bauxite and sugar industries, the two major earners of foreign
currency, which were up to the time of their nationalization in the hands of local
subsidiaries of multinational companies located in Canada, the United States, and
Britain. During the 1970s private schools were abolished and education brought
under the full control of government. The media too (radio stations and national
newspaper) were placed under government control. The dominance of African­
Guyanese (the traditional support base of the PNC) in the armed forces as well as in
the Civil Service (now Public Service) tended to facilitate the PNC' s movements towards
full control of the society.
General elections ("selections") in 1973, 1980, and 1985, assured the PNC
not merely of a simple majority, but of more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament.
The situation that emerged made a farce of parliamentary democracy, and
the PNC's control by 1976 of more than eighty per cent of the Guyanese economy
and of the public media created a situation that came close to approximating the
state of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty Four. As Orwell found his hope in the
"proles", so did the hope for Guyanese emit from a determined opposition, led by
the PPP and the Working People's Alliance (WPA) and including a few hardy unions,
the Anglican and Catholic Churches, and some dedicated individuals attached to
these and other institutions, like the Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA). As
the economic crisis of the late nineteen seventies and of the ninety eighties took root
in the Guyanese society, the response of the PNC state to heightened forms of
popular dissent became an increasing spiral of political repression. The most dramatic
manifestation of this repression was the assassination of world-renowned scholar
and co-leader of the WPA, Dr. Walter Rodney, on 13 June 1980. Other politicallyinspired
killings during this period included Edward Dublin and Ohene Koama (both
of the WPA) and Father Bernard Darke, a Catholic priest.
The state media played a very persistent role in the state's ideological penetration
of the society. Espousing a philosophy of Cooperative Socialism in 197 0,
the PNC moved towards a more Stalinist position in 1974. Not only did the Party
now profess an ideology of Marxism-Leninism, but also the PNC government proceeded
to establish diplomatic and trade relations with the socialist bloc of the day·
In 197 6 the PPP under what is widely believed to be "encouragement" from the
USSR, adopted a' policy of critical support for the PNC government, and during the
next year the Cuban government granted the Prime Minister and leader of the PNC,
85

then on a state visit to Cuba , its highest national honour , the Jose Marti a
1980. following the referendum of 1978 which was as contrived as gene;al ;ar~ . In
had become , the PNC ··won·· the approval that allowed it to frame a new c~cti~ns
tion for the nation . An outstanding feature of this new constitution was th nstituextensive
powers vested upon the new office of Executive President. This offi: very
of course taken up by the leader of the PNC and then Prime Minister of the co~n~~~
Madan Gopal's Politics,
Race and Yuth in _ G_uyana captures With
great sensitivity the oppressiveness of the PNC d1~tatorsh1p m the e~rly 1980s. In
the very selection of his sample of respondents , for instance, Gopal points out that·
spite of his deliberate attempt to ~void the inclusi~n of young people who we~:
known to be excessively critical of tne Government, 1t turned out that all the participants
in the study were very strongly opposed to it. Gopal himself became the object
of suspicion and distrust as he attempted to recruit a sample for his study by himself.
While there are criticisms to be made about the sample in question, the early attitudes
of suspicion. fear, distrust and rejection of the government were very widespread
in the Guyanese society at that point in time .
The oppr essiveness of the Guyanese society was reflected in suspicion and
distrust arising not only out of the fear of victimization by the PNC state , but also out
of the related breakdown of Jaw and order as weU as of social values. Gopal cites
sources like the Catholic Standard newspaper and the Guyana Human Rights Association
Reports to show the erosion of basic rights and privileges. widespread corruption
, lack of accountability in the use of public finances , fatal shootings of suspects
by the police , and the increase of crime in the society. Added to the scarcity in
drugs and foodstuff , and the very high cost of living, it becomes understandable that
Guyana should develop , according to one commentator , the highest rate of emigration
per capita , of any country in the world (save those countries involved in civil
disturbances) . With this background , in which Gopal's work itself is rich, it becomes
possible to explore the study in a fuller way .
