Guyana Historical Journal -Vol IV & V,1992-93
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. o(mnrs 1' V & lJ
~upana ~istorical 3f ournal<br />
h GUYANA HISTORICAL JOURNAL is an interdisciplinary journal of Guyanese Histo<br />
!hed ually by the History Society and the Department of History of the University of Gry, Pubis<br />
e an n .d f f d. . . h. t .<br />
l<br />
1<br />
uyana<br />
Th<br />
. f the JoumaJ is to prov1<br />
e aim o<br />
e a orum<br />
_<br />
or<br />
. .<br />
1ssemmatmg 1s<br />
.al<br />
onca and related inf or mat· bo -<br />
1<br />
ion a ut<br />
G The <strong>Journal</strong> also seeks to publish ongma source maten s, reports and current resea h<br />
b·bJ· uyana. h·c . . d O<br />
. . A . . re and<br />
1·nformation under ,ts Notes an ocuments section. rt1cles m the humanit,·es .<br />
J 1ograp I . h" al d" . · S0C1a]<br />
. d other disciplines m so far as they possess a 1stonc 1mens1on. are welcome for bi·<br />
sCiences an . · . d Th h Id b PU 1ca-<br />
. 0 1 arti·cJes in English will be accepte - ey s ou e double-spaced on white quart .<br />
t1on. n Y al d bl o-s1zed<br />
paper. an d should be of reasonable length. Notes, so ou e-spaced, should be included all tog<br />
e<br />
th<br />
er<br />
at the end of the paper .<br />
ISSN: 1017 - 6659 . KEY TITI.E: <strong>Guyana</strong> <strong>Historical</strong> <strong>Journal</strong>.<br />
TRUSTEES: Joycelynne Loncke, M. Noel Menezes. Winston Mc Gowan and David Chanderbali.<br />
EDITOR: Winston Mc Gowan. ASSOCIATE EDITOR: James Rose .<br />
COVER: The illustration: 'A Sunday Morning in Georgetown, Demerara' by Melton Prior, is taken<br />
from The Illustrated London News, 31 March 1888. Photographed with the permission of the<br />
University of <strong>Guyana</strong> Library.<br />
CONTRIBIITORS: Anna Benjamin is a researcher in the Amerindian Research Unit and part-time<br />
lecturer in History at the University of <strong>Guyana</strong>. David Granger is a graduate student and former parttime<br />
lecturer in History at the University of <strong>Guyana</strong>. Henry Jeffrey is a lecturer in Political Science and<br />
Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. University of <strong>Guyana</strong>. Basdeo Mangru is a former lecturer in<br />
History at the University of <strong>Guyana</strong>. Joseph Theo Morris is a lecturer in Political Science at the<br />
University of <strong>Guyana</strong>. Hazel Woolford is a lecturer in History at the University of <strong>Guyana</strong>.<br />
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The Editors gratefully acknowledge the generous grant for the publication<br />
of <strong>Vol</strong>ume III (1991) from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) .<br />
CORRESPONDENCE: General correspondence, contributions and enquiries about subscriptions should<br />
be addressed to the Editors, <strong>Guyana</strong> <strong>Historical</strong> <strong>Journal</strong>, Department of History, University of<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong>, P.O. Box 101110, Georgetown, <strong>Guyana</strong>. The cost of each issue of the <strong>Journal</strong> is US$9.00,<br />
including postage.<br />
~R_OD~CTION SERVICES: This <strong>Journal</strong> is published by the Free Press for the History Society,<br />
mversity of <strong>Guyana</strong>. Typesetting and layout by Haseeb Khan. Printed by UNIPEN, Main St.,<br />
Georgetown.<br />
COPYRIGHT© D rt .<br />
epa ment of History, University of <strong>Guyana</strong>,<br />
<strong>1992</strong>. All rights reserved.
<strong>Vol</strong>umes JV & V<br />
d9upana J!,15,tortcal 3/ournal <strong>1992</strong>-19<strong>93</strong><br />
ARTICLES<br />
A Preliminary Look at the Free Amerindians and the Dutch Plantation System in <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries<br />
by Anna Benjamin .. ............. ...... .... .... .......... ..... ........... ........... .... ..... .............. ........... 1<br />
Hook-Swinging in Mid Nineteenth-Century <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
by Basdeo Mangru ... .... ......... ....... ..... .... ... ..... ........ ....... ..... ...... .... ........ ..... .... ........... 22<br />
.<br />
Bid for El Dorado (The <strong>Guyana</strong>-Venezuela Border Problem)<br />
by Henry Jeffrey ...... ...... ......... ........... ....... ......... ...... ... .... ..... ..... ................. ............. 52<br />
NOTES AND DOCUMENTS<br />
A Bibliography of The Works of Professor Mary Noel Menezes , RSM<br />
compiled by Hazel Woolford ...... ...... ......... ...... ...... .............. ..... ....... .............. .... ...... 68<br />
Remarks made during a Residence at Stabroek Rio Demerary (LAT. 6 .10 N) in the Latter Part<br />
of the year 1798 .. ... ..... ......................... ........... .... ......... ... .... ......... ..... ........ ...... ... .... . 72<br />
·1<br />
I REVIEWS<br />
Colin Baber and Henry B. Jeffrey. <strong>Guyana</strong>: Politics, Economics and Society (London:<br />
Frances Pinter Publishers. 1986)<br />
by David Granger ............... ........... ............ ............ ........ ................... ..... .................. 82<br />
Madan Gopal, Politics 7 Race and Youth in <strong>Guyana</strong> (San Francisco: Mellen Research<br />
University Press. <strong>1992</strong>)<br />
by Joseph Theo Morris ..... .............. ......... ........ ...... ...... .......... .......... .... ... ... ....... ...... . 84
A pREUMINARY LOOK AT THE FREE AMERINDIANS AND THE<br />
DlITCH PIANf A TION SYSTEM IN GUY ANA DURING TI-IE<br />
SEVENTEENrn AND BGHfEENIH CENllJRIES<br />
by<br />
Anna Benjamin<br />
..<br />
For generations past, the An1erindians of <strong>Guyana</strong> have bee~ typecast in the<br />
history texts as the policemen of the Dutch slave system. It is not that this assertion<br />
is totally without merit· it is more that it represents far too simplistic a generalization<br />
to be fully consistent with the evidence presently available to us. The world of the<br />
Dutch colonial plantation, which is now being revealed from the records, is one of<br />
infinitely greater complexity than was ever previously suspected. Some Amerindians_<br />
did indeed fulfil the roles of slave hunters and traders but, at the same time, others<br />
were also slaves in the true sense , sharing similar conditions to their Black counterparts,<br />
and subject to the same punishments .<br />
The early history of the Dutch settlement of <strong>Guyana</strong> is somewhat obscure,<br />
and even the date for the foundation of Essequibo has never been established be<br />
Y,ond doubt. It was unquestionably a very small settlement, however , and most likely<br />
ad its origins somewhere around l616. Subsequently, it became the property of<br />
the Dutcb _West Jodia Compar:w.J.WIC}. Berbice was founded by Abraham ·van Pere<br />
with 60 or 80 1 male colonists and six African slaves in 1627 . These Dutch settlers<br />
. ,4Cok up residence amid an Amerindian population that is now believed to have been ·<br />
/ comparatively numerous in the early contact period. Recent demographic studies,<br />
I<br />
for example suggest a figure of around 158,000 for <strong>Guyana</strong>, Suriname and French<br />
Guiana in the 16th century. 2 In this situation, therefore, outright conquest of the<br />
Amerindians was never an option for the Dutch; th?ir very survival would have depenaed<br />
-on -avoiding the cruder forms of exploitation of the indigenous peoples.<br />
Even as late as the mid-eighteenth century, it is likely that the Amerindian population<br />
of Essequibo and Berbice outnumb~red the combined black and white population.<br />
Around 1750, for example, the Moravian missionary, Schumann, estimated the<br />
numbers of indigenous peoples domiciled in Berbice to be approximately 5,000-<br />
6,000. 3 This estimate almost certainly would have excluded the Corentyne Caribs<br />
and possibly the upper-river Akawaio as well but, even if that is not so, Indian
s still would have comfortably exceeded t~e plantation totals of<br />
numbe d maybe three hundred-odd Whites. Perhaps abo<br />
3,000 slaves an I.It<br />
The first settlers would have encountered four major Ameri ct·<br />
_ dd. . possibly to one or two minor<br />
.<br />
ones .<br />
Of<br />
t<br />
h<br />
e maJor<br />
.<br />
nar<br />
n ian gro .<br />
Up1ngs<br />
m a 1t1on, , C .b h f ions th<br />
s in overall terms were the an s' w o were ound mainly in Es , e most<br />
numll erou the Corentyne· River. The Arawaks were located in the sequibo, as /<br />
we as on h"I h I ower r"<br />
f nearly all <strong>Guyana</strong>'s waterways, w 1 et e upper Mazaruni Demer 1<br />
verain<br />
ar~as O rt of the Cuyuni were home to the Akawaios. The fourth nation ar~,hBerbice<br />
ahn Dpat sh had extensive dealings were the Waraus, whose preferred hab~tt Whom<br />
t e u c d I a Was th<br />
swampier sectors of the low-lying coastlan s.<br />
e<br />
The isolation of t~e e~rly ~et!lers, who only rarely saw a s~ip frorn horn<br />
P<br />
ied with their numencal inf enonty, would have made them highly vu!<br />
cou . A . d. h . nera be, le<br />
d consequently very dependent on their menn 1an osts. Judging by the f · v<br />
~ . . ~cl<br />
aborted colonies in other parts of the Guianas, it may very well be that the Arnennd·<br />
saved the early Berbice and ~se~uibo colonists from sta~ation - ?r at least pro~~:<br />
essential supplements to their diet over an exten~ed pen~ of tune. What can be<br />
said is that foodstuffs in one form or another constituted an important component of<br />
Amerindian trade items bartered to the Europeans well into the Dutch period. Apart<br />
from the inevitable cassava, there were also such delicacies as salted manatee,4 wild<br />
hog, turtles, cinnamon, nuts 5 and crabs. 6 Above all else, however, there was salted<br />
fish, which various nations supplied to the private planters of Essequibo in the seventeenth<br />
century but which, in due course, became a particular specialty of the Waraus<br />
in both territories.<br />
Salt-fish rations for the West India Company slaves, and to a lesser degree,<br />
private slaves as well, came from the fishery in Orinoco and environs, which was<br />
sited in Warau country. 7 Much of the actual fishing may have fallen to this nation,<br />
although the salting seems to have been undertaken by the Dutch themselves. s The<br />
Spaniards periodically interfered with this fishery, the most serious interruption occurring<br />
in 1769. 9<br />
I~ Be~bice, the fishery was entirely in Warau hands, and was an annual event. 10<br />
By.1.:!_artsi0ck s day, the exercise was preceded by a canoe race between Head Plantations<br />
and sort Na~sau on the Berbice River. After the winner had been presented<br />
with his jug of kilthum, the Waraus then moved to the Canje, where the creeks were<br />
dammed and poisoned with hiarri, and large quantities of yarrow were retrieved to<br />
2
e salted by the women. The men were paid in iron goods and the women in<br />
beads. 11 Both the Berbice and Orinoco fisheries must have represented enormous<br />
cost-savings for the Companies. which otherwise would have been obliged to import<br />
stock-fish supplies.<br />
i I Other than in the arguable case of the Orinoco fishery. no figures can really<br />
/~ be give_n for the quantities of_ f~stuffs provided -to both the private and Co~pany<br />
plantations by the free Amennd1ans. Certainly, the amount of cassava supplied by<br />
the Amerindians must have diminished towards the end of the seventeenth century<br />
because, by that time, the Company estates were cultivating their own 12 - at least<br />
partly for the purposes of cassava bread production. The pattern is repeated in<br />
Berbice where present direct evidence for the existence of bread gardens dates from<br />
the eighteenth century. 13 It may be that, even with modest plantation development,<br />
the Amerindians could not meet the increased demand, or were simply too erratic in<br />
their deliveries. (From a gastronomic point of view, cassava bread was the<br />
Amerindian's most useful contribution to plantation life. It became something of a<br />
staple for the Dutch, and to a lesser extent, for the Black slaves as well. Wheaten<br />
flour did not transport well in the ships of the period, and cassava bread must have<br />
represented a vast improvement in the frequently mouldy and weevil-ridden hardtack<br />
or ship's biscuit from the Netherlands.) In general, what can be gleaned about<br />
Essequibo in the seventeenth century would certainly suggest that the plantations<br />
and the fort relied fairly heavily on Amerindian food sources, 14 while, as suggested<br />
earlier, the closure of the Orinoco fishery in the eighteenth century was regarded as<br />
something of a catastrophe by the Governor. 15<br />
Amerindian tolerance of European plantation settlements on their lands is no<br />
doubt accounted for by their dependency on European manufactures. 16 The <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
Amerindian nations whom the Dutch first encountered would have been already<br />
familiar with these, since the Arawaks of <strong>Guyana</strong>'s western rivers have had trading<br />
links with the Spaniards of Margarita which dated back to the mid-sixteenth century<br />
.17 These links were severed finally in the early seventeenth century 18 and, for a<br />
variety of political and other reasons, the Spanish settlement of Santo Thome could<br />
not fill the void. The appearance of the Dutch, therefore, may well have been<br />
welcomed by the nations of the lower riverain regions. In the eighteenth century, the<br />
WIC was supplying them with such articles as axes, choppers, knives, adzes, razors,<br />
scissors, hooks, pins, cassava chisels, trumpets, combs, mirrors and, of course, beads. 19<br />
There is also a reference to the smithy at Kykoveral manufacturing iron arrowheads,<br />
which must have been intended for the Indian trade. 20<br />
3
However important these manufacturers w re to the nation~, it mu ~t he ~aid<br />
that the Dutch in their turn probably were dependent for many decade on Am 'rindi·<br />
trade for the economic viability of their colonies. Asid~ fron~ the foodstuff~ discuss:~<br />
above. the Indians provided a varied selection of ot~ier item including hunting dogs,11<br />
parrots / 2 crab oil. timber planks ,23 hammocks, conal~ and, above all else, letterwvo
detail. the overriding factors responsible were an absence of capital which in turn<br />
contributed to an acute shortage of African slaves. 30 In plantocratic terms, Berbice<br />
and Essequibo were very modest operations indeed. In 1720, Berbice recorded only<br />
895 Black slaves 31 while, as late as 1762, the colony still had under 4,000, including<br />
both private and Company -owned slaves.] 2 The situation in Essequibo was not very<br />
different; around 1700 the colony had approximately 644 slaves, both Black and<br />
lndian,:n and in 1762 there were 2,571. 34<br />
At present, it seems very unlikely that owing to its lucrativeness the anatto<br />
trade in its own right operated as an inhibiting factor to plantation investment. The<br />
decline of this trade in Essequibo was not accompanied or followed by any exceptional<br />
upsurge in plantation growth .<br />
Much has been written about the role of the postholders in prosecuting trade<br />
among the nations in early Essequibo but, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth<br />
centuries, the WIC did not rely on them alone. There are instances of Governors<br />
sending representatives to encourage the Indians to trade 35 but, by and large, business<br />
dealings with the interior peoples who did not come to the fort were conducted<br />
through Black Company traders, both free and slave. They were never very numerous;<br />
in 1700, fourteen of them are documented, 36 although this total had fallen to<br />
eleven by 1702. 37 No doubt, the totals varied from period to period. They were<br />
always Creoles, and the impression is given that they were a largely closed group,<br />
whose skills were passed down from one generation to the next. The main qualification<br />
required for the job was a fluency in some of the Indian languages, Carib and<br />
Akawaio probably being the two most essential.<br />
In the seventeenth century, their duties sometimes extended beyond mere<br />
trading, since there are references to them being dispatched as mediators in wars<br />
between the Amerindian nations. 38 The job was not without its dangers, however ,<br />
and on occasion they did become the victims of Amerindian vengeance. Such an<br />
incident occurred in 1680 when one of them was poisoned in the interior . 39 The<br />
Caribs blamed the Akawaios for this act, an accusation that was apparently believed<br />
by the other traders, who were afraid to have further dealings with that nation .<br />
~ow ever, the background to this case is not known and, as far as can be established,<br />
it appears to have been the exception rather than the rule.<br />
. If traders did lose their lives at Amerindian hands on occasion, there is also<br />
evidence that it was possible for them to establish a great degree of rapport and<br />
5
tmJt.>t standing with their trading partners. There are references to the Black trader<br />
Jottc1. for instance, whose father-in -law was Makourarawacke, a Carib Captain _4o It<br />
m y very well be that he was not unique and that the WIC encouraged such marrit1ges<br />
- at lea t where their free Black traders were concerned - in order that broomsti<br />
k r IL1tions might serve as a stimulus to commerce . · ·<br />
Sometime during the first half of the eighteenth centu_ry, the_ Black Company<br />
trader begins to fade from the records. As the anatto business, m particular, declined.<br />
then so, presumably, did the need for roving traders . By the middle of the<br />
century, the Amerindian slave trade eclipsed all ~lse, and the WIC no longer attempted<br />
to enforce its monopoly in any systematic. way · It was private enterprise<br />
which controlled the slave trade. and the Company simply could not compete in that<br />
area . By 1760. trade at the posts had been reduced to~ trickle. 4 1 Neither Cuyuni<br />
Mazaruni - once a mainstay for anatto - nor upper Essequibo gave the WIC any profit<br />
worth speaking of. In contrast to the other areas , the Moruka district, through the<br />
agency of the post, continued to be of som~ impo~ance to ~he Company in trading<br />
terms , because it supplied items such as canals which were 1n heavy demand within<br />
the colony.<br />
Surprisingly, perhaps, there is a reference to an Amerindian Company trader<br />
operating on the Orinoco as late as 1766. 42 What exactly he was doing is not made<br />
clear but it is possible that he was purchasing horses, which were always in short<br />
supply in Essequibo, or even letterwood and slaves. It might be noted that it would<br />
have been impossible for a Black trader to have functioned in the Orinoco as late as<br />
the 1760s without being picked up by the Spanish authorities.<br />
At the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth.<br />
thlerek ahre references to Berbice traders operating in Essequibo . 43 These were not<br />
B ac . owever and by th th. d d d .<br />
seems to have c d' Th e tr eca e of the eighteenth century, the practice<br />
1bice<br />
ease · ere do not ap t h b<br />
itself. pos ·bl th pear O ave een any Black traders within<br />
' s1 y<br />
nage trade on the·<br />
e area<br />
G·<br />
was suffic.<br />
ten<br />
ti<br />
Y compact to a<br />
II<br />
ow the postholders to<br />
Amerindian slav~rt 0 7· 1 ~:~ the fact that Berbice was not directly involved in<br />
much longer there tha r~ eE, tra 1 ! 10 nal forms of exchange would have endured for<br />
· n m ssequ1bo A I<br />
m Canje wa instructed t ·<br />
5<br />
ate as 1756, for example. the Postholder<br />
continued to prepare ana~o~~courage trade with the Indians and to see that they<br />
Direct trade in th f<br />
e orm of barter was something<br />
that came well within the<br />
6
~cono~ic experience of the nations, but the seventeenth century also saw the evolution<br />
~ ~ more o~inous trend which was to facilitate the integration of some<br />
~menndtan groups mto the plantation economy. Those who had very little or nothing<br />
to exchange which the . Out c h wou Id accept, cou ld h· ire out their · services in one<br />
f<br />
orm or another, and receive the coveted iron goods, beads, salempore and kilthum<br />
by way of payment.<br />
In the 1670s, van Berkel makes reference to Amerindian droghers 45 but<br />
th~re was also a wide range of other tasks which the nations performed both for the<br />
~nvat~ planters as well as the. Companies. The case of the Orinoco and Canje<br />
ftshenes has already been mentioned but, Amerindians hunted, fished and salted for<br />
individual plantations on a much more informal basis as well. Clearing land for<br />
planting also appears to have been another standard occupation, 46 while some groups<br />
also were asked by the Companies to supply Indians on a regular basis to assist the<br />
military at the brandwagts 47 (signal stations) and the posts. In addition. the Company<br />
traders were dependent on Amerindian rowers in the interior. 48<br />
Those whose access to European goods came primarily through labour, would<br />
have become very much more dependent on the Dutch than those whose mode of<br />
acquisition was through trade . At least in the seventeenth century, commerce could<br />
be conducted at a distance if desired via the agency of the traders in Essequibo, or the<br />
postholders in Berbice. but the provision of labour necessitated proximity to the<br />
plantations. Over time, therefore, some Indians gravitated nearer to the estates,<br />
where they took up permanent residence. The phenomenon was never very pronounced<br />
in Essequibo. although there were some Akawaios living behind the<br />
Essequibo. Mazaruni and Demerara plantations. 49 It was Berbice, however, which<br />
boasted a genuine Amerindian plantation population, composed exclusively of Arawaks O<br />
and Waraus. These Indians were particularly vulnerable to planter abuse, 50 but still\\:<br />
settled near to the private holdings, partly on account of the abundance of kilthum<br />
available there. 51 The Moravians, who established a mission station at Pilgerhut near<br />
the Wiruni Creek in 1740, regarded them as very depraved owing to their contact<br />
with Whites. 52<br />
Even in Essequibo, where the opportunities for trade were greate~, a l~ck of<br />
employment proved a source of anxiety to some members of the free nations 1n the<br />
seventeenth century. In 1687, Commandeur Beekman reported that the new planters<br />
in the colony hardly contracted the free Indians to work, and that these were<br />
"getting bothered by it''. s3 By the second half of the eighteenth century, however,<br />
7
. . . k lave hunters or in putting down upristngc;<br />