Politics, Race and Youth in Guyana attempts to discern the perceptions of a
group of East Indian adolescents from a working-class background about the nature
of inter-ethnic relations as these relations respond to the entrenchment of political
dictatorship in Guyana . Interviews of these adolescents are : conducted very informally
and the conversational style popularly known as the gyaff is used with great
effect. In the course the attitudes of the respondents themselves on the question are
inve tigated. In selected instances probing continued in comparative depth.
86

The adole cents are given a fair amount of scope t d f· t t · · ·
. . . o e me s ra egic pnon -
ties, which are then made the basis of m-depth investigation. All the adolescents
aspire to "~oing fo~ard " and to ''betterment'', (concepts which the researcher duly
explores with the mform~nts) . ~he "coming together " (another concept similarly
explored) of the ~o ma~?r ~thrnc grou.?s , East Indians and African-Guyanese, is
seen as a prere~u1s1te for gomg forward and for 'betterment·. "Coming together '
does not end with a focus on the masses , but should in the judgement of the participants
inform the approach of the main opposition parties of the day - the WPA and
the PPP.
Gopal's findings cohere with the visible evidence of the period. The traditional
constituency of African-Guyanese masses was becoming alienated from the
ruling PNC, and the WPA in particular was developing a large multi-ethnic following,
which at one time seemed to be infringing upon the PPP 's traditional constituency
among East Indian sugar workers.
The integration of the perceptions of the youth within the larger framework
of the political struggle of the day consolidates what is known of the period and what
Gopal himself surmises . This in itself is a very useful achievement of Gopal' s study.
It is not unrealistic for the reader of Politics, Race and Youth in Guyana to
expect new insights into the problem, however. The main reason why these are not
forthcoming has to do with deficiencies in Gopal ' s methodology which will now be
examined. In chapter one of his book Gopal states that:
The aim of this study is to examine the consciousness of a small
group of working class adolescents in Guyana. A qualitative approach
is used and the orientation is inter-disciplinary. One particular ethnic
group, East Indians, is selected for the conduct of this inquiry and a
specific sector of consciousness is identified for study: that concerned
with inter-ethnic relations.
To specify further the boundaries of the study i~ is ~ecess~ry to point
to the strategy adopted for pursuing the investigation. It involves an
1nd1rect · · approac h : et h n1c · re l a ti ons ar e examined by focussing on the
l·t· l In other words through an examination of adolescent
po 11ca scene. , ·tful sought
consciousness of political events in Guyana, frui answers are. f
to issues normally conceptua 11ze . d as fall" 1
ng within the province o
race relations. (Gopal, p. l). ·
87

The fieldwork for the study, according to Gopal , was done in Guyan . ~
1982 during the four months between May and September . It consisted of sev a in
seven unstructured interviews with twenty East Indian adolescents, all aged be;:,ntysixtee~
and eighteen years at the inception of the fieldwork. . Six of these res;~~
dents/ mfor.mants were girls and fourteen boys. Most of the interviews were ta _
recorded , according to Gopal, "usually in the privacy of the participants' horn!~
(Gopal, p. I 07). Originally twenty-two students were recruited to participate in th~
study, but "2 of the girls dropped out after the first meeting , despite their initial
enthusiasm . It was later learnt that their parents did not wish them to undertake the
risks involved '. (Gopal, p. 111).
The interviews fell into two major sections of fieldwork. In the first there
were twenty-seven interviews in which all twenty respondents took part . "They were
conducted in an informal and casual manner and were designed to gauge the main
emphases the interviewees put upon their experience ". (Gopal, p. 107). In the
second part of the fieldwork there were fifty additional interviews, which though as
informal as the first set, "were characterized by more probing by way of questioning.
They were intended to explore in greater depth the basic emphases discovered in the
first part". (Gopal, p. 107) : Only six participants :w-ere chosen in order to facilitate
this process of probing. Gopal makes the point that:
East Indians were chosen for several reasons ~ To begin with, the
study was designed to involve an in-depth, fairly comprehensive exploration
of consciousness . Though concentration on idiosyncratic
particulars was not a primary aim, contact with them and assessment
of their import (as constituents of the phenomenal world) were prerequisites
for the selection of typical emphases; a small sample chosen
from the researcher 's own ethnic group was ideally suited for this
purpose . The advantages of such a choice included a drastic reduction
in the complications posed by the ethnic factor, relative ease in
establishing and maintaining genuine rapport and an increased assurance
of effective communication based on competence in, and personal
knowledge (Polanyi, 1962)* of a host of linguistic, social and
cultural norms peculiar to the group in question. In view of the limited
time available for fieldwork, its subjective orientation, and the delicate
nature of the issues (race and politics} and the potential for disruption
(and worse) in a politically repressive enviroment these are no inconsiderable
benefits. The fact that scholarly studie~ of the Indo-Carib-
88

ean population are few and that work on the youth of this group is
non-existent also influenced the selection of this sample. (Gopal, pp.