the free nation.:; were f mdmg wor ~s 5 an the traditional forms of employment·<br />
both of which were more rernuner ~tive t~ By the end of the Dutch period. thei;<br />
for which the~ c.howed little e~thusiasm.come firmly locked into that of the plantaeconomic<br />
survival and way of life had be<br />
tion.<br />
. h Companies in Essequibo and Berbice also<br />
The provision of service~ to t :a leverage over the free nations which beallowed<br />
the Governors to exercise ext The I<br />
institution of the Captain was imper-<br />
. f f d·rect 1 con ro. f .<br />
came. over time. a orm o<br />
1<br />
ractical purpose o getting labour organized<br />
tant to the Dutch. if only for the ~~re y !d the like. At a much later stage, Captains<br />
for the Warau fishery. the po~tho ers s for military expeditions against maroons<br />
· d. ff1cer corp ·<br />
supplied the Amenn tan ° thing more in some instances than heads of ex-<br />
Originally. they may have been ~o men when dealing with the Dutch but, whatever<br />
tended families who acted a;;~J=t~onship and role among their own people after<br />
the case. they took on a ~th . . nia of office by the Governors, and issued v.,ith<br />
they had been inves~ed v.ll msitgthei·r followers. Recognition of status amongst<br />
f d. t ·b tion amongs<br />
presents or<br />
15 n u h f e became contingent on recognition by the Dutch<br />
h f th · nation t ere or • . · . ·<br />
ot ers O eIT ·.od the authorities in Essequibo were 1nform1ng the nations<br />
By the end of the pen , 1· d b th G ss<br />
that they co uld on I Y se 1 ec t Captains from names supp 1e y e overnor.<br />
Documentation for the very earliest period of ~utch colonization in <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
1s . ex t reme I y sp arse . However , it is unlikely that the first Dutch settlers . would . have<br />
attempted to enslave members of nations amongst whom they lived - 1f only for<br />
security reasons. It is true that the abortive 1613 Corentyne ~ettlement, destr?yed<br />
by the Spaniards the folJowing year, had used Arawak slaves 1n the tobacco fields.<br />
However. these Arawaks had been seized from Trinidad, ostensibly because they<br />
were considered to have<br />
.<br />
operated in alliance with the Spaniards. 56<br />
As early as 1645, a case was cited in the Zeeland Chamber of the WIC<br />
concerning two persons who had "carried off certain Indians,, in Essequibo. The<br />
meeting decided to refer the matter to the Nineteen (the governing body of the WIC)<br />
so that "action could be taken". 57 This would certainly seem to suggest that a convention<br />
was already in operation at that period whereby it was understood that those<br />
Indians in contact with the Dutch should not be enslaved, but whether this applied to<br />
specific nations, or simply to Indians living in particular locales, is really not known.<br />
All the Dutch colonies on the mainland eventually cam'? to recognize the<br />
8
.---- ----·- -<br />
I<br />
I<br />
. . . I d dates back to<br />
inherent freedom of particular nation ·. In Suriname. the ongma or er . 59<br />
1686 and came to include the Arawaks, Waraus. Caribs and the Akuliu or Acuna .<br />
However. no ·uch pub Ii hed order i · on re ord for any part of <strong>Guyana</strong> that is krto~nh<br />
althoug~ Commandeur Beek~an did in titute a regulation i~ tha~:a me ~e~~ ;:;~i -<br />
wa designed to prevent the 11l egal enslavement of free Indians. A simtla ·f<br />
nance dating from 1688 exi ts for Berbice,''1 but neither enactment actually spe_ci ies<br />
which Indians were designated ·free·. By the eighteenth century, however . it becomes<br />
apparent that the free nation s in Essequibo. Berbice and, subsequently.<br />
Demerara , were the Arawaks. Caribs, Waraus and Akawaios . The Akawaios were<br />
not a protected nation 1n Suriname and could be - and sornetimes were - sold there<br />
as slaves. The vendors were invariably Carib , although it s~ems_ that ther~ wer ~ 6<br />
occasions when the Arawaks were not always entirely guiltless m this regard either.<br />
Technically. any member of a nation. other than the four abovementioned,<br />
could be legally held in slavery in the <strong>Guyana</strong> colonies. In practice , there were<br />
nations such as the Panaca yes (Panacayos) who traded with the Dutch , or the Chaima,<br />
who took refuge near the Moruka Post , 63 who were also granted protection , but<br />
presumably this was a concession which operated according to · time and circumstance.<br />
One of the factors possibly supplying an initial impetus for the slave trade<br />
may have been a collapse in the Amsterdam anatto market in the 1680s. 64<br />
The<br />
WIC s response to this was to throw open the Essequibo and Pomeroon Rivers to<br />
free trade for a time. 65 The market had recovered by 1690 , 66 but it is significant that<br />
it is during the first part of this decade that the Commandeur begins to voice _ complaints<br />
about the purchase of slaves ruining the traffic in anatto . 67<br />
For economic reasons the anatto trade could not compete with the slave<br />
trade in the long run . In the first place, slaves fetched far higher prices than did<br />
anatto and, in the second, preparation of the latter commodity involved a great deal<br />
of physical effort. It had to be made into little balls by the women, and then it was set<br />
in crab oil in order to preserve it. Eventually, the women grew "listless about keeping<br />
up one heavy work on the dye", 68 which was a contributory factor to the decline of<br />
tne trade. Since for much of the period the Company officially operated a monopoly,<br />
it would have been theoretically possible for them to have held dov.,'Tl the<br />
price of slaves in order to boost anatto production.<br />
In practice, however, as mentioned earlier, the monopoly was never really<br />
9
. . h spasmodic efforts at enforcement<br />
implemented over an extended penod. althoug<br />
69<br />
Effectively, the Essequibo auwere<br />
made at the turn of the eighteenth century- f the colony to traffic unhinthonties<br />
. ·<br />
a<br />
II<br />
owe<br />
d d<br />
ea<br />
I<br />
ers<br />
f<br />
ram<br />
be<br />
yon<br />
d the frontiers<br />
ts 0<br />
came to dominate the trade<br />
dered, and fairly quickly, the Suriname sla~e :s~:~uibo counterparts,7° and had n~<br />
They paid a higher price for slaves than their 71 As in the case of the private local<br />
difficulty, therefore, in marginalizing the lda~er. laves difficult to obtain on account of<br />
traders, the Company 1tsel<br />
. f f<br />
oun<br />
d Arnerin tan<br />
t be<br />
s<br />
noted, however, that of the Dutch<br />
the competition from Suriname. 72 It_;~s market of sufficient size to absorb fair<br />
Guiana holdings, only Suriname p~ovi_ et J previously, both Essequibo and Berbice<br />
numbers of Amerindian slaves. As ind,~ e ·n need of large numbers of slaves who<br />
were small plantocracies and were ~ar Y 1 rk 73<br />
could not be utilized in heavy plantation wo ·<br />
h. and mechanics of the trade in any detail<br />
Without going into the ist~ry procurers of slaves - the Caribs. This was th~<br />
something must be said about the mt amtematic resistance to Spanish settlement and<br />
· h. h h d O ffered the mos sys I d '<br />
v nation w 1c a<br />
d ·t If the target of large-sea e re uctions by the New<br />
in the eighteenth century, f~un . 15 ~ were those Caribs living in the vicinity of the<br />
G d th 'f s The first victims<br />
rena a au on ,e · rth f the Orinoco. 74 By 1757, the Spaniards were<br />
Guarapiche Riv~r, to thhe no me~ts of the nation based on the south bank of the<br />
ready to act against ot er seg d · h I 75<br />
Onnoco . between t h e C aura and Caroni Rivers, an 1n t e mataca.<br />
Carib survival. therefore,was closely bound up with the Dutch alliance, and<br />
the nation showed no hesitation · in defending Essequibo from Spanish incursi?n<br />
v h threat presented itself. 76 In the first half of the eighteenth century, Canbs<br />
w en any . . . . . . . • h l<br />
attacked both Jesuit and Capuchin m1ss1ons 1n the Onnoco with 1mpumty,<br />
77<br />
ng t y<br />
perceiving them as the true instruments of Spanish penetration.<br />
The slave trade alJowed the Caribs to become virtually the sole distributin.9<br />
agents for European goods among the interior nations. But it also did something<br />
else: it gave them access to guns, which, as in Africa, were an essential adjunct to<br />
sJaving operations. These came mostly from private sources 78 but, at a later stage,<br />
sometimes from Government when there was a slave rising or the like to be dealt<br />
with. In 1762, the Director-General of Essequibo complained that the Caribs ~'can-.<br />
not or will not fight without guns". 79 Firearms were critical weapons in their con-<br />
~1 fr?ntation with the Spaniards, and the Spanish missionaries testified to their skills<br />
with European battle tactics.<br />
with these, and their familiarity<br />
10
Initially, it was the Essequibo and Orinoco Caribs who monopolized the trade<br />
but. as the Spaniards began to close off the Orinoco and reduce its inhabitants, the<br />
Corentyne Caribs became mor e prominent in the business . Some Orinoco Caribs<br />
took refuge in Essequibo 80 where they continued their involvement in slave comn1erce,<br />
but they now obtained their victims from the Rio Branco and its environs<br />
rather than the Orinoco basin. By the 1740s , both Spanish and Dutch sources were<br />
noting that the sole source of livelihood for the Caribs wa the slave trade. 8 1 This<br />
does not mean that other free nations - particularly the Essequibo Arawaks and the<br />
Demerara Akawaios - did not sometimes barter slaves, but they were excluded from<br />
participation to any significant degree: for the most part, they relied on other sources<br />
of income .<br />
Although Spanish and Dutch c01nments on the radical change in Carib occupation<br />
date from the 17 40s , it is likely that the trend was evident twenty years before<br />
this. when the Ca ribs successfully challenged the Caberre nation for control of the<br />
slave trade in the Middle Orinoco 82 and succeeded in excluding the Manaos - a major<br />
slave-trading nation of the Rio Negro - from operating in the Dutch territorial sphere. 83<br />
The Caribs had been important suppliers of anatto 84 and their abandonment of its<br />
production in favour of the more lucrative traffic in human beings was no doubt<br />
something of an economic blow to the WIC. Other nations clearly did continue<br />
producing anatto for considerably longer, but, as indicated above, the quantities were<br />
much reduced.<br />
Eventually, Carib priorities came to be adopted to a greater or lesser degree<br />
by all four free nations. Although the Caribs attempted to protect their monopoly on<br />
the slave trade itself, they eventually became far more amenable to working with<br />
other nations in the preservation of their markets - i.e. the Dutch plantation system<br />
in the Guianas. It is the evolution of this function that more or less obliterated the<br />
already crippled trade in what had once been one of Essequibo 's major exports . By<br />
that time, the WIC itself had lost interest in Amerindian export commodities.<br />
It took time, before the Essequibo free nations were transformed from trading<br />
partners to full guardians of the plantation. In the seventeenth century, it does<br />
not seem as though the Indians were strongly identified (if at all) with a policing role.<br />
Of the odd references to runaways in the Kykoveral Diary, none of the hunters is an<br />
Indian. In the case of the nine runaways from the Company plantation of Nieuw<br />
Middelburgh. it was "2 or 3'' Whites who were sent out after them, 85 while the "Old<br />
~ Negro" , Big Jan. was dispatched to recover a female slave from the fort who had<br />
I I
~<br />
been abducted by a free fndian.86 If the WIC was not utilizing the Indians much as<br />
slave hunt ers at this stage , it is unlikely that the private planter s were either. ,<br />
It must be remember ed too that, at this period. the number of plantations<br />
and slaves was very small. and from the planters· point of view, the problem of slave<br />
control hardly wa critical as it later became._ T~e eighteenth cent~ry_, however, saw\ l<br />
a substantial increase in marronage, the destination for the_ vast maJonty of runaways {<br />
being the Spanish territory of Orinoco . The p~p.ular notion arnong the slaves was 1<br />
that sanctuary could be had there provided a willingness to convert to Ca tholicism<br />
was evinced . In practice, the validity of this notion depended on the caprice of the<br />
individual Governor, one or two of whom even returned slaves to Essequibo . or sold<br />
them to Spanish buyers. However, these interlude.s do ~ot seem to have acted as<br />
much of a deterrent to would-be maroons. Stemming this flow from the Essequibo<br />
{and later the Demerara) plantations became a major preoccupation of successive<br />
administrations. and in this situation the Government turned first to the Caribs.<br />
This was a function which the Caribs were only too willing to undertake<br />
since , as already stated, their own self-interest was closely bound up with the security<br />
of the Dutch plantation system. Possibly from the third decade of the eighteenth<br />
century, or thereabouts, until the Berbice Uprising of 1763, the Caribs almost monopolized<br />
slave-hunting for the colony of Essequibo. The Bari ma Ca ribs eliminated<br />
the maroon community of 1744 (see below), while the Waini Caribs killed those<br />
members of the Creole Island settlement who refused a Government pardon. 88 It<br />
was the Caribs again whom the Director-General arranged to have guard the sea-<br />
,/ coast to watch for runaways in 1760. 89 There is a mention of the Demerara Akawaios<br />
functionin~ as slave hunters in 1752, 90 but this does not appear to have extended to<br />
the Essequibo branch of the nation. It may be significant that, according to Bancroft ,<br />
the Demerara Akawaios sold slaves. 91<br />
·th· th<br />
There<br />
f·<br />
are not all that<br />
many ms<br />
· t<br />
ances o<br />
f<br />
maroons establishing themselves<br />
WI<br />
that<br />
m e<br />
.<br />
con mes of<br />
.<br />
Esse<br />
qui<br />
·b t ·<br />
1·n<br />
8 O erntory. The only camp of any significance was<br />
anma, mentioned abo d d -<br />
were an exce r t · h . ve, an estroyed in 1744 . 92 The Caribs of this area<br />
the Dutch- forp ion ° t e nation as a whole in the sense that they had been hostile to<br />
· many years Th ·<br />
by the destruction of the<br />
8 . eir rapprochement with the Government was marked<br />
<strong>93</strong><br />
maroons are to sm anma encampment. Such other references as exist to<br />
11<br />
Island community aw:r~u?s of runaways, with the arguable exception of the Creole<br />
Creole Island itself mate h~n many r~spects w~s a s?ecial case. It .is possible that<br />
Y ve been 1n Akawa10 territory, and not 1n Carib, which<br />
12
would have offered the runaways some initial protection.<br />
In general. it may be that until 1760 or so, maroon groups who stayed in<br />
Essequibo might have had a modest measure of safety. for a tim~, ~rovided that t_hey<br />
avoided Carib terrain - not necessarily an easy task given the ub1qu1ty of that nation.<br />
Of those who chose to try and settle in hostile country, some of them might have had<br />
a false sense of security if they already personally known to the Caribs. Such w~s<br />
obviously the case with the 13 Company traders who ran away with two women tn<br />
1706. 94 At this early date, however, the Caribs were not picking up runaways as yet,<br />
although they did report the group to the Commandeur, who sent two old traders<br />
and a 'malack' out after them . 95<br />
What the case was with the runaways who settled themselves in the Carib<br />
territory of Waini in 1751 % is not clear. It may be that the Caribs sometimes were<br />
prepared to overlook individuals or very small groups, according to whim. In this<br />
particular instance, the Moruka Postholder was instructed to bring two Caribs named<br />
Jan de Mesi and Flora, who were supposed to know about the matter, to the fort, so<br />
investigations could be pursued. 97<br />
It must be said that the abduction of Amerindian slaves by members of the<br />
free nations in the first half of the eighteenth century was hardly an unknown phenomenon.<br />
98 The vast majority of Indian slaves on the plantations were women<br />
engaged in cassava bread manufacture, 99 or perhaps in domestic work, and presumably<br />
some were taken to become the wives of their abductors. In general, Amerindian<br />
marronage appears to have been of very frequent occurrence throughout the eighteenth<br />
century, and, as in the case of the Blacks, the destination was invariab\y the<br />
Orinoco. 100 Sometimes, Indian slaves would desert in substantial numbers such as<br />
'<br />
when twenty-three of Pieter La Riviere ·s "red slaves" ran away together in 1726. 101<br />
Even in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Caribs made no distinction be<br />
~een Black and Amerindian maroons. 102 In 1735, for example, they apprehended<br />
six of the latter with their leader named Elias in the Pomeroon - most likely among<br />
the Arawaks. 103 For a nation which earned its livelihood by slave-trading, one would<br />
not have expected them to have made exceptions on grounds of race.<br />
!he pattern in Berbice for the first six decades of the eighteenth century is<br />
rfther different.from that in Essequibo. It has already been noted that there was no<br />
~ve ~~de there a~? th~t the anatto trade also enjoyed a much longer life than in<br />
sequi o. In addition. 1t was remarked that Berbice had a sizeable population of<br />
13
plantation Amerindian s composed of certain Arawaks and Waraus. However, these<br />
were not the only features which distinguished it from Essequibo . Of the bush nations,<br />
the Berbice authorities dealt most frequently with the Arawaks , and very little<br />
with the Caribs, who were based on the Corentyne River outside the jurisdiction of<br />
the Berbice Government .<br />
Unlike Essequibo too, it is thought tha Berbice had no private plgntations<br />
until at least the 1720s and possibly not until the beginning of the J. 730s. Private<br />
piantation development in the latter colony therefore. wct::s unusually rapid , occurring<br />
within a very limited time-frame of no rnore than 10-20 years. By 1740 , there were<br />
perhaps up to 100 plantations strung out singly along the river banks for a distance<br />
of almost 100 miles upriver. 104 Although the number of slaves deployed on each of<br />
these holdings individually was very tiny (the vast majority grew coffee , cotton and/<br />
or cocoa) , nevertheless, their isolation and singular distribution gave rise to security<br />
problems for the colony which it would not have encountered in the seventeenth<br />
century, with its five or so estates and a good deal less than 900 slaves.<br />
It is likely that , from the inception, one of the tasks which fell to the resident<br />
plantation Amerindian population was the matter of estate security . Inevitably, the<br />
services of the bush Amerindian - usuaJly Arawaks - would have been called upon to<br />
deal with those runaways who escaped the plantation net. The twelve Company<br />
slaves who revolted after being hired out to the Vernesobre 's in Canje in 1733, were<br />
dealt with promptly by members of a bush nation which was almost certainly Arawak. 105<br />
The fact that there were no successful maroon settlements in Berbice prior to the<br />
great uprising is testimony to the effectiveness of the Amerindian screen. (The 1763 .<br />
Uprising was partly made possible by the fact that large numbers of Amerindians had<br />
./ moved out of the colony to escape an epidemic .) The better-informed Berbician<br />
maroons , therefore, generally made for Essequibo or the Orinoco.<br />
This does not mean to say that the Berbice nations always co-operated with<br />
the Government and the planters on the matter of maroons . An interesting ordinance<br />
of 1760 106 speaks of them hiding runaways in order to have them work for<br />
/ ( ; them wh~le, in 1762, the free Indians flatly refused to wipe out a very small maroon<br />
band which had established itself somewhere above the Akawaio Post ostensibly<br />
blecause Governor van Hoogenheim would not issue them with guns. 107 It is not\<br />
a together certain which t · . . . .<br />
tf A . k . na ion was involved here, although most hke.ly again 1t was<br />
t~e rawa s. It is known that subsequently the Akawaios went a step further , saving<br />
e same group from starvation by supplying them with food. 108 It may be, however .<br />
14
-<br />
that the Berbice Akawaios were not normally involved in policing functions , since<br />
they had little contact with the plantations. There is a case during the 1763 Uprising.<br />
for example , when tvJo Akawaios assisted Coffy's forces.<br />
The colony of Demerara was of late foundation and administratively came<br />
under Essequibo jurisdiction for many years . Although no Caribs were resident there,<br />
the Governors of Essequibo nevertheless tended to employ them in Demerara as<br />
well. The Arawaks were probably the most numerous of the Demera~a· nations,<br />
although the Akawaios too had a not insignificant presence , participating in the slave<br />
trade and in plantation policing work at an early period, as has already been noted .<br />
.. I<br />
The great watershed in terms of the Amerindian role on the plantations of<br />
Essequibo in particular , is the 1763 Berbice Uprising. It had no precedent in any<br />
Dutch colony and , at one stage , threatened Dutch hegemony throughout the Guianas.<br />
If the scale of the rising itself was unprecedented , then so was the number of<br />
Amerindians who volunteered to deal with it. The Caribs were not slow to grasp its<br />
implications for their long-term economic and political survival and, after some initial<br />
delay, they came from all parts of Essequibo to be issued with firearms . Director- I 1<br />
General Storm van 's Gravesande of Essequibo claimed he had never seen so many<br />
Caribs in his life as mustered on that occasion, and was not aware that there were so<br />
many of them domiciled in the colony . 109<br />
(stk'<br />
Notably absent from the Amerindian complement were the Berbice nations,<br />
with the exception of the Corentyne Caribs and a few Arawaks. 110 (Most Arawaks<br />
had evacuated the colony prior to 1763.) Apart from the Caribs , the Demerara<br />
Akawaios 111 volunteered to go to Berbice (but not the Mazaruni branch of the nation),<br />
as did the Wauwejans , or Arawak-Akawaios, also of Demerara , Some Arawaks<br />
- possibly from Essequibo - agreed to fight under Carib leadership. As was acknowl-<br />