107-109) .
In considering the fieldwork , serious questions arise about the representativeness
of the sample Gopal uses. Even if one were to accept Gopal's justification for
choosing participants from exclusively one ethnic group (and this will be discussed
later in the review), the sampling technique he uses is one clearly given to bias, that
is, over and above whatever bias is legitimately a part of any measure of "subjective
attitudes" of the type that Gopal is attempting. For example, in the small sample of
the restricted class of East Indian youth that Gopal is studying, women are quite
clearly under-represented. Yet Gopal boldly asserts that: "Difference on the basis of
gender was not noteworthy in the adolescents ' outlook". (Gopal, p.206). While this
may be the case in Gopal's sample, one is very uncertain as to how valid this statement
is for youth (even only East Indian youth) in Guyana.
A second example that brings out the inadequacy of Gopal's sample concerns
its geographical restrictiveness. Gopal states about the participants\respondents
of his study: "Four of these resided in Georgetown. Most of the others resided
within a distance of 14 miles from the city. Three lived much further away in the
rural setting on the East Coast of Demerara". (Gopal, p.111). One has to view quite
sceptically the capacity for such a sample to speak validly for the national population.
Indeed, even in Gopal 's geographically restricted sample, he discerned variations in
responses that cannot be ignored, and that hold implications for the study as a
whole. About his informants for instance he states:
Two of those who lived in or near Georgetown seemed to be a bit
more sympathetic towards blacks. In part, this was probably due to
their being able, on account of their residential location, to observe
more closely their hardships. They also often overheard their condemnation
of the Government. (Gopal, p.206).
The reader of Politics, Race and Youth in Guyana can only guess about the
variations in the attitudes among the youth of the East Indian population in a more
representative national sample.
Thirdly, there is absolutely no attempt to justify the sample on scientific
grounds. All that the reader is told is that "the researcher had originally intended to
89

~ecruit at least some of the participants on his own initiative" (Gopal, p.109) .
mg encountered difficulties in so doing:
Hav-
He sought the help and cooperation of four experienced , senior teachers
, employed at three different secondary schools locat~d within a
radius of forty miles from Georgetown . He depended on them exclusively
for his sample and abandoned all further attempts at personally
initiating contact with potential participants . (Gopal , p .110).
Paradoxically , Gopal does show awareness of the potential for bias in his sample.
He explains that "in order to guard against bias, all teachers were requested to use
their judgement and experience in eliminating from their choice students who were
known to be excessivelly critical of the Government "· (Gopal , p.110). Obviously this
does not go far enough.
Yet another important example of the lack of scientific rigour in the study
derives out of the use of a very shaky and contradictory conceptualization of the
whole data coHection process. In fact, the writer could well be accused of tautology.
In chapter ~ight c;;f the book he asks: "To what extent can a sample of twenty
inf or man ts, subsequently· reduced to six, be considered a sound basis for generalization?"
(Gopal, p.243) . In answer to his own question he states:
The subjective outlook of the small group was not intended to be used
uncritically as the sole basis for drawing inferences about the larger
macro-enviroment. The fieldwork was in fact aimed at refining and
extending a prior understanding of the latter derived from historical
and sociological analysis ... (Gopal , pp. 243-244).
. .
The writ~r cites "his own experience and observation during the field research in the
setting " and his "personal knowledge" as means by which prior understanding is
achieved .
: ' : ..._ ; I ,. . ,
. This pa;tb is.