..... ed ed at the time , the Amerindian contribution proved critical to the success of the<br />
"/. Dutch operation to recover Berbice . At the end of the Uprising, Storm van 's<br />
Gravesande remarked: 112<br />
Our Caribs, both from these rivers and even from Barima , have loyally<br />
done their best and are yet doing it, constantly roving about between<br />
the two colonies and having, through the Lord 's blessing been<br />
so successful in all their expeditions as to have lost none of their own<br />
people, thus making them bold and beyond belief and expectation<br />
enterprising, and even reckless; and these occurrences cause a great<br />
15
crnbittennent betwee n the blacks and them , which , if well and reaonably<br />
timulated, cannot fail to be of much use and service in the<br />
future to the Colonie s.<br />
While the importance of this psychological factor and the Dutch manipulation of it,<br />
i not to be underestimated, there were other forces at work in the post-Uprising<br />
perioo which sealed the fate of the free nations in all the <strong>Guyana</strong> territories . The first<br />
of the ·e wa simply the expansion of the plantation system. Even before the Uprising.<br />
Essequibo had begun the move of her plantations downstream to more fertile<br />
soils and had experienced a modest increase in her slave complement. The process<br />
began rather tentatively in Berbice after 1764 , but accelerated in the 1770s. African<br />
-born slaves were imported to replace those lost during the Uprising and, by<br />
1774. their total exceeded that of 1762 . 113<br />
Even more dramatic was the rate of plantation development in the new colony<br />
of Demerara which had been established in 1745 . Its slave population grew from<br />
1648 in 1762, to 12,559, twenty years later. 114 Gradually , as the century wore on ,<br />
the demographic balance began to shift away from the Amerindians in favour of the<br />
Blacks . Plantation expansion and a greater number of slaves working in larger units<br />
presented the Dutch with quite new custodial problems .<br />
The second factor of some significance was the appearance of sizeable ma <br />
roon communities, more especially those in Demerara . Although the earlier Essequibo<br />
maroons had been a source of concern to the Dutch , they had never represented a<br />
major threat because their numbers were insignificant and they were too far removed<br />
from the plantations. However, the Demerara maroon camps were a different matter<br />
entirely. In the first place , the encampments were fairly sizeable and, in the<br />
second , they were all well within striking distance of the plantations. Not surprisingly<br />
too, their residents were known to be in communication with the slaves. Even<br />
Berbice acquired maroons on the Canje and Wiruni Creeks for the very first time .<br />
Whether or not as a con sequence of these maroon camps desertion from<br />
1<br />
t~e ; states be~ame_so commonplace. both in Essequibo and Demerara at the end of<br />
t e )utch penod, 11 _:, that in 1770, the Government instructed the Arinda Postholder<br />
~est the Canb captain s to send a detachment. of fifty men to guard the e ·<br />
::t;:.'f<br />
At thi period the cola . I .<br />
· ~ rna economy re ted squarely on the plantation system<br />
16
and the Government's primary concern in all three colonies became the security and<br />
maintenance of that system. In the days when there had been few plantations.the<br />
Amerindians boosted exports by supplying anatto, balsam and letterwood, and reduced<br />
imports by providing the Company and private planters with a wide range of<br />
fooo items, among other things. The anatto trade was now dead, however, and the<br />
number of plantations and slaves so increased that the impact of Amerindian food<br />
production was virtually negligible. As an independent trader, the Amerindian had<br />
become of marginal importance,and it was only in the role of colonial policeman that<br />
v he assumed a value to the authorities.<br />
· ns or se ments of<br />
nations w 1c a enera en age in slave huntin · ods now<br />
began to o so. In 1768, for example, the Waraus were paid for returning slaves 117<br />
wh~n 1772. some of the Essequibo Akawaios agreed to help the Caribs in putting<br />
down the rising on P.C. Hooft's Demerara plantation. 118 On that occasion, the<br />
Director-General remarked that he had never seen this particular group come to the<br />
Government's assistance with arms before; they were "good friends" but nothing )<br />
else. 119 Illustrative of the general trend is the case of the Demerara Arawaks who<br />
played a very prominent part in the war against the maroons at the end of the<br />
eighteenth century.<br />
Towards the close of the 1770s, the Essequibo authorities began to put more<br />
direct p1.essure on the free nations by attempting to formalize arrangements with<br />
them and spell opt their obligations with greater precision. In 1778, various Uils, and<br />
Captains comprising two Mazaruaj Caribs, four Essequibo Caribs, three Arawaks,<br />
one War au and two Cuyuni Caribs plus some of their followers were presented with<br />
gifts and were asked to promise to give their assistance whenever required. Significantly,<br />
they also agreed not to move away from their "present abode" . 120 This<br />
?><br />
exercise was repeated with other Uils a few days later. 121 -<br />
The new approach was applied even to nations which traditionally had never<br />
been designated 'free', but which lived within the Dutch sphere. When the Arinagotos<br />
(Arekunas) detained some runaways in 1778, the Court of Policy deemed them<br />
"guilty of ill-faith", and the Caribs were dispatched to bring a few to Port Zeelandia as<br />
prisoners to give account of themselves. 122 The terms of the contract,· it seems, had<br />
now been enunciated, and the Dutch authorities were prepared to take measures<br />
against any nation which acted in breach of them.<br />
17
For their part. some of the free nations were not unmindful of their power to<br />
blackn1ail the Government. In 1785, the Governor-General of Essequibo received<br />
an unwelcome visit frorn tlie aribs who "were very insolent , and in the presence of<br />
the negroes said that if they obtain no presents , they. if onc e aoain a revolt occurred,<br />
would not alone abstain from helping the whites, but would assist the negroes and<br />
1nurder the whites "_ 123 The Governor knew that he had no option but to "gratify''<br />
--,<br />
them . 124 By the time of the Demerara Maroon War of 1795, the process was complete;<br />
the only function of the former free nations in the colonial system had become<br />
that of plantation policemen . The 17<strong>93</strong> abolition of Amerindian sJavery 125 did nothing<br />
to alter that arrangement, although it dealt a severe economic blow to the Caribs,<br />
and might have been responsible for them leaving the colony in some numbers at the<br />
beginning of the nineteenth century . It was not until Emancipation .in 1838, however,<br />
that the long-established association of the free Amerindians with the <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
plantation system was brought to an end , and they were set adrift to fend for themselves<br />
economically .<br />
Abbreviations<br />
ARA Algemeen Rijksarchief (fhe Hague}.<br />
BGB British Guiana Boundary . Arbitration with the United States of Venezue la.<br />
BGBB British Guiana Boundary . Arbitration with the United States of Brazil.<br />
GNA <strong>Guyana</strong> National Archives.<br />
PRO Public Record Office (London).<br />
USC United States . Report and accompanying paper of the Commi ssion appoint ed ··t · t· d<br />
tḣ<br />
d· · · I 1· ··· o mves tgate an report<br />
upon e true 1vts1ona me between the Republic of Venezuela and British G · ..<br />
Wlc D u t c h W '<br />
est<br />
I<br />
n<br />
d.<br />
,a<br />
C<br />
ompany<br />
u1ana .<br />
1.<br />
2.<br />
3.<br />
NOTES<br />
The precise number of colonists who went to Berbice i .<br />
General gives the figure of 80 althou h N t h I . s not certain at present . The Charter from the States -<br />
colonies Essequibo, De~era !ndeBsc e~ c aims that only 60 left . See PM . Netscher, History of the<br />
Ch_ronicle ··. 1929), p. 27. ry erb,ce ... translated by, Walter Roth . - (Georgetown : "Th e Daily<br />
Neil L Whitehead, L Lords of the Ti . .<br />
tions. 1988). pp. 38-39. ger Sp,nt (Dordrect, Holland and Providence, USA Fons Publica·<br />
F Staehelin, Die Mission der B d<br />
Jahrhundert (Herrnhut· Vi . f ru ergemeine in Suriname und Berbice i<br />
4 8GB. Appendix I p 185. C erems ur Brudergeschichte. 1913), <strong>Vol</strong> II Pt 2 17 m achzehn ten<br />
5 BGBB. Annexe I., p .. 19. f..xtom:nfandeur, Essequibo to West India Co~pa~v (WIC) 1681<br />
6. BGB A d. . rac rom a Stock Book f th W . . . . . .<br />
7 8GB. A::nd_,x NI, P 219. An Official Diary kept at~ k c ~, ~t India Company, 20 February 1721.<br />
8 B ~ . n ix . p . 2. Director-Gen ~ . y over a . J uly 1699- 1701 .<br />
GB. Appendix II. P 47 Com . d era!. Esseqwbo to WIC. 21 February 1769<br />
' rnan eur, Essequibo to WIC, 7 December 1746. .<br />
18
-<br />
9<br />
BGB. Appendix rv. P 2 . ApD(!ndix rv. pp . 6 -7, Director-General, Essequibo to WIC. 15 March 1769.<br />
10 Adriaan van Berke!. Adriaan van Berkel's travels in South America ... translated by Walter Roth<br />
{Georgetown: The MDaily Chronicle ·· Ltd., 1948). pp. 68-9 .<br />
11 J .J Hartsinck, Beschryving van Guiana ... (Amsterdam : Gerrit Tielenburg, 1770), <strong>Vol</strong>. I, pp. 291 -2 .<br />
12 PRO. CO. 116/19. llnventory of Company Holdings and private Plantations] 20 August 1700.<br />
The Inventory of slaves employed at the Fort Bread Gardens lists a total of fifteen, three of whom were unfit.<br />
There were three Amerindian women and one boy among them . Th€ fort had had its own bread garden from<br />
at least 1681, when the Amerindians were asked to clear an island in the Cuyuni for that purpose . (8GB<br />
Appendix I. p . 185).<br />
13 Sec. for example. ARA, Nauwkeurige Plaan van de EDI. Compagnie Plantage Weest Soeburg,<br />
January 1752. where bread gardens are shown.<br />
14. BGB, Appendix I, p. 185. Commandeur, Essequibo to WlC, 27 February 1683.<br />
15 BGB Appendix <strong>IV</strong>, p. 2<br />
16 Lawrence Keymis, ··S€cond voyage to Guiana . 1596", in list of extracts from printed books ([Lon·<br />
donJ. le 1898]). pp. 20-21.<br />
17 . See Arie Boomert, ·The Arawak Indians of Trinidad and coastal Guiana,ca 1500-1650~, <strong>Journal</strong> of Caribbean<br />
History. <strong>Vol</strong>. 19, No . 2, 1984 ; A.J . Mc R. Benjamin, "The <strong>Guyana</strong> Arawaks in the 16th and 17th<br />
centunes~. in Proceedings of the Conference on the Arawaks of <strong>Guyana</strong>, 14-15 October 1981<br />
(Georgetown : Amerindian Research Unit, 1988) . ·<br />
18. Ibid.<br />
19 . BGBB, Annexe L p . 31. Extract from a Stock Book of the West Jndia Company, 13 January 1736.<br />
20 . 8GB, Appendix I, p. 84 . An official diary kept at Kijkoveral 1699-1701.<br />
21. PRO, CO 116/19. !Inventory of Ccmpany and Private Plantations circa 1700] .<br />
22. BGBB. Annexe I. p. 19 . Extract from a Stock Book of the West India Company, 20 February 1721.<br />
23 . 8GB, Appendix I, Commandeur, Essequibo to WIC, 2 July 1707.<br />
24. P.M. Netscher. Geschiedenis van de kolonien Essequebo, Demerary en Berbice ... ('s Gravenhage :<br />
Martinus Nijhoff, 1888). p. 376.<br />
25. van Berke!, p . 95 .<br />
26 . PRO. C.O . 116/18, Jacob de Jongh to Zeeland Chamber, Wl, 31 August 1688.<br />
27 . S€e, for example, 8GB, Appendix I, p . 53, Kykoveral Diary; GNA Berbice Ordinances, Instructions to Postholder<br />
in Canje, 1756 .<br />
28. 8GB, Appendix I, p. 183, Commandeur, Essequibo to WlC, 28 June 1680; p . 185, Commandeur, Essequibo<br />
to WJC. 27 February 1683 .<br />
29. See, for example, USC, Extracts from Dutch Archives, p. 240; 8GB Appendix Il, p. 10, Proclamation made<br />
by Commandeur, Essequibo 2 April 1730; 8GB, Appendix II, p. 202, Minutes of the Court of Justice. Essequibo<br />
5 October 1761.<br />
30. See Winston M
44 Op. cit<br />
45 van Berk I. p . 29<br />
46 . BGB, Appendix rv. Acting Postholder. Cuyuni to Director-General. Essequibo, 8 May 1769 .<br />
47. USC. Extracts ~rom Dut h Archives. p . 617 . W.A.S . van Gro_vestin 's journal. 1794 ; GNA. Berbice Ordinanc'<br />
. lnstrnctJon s to Postholder in Canje. 1756; Kykoveral Diary, P- o 7 ·<br />
48 Kykoveral Diary, pp . 83, 85 .<br />
49 . Charles A. Harr is and J .A.J de Villiers. Storm van's Gravesande: the rise of British Guiana<br />
(London : Hakluyt Society. 1911), p. 340 .<br />
50 . See GNA. Berbice Ordinances, 1688 , 1736. 1756.<br />
51 . lneke Veiling , De Berbice Slavenopstand 1763 (M.A Thes is. Univer ity of Amsterdam, 1979), p . 69 .<br />
52 . Staehelin , <strong>Vol</strong>. II. Pt. 2. p 11.<br />
53 . Nctscher. Geschiedenis . p. 376.<br />
54. Hartsinck. <strong>Vol</strong>. I. p. 270 .<br />
55 . 8GB , Appendix rv. p . 188. Extract from report by the Manager of Duynenberg . 16 March 1778 .<br />
56 Antonio Vaquez de Espinosa, Description of the Indies translated by Charles Upson Clark (Washington·<br />
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1968). p . 77 ; 8GB. Appendix I. pp . 31-34 .<br />
57 . BGB , Appendix f. p 131. Proceedings of the WIC (Zeeland Chamber), 1645 .<br />
58 . A. Boomert. ''The Taruma Phase of Southern Suriname", Archaeology and Anthropol'ogy <strong>Vol</strong>. 4, Nos.<br />
1 &2.1981.107 .<br />
59 . C. Quandt. Nachricht von Suriname (Amsterdam: S Emme.ring, 1968) , p . 283 .<br />
60 . Netscher, Geschiedenis , pp . 367-368<br />
61. GNA. Berbice Ordinance , 1688 .<br />
62 . J .C. Stedman. Narrative of five years· expedition ... (London: J . Johnson & J . Edwards. 1796) , <strong>Vol</strong>.<br />
II, 192 .<br />
63 8GB. Appendix II, pp l 21-2, Director -General , Essequibo to WIC. 9 September 1755.<br />
64 . USC. Extracts from Dutch Archives , p. 269, Zeeland Chamber to Commandeur, Essequibo, 14 January<br />
1686 .<br />
65 Ibid.<br />
66. Ibid.<br />
67 . BGB. Appendix I. WJC to Commandeur. Essequibo, 6 December 1696 .<br />
68 . 8GB , Appendix IL p. 25, Commandeur, Essequibo to WfC, 12 Januarv 1737 .<br />
69 . 8GB, Appendix I, WIC to Commandeur. Essequibo, 6 December 1696: Netscher Geschiedenis. p . 373 :<br />
USC. Extrac!s , p. 238; 8GB , Appendix I, p . 238 , Commandeur. Essequibo to WfC, 6 January 1714<br />
70. BGB, Appendix 11. p. 61. Commandeur, Essequibo to WIC, 29 March 1749 .<br />
71. Ibid ., Report of Commandant Laurens Storm van's Gravesande. 1750 .<br />
72. Ibid .<br />
73. Ibid ., Court of Policy. Essequibo to WIC. 14 July l 731 .<br />
74 . See Whitehead. Lords of the Tiger Spirit .<br />
75 Marc de Civrieux "L Ca lie I C ·<br />
5 1976 880·· W'oh~ h n d s Y a onqu1sta de la Guayana Espanola ('Etnohistoria Kar'na')". Montalban.No .<br />
· · P- . 1te ea . p. 126 .<br />
76 · tGBf Appendix! II, PP- 99-100. Director-General, Essequibo to WIC. 26 November 1754<br />
77. e. or exampe , Stnckland Documents d h .<br />
ela and British G · · ~ an maps on t e boundary question between Venezuu,ana<br />
J rom the Capu h · h · . .<br />
Cooperativa Editrice, 1896). c '" arc ives '" Rome (Rome : Pnnted by the Unione<br />
78. 8GB. Appendix 11. p. 67 Re ort f C<br />
79. Ibid. Director-General E.s P . 00<br />
° ommandant Laurens Storm van's Gravesande , 1750 .<br />
80. Civrieux, p 881. I sequi to wrc, 28 August 1762 .<br />
81. 8GB, Appendix II, p. 46, Cornmandeur Es .<br />
Letter of Prefect of Missions to Co ' sequ1bo to WIC. 7 December 1746 : Appendix II. pp. 145-149.<br />
82. W.H. Brett Leg d mmandant of Guiana.<br />
w·11 Ga . en s and myths of th b . .<br />
83 Bis rdner. f1880D. pp. 99-10] ea original Indians of British Guiana (London : William<br />
GB. Appendix ll 2 M· .<br />
. p. . inutes of Court of p<br />
0<br />
1· Es<br />
icy, sequibo. 16 August 1724. Appendix II. p . 222 Director ·<br />
20
,e1wrc1I. ls~cq11ih\,_) I WI . 22 F"'bt11,1rv I 7ld<br />
S4 St!e. for cxc1n1plt•, B ·o. /\ ppc 11Ji x I. p . 2 1 :,. Kykoverc1I Di.:iry<br />
ar: BGB. /\ prw ndi x I. l
HOOK-SWINGING<br />
MID-NINETFENIH-CENllJRy GUVANA<br />
by<br />
Basdeo Mangru<br />
Indian immigrant workers, introduced into <strong>Guyana</strong> under the iniquitous indenture<br />
system (1838-1917) were recruited largely from the North-Western Provinces<br />
and Oudh (modern Uttar Pradesh), Bihar and Bengal in North India. The<br />
culture they brought to the Caribbean was a blend of various local practices and<br />
beliefs, but the Bhojpuri tradition quickly became dominant. This tradition was epitomized<br />
in language by the Hindi Bhojpuri dialect ,and in religion by two religious epics,<br />
the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, which defined cultural ideals and values in the<br />
Indian community. Smaller batches of Indian workers, too, were recruited from the<br />
Tamil and Telugu districts of the Madras Presidency in South India. In comparison<br />
with North India, the volume of traffic to the Caribbean frof'!l South India was small,<br />
irregular and short-lived, as immigrant workers found more lucrative employment in<br />
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Burma and in local government undertakings . Both Bengalis<br />
and Madrasis 1 introduced a rich note of cultural differentiation in the Caribbean<br />
largely through their language, beliefs, religious observances, dress, music and dance.<br />
This brief article examines a predominantly South Indian religious ritual totaHy<br />
neglected in the literature on the Indian diaspora in the Caribbean. The lack of<br />
attention is due presumably to its comparatively brief existence and the insignificant<br />
number of Indians who participated actively in it. Madrasis ref erred to the observance<br />
as Chedalardtana or Shedal; others as the 'Charak-puja', 'khidi-mari', hook -<br />
swinging or wheel form of worship. ~<br />
Indian immigrant workers were introduced into <strong>Guyana</strong> to supplement the<br />
truculent ranks of the local workforce following the abolition of slavery in 1834 and<br />
full emancipation four years later. Accustomed to a mentality of coerced labour,<br />
Guyanese ~ugar pl~ters sought to re-establish their control over labour through<br />
lar~e-scale importation . What they desired most was a regular, docile .workforce<br />
which ~ould b~ manipulated and used effectively under any pressing emergency .<br />
The neighbouring. West Indian Islands, southern United States, Europe, Africa, the<br />
Portuguese Atlantic Islands and Asia were tried with varyi·ng d f It<br />
egrees o success.<br />
22
was India, with its teeming millions in heavily congested areas, which fulfilled the<br />
planters' needs. 2 The movement which commenced in.1838 was stopped t~ following<br />
year; it recommenced in 1845, temporarily stopped three years later and<br />
c~nuectu11it 1terrupted from 1854 to its demise in 1917.<br />
The movement from India was not spontaneous. It was governed rather by<br />
socio-economic factors, the persuasive force of the recruiters and by the annual<br />
indents of the various recipient colonies. While famine and food scarcity were effective<br />
recruiting agents in themselves, the euphoric promises held out to unsophisticated<br />
Indian villagers by unscrupulous recruiters were difficult to resist. The inducements<br />
were tempting indeed--light work at attractive wages, free accommodation<br />
and medical care, wholesome and nutritious food, legislative protection from plant~r<br />
tyranny and neglect, opportunities to remit money to families in India and free repa-:<br />
triation following a stipulated period of industrial residence. 3 Intending emigrants<br />
with daughters of marriageable age were assured that their children would find 'hand.._<br />
some' husbands in the colonies . The most valued assurance, however, was the<br />
privilege of practising their religion which was an inseparable part of the lives of<br />
Indians. In time, religion became the most persistent form of resistance against the<br />
harsh features of the plantation system. ,<br />
I, '. -. •• ~ • •<br />
Hook-swinging was largely an annual ritual practised extensively in the Madras<br />
Presidency. In 1853, official reports from the Chief Magistrate and the Super-:<br />
intendent of Police in that Presi _dency indicated that . the ritual was prevalent in<br />
Trichinopoly, Salem, Ganjam, North and S0t:1th Arcot, Cuddapah, Masulipatam,<br />
Vizagapatam, T anjore and Tennevelly. Hook-swinging was purely an Indian custom,<br />
practised mainly by such low castes as Pariahs (untouchables), 1'allies and Pallars.<br />
The patrons of the ,ritual were Lord Shiva and his wife, Mother Durga, who 'protected'<br />
the Bhagtas or devotees from injury during the 'swinging' process. J.H<br />
Powell alluded to the origin of the ritual:<br />
• ~ . I<br />
... Siva and Durga were not born as children, but came into the world<br />
as grown man and woman, ifr a-place called Kailas-parbad. This<br />
. supernatural arrival was made known oo.ly to a poor Brahman and<br />
his wife .who were childless ... He (Shiva)· said that he was a god who<br />
gav~ children and rice crops. Tqe..~rahman replied that if he would<br />
give .him a child as well as ri~~ lie, would be his follower, to which Siva<br />
consented,and told him that _ he ~ould have to perform the Charakpuja<br />
('hook-swinging') according to the methods which he then showed<br />
23
h 1m . ... The people of the village decided to make trial of Siva' s<br />
power, so erected a staging and carried ?ut the i~structi?ns given as<br />
regards hook-swinging, the Br~~an a~~1ng a~ pne~t wh1l~ the lower<br />
castes of the people were being swung . While this was m progress<br />
Siva appeared to the Brahman, with whom he was very angry for<br />
having started the ceremony without his permission, wheret.Ipon the<br />
Brahman asked forgiveness and pleaded ignorance, saying he did<br />
not know when the god wanted the Puja (religious ceremony) to start<br />
... Three days after this (performance of the puja foHowing Siva's<br />
precise instructions) the Brahman 's wife gave birth to a child. 4<br />
for three days prior to the ceremony, devotees must fast and observe certain<br />
ritual purity. During the ritual the Bhagtas, adorned with garlands of flowers, and<br />
with hooks impaled in the fleshy portions of their backs, were swung from the longer<br />
end of the stout pole pivoted on a firmly planted upright thirty to forty feet above the<br />
ground. The rotation usually lasted between two and five minutes accompanied by<br />
music, particularly the flute. The ritual was intended to promote fertility among the<br />
Bhagtas who were expected to father children "after carrying out Siva's instructions".<br />
5 The touching of the ground by the chief operator , (who usually belonged to<br />
the blacksmith or lohar caste) before inserting the two hooks , the circlets of bells<br />
around the ankles of the devotees and the draught of sugar and water seemed to<br />
indicate a fertility ceremony or propitiation of the 'Earth Goddess ' to ensure an<br />
abundant rice-crop. Other reasons given for the performance included the honoring<br />
of a village goddess, the fulfilment of a vow made in times of severe illness or the<br />
expression of gratitude for benefits received.<br />
Throughout the indenture period, Indian religion was viewed by the planters<br />
and indentured immigrants from opposite ehds of the spectrum. To the latter, religion<br />
constituted a form of protection , a unifying force in what was undoubtedly an<br />
alien environment. Since the plantation system was geared to foster a feeling of<br />
hel~lessness and dependence similar to slavery, it was psychologically necessary for<br />
Indians to have some form of resistance to preserve their identity and prevent the<br />
s~stem from reducing them to mere puppets . The planters, in contrast, saw Indian<br />
~tuals as a counterpoise to discontent, a safety-valve through which pent-up aggression<br />
coul~ be ,~eleased. By patronizing Indian religion, they hoped to foster a sense<br />
~~longing.<br />
rendering a residence popular and attractive to this invaluable class of<br />
t~ . urers" · Some ~1~nters even encouraged Indians to recreate 'Village India ' on<br />
eir estates by providing building materials either free of cost or at·a nominal charge.<br />
24
The influential, absentee-proprietor, Quintin Hogg, underlined the importance of<br />
facilitating Indian religion, " ... if we cannot make Coolies Christians let us build them<br />
Hindoo temples", 6 an advice which became part and parcel of planter policy.<br />
• l<br />
Nevertheless, the "cruel nature " of the hook-swinging ritual was singled out<br />
for particular attack right from its inception. The pro-planter Governor, Sir Henry<br />
Barkly, seemed to carry out a personal crusade against it. Besides the "novel and<br />
exciting nature" of the observance, Barkly perceived the reported "·drunkenness and<br />
immorality" accompanying it to have an adverse effect not only on Indians but to<br />
some extent on young creoles{those of African descent born in the colony), who<br />
witnessed the spectacle in significant numbers. His despatch to Colonial Secretary,<br />
the Duke of Newcastle, dated 14 April 1853 clearly indicated his disquiet over the<br />
observance:<br />
Though doubtless necessary from motives of policy in our vast Indian<br />
Empire, to conciliate Native prejudices, even to the extent of<br />
patronising the Pageants held in honour of the Hindu deities, however<br />
barbarous or inhuman they may be, I do not suppose that, under<br />
the very difficult circumstances in which the Indian immigrants are<br />
placed in this Colony, it can be the wish of Her Majesty's Government<br />
that such exhibitions should be carried beyond the fair bounds<br />
prescribed by the spirit of toleration prevalent in British possessions,<br />
or that they should be permitted to outrage the feelings or vitiate the .<br />
principles of the remainder of the Population. 7 . ·<br />
Barkly understood well the planters' dependence on Indian labour to ·resuscitate<br />
the sugar industry and recognized the efficacy of patronizing Indian r-eligiori :· Yet<br />
he doubted whether the British Government would tolerate a ritual which could only<br />
have a negative impact on the population. His despatch was thus geared to test the<br />
political waters, to ascertain whether the Home Government would object to the<br />
suppression of the ritual. The failure or reluctance of the Colonial Office to address<br />
the issue gave Barkly carte -blan·che to initiate action to suppress the observance.<br />
Barkly found a determined ally in ~ever:end .E. Williams, Wesleyan Missionary<br />
to the Indian immigrants. Williams had "an intimate knowledge" of Tamil, the<br />
language spoken by the majority of Madrasis, and "a degree of proficiency" in<br />
Hindustani spoken by Bengalis , and was thus able to 'establish considerable rapport<br />
with Indian immigrants. He denounced vigorously · the "barbarous character and<br />
25
• -=- - -<br />
. . t dency"B of the ritual. His reports showed considerable 's,,,; .<br />
demora I 1smg en f vvinmng '<br />
. . . th Mahaica area on the East Coast o Demerara. Here, the ritual<br />
act1VIty m e . h. h .od f . \.l,,ras<br />
. b ed on a monthly basis and, wit 1n as ort pen o time, no fewer th<br />
bemg o serv d ·1 d th h . l d" . an<br />
Bh tas "had swung''. Williams eta1 e e p ys1ca con ibons of sorne f<br />
1<br />
;h:v~:vote:~: "One of these men we had seen at Melville with his back still swoU;n<br />
at the part where the hooks had passed; anothe~ devotee, .a youth of about 13 or 14<br />
f age of remarkable intelligence, and with a considerable knowledge of Enyears<br />
o ' 20 d" . h h . ,<br />
I<br />
. h showed us his back, on which were 1shnct scars, e aving swung' no<br />
g IS , · d 11 · th· C 1 .<br />
f<br />
er than five times, in five successive years, an a 1n 1s o ony, viz, once at<br />
W<br />
e . " 9<br />
Cummings Lodge and four times at Supply .<br />
Both Barkly and Williams launched a sustained anti-hook-swing ing campaign<br />
or persuasion to terminate "this cruel and barbaric ritual". They adopted this policy<br />
presumably to avoid any possible criticism from the powerful planting interests, the<br />
Colonial Office or the Government of India. Through persuasion, the ten or twelve<br />
individuals expected to 'swing' at Plantation Melville abandoned their design and<br />
surrendered the iron hooks and poles prepared for that purpose. Concomitantly, a<br />
'Government Notice' of 27 March 1853, written in English and Indian Language,<br />
advocated its discontinuation. In a rather conciliatory note, it claimed that while<br />
Indian observances generally did not demoralize the uneducated Black population ,<br />
the Shedal was "calculated greatly to blunt their feelings, and strengthen them in<br />
vice". The proclamation assured Indian immigrants that "no interference will be<br />
exercised in reference to any observance but the simple 'swinging'" . 10 Thus by a ...<br />
combination of persuasion and assurances hook-swinging was abolished in <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
in the mid-1850s. No evidence has been found in the documents indicating the reemergence<br />
of this ritual in any part of <strong>Guyana</strong> . Although the ritual continued in<br />
South India, reports in 1858 suggested that in such districts as Canara and Nellore<br />
the observance was "gradually on the decline" .<br />
. . That_ ~illiams should pursue such a vigorous role in suppressing hook-swing <br />
!~g 1s n~t d1ff1culto u~~er~~and. He constantly complained that the mission of<br />
1~structmg and evan~ehzmg Indians had met with "multiplied difficulties", disheartening<br />
to any evangelical. Others later were to echo the same " .<br />
hard as stones and as cold as icicles,,. i 1 Williams ad b c~~- Indian' s are a~<br />
obstacles he had encountered i·s h1·s m· . . um rated the ·1nsurmo ntable<br />
1ss1onary activity:<br />
1.<br />
the utter indifference of the Coolies<br />
tion, and particularly to the I d gen~rally to all religious obligaru<br />
es an duties of the Christian.,system.<br />
26
2. the extreme difficulty, I may say, impossibility, of gathering together<br />
on one estate those labouring on near or even adjoining plantations.<br />
3. the paucity of readers. .,<br />
4. the extent of country over which the immigrants are scattered. . ,<br />
5. the difficulty of establishing schools arising from the lack of persons<br />
acquainted with both their languages and English to act as teachers.<br />
6. the hitherto frequent changes in the place of residence. .<br />
7. the aversion natural to men, and particularly strong in the Hindu, to<br />
cast away his own creed for that of strangers.<br />
8. the multiple difficulties which would (still) in many cases be found on<br />
their return to India to beset their path if they embraced Christianity<br />
here.<br />
9. the sadly demoralizing effect of intemperance.<br />
10. the pernicious consequence of the great inequality in the proportion<br />
of the Sexes . 12<br />
A decade lat r, the problems encountered by Williams were echoed by Reverend<br />
E.B. Bhose, a Christian missionary to the Indians. Bhose adumbrated a variety<br />
of obstacles deterring Indians from embracing Christianity. Conversion to Christianity<br />
meant to Indians the severing of family ties and connection and "the loss of<br />
worldly prospects ". Bhose observed that although caste distinctions and religious<br />
prejudices underwent considerable modifications, the Indian community generally<br />
would ostracize those who were christianized. Besides, Indian immigrants perceived<br />
themselves as "exiles in a foreign land" and were more anxious to claim their return<br />
passage entitlements than in renouncing their faith. The fear among Indians that<br />
they might be debarred from revisiting Ind·a was another powerful obstacle to their<br />
reception of Christianity. An additio stumbling block, observed Bhose, was<br />
.r<br />
the<br />
conspicuous increase in intemperance in the Indian camp which "undermines their<br />
constitution and makes them indifferent workers ". 13 These impediments tended<br />
collectively to frustrate missionary activities with the result that in the nineteenth<br />
centu~ Christianity touched only the fringes of the Indian immigrant communy<br />
The motives of Williams and Barkly were not too difficult to discern. To the<br />
former, suppression of hook-swinging would undoubtedly help to alleviate some of<br />
the obstacles to missionary activity. Barkly, on the other hand, was a merchant,<br />
mortgagee and proprietor of sugar estates in the colony and his appointment as<br />
Governor ( 1848-1853) was designed to buttress the interests of sugar. His role in<br />
the suppression of hook-swinging would, therefore, seem inimical to the propriet ,.,<br />
27
kl s apparently conversant with the far-reaching social<br />
interes~s-. But ~ar Y ~:curring in mid nineteenth-century British India. In 18<br />
~nd<br />
humamtanGan re olrWm~11·am Bentinck abolished sati or the burning of widows on th~'<br />
Governor- enera 1 1 . . h hod e1r<br />
b d , funeral pyres despite opposition from t e ort ox supporters of th<br />
hus ~n 5 E<br />
1<br />
. the Indian Government had outlawed Female Infanticide or the<br />
practice. ar ier, . f . I d' e<br />
ractice of killing girls at birth owing to (the paucity o young men ~n n ia and) the<br />
P<br />
I<br />
f the 'evil' dowry custom. By Act V of 1843, the lnd~an Gov rnment<br />
prevaence o . . . f d' · h . ·<br />
abolished slavery, thereby liberating m1lhons o In _1ans wit out co?1pe atmg their<br />
owners. In 1856, Governor-General Lord Dalhousie passed the W1 w Remarriage<br />
Act enabling Hindu widows to remarry. 14<br />
Prohibition of hook-s~inging was, therefore, compatible with the humanitarian<br />
measures pursued by British administrators in India. There was little sustained<br />
opposition in India because the reforms touched only the fringes of the Indian social<br />
system. Correspondingly_, the suppression of hook-swinging affected only an insignificant<br />
number of indentured immigrants in <strong>Guyana</strong> and as such opposition was not<br />
vocal.<br />
While the Wesleyans launched a campaign of persuasion against hook-swinging,<br />
initially they seemed to adopt a laissez-faire attitude towards tadjah or muharram ,<br />
a ritual which certainly impeded missionary activity. Tadjah was a Muslim festival<br />
commemorating the martyrdom of Hussain and Hassan, grandsons of the Prophet<br />
Mohammed. This ritual, which ended in a procession, had gradually "degenerated<br />
into a . Saturnalia in which Hindus, Mohamedans, and Negroes mingle promiscuously,<br />
and rum and ganjah add to the religious fervour of the processionists. " 15 It<br />
was often accompanied by violence and death, as the processionists were armed<br />
with sticks, guns and asegais (cutlasses attached to poles). Not infrequently the<br />
procession would block the entire highway and Indians "under the influence of artificial<br />
or natural excitement" would attack any estate official who failed to dismount<br />
from his horse or carriage on approaching tadjah 16<br />
Despite the frequent inter-tadjah clashes assault and battery of · t<br />
l b'd· · · d h ' 1nnocen<br />
aw-a 1 mg citizens an t e general lawlessness which prevailed th 1· '<br />
tempt to suppress tadjah as was done in the case of h - . ., ere was l~~e. atagainst<br />
tadjah became .vocal, the planter-dominated I ook ~wmging · When cnbc1sm<br />
by regulating the procession and stipulating rt . ocal Je?1slature responded merely<br />
law. There were perhaps th . ce am penalties for infringement of the<br />
b<br />
' , ree mam explanat· f h<br />
0 servance in <strong>Guyana</strong>.<br />
tons or t e continuation of tadjah<br />
28
firstly, the planters were apprehensive that any undue interference With the<br />
religious practices of Indian immigrants would impact adversely on the prosperity of<br />
the sugar industry. Interference could result in recruiting obstacles in India or the<br />
stoppage of immigration, which was perceived as "a matter of life and death importance<br />
to the Colony" . 17 Secondly, although the planters viewed the violence with<br />
increasing disquiet, they realized that the aggression displayed during the ritual tended<br />
to contribute to the control which estate management sought to exercise over labour<br />
after Emancipation. It was claimed that, following the observance, workers became<br />
more easily manipulated. Thirdly, even if the authorities were disposed to take<br />
action against tadjah, the hundreds of spectators and participants, comprising Bengalis,<br />
Madrasis, Chinese, Creoles, West Indians and Portuguese, demonstrated that it was<br />
a national event and therefore difficult to abolish.<br />
The suppression of hook-swinging, on the other hand, would not pose any<br />
serious problems as participation was limited, mainly because of the extremely small<br />
Madrasi population in the colony. The importation of Madrasis commenced in January<br />
1845 and by 1848, the heyday of this immigration, a total of 6,417 had been<br />
introduced in <strong>Guyana</strong>. The report of the Colony's Immigration Agent-General for<br />
1858 showed that, of 26,779 emigrants despatched from India in the two decades<br />
1838-1858, only 8,247 or 32.5 per cent were Madrasis. 18 By 1873, Madrasis<br />
comprised a mere 4.8 per cent of the total workforce on the Guyanese sugar plantations,<br />
owing to repatriation and a gradual movement away from the estates to seek<br />
profitable employment in the urban areas.<br />
The comparatively small importation of Madrasis was due mainly to planter<br />
prejudice against their eating habits and~l eged indolence. The stereotype of the<br />
Madrasis was that they frequently dishonoured their labour contracts and adopted a<br />
life of vagrancy and drunkenness, that they were "idle, sickly and beggarly, filthy in<br />
their food and habits, living often on putrified offal and carcasses rescued from the<br />
vultures, covered with ulcers and inveterate itch". 19 These · alleged t~ ies coupled<br />
with the fact that they were manifestly less docile than the Ben galls ·were traits considered<br />
undesirable on estates, where the profit motive was paramount and labourers<br />
regarded merely as animated machines . Consequently, some planters refrained from<br />
employing them on any terms, while others would only engage thei~ces when<br />
an alternative labour supply was not obtainable . .<br />
This prejudice, however, seemed misguided for there were two distinct classes<br />
of Madrasi immigrants. In fact, those resident at Plantations Albion, Paradise and<br />
~<br />
29
ere decidedly superior to those imported between 1845-184 7. 20 G<br />
E nmore W h Be<br />
ally Madrasis were less successful as labourers t an nga 1 ts . b u~, once acclirnatizect<br />
ener<br />
any<br />
became invaluable labourers and were generalJy employed m work of an aq .,<br />
m<br />
nature. Although Madrasi immigration<br />
·<br />
ceased tn<br />
· 1863<br />
, sma<br />
JI b<br />
atches did arrive.<br />
uatic:<br />
1886 and 1913 and they seemed to provide satisfactory service on the plantatio in<br />
One District Immigration-Agent described them as "an intelligent lot of peop~:·<br />
hardworking and amenable to discipline". 21<br />
'<br />
That the suppression of hook-swinging in <strong>Guyana</strong> elicited little resistance<br />
could hardly be disputed. The comparatively small Madrasi importation and the<br />
rather insignificant number of them resident on estates tended to blunt any concerted<br />
action or vocal protest for its continuation . The planters, too, who depended<br />
exclusively on Indian immigration to resuscitate the sugar industry, adopted an indifferent<br />
attitude to hook-swinging even though restriction on Indian cultural activities<br />
could prove a poor advertisement to emigration in India. Additionally, the<br />
discon~inuation
11.<br />
] 2.<br />
13.<br />
14.<br />
15.<br />
16.<br />
17.<br />
18.<br />
19.<br />
20.<br />
21.<br />
See R.J. Moore, 'East Indians and Negroes in British Guiana'. (Unpublished Ph .D. Thesis, University of<br />
Sussex, 1970), pp . 345-353 .<br />
P.R.0., C.O . 111/294, Williams to Barkly, 20 January 1853 .<br />
The Royal Gazette, 21 April 186-S.<br />
See R.C. Majumdar et al., An Advanced History of India, (Delhi, 1967), pp . 815-820 .<br />
The Argosy , 28 February 1885.<br />
For details of the socio-political effects of this ritual, see B. Mangru, "Tadjah in British Guiana. Manipulation<br />
or Protest?", forthcoming in Indenture and Abolition (Toronto South Asian Review, 19<strong>93</strong>).<br />
See H.V.P. Bronkhurst , The Colony of British Guiana and its Labouring Population (London,<br />
1883), p. 128.<br />
P.R.0 ., C.O. 111/321, Immigration Agent-General to Govt. of B.G., no. 133, 28 October 1858.<br />
P.R.0 ., C.O. 111/250 , Ught to Lord Grey, No. 10, 11 January 1848 .<br />
See Parliamentary Paper, 1851, XXXIX, (624). Colonial Land and Emigration Commission to Colonial<br />
Office, 26 September 1850, pp. 431-432.<br />
See Report of the Immigration Agent-General for 1914-1915.<br />
31
GlN ANA'S GOIDEN AGE:<br />
THE D<strong>IV</strong>ERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH<br />
GUIANA, 1880-1<strong>93</strong>0<br />
by<br />
David Granger<br />
The years 1838 to 1<strong>93</strong>8, constituted a century of continuous change and<br />
crisis in the economic history of British Guiana. 1 During that era, the liberation of<br />
over 80,000 ex-slaves from the Apprenticeship System, and the entry of over<br />
340,000 2 Asians, Africans, Europeans and West Indians into the economy under<br />
the Indentureship ~tern, drasti@lly altered the demographic composition of the<br />
Colony, laid the basis for a large free populace and transformed the economy. Recurrent<br />
crises and rising competitiveness in_ the !nternational commodity markets<br />
triggered small booms and big depressions 3 which fractured the monocultural structure<br />
of the Guyanese economy; they initiated a chain of events which created new<br />
spatial patterns of land use, new avenues and institutions of enterprise, and new<br />
modes of production.<br />
It is in the context of such internal change anqjRternational crisis in the<br />
nineteenth century that the economy of <strong>Guyana</strong> must be examined. For about fifty<br />
years, from 1880 to 1<strong>93</strong>0, several factors combined to intensify the rate and direction<br />
of change . This paper seeks to discuss the major attempts made to diversify the<br />
economy, largely between 1880 and 1<strong>93</strong>0, in order to ascertain their causes and to<br />
determine their extent. In attempting to account for these economic changes, the<br />
paper argues that the challenge to the traditional sugar economy by a new diversified<br />
econom~ was_ ~ad~ possible mainly by an indigenous middle class. This class incre~sed<br />
its pohtical influence i~ the colonial polity as a result of constitutional changes<br />
which challenged the ~lanters c~n_trol of colonial resources through the legislature .<br />
By 1928, when a relatively restrictive constitution was introduced to limit th<br />
1·rcal<br />
power of the Creole elite, the thrust of diversification of th<br />
e po 1 I<br />
was blunted and many of the new a ti ·t· . e non-sugar economy<br />
c vi 1es went into decline. .<br />
To make sense, economic development and diversification m~st be seen as<br />
32
more than mere short-term increments or quantitative alterations in the volume and<br />
variety of economic output. Economic development is taken to be "... a process<br />
whereby the material welfare of the people of a ... country is improved consistently<br />
and substantially over long periods of time. " 4 In the same way, economic diversification<br />
should be regard as a process whereby the monocultural structure of a typical<br />
plantation economy could be significantly modified by the cultivation, extraction or<br />
manufacture of a variety of commodities. In diversifying its economy, therefore ,. a<br />
country could avoid sharp or sudden changes in revenue which might accompany<br />
the fluctuations likely to occur by producing for a single market , such as Britain.<br />
Equally, it could achieve a real improvement in the distribution of income among the<br />
majority of the country 's people and make a permanent impact on their livelihood.<br />
<strong>Historical</strong>ly, <strong>Guyana</strong> has been described as a plantation economy. This plan-<br />
. ~<br />
tation mode of production was characterised by a speculative outlook, a low level of<br />
inves ent and technology, the high specificity of capital, production for export to<br />
the world market, absentee ownership and the drain of surplus which superseded<br />
reinvestment in the Colony . 5 Such a mode of production prevented the emergence<br />
of a free, local market which could rival the export economy. In effect, <strong>Guyana</strong> was:<br />
... little more than a geographical extension of the British economy<br />
with the bulk of its revenues flowing directly out of the colony in the<br />
form of remitted profits, interests on borrowed capital, rent and payments<br />
for externally supplied estate inputs. 6<br />
The idea of economic diversification , therefore , should be seen on the one hand ,<br />
against this backdrop of preserving the plantation mode of production . of sugar for<br />
export and. on the other hand, as aiming at the objective of building up a non-sugar<br />