, of course ~ J~ded with pitfalls . The co~h"~is ~pon.
the writer's
own misperce?!ions that should mandatorily direct the testing of hypotheses empirically,
are sacnf1ced on the altar of the assumption that his "sociological analyses ",
"?bserv~tion" and "personal .knowledge" . abom the myriad issues that affect the soc1aJ
relationships of grou J t t h d · · d d
ps re evan o t e stu · y are beyond reproach and can m ee
90

e as a methodological complement to the actual e . .
serv . d 1
1
1 h· mptnca work done Gopal' s
restncte samp e en arges t ts domain of specul ti d . ·
sJ11a d I d d a on an undermines the val·d·ty
of the stu y. n ee one may suggest that if the writ \ h . . .
I J h d h d t d er researc er s ms1ghts are
so deep, w y oes e con uc a stu yin the first place?
In fact, what comes through to the reader of Pol"t· R
· h · · ,
1
res, ace and Youth
·n Guyana 1st e 1mpress1on that Gopal s methodology is th t·
' . . h . e ra 1ona 112ahon . . made
of the i~prov1satton(s t e ~ 1ter. was forced to make to the study because of constraints
m resources espec1a 1 y time) and because of the absenc
e o
f
a we
ll
-conceived
.
plan.
As a final . comment . on Gopal 's methodology , in part1·cul ar h· 1s samp l e, one
has to challenge ht'~ exclusive fo~us o~ East Indian youth as participants\ informants.
Gopal does ~elat~ a long term 1nterd1sci~linary interest in the society and culture of
the overse~s Indians on an aspe_ct ~f which, namely the subjective immigrant experience,
he 1s currently concentrating · (Gopal, p.xi). In another passage quoted above
Gopal alludes to the advantages of "a small sample chosen from the researcher's
own ethnic group ". While this need Go pal identifies for studies that analyse the East
Indian experience in the Caribbean does legitimately exist, it is noteworthy that there
is a growing body of work on this subject . (See , for instance , Dabydeen, D. and
Samaroo, B., eds. , 1987; and Klass, M., 1961 and 1991). There seems relatively
little to be gained for this particular study, in spite of Gopal's assertions, by the
exclusiveness of the sample. In fact, the "drastic reduction in complications posed by
the ethnic factor '' that Gopal sees as a benefit from the ethnic exclusiveness of the
sample is very likely to be off-set by a limiting of insights into the problem as a whole.
Why settle for the perceptions of one of two major groups when the complementary
perceptions of African -Guyanese youth would give a more accurate representation
of the true picture at the time with respect to the state of race and class relations as
they affected the political question? Indeed, quite often, Gopal 's
informants\ respondents are made to speculate about the very attitudes of African­
Guyanese on que stions of race and politics. He himself observed that in the 1970s
there emerged a new -found consciousness among African -Guyanese who "have been
making overtures to their East Indian counterparts"(Gopal,
p .102). It is unfortunate
that Gopal did not find it necessary or possible to explore the parallel attitude of
African-Guyanese youth . Executing this might have necessitated the use of re~earch
assistants but there is no doubt that the study as a whole would have been ennched.
J.B. Land,is s study of 1973 comparing racial attitudes of Africans and East Indians in
Guyana is instructive in this re spect.
91

Although the whole of the Guyanese working class became marginalized
under the PNC regime (see Khemraj Rai, 1983), the focus on . youth does have
advantages beyond increasing the manageability of the study. Gopal refers to the
dearth of studies on East Indian youth in particular, and to this justification might be
added the fact that it is in the the attitudes of the youth that much of the potential for
social progress at the present and in the future rests. _This _w~s as true in 1982 as it
is now. Yet the restriction of his sample to just East Indians hmits an understanding of
the process of class formation that Gopal explores as a central theme in his notion of
"Coming Together For Betterment" .
An important consequence of Gopal 's specification, especially at the level of
ethnicity, is that it is impossible now to extend the p~rameters that he has established
in his work. The simple fact is that Guyanese society has begun so fundamental a
change since October 1992 that the whole framework in which Gopal conducted his
1982 study has become changed . The publication of the 1982 study a decade later
has consequently severely hampered the possibility for an extension of Go pal, s work.
' I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
In spite of the criticisms that will be made below of its .p)ace in Gopal's overall
methodological treatment of the problem he investigates , the background material
the writer presents is indeed. impressive and goes a Jong way in establishing the work
as important. This background is not merely of .':1 general historical nature , but is
extended to consider the history of race relations in Guyana . Most impressive is the
tapestry of relevant scholarship that the writer weaves into . the study as _a whole.