sector to satisfy domestic needs. Given the limited labour and, to a lesser extent,<br />
land and capital resources of the Colony, the emergence of rival sectors implied that<br />
there would be fierce competition within the local economy. To all ap _ earances, this<br />
competition intensified with the thr?at to sug.ar during _ the 'Great Depression' in<br />
Britain and declined, to some degree, about the time of the ' russels Convention ' in<br />
1903. . . .<br />
The second phase coincided with World War I during which Britain underwent<br />
another depression ; it ended during yet another Great Depression ' of 1929,<br />
1<br />
soon afte; <strong>Guyana</strong> reached a level of constitutional and economic stagnation. The<br />
gist of the argument of this . paper is that, during these · two phases, the domestic
"<br />
diversification process was dependent, to a great degree, on the performance of th<br />
plantation-export economy, which, in turn, was susceptible to external shocks cause~<br />
by falling commodity prices. Once stability was restored , the diversification process<br />
seemed to falter.<br />
In the early years after the liberation of Africans from the Apprenticeship<br />
System, and later when European and Asian labourers were freed from the<br />
Indentureship System, a free peasantry had started to develop as the advance guard<br />
of diversification. That free peasantry collided with the unfree plantation : "... where<br />
one was strong the other was weak, and the plantations ' strength depended mainly<br />
on sugar. " 7 In British Guiana, as elsewhere in the British Caribbean, the plantation<br />
was more than an economic system of commodity production ; it was also a political,<br />
social and cultural system of domination in which a small group of British officials,<br />
planters and managers held sway over a large group of non-British labourers. Although<br />
some planters were ruined by the changes which took place in the industry in<br />
the middle of the nineteenth century, sugar was still regarded as the greatest potential<br />
source of profit and many planters did remain , determined to prosper. The<br />
planters, rightly or wrongly, considered their success, or survival, as depending on<br />
their monopolistic control over the factors of production, particularly tractable labour<br />
and empoldered land which were always in short supply in <strong>Guyana</strong>.<br />
The labourers longed to escape from the harsh regime of plantation discipline<br />
and the relentless cycle of planting and harvesting the sugar canes , and preserving<br />
or extending the arable land; this meant quitting the fields if they had a choice.<br />
The ambitions of the planter-class were therefore invariably in opposition to the<br />
aspirations qf the labouring class. It was this underlying antagonism which governed<br />
planters' approach to any significant form of economic activity, other than sugar<br />
cane cultivation, which was likely to compete for scarce labour and land.<br />
I<br />
I<br />
. The reasons, the rate, and the results of diversification, and indeed all other<br />
maJor econ~mic activities in the Colony during this period therefore were regarded<br />
as ~spect~. of the rivalry wit~ sugar: sugar planters and the plantatio~ system . Para <br />
d~x1call~, 1t was. ou! of the 1mplanhng of a large immigrant population, installin an<br />
ohgarch1c constituhonal order, and preserving the monocultural econorn f g<br />
that the strongest reasons for diversification emerged.<br />
y o sugar<br />
One of the_most obvious factors wh· hf 'I' . . . .<br />
graphic nature of the coastland D ·t . IC ac1 itated d1vers1f1cation was the geo-<br />
. ~spt e its great extent, there were severe artificial<br />
34
and natural obstacles to access to the land and the success with which it could be<br />
used. The perennial problem of protection from the sea, and the recurrent_ cycle of<br />
drought and flood, 8 demanded a complex network of dams, dykes, kokers and canals<br />
which required skilled engineers for their construction, a centralised authority for<br />
their management and enormous expenditure for their maintenance. They could<br />
not easily be .. altered for other purposes, and the cost and conditions of purchase of<br />
such improved lands were made deliberately prohibitive. These were all beyond the<br />
resources of the impoverished peasants, many of whom were forced to seek new,<br />
but less fertile, areas further away from the coastal markets. There , they produced<br />
goods and crops which did not demand the same degree of investment and management<br />
as sugar, if only to survive. 9 This was a 'push' factor away from the coast and<br />
from sugar; they were obliged to diversify or die.<br />
Another factor was the demographic transformation of <strong>Guyana</strong> . One of the<br />
chief consequences of the termination of Apprenticeship was the accelerated growth<br />
of villages:<br />
Labour was free to move, free to choose betwee·n residence upon the<br />
old plantation or settlement upon new land, free to use its time upon<br />
plantation land, or upon its own plots, free to bargain for wages in<br />
exchange for its own services. 10 . . ~:<br />
Within the dramatic ae.cade (1838-1848), 44,456 ex-slaves bought 15,462.5 acres<br />
of 'land at a cost of $1; 038, 000. 11 Secondly, and as a consequence of the first, there<br />
was a significant shift of population from the plantations to the villages, a sudden<br />
surge in wage labour, and a significant plunge in the relative size of the export sector<br />
work force, from 88 per cent to 42.6 per cent of the employed population. 12 Thirdly,<br />
there was relatively large-scale immigration of indentured labourers from Europe,<br />
Africa, Asia and the West Indies. As soon as the immigrants , short contracts expired,<br />
many chose to remain in <strong>Guyana</strong>, but not on the plantations; they decided, or<br />
were forced, to fend for themselves in new occupations. Within ninety years, from<br />
1841 to 1<strong>93</strong>1, the population trebled from 98,154 to 302,585. The land had to<br />
provide a living for over 200,000 more persons . 13<br />
J<br />
This demographic surge led to pressure on useful lands as· farms, settlements,<br />
villages and towns were founded along · the coastland. It also led to occupational<br />
differentiation , as people pursued divers~. economic ·interests. Most of all, these<br />
movements had an expansionary effect on the growth of the internal . market by<br />
35
oducing substitutes for imported consumer goods, by extending the systern f<br />
~:tribution with travelling pedlars and petty shopkeepers, by expan~ing the rnon~y<br />
economy through increasing the level of estate wages, and by creating basic infrastructure<br />
in the form of the construction of. hou~~s, ~hurches , shops·, bridges anct<br />
roads. All of these activities stimulated the d1vers1f1cabon of the economy.<br />
Deriving from this demographic factor was the element of ethnic diversity. In<br />
the pursuit of their commercial self-interest, the large non-planter majority of the<br />
population embarked on new areas of endeavour. Between Emancipation in 1834<br />
and 1891, about 228,800 immigrants entered <strong>Guyana</strong>, of whom fourteen per cent<br />
were (Madeiran) Portuguese, six per cent were Chinese, six per cent were Africans<br />
and seventy-four per cent were East Indians. 14 The Portuguese, who started coming<br />
from as early as 1835, quit the fields as soon as they could and, by the 1840s, took<br />
over dominance of the retail trade from the Africans and even cha11enged the bigger<br />
merchants in the wholesale business. As a relatively cohesive community , they became<br />
a dynamic entrepreneurial element not only in commerce but also in farming<br />
and manufacturing. The Chinese , who came from 1853, followed suit, and after a .<br />
shaky experiment in land settlement, became entrenched in the commercial sec~or.<br />
Many of the East Indians who left the plantations remained in agriculture, but producing<br />
non-sugar commodities such as rice, coconuts and cattle on a commercial<br />
scale. Amerindians were increasingly marginalised from the plantation economy,<br />
but were involved in the non-sugar economy, where they were employed for their<br />
skills in logging, mining and river navigation, and as guides in the hinterland. Africans<br />
spread most widely across the coastland and hinterland. Most remained as<br />
peasant farmers in the rural areas, but many moved into urban occupations in the<br />
service trades or as skilled artisans, and pioneered the development of hinterland<br />
settlement and employment. 15 The sundry origins of these people , their diverse<br />
interests, traditions and skills and their occupational differentiation were an impetus<br />
to the diversification from the pre-existent monoculture.<br />
36
Government, constitutional reforms were introduced in 189l1 6 which ned the<br />
po itical grip of the planters on the apparatus of the state . The gradual infiltration of<br />
r;presentatives of the new indigenous professional elite into the legislature was able<br />
to bring about the relaxation of restrictive controls over Crown lands, 17 thereby fa_silitatin~~:upatioA<br />
af IM1d for facroiog and cattle-rearing on the coastland, and for<br />
fogging and mining in the hinterland.<br />
The constitutional order of the day was the main determinant of the distribution<br />
of power since the planters, who formulated policy in the Court of Policy, also<br />
influenced fiscal policies and dominated the statutory boards which regulated public<br />
works. 1s In this way, they impeded activities which hindered, and improved the flow<br />
of funds to activities which helped , sugar production . The capture of political power<br />
through constitutional reform was, therefore, a prime objective of non-sugar in~r <br />
e~ring the last uarter of the nineteenth century. It would have -been im ssible<br />
to pursue any serious programme o economic 1versification in the face of the<br />
planter opposition without acquiring a secure platform of political power.[f he political<br />
victory of the new business elite over the old planter elite was the ref ore one of the<br />
reasons for economic diversification because it broke-the opposition to change , opened<br />
access to land and allowed greater mobility to labour.<br />
The logical consequence of control of the legislature was the capacity to<br />
make laws which reflected the class intere.sts of the lawmakers. One of the main<br />
causes of the demise of the African Village movement had been the 'l~islative encirdement'19<br />
engineered by the planter elite io the Court of Policy. There ,the law<br />
was used methodically as a weapon of coercion , by· means of various fiscal devices,<br />
to obstruct the acquisition of land and t 1 of working people. 20 Hence ,<br />
once cons 1 u 1ona change had been effected, and politica power assured , some of<br />
the legal obstacles erected by the planters , particularly in relation to the sale of Crown<br />
lands and the inequitable distribution of taxes, were dismantled.<br />
A variety of social factors facilitated diversification. In particular, the introduction<br />
of compulsory primary education in 1876 21 accelerated the acculturat ion<br />
process r amongst the polyglot immigrant community and aided their assimilation of<br />
new techniques and technology . It is not without significance that each extension of<br />
the electoral franchise , and . the adoption of technical · innovations in industry or agriculture,<br />
followed educational advances . In addition ~ the · several social, professional,<br />
political and religious institutions which emerged terided to reinforce ethnic or social<br />
particularism. This led to the eruption of political agitation, ethnic conflict ·and labour<br />
37
th ne hand O<br />
unrest on e · 22 They . . also fostered . the d formation h b · of ethnic-based . 1 and-<br />
J t Schemes limited liability companies an ot er usmess groupings wh·<br />
sett emen , , t·t d t .b t d ich<br />
eroded the monopoly control of the old planter e t e an con n u e to diversification,<br />
on· the other hand.<br />
Technological improvement stimulated eco~omic div~rsific~tion in several<br />
ways. New equipment and more efficient processing techn~iues mtr~uced into<br />
sugar factories released many workers for other employme~t. Inventions such as<br />
the telephone, telegraph and electricity and improvements tn transport such as the<br />
railway and steamer, demanded new skills and provided new occupational opportunities.<br />
The industrial progress of Europe and North America created markets for<br />
hitherto unexploited commodities such as rubber, balata and bauxite. 24 In order to<br />
satisfy the needs for these new skills and commodities, there had to be a shift away<br />
from the narrow limits of the monocultural economy.<br />
The economic depression in Europe was probably the single most important<br />
d immediate reason for diversification. There were two asJ?gcts - international and<br />
internal. In e irst case, ritain's population and industrial capability had made it a<br />
v9racious cons1 iroer of raw material from the underdeveloped areas of the world. In<br />
its shift toward free trade ver Britain all but stripped away the preferential tariff<br />
un er w 1c ar indust en·o ed a rivileged, protected, if<br />
not prosperous, existence. Caribbean cane sugar gradually lost its share o the<br />
market during the second half of the nineteenth centu to both the -sugar<br />
pr:oducers from tro ic areas sue as razil and Cub s to th
established as a m~jor _source of staple food production and a manifestation of agricultural<br />
diversification m the Guyanese economy.<br />
The final important reason for diversification was the opportunity afforded<br />
b the conjuncture of discoveries in the second half of the century. They furnished<br />
tie 'pull' factor of labour into other industries, just as the depressi~n furnished the<br />
. ush' factor out of the sugar industry. The chief discovery was thafof gold, 2 8 which<br />
fttracted new classes of investors, owner-managers and labourers, provided a_ valuable<br />
export commodity, stimulated the rise of a variety of small market-oriented<br />
industries (such as foodstuff and transport), and opened the way for_ other forest.<br />
activities. During this time also, the revelation of the usefulness of balata (1859), ~P~ .<br />
discovery of bauxite (1896), and the international demand for green_heari logs '(c.·<br />
1850s) all pointed to the possibility of exploiting local resources, establishing exportoriented<br />
products, and further diversifying the economy.<br />
•<br />
~<br />
Of these reasons, it was the collapse of sugar prices in the mid-1880s which<br />
did the greatest dcimage to the economic dominance of sugar and the political position<br />
of the pJantocracy. The crisis convinced Guyanese of all races and classes, and<br />
even the British Government which appointed a Royal Commission , 29 of the dangerous<br />
f oily of relying · too heavily on a single crop for their subsistence. The crisis<br />
accentuated the social and political contradictions within th accelerated tne<br />
movement for constitutiona re orm<br />
e<br />
largely expatriate lanter {upper) class and the indi enous mercantile and profess10nal<br />
(middle) class. 30 n s ort, the competition between the sugar and the nonsugar<br />
sectors of the economy for land, labour and capital was exacerbated. There<br />
was, therefore, not one single reason, but several reasons, why economic diversification<br />
was sought.<br />
In some measure, it was the outcome of the struggle between the two elites<br />
which would determine the degree of that diversification over the next half-century.<br />
Economic diversification extended into several service and productive areas of activity.<br />
Some activities were supportive of the economy, others were directly p~9(iuctive.<br />
They all developed side by side, however, and should be seen as .separate<br />
components but of the same process.<br />
The most elemental change was the rapid expansion of administrative services<br />
and public utilities which themselves were the harbingers of economic transf ormation.<br />
Prior to Emancipation, slaves were privately -~wned and thus were the re-<br />
39
sponsibility of their masters; since they repre:ented over eighty per cent of the Population<br />
Government's responsibility was confined to a small ~umber of persons. Aft<br />
Em<br />
' ancipation however Government became charged with responsibility for la"·<br />
er , , . I h 31 d . d vv<br />
enforcement, administration of justice, welfare, heat , e ucahon, an later, a variety<br />
of public works such as the pure water supply, sewer~ge and sea defence systems<br />
for the entire population. There was also need for coinage to make payments of<br />
wages of the expanding labour force and for postage stamps to facilitate local and<br />
international correspondence.<br />
These services and utilities furnished the foundation and framework without<br />
which other forms of economic activity could not take place efficiently. They were<br />
so complex and costly, and required such a level of cooperation and expertise, that<br />
they could be undertaken only by a competent central authority such as the Government.<br />
The immediate economic consequence was a sudden surge in central Government<br />
expenditure which increased fivefold from 1833 to 1842. 32<br />
;. Another area of innovation and diversification was in communications and<br />
transport. In communications, cable messages were exchanged between Georgetown<br />
and London in 1871, the telephone was introduced in 1884 and wireless telegraphy<br />
in 1909. In transport, the first railway (East Demerara) was opened for traffic in '·<br />
1848, 33 the Georgetown electric tramway in 1901, and the coastal steamer service ,<br />
and aeroplane flights were inaugurated in 1913. A network of roads - main, branch<br />
and village and estate - was developed, and fair-weather hinterland roads were opened<br />
in the North to Wanaina, in the South to the Rupununi and in Central <strong>Guyana</strong>, to<br />
Kangaruma. 34 The economic impact of such infrastructure was the improvement of<br />
access to information and to new areas. It was important enough for entrepreneurs<br />
of hinterland activities to demand the equitable distribution of expenditure on similar<br />
services as the coastland enjoyed. 35<br />
'<br />
. An i1:1portant area of diversification was in building construction, especially<br />
1n ."':'ood, which reached its apogee. Almost all of Georgetown's most impressive<br />
edifices - the Supreme Court (1887} the City Hall (1889) and St G ' C th<br />
d l ( 89 . · . ' , . eorge s a e-<br />
ra_ 1 .2) - which added endunng elegance and grace to the urban skyline rose<br />
dun~g this era. They called forth new professional ·expertise in a h't , .<br />
neenng and craftsmanship and stimulated I ·n . . re t ecture, eng1-<br />
use of, and demand for focal woods 36 Thoggi g and sa~rrulhng enterprises by their<br />
expansion of constructi~n in wood th f e growth of villages -and towns, and the<br />
sification. ' ere ore extended the scope of economic diver-<br />
40
Another area was that of commerce , and the ancillary wholesale and retail<br />
trades. The expansion of the free population and the creation of a wider domestic<br />
market encouraged the demand for locally-prcx:fuced focx:f as a substitute for imports.<br />
Initially, the value of imported food, drinks and tobacco fell. 37 The importation of<br />
foreign clothing and other commodities, however, continued and swelled the inventories<br />
of consumer gocx:fs available to the public. As a result, shipping increased and l \<br />
brought about a rise in the number of warehouses, shops , markets, hucksters and<br />
pedlars. Economic diversification was achieved by the increase in the va,riety of<br />
employment opportunities of a greater part of the population into the money economy ,<br />
the utility of the foreign hardware imported , and the prcx:fuctivity of local farmers and<br />
artisans for the market. On the other hand, the continued importation of some<br />
items of foodstuff hampered local prcx:fuction of substitutes and limited the extent of<br />
diversification. ·<br />
There were major changes in the availability of banking services, credit, capital<br />
and investment finance . The 'Colonial Bank of the West Indies' and the 'British<br />
Guiana Bank ' had been granted their charters since 1836 and were well established.<br />
As a result of instability in agriculture, they were expressly prohibited from pr.oyiding<br />
credit to such enterprises, particularly sugar. 38 Fire and Life insurance servi~es had<br />
developed in response to the frequent and devastating fires to which the wooden<br />
buildings of Georgetown were often subject. 39 lh~y too became reservoirs of capital.<br />
·<br />
The money accumulated by the . banks and insurance companies , however,<br />
was used only to a limited extent for investment in productive industries. The bulk of<br />
their capital was tied up in bonds and deposits. 4 ° Capital for business credit was<br />
precarious, and in the highly speculative atmosphere of nineteenth-century <strong>Guyana</strong>,<br />
credit Wq~,grpnted for extremely short periods of sixty to ninety days, too short for a<br />
satisfacton,i return on investine~t, and precluding long-term enterprise . As a result,<br />
when principal importers demanded cash payment for goods, small dealers would<br />
tumble into bankruptcy . This had the effect of hindering the development of new<br />
industries and limiting the extent of diversification .<br />
The most successful field of diversification was in farming and, to a lesser<br />
degree, in livestock-rearing. Six crops (apart from sugar-cane and rubber) were grown<br />
with some success - rice , coconuts, cacao, coffee, citrus (limes in particular), and<br />
ground provisions. Further attempts at diversifying farming by growing cotton , kola<br />
nut, and nutmeg on a commercial scale, yielded very indifferent results, but fruit,<br />
J<br />
41
t~bacco and ginger survived on some small farms. 41<br />
Several factors favoured the few crops which flourished: they were all Oriented<br />
to the export market; they were grown on lands which had formerly been used<br />
for sugar-cane and therefore had improved irrigation and drainage; labour had easy<br />
access to the fields, and the level of capital investment was low· On the other hand,<br />
production was hampered by poor selection of sites and soils (for example, the heavy,<br />
; wet conditions on the coast were unsuitable for the cultivation of cacao and coffee),<br />
poor transportation to the market from outlying and riverain areas, and the proliferation<br />