There can be no doubt that such background treatment can easily sustain a much
more substantial study, and this fact helps to uphold the suspicion -that if only in
scope , the actual study·.upon ·which Gopal embarks is a convenient adaptation of a
more elaborate idea. · ·
. . Included in his background work are important conceptual efforts. Gopal,
!or instance, discusses both the theories of social and cultural pluralism, and of Marxis~.
He ~ro~oses in his study to give equal weight to ethnicity as to social class as
vanables m his analysis. It is noteworthy that leading Caribbean intellectuals like
C._L.R. James , who like Gopal reject the Marxian orthodoxy that race is
epiphenomena] , tend overall to give more significance to class as a social force than
to race . In so doing, however , James manages to maintain an accommodation of
race that establishes him as a leading Pan-Africanist. .
Unfortunately there is the tendency for Gopal's backgr~und ·work to pver -
92

whelm the study as a whole. Too many sections of his study are overrun by introductory
and exp!anatory remarks and justificatory comments . There is also the deliberate
introduction . and development . of many key concepts central t o G op~ l' s purpose:
congruence, mco~gruen~e , 1ntermediat~ .i~congruence, extreme incongruence, coming
together, p~rtial coming together , vis1b11ity, blockage , threat, retrogressive movement,
progressive movement and so on . The certain effect of this approach upon
the advanced student of Guyanese politics (and for that matter an advanced student
of the social sciences) is the feeling of tedium , and often of the belabouring of the
obvious. The scores of typographical errors in the work also do not help Gopal's
cause.
One urgent and necessary task of social and political analysis of Guyana of
the 1970s and the 1980s is to help the victims of the PNC dictatorship to understand
and appreciate the nature of the tragedy that befell them and to, over time,
exonerate themselves of its effects on their lives as they recommit themselves to the
task of building a truly human society . Interdisciplinary scholarship of Gopal's type
is indeed specially suited to this objective. Gopal, however, does not really advance
our understanding of the period, even though he does reinforce what is known of it.
As a consequence he provides a work which seems to be specially suited to the needs
of the undergraduate student , particularly if he or she has a limited exposure to the
Guyanese reality. The choice of his sample itself tends to invite an empathy from the
young reader. The slow and crucial details of the perceived "coming together " of
different ethnic or racial groups in the struggle against a common oppression, his
notion of a "reduced gap " between the two major sections of the Guyanese working
class, an "intermediate incongruence", does constitute a very basic lesson in the
formation of classes . The simple kinds of generalizations provided in Politics,
Race and Youth will certainly not satisfy the more advanced student.
Gopal' s stated intention "to preserve a balance between the micro-psychological
and macro -social levels" of social life (Gopal, p. xii) in his study, reflects an
approach of serious intellectual depth and training . The restrictiveness of hi~ sample
does not allow for this realization . While one has to contemplate soberly Gopars
concern about the "potential for disruption (or worse) in a poli~,ically. r~pres~ive
enviroment' ' in which he conducted his study, it is also clear that the hm1ted time
available for fieldwork" made its full impact upon the study. The consequence of
these circumstances is that the great promise of Politics, Race and Youth in
Guyana has not been fulfilled.
Joseph Theo Morris
93

BIBLIOGRAPHY
0 byd n, David and amaroo , B. (eds.) fnd,·a ,·~ the Caribbean (Hertford : Hans ·b Pub1· h
I IS ing ltd .' } 987)
I lo . Morton East Indians in the Caribbean: A Study of Cultural Persistence (New York- C 1
Univ r 11 Pr s . 196 J ). · 0 urnbia
l{la s. Morton Singing with Sai Baba: The Politics of Revitalization in Trinidad (Oxford : Westv· p
199 1). iew ress,
Lan di . J B . .. Racial Attitudes of Africans a nd Indians in Guyana ··, Social and Economic Studies, 22( 4
) Dec.
I 973. pp .427-439 .
Rai. K. · Periph eralizing the Guyanese Working Class ·· Transition , Issue 8, 1983, pp . 25 -36 .
Thomas, C Y. ··State Capitalism in Guya na : An Asse ssmen t of Burnh am ·s Cooperative
and H Cohen Crisis in the Caribbean (London : Hein emann, 1983), pp . 27-48 .