of plant diseases due to ignorance of new crops or lack of research or resources<br />
to deal with them. 4 1 At another level, some commodities such as cotton, coffee and<br />
rubber were produced at too high a cost, and in too low quantities, to compete<br />
against producers such as Brazil and the U.S .A., on the international market. Further,<br />
once the local sugar industry recovered from the recession , it was able to restrict<br />
the transfer of redundant labour and land to new crops, and tried to regain ground<br />
Jost to other crops.<br />
The predicament of livestock-rearing demonstrates the difficulty of diversification<br />
in the shadow of the sugar estates. Most of the animals were reared as<br />
·appendages to some other form of farming, such as paddy cultivation, where they<br />
could be grazed after the harvest but, while the paddy grew, the animals had to be<br />
kept away, frequently in water-logged fields 'aback', severely affecting their health<br />
and worth. Livestock made a breakthrough both for territorial and commercial diversification<br />
in the Rupununi savannahs. But here again, inefficient husbandry, inferior<br />
pasturage and the long distance from coastal markets impeded the growth of this<br />
enterprise. 43<br />
. A~other endur~n~ fiel~ of diversification was in forestry, where logging was<br />
the most important activity. ~ imber was established as an export industry as early as<br />
the 18?0s when the construction of canals, piers, ports and docks in the industrialised<br />
co~!ne: of the world created a demand and outlet for greenheart 44 The local<br />
building industry also provided good markets and by the 1880 th .<br />
two steam -powered saw mills operating to meet those needs . s, ere were already<br />
Salata production enjoyed a brief flor<br />
London in 1859 and its gutta h 1· . escence after samples were sent to<br />
20 000 lb perc a qua tbes were reve l d Th<br />
, ,! , • s .. were being exported. but the fled I' . a e · ree years later,<br />
ep 110. ic .Jf mismanagemenf4S c~us db dg ing industry was plagued with an<br />
e Y cru e bleedin 9 an d careless preparation<br />
42
of the product. Rubber fared no better, despite a brief boom; the indigenous species<br />
were found to have a low commercial value. Although an attempt was made to<br />
switch to the more prolific Hevea Brasi/iensis grown successfully in the Amazon<br />
region, 46 local output could not maintain a profitable foothold on the foreign market<br />
which was flooded with cheaper Brazilian rubber. Other for est products, such as<br />
gums and nuts, 47 were collected in small quantities but never became established as<br />
major exports.<br />
The earliest attempts at industrialisation were in manufacturing and milling;<br />
the latter was an adjunct of agriculture, namely in sugar cane, copra and rice milling,<br />
and of forestry in sawmilling, and reflected a small degree of technological advancement.<br />
Commercial manufacturing achieved some measure of import substitution<br />
and, by 1<strong>93</strong>0, there were already aerated water bottling plants, biscuit and bread<br />
bakeries, boot factories - one on the East Bank and one on the West Bank, Demerara<br />
- a soap factory, a castor-oil factory, a tannery, distilleries, a woodworking factory, ·<br />
chemical works and plants for the production of candles, cigars, citrate of lime, ice ·<br />
and macaroni. 49 The bulk of manufactures was consumed locally, but a few items,<br />
such as coconut oil, citrate of lime and hides were exported. ,-<br />
Mining was an almost entirely new field. The brightest spot belonged to<br />
gold, the discovery of which was first announced in 1863 in the Cuyuni. Commercial<br />
mining was sporadic but a real gold rush began in the 1890s, the decade 18<strong>93</strong>-<br />
1903 being Guiana's 'golden age' of mining. 50 The major portion of prcxluction<br />
came from placers worked by individuals or small groups of tributers. Capitalists<br />
formed several companies and introduced quartz mining (1890), hydraulicing (1902)<br />
and dredging (1906) techniques. In 1890, the discovery of diamonds was also reported<br />
and extraction took place alongside gold mining; it is therefore possible to<br />
speak of gold and diamond mining as a single industry.<br />
The economic importance of these precious minerals was enhanced during<br />
the 'Great Depression' as local banks were able to use gold as a stable medium of<br />
exchange for commcx:lities from Great Britain. 51 Gold also became the basis of the<br />
wealth of some members of the middle class and a significant area of employment of<br />
African labour. -.. As with other 1 bush' activities of this petiod,-however, g9!dmini_!}g<br />
was a poorly-mana ed busin es ite the bi profits -of the boom ears. l he cost<br />
of · ue to o erate m anical e uipment rose; the danger and difficulty· of penetratin<br />
furt er into bush attenuated the rai transport and logistical resources; abour<br />
remained seasonal and itinerant, and capit investment was low and speculative,<br />
----<br />
43
The mining of bauxite start!::_d after the registration and establisbroeot althe<br />
Oemerara Bauxite Campany ( J 9 J 6), a s11bsidiarv of the Canadian Northern Aluminum<br />
Company. The mineral was discovered at Akyma (1896) and output rose ~ery<br />
slowly because of the backward technology. At fir~t, work was done witb'+)icks,<br />
shovels, wheelbarrows an - rts. 53 Exports reached 4,199 tons by 12) 8<br />
and b -21 · n rose to n . In the post-war depression of the<br />
,l<br />
late 1 :c---Os<br />
'<br />
over two-thirds of the workers were laid-off and output stagnated until its<br />
.<br />
recovery during the Second World War. The industry, nevertheless, became wellestablished<br />
during this period.<br />
1<br />
<strong>Historical</strong>ly, the diversification of the economy of British Guiana started in<br />
the 1850s. The process moved very slowly because of the strength of the sugarexport<br />
economy, the power · of the planter class to prevent factors of production<br />
from.being moved out of the sugar sector, the absence of an entrepreneurial class to<br />
promote new enterprises and the lack of knowledge .or means to exploit previously<br />
underutilised resources .<br />
. ' . I<br />
·· ·By the mid 1880s - 1890s, all this had changed. Sugar exports had been<br />
reduced and prices had fallen in the crisis of 1884; the constitutional grip of the<br />
planter class had been loosened by the reforms of 1891, and redundant land and<br />
labour could more easily be deployed to other fields; an articulate middle class had<br />
emerged, and inventions and innovations from industrialised countries and the discoveries<br />
of : deposits of natural resources in Guiana made commercial exploitation<br />
possible.<br />
The diversification process had three principal effects on the economy of<br />
B~itish Guiana. These were~ 'the creation of an indigenous business elite and the<br />
reinforcement of the trend towards an ethnic division of labour~'1,{e consolidation of<br />
c;1 landed peasantry and the _oper:iin~ up of the hinterland~\nd the formation of a<br />
large, free domestic market. · ·<br />
Many Portuguese and Chinese went into the capitalist. strata of business, in<br />
44
insurance, commerce, manufacturing and in the formation of limited liability companies<br />
for mining and the extraction of forest products. Many Africans became prof essionals<br />
or entered the service trades. They joined the small but growing public<br />
service in jobs such as clerks and policemen or became artisans in urban services and<br />
trades; with the Amerindians, they also provided the main labour force for mining<br />
and the forest industries. Many East Indians became entrenched in rice and coconut<br />
cultivation and cattle-rearing on the coastland. -<br />
The extensive hinterland was penetrated, though not effectively settled except<br />
in a few spots, by gold-miners, loggers, and balata-bleeders. Tenuous communications<br />
were established with the Rupununi; coastal steamers crossed the estuaries<br />
of the great rivers, and aeroplane flights were started.<br />
The value of non-sugar goods exported from the Colony soared. The domestic<br />
market was enlarged by the increased production, and distributive trades carried<br />
goods to all parts of the Colony.<br />
The extent of this economic diversification could thus be measured by the<br />
vast area under cultivation and the variety, value and volu,me of goods which <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
became capable of producing and exporting. The evidence shows that between<br />
1903 and 1923, acreage under rice, coconut, cacao and coffee increased, while that<br />
under sugar declined. Although initially the exports of agricultural commodities gradually<br />
increased, towards 1<strong>93</strong>0 (except for timber, rice and provisions), they all were in<br />
a state of decline . The same is true for gold, though not for diamonds. 54 In the last<br />
analysis, diversification was manifested in the changing patterns of land use, occupational<br />
differentiation and resource allocation in the colony. By 1<strong>93</strong>0, however, in<br />
the face of yet another world-wide depression, this time precipitated in part by the<br />
stock market crash in the U.S.A ., the diversification process had reached a plateau.<br />
The diversifi~ation of the economy was the result of several factors which<br />
had been held in check by the near-absolute powers ·wielded by the plantocracy in<br />
the monocultural economy under the system of slavery. The monopoly control over<br />
labour was ~haken by the depression of the 1880s which forced the retrenchmen t ·of<br />
resources . The monop o ly pr'oduction for export was broken by the collapse of sugar<br />
prices when · the planters were obliged to encourage domestic production for consumption.<br />
The monopoly of political power in the legislatu~e was broken ~y the<br />
Constitutional Reform of 1891. The monopoly of Crown _lands was relaxed . . Out<br />
of all this· arose a new elite which sharpened the struggle between the closed planta-<br />
45
· rt-economy of sugar and the open diversified economy.<br />
tion expo<br />
During the first phase of this study, from 1~80 !~ 1903, when the sugar<br />
sector declined, the production of gold soared and the d1v~~s1f1ed sector of t_h econorny<br />
became fairly well-established. External market conditions for sugar improved in<br />
1903 after the Brussels Convention, 56 but fell during the years of World War I and<br />
finally started to rise again in the early 1920s, 57 probably in response to the restoration<br />
of imperial protective tariffs. 58 During the second phase (1904-1<strong>93</strong>0), with few<br />
exceptions, many of the industries which had been established or reintroduced went<br />
into decline or stagnated. The relative languor of the diversified sector could be<br />
compared with the renewed vigour of the sugar sector. 59 It would therefore be useful<br />
to draw some conclusions on the major factors which limited the extent of the diversification<br />
of the economy of the Colony.<br />
Some of the new industries and agricultural enterprises had been established<br />
in the hinterland or in riverain areas which were relatively difficult to reach. The<br />
construction of adequate infrastructure, particularly of transport and communications,<br />
was too costly to bear either by Government or the private companies which<br />
were formed. As a result, access and delivery of produce became expensive and<br />
unreliable. The further into the bush or upriver activities moved, the worse the<br />
problems of logistics became. Inevitably, many of these industries were plagued by<br />
an epidemic of mismanagement. Workers were often required to function on their<br />
own with meagre resources and without supervision; techniques of husbandry were<br />
careless, if not reckless; the level of technology was low and professional knowledge<br />
was scant. 60<br />
Despite the early establishment of investment, finance institutions such as<br />
banks and insurance companies, and the profits from the gold industry, credit to new<br />
enterprises seemed to be of a limited and short-term nature. It was therefore unable<br />
to ~ustain the large-scale, long-term development of estate crops or new enterprises<br />
which took lo~ger to show returns on investment. · In fact, in an era when the sugar<br />
sector was bemg treate~ as an organized business activity, the diversified sector was<br />
regarded as a speculative venture with 'mushroom' companies be" f d d<br />
n -· · t b kr 1ng orme an<br />
co. ~psmg m O . an uptcy thereafter. Due to the instability of the · war ears the<br />
efficiency and size of larger low-cost international commocJ.·ty od y d ' l<br />
because of the smatl-scale hi h cost d . 1 pr ucers, an part y<br />
produced by 'hit-and-miss' 'me(hod an unreliable suppli~s of Guyanese goods<br />
s, export markets could not be maintained.<br />
46
Most of aIJ the opposition of-the planter class to the development of the<br />
h·nterland and the 'emergence of rival industries never relented. As during th~ sec 1 -<br />
1<br />
ond half of the nineteenth century, this economic strugg<br />
l<br />
e_ was wa<br />
ged vicanous<br />
. . tuthrough<br />
the legislature. The result was that, in 1928, a relatively b~ckw~rd .consti ,<br />
Y<br />
tion was imposed on the Colony designed, in part.to safeguard the .special interests<br />
of the sugar sector of the economy. 61 At this juncture, the political position of the<br />
professional elite was weakened and the process of the diversification of the economy<br />
slowed noticeably.<br />
The local entrepreneurial elite itself was perhaps unwilling to look beyond<br />
quick commissions and short-term investments, or unable to bear the burden of<br />
major economic development. It did not have access to capital, technology, shipping<br />
and overseas markets as the new transnational corporations had in the sugar<br />
industry. The diversified sector seemed doomed to stultification after its 'beginner's<br />
luck' ran out, and its initial investments were exhausted. By 1<strong>93</strong>0, it was still speculative<br />
in its outlook, primitive in its technology, and exploitative in its relations with<br />
workers, just as sugar had been a hundred years earlier.<br />
It could be said, therefore, that the diversification of the economy of British<br />
Guiana up to 1<strong>93</strong>0 was only a limited success. By the end of this period, no single<br />
industry had been able to supersede sugar in terms of extent of land under cultivation,<br />
value of commodity exported, or size of labour force employed. The material<br />
base of commodity prcxluction in the Colony nevertheless had been significantly<br />
expanded, the domestic consumer market had been enlarged and the variety of<br />
goods extended far beyond what prevailed fifty years earlier in 1880. Although<br />
there had been sporadic fluctuations, and a general pattern of decline had already<br />
become evident in the late 1920s, there was no complete collapse, abandonment or<br />
reversal of the diversification process as a whole. It was clear that change had been<br />
substantial and widespread over a reasonably long period of time, . and the lives of a<br />
significant part of the population of all races ·had been affected, if not impr(?v~d.<br />
By 1<strong>93</strong>0, the drive towards diversification had slowed; there was disillusionment<br />
caused by economic distress which, later that decade, degenerated into violent<br />
industrial disturbances and political dissatisfaction. Diversification had failed to dethrone<br />
'King Sugar' in the economy. Its enduring legacy, however, was to demonstrate<br />
to posterity, the enormous but still unexploited physical potential of the Colony<br />
and the wide scope of human endeavour arid enterprise to create a broad-based, selfreliant<br />
economy.<br />
47
l.<br />
2.<br />
3.<br />
4.<br />
5.<br />
6.<br />
7.<br />
16.<br />
NOTES<br />
Gu . , p to 26 May 1966 when it became independent<br />
·s T h ,ana u ' ·<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> was known as n ,s. . S stem l 834 -1838 : A Leap in the Dark." History Gazette<br />
2<br />
M.N. Menezes! 'The App~entic;s7ip /vary, one being as high as 90 ,000 . But mak)ng provisions fo/~~:88 ),<br />
8. The figures f~r emancipate s_ a~:ce table. See also, Dwarka Nath , A History of Indians in Gu ildren<br />
anddeat~s .. ~h~ figu~~ of 80 ,00Jo~ - Th~ Author, 1970), pp . 219-220 . The figure 341,599 is un\ikeli~ttQ.<br />
Second Revised ~itton . (L~n d f rsons whose entry was recorded by the Immigration Departrn be<br />
accurate since this was calcu ated ;om ~ . An Economic History of Britain since 1"750.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 57 .<br />
20. James Rose, 'The Taxation Policy of Sir Henry light, 1838-1848', History Gazette, 38, (1991), pp. 2-3 .<br />
21. Hazel M. Woolford, 'The Introduction of the Compulsory Denominational f.ducatlon Bill, 1876', History<br />
Gazette, 9, (1989).<br />
22. There was serious friction between the Africans on the one hand, and the Portuguese, the Chinese and the<br />
East Indians, as separate groups, on the other. During this time also, East Indian (1918), Chinese (1920) and<br />
African (1922) ethnic Associations were established and political proto-parties were created. The Royal Agricultural<br />
and Commercial Society, a planters' association, was formed .(1844) and the Chamber of Commerce<br />
was incorporated (1898). The British Guiana Labour Union was the first trade union to be registered (1922).<br />
23 . Richard A Lobdell, 'Patterns of Investment and Sources of Credit in the British West Indian Sugar Industry,<br />
1838-97'. Joumal of Caribbean History , 4, (1972), 34. These included ploughs, boilers, steam engines,<br />
hydraulic lifts and mechanical cane and megass carriers. See also Mandie, pp. 61-62 .<br />
24 . These will be discussed later in this paper .<br />
25 . W. Beachey, The British West Indies Sugar Industry in the Late 19th Century . Reprint. (Westport:<br />
Greenwood Press Publishers, 1978), p . 50 .<br />
26 . Ward, p. 18.<br />
27. M. Shahabudden . From Plantocracy to Nationalisation: A Profile of Sugar in <strong>Guyana</strong> .<br />
(Georgetown: University of <strong>Guyana</strong>, 1983), p. 232 . See also Adamson, pp. 258-259.<br />
28 . Moehr, 'The Discovery of Gold ... · 61.<br />
29 . Great Britain, Report of the West India Commission (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1897).<br />
Although this Commission recommended that the sugar industry should be saved from collapse, it also advocated<br />
the development of the hinterland, and the diversification of the economy, by opening communications<br />
and introducing new crops.<br />
30. Francis Drakes, 'The Middle Class in the Political Economy of British Guiana, 1870-1928 '. History Gazette,<br />
11, (1989), pp . 4-5 . See also Moohr, ''The Discovery of Gold ... " p. 65. The reason for this confrontation<br />
was that the planters had invested in sugar and the professionals had invested in gold and other 'new'<br />
products.<br />
31. Moohr, 'The Economic Impact of Slave Emancipation .. ', 592 . As a result, Government had to build jails and<br />
asylums and employ an entirely new and wide range of official personnel to carry out these functions.<br />
32. Ibid ., 5<strong>93</strong>.<br />
33. A.R.F. Webber, Centenary History and Handbook of British Guiana (Georgetown: The Argosy<br />
Company Limited, 1<strong>93</strong>1), p. 224 et seq.<br />
34. British Guiana Handbook, 1922, p. 17. . . .<br />
35. Moehr, "The Discovery of Gold ... ," 66. It was realised then, as later, that efficient communications are an<br />
essential prerequisite to any form of economic development in the hinterland of Guiana. The Balata Company<br />
bought a seaplane in 1925 to reduce travelling time to its hinterland locations. See H.S. Burrowes. Fifty<br />
Years of Flying in" British Guiana. (Georgetown : <strong>Guyana</strong> Graphic, 1963), p. 5.<br />
36. Rodney, pp. 94-95 . }<br />
37. Moohr, 'The Economic Impact of Slave Emancipatioh ... · 597 . .<br />
38. J. Van Sertima, Th_e British Guia,na Bank: Brief Hi tory.' Timehri, 3, ·Inird Series (1913), 9. See also,<br />
Lobdell, p. 37.<br />
39. Webber, p . 270.<br />
40. Adamson, p . 260 .<br />
41. Edgar Beckett, 'The Minor Industries,' Timehri, 2, Th'rd Series (1912), 73 et seq . .<br />
42 . Ibid ., pp . 73-78 . Most of the commercial crops were ,seriously affected~ disease . ~oco~uts s~ffer~d from<br />
'bud rot' cocoa and coffee were infected by the dang~rous fungus called witch broom which still existed on<br />
old estat~s, and plantatio~s were affected by 'moko' disease, for example. • . .<br />
43. Harry Everard Turner , The Rupununi Development Company, Limi~ed: ThefEarldly f!•;io~.<br />
(Georgetown: Autoprint, 1972), p. 9. Contrary to the ~)aims by Moohr,. The Discovery o Go ... , , t e<br />
savannahs do not make ideal grazing lands.<br />
44 . Rodney, p. 92. There was also a local need for fuel (charcoal and logs) and for other products such as staves<br />
and shingles for roofing .<br />
49
45.<br />
46 .<br />
47 .<br />
48 .<br />
49.<br />
50.<br />
51.<br />
52.<br />
53 .<br />
54 .<br />
55 .<br />
56.<br />
57.<br />
58.<br />
59.<br />
60.<br />
61.<br />
George C. Benson, 'The Balata Industry .' Timehri , 2, Third Series (1912), 81<br />
F.A. Stockdale, 'The Indigenous Rubber Trees of British Guiana,' Timehri, 1, New Series (1 912<br />
British Guiana Handboo~ 1922, p . 99 . }, 21<br />
Ibid ., p. 154. See also Khayum, p . 6.<br />
Many of these items found their way overseas .<br />
James Rodway, History of British Guiana From t~e 1:"ear 1668 . <strong>Vol</strong>ume III. (Georgetown, 18<br />
9<br />
217-227 passim . Vide Table 4 which shows the dechne m the second phase .<br />
1·94),<br />
Rodney, p. 98 .<br />
Alan Lancaster, · An Unconquered Wilderness : A <strong>Historical</strong> Analysis 1919' (M.A. Thesis, University of Guy<br />
1977). See also Rodway, 218. ana,<br />
Ralph Prince, 'Demba Completes 50 Years in <strong>Guyana</strong> ·. The Chronicle Christmas Annual, 19 66<br />
77. . ' p,<br />
Vide Tables 3 and 4 which ill1:15trate inter ~l_ia the signifi~a~t improve~ent in_ the export potential of the<br />
colony of its agricultural and mineral commod1ttes. T~bl~ 1 md1cates th~ change m l~nd use and Table 2, the<br />
livestock population . The variety of exportable goods 1s hsted at Appendix 1. It provides evidence of the Wid<br />
scale of commodities which were actually produced, although, admittedly , some of their quantities were palt e<br />
and their prominence was transitory .<br />
ry<br />
Moohr, 63-65.<br />
Beachey , p . 165. This was an agreement among European producers to suppress bounties for beet sugar on<br />
the one hand and to eschew preferential tariffs for cane sugar on the other .<br />
Ward. p 47. See also Table on p . 9 .<br />
Ibid ., p . 47 .<br />
Lobdell, 53, and Thomas, p. 24 . During this period, the sugar sector in <strong>Guyana</strong> was taken over by large TNCs<br />
which applied enormous capital , modern technology and efficient techniques to transform the plantations into<br />
businesslike enterprises.<br />
Turner. p. 9, and Benson , p . 81.<br />
Harold A. Lutchman , Some Aspects of the Crown Colony System of Government with Special<br />
Reference to <strong>Guyana</strong> . Mimeo (Georgetown : Critchlow Labour College , 1970), p. 23 .<br />
•' .,<br />
APPENDIX 1<br />
TABLE 1: ACREAGES UNDER CULT<strong>IV</strong>ATION: 1903, 1913, 1923<br />
I<br />
SUGAR coco- PRO-<br />
YEAR CANE RICE NUTS CACAO COITTE RUBBER LIMES V\SlONS<br />
1903 78,860 17,500 3,950 1,530 15,748<br />
1913 72,685 33,889 14,177 1,863 3,166 4,018 941 17,580<br />
1923 57,814 34,965 22 ,970 1,903 4,096 2,080 800 11,924<br />
TABLE 2: L<strong>IV</strong>ESTOCK ON COASTI.AND: 1914, 1918, 1923<br />
YEAR HORSES MWLES OONKEYS CAITLE BUFFALOES GOATS SHEEP SWINE<br />
1914 1,010 "2,000 6,000 79,500 100 14,800 19,700 11,600<br />
1918 1,002 2,359 5,332 77,108 176 11,136 20 ,611 12,532<br />
1923 800 1,790 5,440 56,670 264 7,940 15,130 11,134<br />
,<br />
50
TABLE 3· . EXPORTS OF AGRJCULnJRAL COMMODIDES: 1900-1<strong>93</strong>0 (BY VALUE-G$)<br />
PROcoco-<br />
YEAR TIMBER RJCE NUTS CACAO COFFEE SALATA CITRUS VISIONS<br />
1900-01 87,374 N.A . 1,340 2,444 - 94,007 N.A . 809<br />
1915 53,383 642,678 31 ,280 8,508 18,238 766 ,089 N.A. N .A.<br />
1<strong>93</strong>0 139,647 1,090,385 1,845 N.A. 22,400 390,292 10,885 16,872<br />
TABLE 4: EXPORTS OF MINERALS: 1903-1<strong>93</strong>0<br />
(BY VALUE-G$)<br />
MINERAL 1902-1903 1906-1907 1910-1911 1914 1918 1922 1926 1<strong>93</strong>0<br />
GOLD 1,789,587 1,532 ,266 946,7777 1,114,007 391 ,467 179,070 98,263 89 ,581<br />
DIA - 97,710 32 ,627 29 ,573 87 ,196 164,230 3,859,357 3,300 ,952 1,431 ,364<br />
MONDS<br />
Sources : British Guiana, Annual Reports of the Heads of Departments<br />
Reports 1894 to 1<strong>93</strong>0.<br />
1880 to 1896 Administrative<br />
Appendix 2<br />
GENERAL UST of PRINCIPAL EXPORTS of DOMESTIC PRODUCE c.1917<br />
Class I - Food, Drink and Tobacco.<br />
( 1) Cattle, horned<br />
(2) . Coffee, raw<br />
(3) Coconuts<br />
(4) Lime Juice<br />
(5) Indian Corn or Maize<br />
(6) Rice<br />
(7) Farinaceous Preparations<br />
(8) Salt, fine<br />
(9) Nutmegs<br />
( 10) Bitters<br />
(11) Rum<br />
(12) Sugar, unrefined<br />
(13) Molasses<br />
(14) Vegetables (fresh)<br />
(6) Copra<br />
(7) Oils - Coconut<br />
(8) Lumber<br />
(9) Timber<br />
{10) Firewood<br />
Class Ill - Articles wholly or mainly Manufactured<br />
(1) Molascuit<br />
{2) Charcoal<br />
(3) Citrate of Lime<br />
(4) Glue<br />
{5) Oils - Essential (of Llmes)<br />
(6) Starch<br />
(7) Railway Sleepers<br />
(8) Shingles<br />
Class II - Raw Materials and Articles<br />
mainly Unmanufactured<br />
(1) Diamonds<br />
(2) Salata<br />
(3) Rubber<br />
(4) Hides<br />
(5) Bauxite<br />
Class <strong>IV</strong> - Miscellaneous and Unclassified<br />
(1) Asse.s<br />
(2) Horses<br />
(3) Mules<br />
Class V - Bullion and Specie<br />
(I) 'Raw Gold ·
BID FOR EL DORADO:<br />
THE GUYANA-VENEZUELA BORDER PROBLEM<br />
by<br />
Henry Jeffrey<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong>, whose rich feet are mines of gold. Whose forehead<br />
knocked against the roof of stars. Stands on her tip-toes ·at fair<br />
England looking. Kissing her hands, lowering her mighty breast.<br />
And every sign of submission making to be her sister and her<br />
. daughter .both. Of our most sacred maid.<br />
George Chapman · (Adamson &. Folland, 1969: 232)<br />
Sir Walter Raleigh so believed in the legend of El Dorado, ruled by the Emperor<br />
El Dorado, that he spent his entire fortune fitting out expeditions bound for its<br />
imperial city, Manca. The Spanish conqu~st of the Aztecs and Incas and the treasure<br />
which flowed into the Spanish treasury dazzled the minds of European monarchs.<br />
Raleigh observed that the Spanish wealth consisted mainly of silver; therefore,<br />
he speculated, America's gold existed elsewhere.<br />
The Empire of Guiana is directly east from Peru. It hath more<br />
abundance of gold than any part of Peru, and as many or more great<br />
cities than Peru had; it is governed by the same laws, and the people<br />
obey the same religion and the same form of policies in Government<br />
as was used in Peru not differing in any part. (Ibid: 236)<br />
This Raleigh knew even before he left England. He had come into contact<br />
with persons who told stories of tons of gold, and a few of his contacts had even<br />
visited the "imperial city"! Whatever the genesis of this story, the .truth,9f the matter<br />
is that El Dorado did not exist and Raleigh, Berrio, and others suffered in vain.<br />
(Naipaul, 1973: 25-109) Nonetheless, that area in which the imaginary city of gold<br />
became best associated continues to give rise to controversy. At the end of the last<br />
century, war between Great Britain on.the one hand and the United States of America<br />
and Venezuela on the other was narrowly averted and today that controversy<br />
52
still exists.<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong>, the only British colony on the mainland of South America, won its<br />
. d pendence from Great Britain on 26 May 1966. It has a population of about<br />
~S:, 4 00 (1990 Estima~e} and it~ total land area is 214,97_0 sq. km. The country is<br />
d. ·ded into three counties: Berb1ce, Demerara and Essequibo. Venezuela claims the<br />
e:re proportion of <strong>Guyana</strong> west of the Essequibo river: some 70 per cent of the<br />
country.<br />
Venezuela was a Spanish colony on the mainland of South America which<br />
on 5 July 1811 proclaimed its independence from the Spanish Crown. It has a<br />
population of about 17 million and a total land mass of some 912,050 sq. km. On<br />
the south it is bordered by Brazil, on the west by Colombia, on the north by the<br />
Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, and on the east by <strong>Guyana</strong>. The country can<br />
be divided into six natural regions: ·tlite Lake Maracaibo Basin, the Venezuelan Andes<br />
and Coast Ranges, the Llanos, the <strong>Guyana</strong> Shield or Southern Highlands, the Orinoco<br />
Delta and the Coastal Island.<br />
The Colonial Claim<br />
The <strong>Guyana</strong> Shield of Venezuela and the Essequibo region of <strong>Guyana</strong> constituted<br />
the main hunting ground of those who sought El Dorado and it is this region<br />
which is still in dispute. This paper seeks to place the modern controversy between<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> and Venezuela in its broader context. ·<br />
It is said that Alonso de Ojeda first sailed into Guiana up the Essequibo in<br />
1499. In December 1596 the first European settlement was founded by Antonio de<br />
Berrio at San Thome de la Guayana on the Southern Bank of the Orinoco. (BPP,<br />
1896: 1290} Somewhere between 1616 and 1617, Sir Walter Raleigh destroyed<br />
the Guayana settlement which was later rebuilt. A Charter from the Government of<br />
the Netherlands to the Dutch West India Company in 1621 (reaffirmed in 1637)<br />
gave the limits of the Dutch West India Company as the Orinoco. (Ibid.) According<br />
~o eyeWitnesses, in 1637 the Dutch were in the Amacura, Essequibo and Berbice.<br />
t rom a secret report to the King of Spain, it would appear that by the mid seven<br />
;enth century Dutch settlements extended to the neighbourhood of the Barima and<br />
macuro rivers. (Ibid.)<br />
The Treaty of Munster (1648) put an end to the war between Spain and he<br />
53
Netherlands and allowed for the Dutch and the Spaniards to possess what th<br />
and to own:<br />
ey hac1<br />
such Lordships, citie~, castles, fort~esses, ~ommerce and countries in<br />
the East and West Indies, and also tn BraZII and on the coasts of Asia<br />
Africa and America respectively, as the said Lords, the King and th~<br />
States' respectively, hold and possess, comprehending therein particularly<br />
places and forts which the Portuguese have taken from the<br />
Lords, the States since the year 1641; as also the forts and the places<br />
which the said Lords, the States, shall chance to acquire and possess<br />
after this, without infraction of the present treaty. (US Com., 1:75)<br />
In 1664, Father Flaurie, who visited ~uiana to set up a Jesuit mission, reported<br />
the province abandoned by the Spanish. In 1669, the Dutch West Ind·<br />
Company granted to Count Fedrick Casimir, 30 Dutch miles on the coast of Gui~ ia<br />
100 Dutch miles inland and as many more as might be required and occupied at 0 ;'<br />
time or another from their territory of Guiana situated between the River Orinoc~<br />
and the River Amazon. This grant was made openly and was published in the same<br />
year without protest from the Spaniards. In the 1730s Marquis d_e TomiJ:luera claimed<br />
that the Dutch were occupying lands from the Orinoco to Surinam, from '318 1/2<br />
degrees to 324 degrees longitude. (Ibid.)<br />
In 1781, the Dutch colonies were captured by the English and in the following<br />
year the French took them from the English. J3y· the Treaty of Versailles, 1783,<br />
the col_o_nies were returned to the Dutch. In April 1796, during the Napoleonic wars,<br />
the Bntish captured the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice. Under the<br />
terms of the Peace of Amiens, March, 1802, Great Britain returned to the Dutch the<br />
captured G uiana · co I onies. · A year later · the · Treaty of Ami ens was a piece of paper.<br />
In September 1803 the B n ·t· 1s h once again · took the colonies never again to return<br />
t h em<br />
.<br />
They we<br />
r~ c??<br />
f<br />
irme<br />
d<br />
in<br />
.<br />
their<br />
.<br />
possession by<br />
·<br />
the Treaty<br />
'<br />
of London, August<br />
1814<br />
In 1827, an official rep rt C .<br />
jamin D'Urban gave th b d O . on rown lands by Lieutenant Governor, S1r Bensea-coast<br />
from the rno~th 0 ~~ar~: of the colonies as follows:· "Out to the North the<br />
Orinoco. On the west ? e i~er Abary to Cape Barima near the mouth of the<br />
a 1 me running rth d · · ·· th<br />
interior". (Ibid.) In l <strong>93</strong>S th . . no an south from Cape Barirna mto e<br />
8<br />
grap~ical Society to explo;e it: c~i:~h Gover.nment gave a grant to the Royal Geo·<br />
Y of Guiana. The Society selected one Robert<br />
..<br />
54
urgk to do its work and in 1839 he called attention to the need for an early<br />
5cho~ation of the boundary between Guiana and Venezuela. In 1840 the Governdernr<br />
employed Schomburgk to revisit Guiana to map out the boundary and the<br />
~::ezuelans immediately objected to the line he began to draw. (Times, 14.1.1896)<br />
The evidence presented so far enunciates the British case, according to which<br />
B ·rsh possessions comprised of the territories bounded by the Orinoco, the Rio<br />
N:;ro, the Amazon, t~e waters joining the Amazon and the Rio Negro and the<br />
Atlantic Ocean. According to the Venezuelans, the proper boundary between Guiana<br />
and Venezuela was the Essequibo River.<br />
In 1844, the Venezuelans published their first formal statement on the question.<br />
According to this, Spain first discovered the New World and this discovery was<br />
recognised by the Papal Bull of Pope Alexander Vl. However, this was definitely an<br />
argument of convenience. In their Manifesto to the World published in 1811, the<br />
year of independence, the Venezuelan Government declared:<br />
Those who conquer and obtain possession of a country by means of<br />
their labour, industrious cultivation, and intercourse with the natives<br />
thereof, are they who have preferable rights to preference ... and<br />
transmit it to their posterity born therein (Manifesto, 1811)<br />
The remainder of their presentation was intended to show that from a very<br />
early date, the Spanish had explored and occupied the Orinoco and the territories<br />
about the Barima, Maruco and Pomeroon rivers; that at the time of the Treaty of<br />
Munster the Dutch had no possession in <strong>Guyana</strong>; and that Spanish domination<br />
extended as far as Essequibo and any possessions of the Dutch West India Company<br />
on that river were usurped and not recognised by the Spanish Government. They<br />
quoted some geographers who claimed that the Essequibo was the boundary of<br />
Venezuela and British Guiana.<br />
Like the British, the Venezuelans were able to make out a plausible case for<br />
their territorial claim. Dr. Raphael Segio, a Venezuelan jurist, cited General P. Melscher<br />
(a Dutchman) who in his "History of the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and<br />
Berbice", published in 1785, stated that the Netherlands did not extend to the<br />
Amacuro, not even to the Barima. (Ibid.) Both sides to this quarrel had taken time<br />
: 0 .collect large a~ounts of evidence in support of their claim. It is not the purpose of<br />
his paper to decide where the line should have been drawn. That was done by the<br />
55
Arbitration Tribunal in 1899 which took into consideration "long continued occupation<br />
and possession as far as could be established on either side". (Documents<br />
1981) '<br />
Great Britain had two claims, one within the boundary drawn by Schomburgk<br />
line and another "extreme claim" going right to the Orinoco. Her Majesty's Government<br />
stated that it was willing to take that proportion of its claim outside the<br />
Schomburgk line to arbitration , but was not prepared to discuss territories within the<br />
line which it regarded as undisputedly its own. Venezuela did not agree to this<br />
limitation and Britain's refusal to yield this area to arbitration brought the United<br />
States of America into the dispute .<br />
THE MONROE DOCTRINE<br />
In 1823 President Monroe of the United States stated:<br />
The occasion had been judged proper for asserting a principle in<br />
which the right and interest of the United States are involved, that the<br />
American continents by the free and independent condition which<br />
they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered<br />
subjects for future colonialisation by any· European power ... We<br />
owe it therefore, to candour and to the amicable relations existing<br />
between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should<br />
consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any<br />
proportion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety<br />
.·.. it is important therefore , that we should not behold such interposition<br />
in any form with indifference . {Heffner, 1965 :89)<br />
This is what became known as the Monroe doctrine, the essence of which was to<br />
debar European states from extending their colonial possessions in the Americas.<br />
In October 1894, Venezuelan forces crossed the border into British Guiana<br />
and established a post; the British colonial police and magistrate left without putting<br />
up any resistance. (Times, ,1894) In December 1895 the President of Venezuela<br />
:tated in an address to Congress that "The doctrine {M~nroe) upon which we stand<br />
is strong ··· ~n~ cannot become obsolete while the republic endures". He pointed<br />
out that the ms1stence of Great Britain on extending its border was "dangerous to<br />
our peace and safety". Britain had argued that the Monroe doctrine "has no prin·<br />
r<br />
56
ciple of internati.onal law, and ~o nation, however powerful, has the right to insert a<br />
code of international law that 1s not recognised by any other country". The President<br />
of Venezuela stated that his country claimed the doctrine as its right. Insofar as<br />
he was concerned, Great Britain was bent upon increasing her territory in the hemisphere;<br />
it was therefore incum~nt up~n the United States of America to determine<br />
the correct border between Bntish Guiana and Venezuela after which,it must resist<br />
by every means at its disposal every new and wilful "aggression upon its rights and<br />
interest". (Times , 14.1.1896)<br />
The entire business was coming to a head . In 1895, President Cleveland of<br />
the USA asked Congress for appropriation to set up a Boundary Commission. The<br />
duty of the Commission would not be to denote "the utmost limits claimed by Great<br />
Britain as a matter of right, but a line ... in consideration of convenience and expediency".<br />
(rimes , 14.1.1896) In 1897, with the USA at its side, and sensing that<br />
Britain was under pressure to arbitrate, Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with<br />
Britain, began to give out concessions on land claimed by the British, and struck<br />
across the border into British Guiana in an attempt to occupy as much of the area as<br />
possible. (Schoenrich: 1949)<br />
Before the US Boundary Commission could finish its work, Great Britain<br />
agreed to take the entire issue to arbitration. A Treaty of Arbitration was signed in<br />
Washington on 2 February 1897 and the US Boundary Commission was dissolved<br />
on 27 February. In Venezuela the incident passed without much comment, for no<br />
one wished to be reminded of the "dangerous controversy which could have led to<br />
war." (Times, 4.2., 1897) But was the Monroe doctrine at stake?<br />
Both parties accumulated large amounts of evidence supporting their claims<br />
and counter-claims as to prescriptive rights, long-continued occupation and possession<br />
by their predecessors, etc. It was never a question of conquering new lands and<br />
the Monroe doctrine was not intended to apply to things in existence. Chas D. Daly<br />
argued that the facts as presented by cartographers and geographers showed that<br />
the territory claimed by Venezuela was regarded as belonging to the Dutch. (Daly:<br />
1869) Whether or not the conclusion drawn by Daly and others was correct, the<br />
British did present a plausible case. Therefore, regardless of what one thought of the<br />
Monroe doctrine, Britain could not logically have been accused of transgressing it by<br />
seeking unilaterally to extend its territory. After Britain agreed to arbitration in<br />
1897, Dr. Adlof Ernst, an expert on Venezuelan history, said the agreement was "no<br />
victory" for the Monroe doctrine, for the conditions which rendered it (the doctrine)<br />
57
necessary "have long passed. " (Times, 8.6. 1897)<br />
World opinion, however, was against Britain. She was envisaged as a "Slogg<br />
Bill", twisting the arms of her weaker opponent. (Thurston, 1896) So long as t~r<br />
United States did not get involved, the disparity in strength between the claimant~<br />
was such that Venezuela could only have recourse through peaceful means.<br />
THE AWARD OF 1899 . ,<br />
The award of the Tribunal of Arbitration given in Paris on 3 October 1899<br />
stated that the four Arbitrators (the Right Honourable, Lord Russell of Kiliowen, the<br />
Right Honourable, Sir Richard Henn Collins, the Honourable Melville Weston Fuller<br />
and the Honourable David · Josiah Brewer) · had selected his ExceJiency Frederic de<br />
Martens ;i L.L.D; -(Cambridge and Edinburgh), Privy Councillor and Permanent Member<br />
of the ·Council of-the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia, to be the fifth Arbitrator.<br />
(Documents, 1981:8)<br />
The role Frederic de Martens played in the -award of the Tribunal is most<br />
important. He is seen as the man who did a "deal" with the British. The Venezuelans<br />
described him as a theorist of Russian colonialism, and pointed to his 1897<br />
work, "Russia and England in Central Asia" ;.(1897), where he referred constantly to<br />
the "special mission" granted by : heaven to both powers to civilize the semi-barbarous<br />
nations of Asia. (Affairs, 1965:4) · So far as the Venezuelans were concerned,<br />
Martens was ideally suited to concoct a colonialist "deal" .<br />
., .<br />
How did Martens, the · "colonial .theorist", become involved in the affairs of<br />
the Tribunal? The Venezuelans argued that Great Britain made it clear that "no<br />
English Arbitrator could sit side-by-side with a creole or a coloured jurist". (Ibid.)<br />
Therefore, this made it impossible for them to choose one of their own people.<br />
Even if this is true, the Venezuelans placed great faith in the United States and two<br />
renowned US justices represented their interest on the Tribunal. In any case Great<br />
Britain would never have accepted a Venezuelan chairman and vice versa. The<br />
chairman had to be someone acceptable to both parties, and only the name of<br />
Frederic de Martens appeared on the lists of . jurists submitted by both countries.<br />
(Times, 14.10. 1897) The -Tsar of Russia only sanctioned Martens ' appointment to<br />
the Tribunal upon the insistence of both Governments. -{Ibid.·, 27.12.1897) What·<br />
ever the Venezuelans might. think of Martens today, at the time of the arbitration<br />
they rated him highly.<br />
58
The Tribunal of Arbitration awarded to Britain almost all of the territory within<br />
5chornburgk line. Her extreme claim, or that outside the Schomburgk, was<br />
the d d to Venezuela. The line drawn by the Tribunal was as follows:<br />
aware<br />
Starting from the coast at Point Playa, the line of boundary shall run<br />
in a straight line to the River Barima at its junction with the river<br />
Maruruma, and hence along the mid-stream of the latter river to its<br />
source and from that point to the junction of the River Maiowa with<br />
the Amakuru, and hence along the mid-stream of the Amakuru to its<br />
source in the Imataka Ridge, and thence in the south -westerly direction<br />
along the highest ridge of the spur of the Imataka Mountains to<br />
the highest point of the main range of such Imataka Mountains op- ·<br />
posite to the source of the Barima, and hence along the summit of<br />
the main ridge in a south-easterly direction of the lmataka Mountains<br />
to the source of the Acarabisi, and hence along the northern bank of<br />
the River Cuyuni westward to its junction with the Wenamu, and<br />
hence foil owing the mid-stream of the Wenamu to its western-most<br />
source, and in a direct line to the summit of Mount Roraima, and<br />
from Mount Roraima to the source of the Cotinga, and along the<br />
mid-stream of the river to its junction with the Takutu and hence<br />
along the mid-stream of the Takutu to its source, thence in a straight<br />
line to the western -most point of the Akarai Mountains to the source<br />
of the Corentyne called the Cutari River. (Documents, 1981: 12-14)<br />
The Venezuelan and British Governments<br />
accepted this line as "a full, perfect and<br />
final settlement". {Ibid. Article XIII) It was not until 1904, after the British and<br />