Republic " in FA b
· rn ursley
----,___
~
~~
94

1!,igtorp @a~tttt
The HISTORY GAZETTE
1s
· th
e mont
h
ly publication
· ·
of the History Soci ty d · I ·
the Department of History of the University of Gu ana . e an. is . re eased In conjunction with
on the history of Guyana , the Caribbean and th y . It i;.~n ~ultll et !or the ~ubl~catton of the results of research
rnade since 1988 : o er areas . e o owmg pubhcattons of the Gcuette have been
·No.18, D. Khayum, The Labour Force in Georgetown 1781 - 1881
No.19, C. McAJmont, Peter Rose: The Years before 1835 ·
No.20 , C. McAlmont, Peter /fose: The Report of 1850 . ·
No.21 , M.N. Menezes, The Background to the Venezuela - Guyana Boundary Dispute ,
No.22 . F.M. Drakes, The Causes of the Protest of 1905 . ·
No.23 , J.G. Rose, The Strike of 1848 .
____,./
No.2d 4 , W.MF. _Mc. Gowan , Christianity and Slavery: Slave Planter and Official Reaction to the Work o,f Th
Lon on 1ss1onary Society in Demerara, 1808- 1813 . e
No.25 , J.G. Rose, The Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution, 1953 .
~o .26 , :1.M. Woolford, Social Issues Behind the Introduction of the Compulsory
tion 8111 of 1876 .
Denominational Ed .
uca
No.27 , FM . Drakes, The Development of Political Organization in Guyana up to 1953 .
No.28 , &sd eo Mangru, Crossing Kala Pani: Mortality on Emigrant
teenth Century .
Ships to the Caribbean in the Nine­
"No.29 , lneke Velzing, The Berbice Slave Revolt-of 27th February, J 763 .
"No.30 , Anna J. Benjamin , The Origins of the Berbice Slave Revolt, 1763 .
No.31 , Anand James , The Emigration of Liberated Africans to British Guiana, 1841-1852 .
No.32 , Reuben J . Kartick, The Village Policy of Francis Hincks, 1862 - 1866 .
No.33 , Basdeo Mangru, Imperial Trusteeship and East Indian Indentured Labour in British Guiana .
No.34 , Reuben J . Kartick, James Crosby : Immigration Agent General .
No.35 , Reuben J . Kartick, Joseph Beaumont: Chief Justice of British Guiana 1863 -1868 .
No.36 , Francis M. Drakes , The People 's Association, 1903 -1921 .
No.37 , Francis M. Drakes, The Reaction of Sir Frederick Hodgson to the Protest of 1905 .
No.38, James G. Rose , The Taxation Policy of Sir Henry Light, 1838 - 1848 .
No.39 , Hazel M. Woolford, The Reaction of the Press to the Compulsory Denominational Educational Bill
of 1876 .
No.40 , Harold A. Lutchman. The British Guiana Constitutional Change of 1891 .
No.41 , Harold A. Lutchman , Patronage in Colonial Society: A Study of British Guiana, 1891-1928.
No.42 , Tota C. Mangar , The Rural and Interior Development Policy of Henry Irving, 1882-1887 .
No.43 , Hazel M. Woolford , Hubert Critchlow: The Crusader .
No.44 , Caesar N. Gravesande , Amerindian Jurisdiction in the Guiana Region in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries .
No.4S , Eirene O 'Jon , Slave Society in Early Nineteenth Century Berbice .
No.46 , Roberta Walker-Kilkenny , The Leonora Strike of 1839 .
No.47 , Lesley M. Potter , The Paddy Proletariat and the Dependent Peasantry: East Indian Rice Growers
in British Guiana, 1895-1920 .
No.48 , Lesley M. Potter , Indian and African-Guianese Village Settlement Patterns and inter-Group Relationships,
1871-1921 .
No.49 , Roberta Walker-Kilkenny , Women in Social and Political Struggle in British Guiana, 1946-1953 .
No.SO. Harold A. Lutchman , Constitutional Developments in British Guiana during the Second World
War.
., 8
• · h
No.SI , Hugh W. Payne, The Expulsion of the People's Progressive Party from the Government OJ nt1s
Guiana in 1953 .
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