Venezuela Com mi sioner s had demarcated the actual boundary, that the people of<br />
British Guiana were told officially where their border with Venezuela lay. Formal<br />
agreement with rega rd to the mapping of the boundary was signed in Georgetown<br />
on 10 ,Januar\) 190 5.<br />
PREVOST'S DEAL: SOME QUESTIONS<br />
Mere the story rest for the next sixty years until August 1962 when Venezuthe<br />
Un it d Nat ion that she wa s no longer prepared to accept the<br />
~I;, d(J I( red<br />
do.(i' i Jn of th Tribuna l of 1899. (Question De Limites, 1967 :24-26) The reason<br />
Oiv~n f 1r thi" dr matic tep was that , fou nd within the paper s of Mr. Mallet-Prevost ,<br />
wh mr,m .ent
60<br />
. which he accused Russia and Britain of .<br />
was a rnernorandurn 10 1<br />
of "very extensive and important terntory1:!1aking a "ct<br />
which deprived V~n~zui~ 00 right. (Schoenrich 1949) Prevost left ~ "'hich, i~<br />
opinion, Great B~t~;ath. Absurd as it may seem, the entire modern e Pai:>er to Q<br />
published after his ·marily on this one piece of paper which th G~Yana/\; ~<br />
I d . ute rests pn ·d h' h l e Wnte eti.<br />
ezue a 1sp . h hen he was alive, an w 1c on y came to light h r Was<br />
1 I'\<br />
prepared to pub ~s wi~h the arbitration were dead!<br />
.. VJ en au th~<br />
closely connecte .<br />
d<br />
. tely after the ' award on 3 October, 1899, Prevost and<br />
Imme ia d t t t R ' G<br />
f , 'enezuela ma e a sta emen o euter s correspo d enera\<br />
H<br />
. lawyers or v 1 ' n ent h<br />
arnso~, . "victory" for the Venezuelans, went on to argue that the line \lJ ich,<br />
after c~a1m~g was one based on diplomatic compromise instead of legal ~:a~~<br />
the Trd1~unt th m Venezuela had gained much but should have gained mp ihnc 1p\es.<br />
Accor mg o e ' ·1 d t d bl fr uc rno<br />
·1d 1950) Such sentiments are east y un ers an a e om attorneys wh d· re.<br />
(Chh~'<br />
ll they wanted for their clients and it .should be remembered that 0 th td not<br />
ac 1eve a bed h p ·d t Cl l e Ven<br />
I G nment was not distur w en res1 en eve and ordered h·<br />
ezue an over . " . . 1s<br />
Bo -<br />
undary<br />
Commission to find a line based upon convenience and expediency" and not on<br />
"right".<br />
The Mallet-Prevost story · is incon~istent. He stated that in January 1899 he<br />
and Justice Brewer stopped over in London on their way to the Tribunal meeting<br />
Paris. While there, he met Lord Chief Justice Russell and in the course of their<br />
conversation he ventured to express his opinion that international arbitration should<br />
be based on legality. According to him, _Lord Russell disagreed and stated that in his<br />
opinion international arbitration should take into consideration questions of international<br />
policy. As Mallet-Prevost commented, "From that moment 1 knew that we<br />
could not count upon Lord Russell to decide the boundary question on the basis of<br />
strict rights". (Schoenrkh, 1949) On the occasion when ·Mr. Mallet-Prevost met<br />
with Lord Russell, the latter ·was in no way connected with the arbitration. 1n Janu·<br />
ary 1899 Lord Herschell and Justice Collins were the British Justices on the panel. It<br />
was not until 16th March , 1899 that Lord Russell of Killowen was confirmep a? an<br />
arbitrator in place of Lord Herschell who died suddenly . (Times, 17 .3. 1899)<br />
.· Secondly, Mr. Prevost ~uccumbed to the very· line of argument he considered<br />
H<br />
irrelevant<br />
. ,· Accord·<br />
tng<br />
t<br />
o<br />
h<br />
1m,<br />
. ·<br />
t<br />
h<br />
e reason he agreed to the<br />
"<br />
dea<br />
l"<br />
was<br />
Genera<br />
. .<br />
l<br />
arnson 5 observation: "Mallet-Prevost if it ·s.hould ever b~ known that we had it 10<br />
~:~J;wer to save for Venezuela th_e m~uth of the Orinoco and failed to do so w~<br />
never be forgiven" · (Schoen·rich, 1949) · What ·was · this if not consideration°
international policy?<br />
Prevost also claimed that at first, Lord Justice Collins's attitude gave the<br />
·on that he was leaning towards the side of the Venezuelans. He came to this<br />
~~ .<br />
clusion because, according to him, Justice Collins asked numerous questions<br />
:ch were critical of the British case. However, according to Prevost, after two<br />
eks holidaying in England, the Judge changed noticeably; he asked very few ques<br />
::ns and his whole attitude was different. (Ibid.) The records show that taking his<br />
marks as a whole, Lord Justice Collins gave no tangible indications that he was<br />
~aning towards the Venezuelans' side. After the break, as indeed before, he asked<br />
as many questions as Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer (Child, 1950).<br />
Prevost leaves the impression that the Venezuelan case was overwhelming.<br />
This is understandable since he was partly responsible for putting that case forward -<br />
but a British agent, Sir George U. Buchanan, Britain's Minister at the Hague and<br />
British Agent before the Tribunal, reported to his home office that the Tribunal had<br />
not, in his opinion, been very profoundly impressed by his (Mallet-Prevost' s) performance.<br />
Buchanan wrote: "The speech which Mr M.P. thus brought to a close has<br />
not, I believe, made any real impression on the Tribunal. It has attacked the British<br />
position too much in detail, any success which he may have obtained has been of a<br />
purely negative character". (Ibid.) Of General Harrison's statement, Buchanan reported<br />
that notwithstanding its force and eloquence, the contention that Venezuelan<br />
as successor to Spain had prior title to the territory in dispute failed to impress the<br />
Tribunal. (Ibid.)<br />
Of all the fifteen volumes of paper in the British Foreign Office, and all the<br />
documents found in St. Petersburg, there is not a single indication of a "deal". Even<br />
the movements of the Arbitrators do not indicate how a "deal" could have been<br />
made (Ibid.) What appeared uppermost in M. de Martens's mind as the Tribunal<br />
:me to a ~lose was the philosophical and practical place of Arbitration in internanal<br />
conflict. Having noted that in cases where a majority verdict was given there<br />
Were always d. t· . . .<br />
. 1ssen 1ng op1n1ons which could provide the basis for conflict, he sought<br />
a unanimous d . . S<br />
down b . ecis1on. o<br />
f<br />
ar as De Martens was concerned, the boundary line laid<br />
judges : the Judges was based on justice and law. However, he agreed that the<br />
q """sti adhbeen actuated by a desire to establish a compromise in a very complicated<br />
~ on t e · · f .<br />
Obid.) ' ongin o which must be looked for at the end of the fifteenth century.<br />
61
f h . f "deal" was uppermost in de Martens ' s tnind h<br />
erpetration o a f t 11 h d , e n<br />
I<br />
·<br />
t e P<br />
Ived<br />
A erican judges. In ac , a e nee ed to have d eed<br />
the two rn . B ·t · , f one w<br />
not have mvo .. h . dges for a decision m n am s avour. Judge Sch ils<br />
to vote with the tw~I Bn;s JUst's document, claimed that the Award of the ~~ch,<br />
h who d published ted "genera Ma el t- surprise<br />
re~o and disappointment" and that "students of the 1.2 enezu UnaJ<br />
elan a cr~a side o f t h e con tr ° versy were shocked at the excessive grant of territory" to -<br />
Britain. (Schoenrich, 1949} ·<br />
It has been pointed out that Mallet-Prevost and Judge I:Iarrison themselves<br />
k O<br />
f the decision as a "victory", although they attacked 1t as being Without<br />
spo "f e dation". They went on to boast t h at " every f oo t" o f th e t emtory · to which<br />
G;e~~ Britain made claim in her "extreme claim" had been awarded to Venezuela.<br />
From Caracas the British Minister reported that the news had been received With<br />
"indifference by the public". He had not seen a newspaper artide-an the .subject<br />
and, as if to counter Schoenrich's claim, he stated that: "Venezuelans .of,el:lucation<br />
... regretted extremely that the Barima has been awarded to them as now they can<br />
never hope for'the wealth and prosperity of the region of the Orinoco which would<br />
have (Child, resulted 1950) from that river being opened to our (British) commercial influence".<br />
"d ea 1 ,, came<br />
Anot~erthpiecfe<br />
m e orm of of evidence an try produced . th d" by Venezuela in support of Prevost's<br />
Russell , Mr R.J. Block. 0 M e~ m · e iary of the Private Secretary to Lord<br />
"Venezuela: Martens's ·o~r ~~e~Y, 2 ~cto~r 1899, Block entered in his diary:<br />
the next day the Tribunal gave~t Victor. (Question De Llmites , 1967) On<br />
ud:<br />
I s Ver ICt.<br />
. All Parties agreed that the 1· d<br />
mise For d M t me rawn by the 1i "b<br />
" deal ·,, (1f . one e cares) ens h to d t get be the two s1 "d es to agree t rt unaJ Was one of compro-<br />
O<br />
possible that d M rt a canvassed. Mallet p O a compromise position, a<br />
e a ens who wa - revost sp k ·t .<br />
sion had made a simila 'th s most concerned With O e as 1 it was not<br />
' r reat to the B T h . · · reaching , .<br />
a detailed and useful historical 1 . n is JUdges. Ced . J a unanimous dec1-<br />
Prevost allegation that the awa:;a Ys1s ~f the dispute, totau:c _oseph, Who has made<br />
sion ... that it was not a truly iudic~~~c~s~is~t of a diplonia~~l~~te~ both the Malletof<br />
the evidence presented by both sides ton hJosep~, 1968, 72)al ~d the conclusettlement<br />
had to include a degree of c t e _arbitration, an .
Apart from the two British Judges, Chief Justice Fuller Brewer of the United<br />
States Supreme Court represented the Venezuela_ int~rest on the Tribunal. Venezuela's<br />
e was put by a battery of four lawyers which included an ex-President of the<br />
cas United States o fA menca, · B en1am1n · · H arnson, · an d an ex-Se<br />
cretary of War of the<br />
United States of America, General Benjamin S. Tracy . Mallet-Prevost was a relatively<br />
junior member of this team, but except for his allegations, none of these outstanding<br />
men is known to have indicated that a plot took place which robbed Venezuela<br />
of its lawful right. What is also most coincidental is that Mallet-Prevost accepted<br />
a Venezuelan national award, the "Order of the Liberator", one month before<br />
he penned his story of a "deal ".<br />
ATTEMPTS AT SOLUTIONS<br />
In November 1962, after the Venezuelans ' assertion that a "deal" was done '<br />
Great Britain said that she was ready to arrange with the Government of Venezuela<br />
and the Government of the colony of Guiana , a tripartite examination of the historical<br />
documents. (Times, 14.11.1962) One day before this statement by the British<br />
Government, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister had claimed that "the disputed area<br />
has never ceased to belong to us." {Ibid.) The British Deputy Permanent Representative<br />
to the United Nations made it clear that Britain's offer to examine the records<br />
was "in no sense an off er to engage in substantive talks about revision of the frontier".<br />
He insisted that if it was possible to open a case that was closed for· so many<br />
years on the evidence put forward by the Venezuelans, "there will be no frontier<br />
agreement that cannot be questioned." He was certain that when the Venezuelans<br />
had examined the British papers, they would come to the conclusion that there was<br />
no need to reopen the case. (<strong>Guyana</strong>/Venezuela Relations, 1968: 9)<br />
Venezuelan experts visited British archives and British experts visited Caracas.<br />
From the British standpoint the experts did not find a shred of evidence in support of<br />
~e Venezuelan contention. However, in 1964, the British Government announced<br />
i~s Willingness to engage in discussion with the Venezuelan Government at a ministenal<br />
l:~el on the findings of the experts. These talks commenced in London with the<br />
Participation of the British Guiana Government, but they were inconclusive.<br />
At the end of 1965 the three Governments agreed that another meeting<br />
should take place in Geneva' in the early months of 1966 . This time arrangements<br />
Were made for the signing of the Geneva Agreement which provided for the setting<br />
up of a G I\ , · ·<br />
uyana1 venezuela Mixed Commission . The Comm1ss1on soug h t a " sa t· 15 f ac -<br />
63
.<br />
1<br />
ttlernent of the controversy between Venezu \<br />
I'<br />
f the pract1ca se t, l t . ea r\"'<br />
o solution or . h has arisen over the venezue an con ention that the A :--1 •cl .J<br />
t ryUnitedKingdomwhic d ·d" (Documents, 1981:12-19) rb1trQ\ r<br />
the 899 ... is null an vo1 . .<br />
Award of 1<br />
. quarters that the Geneva Agreement made an .<br />
It was argued 1 ~ ,5orne lans by raising their "spurious claim" · to the t 1 rnPar-<br />
. to the venezue . h G s atus f<br />
tant concess10~, Hubbard 1967:5-6) However, 1t wast e uyanese and Bri _a<br />
a ·· controversy · ( . th t the agreement merely sought to establish hsh<br />
t , contention a d rt p , lllec:ha<br />
Governmen s . h th r evidence existe to suppo revost s contentio T -<br />
nisms to deteri:nmde; e 7ssion expired in 197 0 without resolving the contr n he<br />
terms of the M1xe om.m . on was hamstrung over the correct interpretatio oversy.<br />
The work of the Commfiss~erence. The British and Guyanese held that then to be<br />
·ts terms o re d h"l th , , contraplaced<br />
upon t he validity of the 1899 Awar , w I e e ve~ezuelans Wished<br />
versy concerned \ 1<br />
l"ty of the 1899 award was already established. to<br />
proceed as if the t ega l<br />
ultation between the Governments of Venezuela and Gu<br />
After furtherrtcof~;pain was signed on 18 June 1970 in Trinidad & To~ana,<br />
p t col of Po -o f . od f tw l ago<br />
the ro o ut the dispute in abeyance or a pen ~ eve years, during Which<br />
The Protocol PG undertook not to make any claim on the other's territory<br />
' , eJa and uyana b ld be . 1 t<br />
venezu . II ewable after the twelve years, ut cou terminated if eith<br />
automat1ca y ren 24) Th f· er<br />
~as . d . t b (Documents, 1981: 21- e irst twelve-year period of th<br />
side wishe it o e. . ll . b e<br />
Protocol ended on 18 June 1982. and . was automabticfa y rle8newa le unless either<br />
party notified the other of its intention not to renew e ore December 1981. ln<br />
April 19 81, the Venezuelan Government inf or med the <strong>Guyana</strong> Government that it<br />
did not intend' to renew the Protocol. ·. :<br />
The Geneva Agreement provided other peaceful means by which the dispute<br />
might be settled. These are specified in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter<br />
which provides for negotiations, enquiry, mediation and conciliation. Venezuela and<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> were deadlocked on the means to be employed to settle the controversy.<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> was in favour of a legal resolution, while Venezuela supported some kind of<br />
negotiated settlement. It was finally agreed, in keeping with the Geneva -Agreement,<br />
that the Secretary-General of the United Nations be asked to identify the means by<br />
which the dispute should be solved. (Burnham, 1983) In 1989, with the agreement<br />
~f .the parties, the for mer Caribbean . Community Secretary-General, international<br />
civil servant and present Vice Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, Mr.<br />
Alyster McIntyre was appointed by the UN Secretary-General to use his good office<br />
to reach agreement on the means to be used in solving the . problem. Here the<br />
110<br />
d<br />
64
-<br />
modern story rests.<br />
p0UTICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES<br />
In September 1966, <strong>Guyana</strong> reported that the Venezuelans had occupied<br />
the <strong>Guyana</strong> half of the island of Ankoko, in one of the border rivers. The Venezuelans<br />
claimed the entire island to be theirs. (Ankoko Affair, 1966) <strong>Guyana</strong> also<br />
accused the Venezuelans of excluding them from the Organisation of American States,<br />
of which they eventually became a member in 1991. (<strong>Guyana</strong>/Venezuela Relations,<br />
1968: 6-7) Venezuela was accused of interfering in the internal affairs of <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
through the subversion of a number of <strong>Guyana</strong>'s indigenous Amerindian communities<br />
and of contravening the conventions of Laws of the Sea, when on "9th July of<br />
this year, ( 1968) the President of Venezuela issued a decree in which he purported to<br />
annex as part of the territory of Venezuela, and to assert a right to exercise sovereignty<br />
over, a nine mile belt of sea extending to within three miles of the coast of<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> and contiguous to <strong>Guyana</strong>'s territorial waters". ( <strong>Guyana</strong>/Venezuela Relations,<br />
1968: 20-24) Venezuela placed advertisements in the London Times warning<br />
investors away from the disputed territory and urged the World Bank not to<br />
support a loan for the Upper-Mazaruni Hydro-Power Project which the <strong>Guyana</strong><br />
Government was then attempting to build in the region. (Burnham, 1981: 16}<br />
The <strong>Guyana</strong> Government argued that by these actions, Venezuela breached<br />
the Protocol agreement between the two countries, "that each Government would<br />
abstain from any statement, publication or other acts which could be detrimental to<br />
the economic development and progress of the other State" . (Affairs, 1965: 3)<br />
Over the years there has been much talk about Venezuela's intention to seize all, or<br />
a large proportion of, the territory and there has been reported movements of Brazilian,<br />
Venezuelan and Guyanese troops in the border area. No such invasion has<br />
taken place, but the Venezuelans continue to notify investors of their claim to the<br />
Essequibo region, although in recent years relations between the two countries have<br />
been relatively friendly.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
Few can fail to see the tenuous nature of the Venezuelan claim and, as 'a<br />
result, other reasons have been given as to why the Venezuelans embarked upon this<br />
venture. The area under dispute is said to be mineral rich. The Venezuelans claimed<br />
that the Award of 1899 gave them land that was not worth £5 Sterling, but gave to<br />
65
British Guiana 60,000 square miles of land gold mines and forests Re ~<br />
, ' · cent surv<br />
have shown strong indications that oil, in marketable quantities, may well exist in :is<br />
area and the Venezuelans may have felt that they have an opportunity to capt e<br />
some o f th 1s . potent! ·a1 wealth .<br />
Ure<br />
Then there is the suggestion, promulgated mainly by the People's Progressive<br />
Party of <strong>Guyana</strong> (PPP), that the dispute was conjured up by the USA to provide<br />
grounds for intervention into <strong>Guyana</strong> if that Party attempted to introduce Marxist<br />
policies when in office. (Hubbard, 196 7, 32 -41) In the 1960s , when the dispute<br />
arose anti-communism was rife in America and the PPP was viewed as a Marxist<br />
'<br />
party . The PPP argued that ''The Venezuelan question thus is in abeyance for the<br />
time being until the next General Election in Guiana or until a Government in office<br />
takes a line which the US State Department does not like''. (Ibid .) Indeed , after the<br />
ruling People 's National Congre ss (PNC) began to dabble with Marxism in the second<br />
half of the 1970s , the border issue flared again and in his address to the fourth<br />
Biennial Congress of the PNC, its leader and President of <strong>Guyana</strong> , Forbes Burnham,<br />
implied that the border dispute might have been revived as part of a process to press<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> into giving up its socialist course . (Burnham , 1981) Wider political implications<br />
have been placed upon the Venezuelan claim. There are those who believe<br />
that Venezuela had imperialist designs upon parts of the Caribbean region. (Williams,<br />
1975) Moreover, ever since its 1962 claim, maps of Venezuela include the<br />
Essequibo region of <strong>Guyana</strong> as a part of Venezuela . Generations of Venezuelans<br />
have grown up believing Essequibo to be a legitimate part of their country . This is<br />
bound to complicate the negotiation process.<br />
The <strong>Guyana</strong> Government said that it is determined to develop the resources<br />
of the disputed area and to settle the controversy peacefully. A measure of progress<br />
has been made and there is hope that with goodwill between the parties , an amicable<br />
solution will be found which wilI alJow the peoples of these two countries co-operatively<br />
to pool their resources for the common good . Nonetheless ., it is possible to say<br />
of Venezuela and <strong>Guyana</strong> exactly what was said at the end of the nineteenth century<br />
of Britain and Venezuela: "The disparity of the strength of the claimants is such that<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> could only have recourse through peaceful means ". It matter s not how<br />
absurd<br />
" .<br />
it may ap<br />
pear,<br />
·t · h ft<br />
1,, remains true t at a er over one hundred years of wrangling,<br />
the B1d for El Dorado is not yet dosed.<br />
66
REFERENCES<br />
Adamson, Jack H , & Folland , I: ~rold (1969) The Shepherd of the<br />
British Governm ent , (1896) British Parliamentary Pape (BPP) ( Ocean (Boston: ambit)<br />
Burnham. L.F.S. (196 8) GuyancvVenezuelan Relations· r;t t London· HMSO}. ·<br />
f G (Ge · a ement by<br />
Minister o uyana<br />
the H bl<br />
orgetown : Mini stry of Foreign Aff airs) o no ura e L F.S. Burnham /J .<br />
Burnham , L.F.S. (19 8 1) Organise f or Production and Def · (G ' nm~<br />
Burnham , L.F.S. (198 3) Will to Survive (Georgetown : Off~c:c\ t: o~get~wri: Office of the President)<br />
Child, Clift on (1950) "The Venezuela-Briti sh Guiana Bound aryoA b~t rt~stdenft).<br />
r t ra ton o 1899" Th<br />
International Law, (LXN , 4) . , e American Joiirnal of<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong>, Documents on the Territ_orial Integrity of <strong>Guyana</strong> (198 1) (Gear etown· . . .<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong>, GuyancvVenezuela Relations (196 8) (Geo rgetown : Mini stry of tt ·A~l~ tSlry of Foreign Affairs).<br />
1<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong>. The Ankoko Affa ir!i. Not es on <strong>Guyana</strong>'s Protest (1966) (Geo<br />
trna M. 3 1 '.s).<br />
Heffner. Richard , D. (1965) A Docum entary History of the United Statr 9 5'\rw~ tn~try of Foreign Affairs).<br />
Hubbard, H.J .M. (1967) The Venezuelan Border /.,;sue (Georgetown · p=~ple?snPon: ~ntopr Bookc;)<br />
h Ced . (1968) "Th ', I . . . . . rogres:,1ve arty).<br />
Josep . · nc e v enezue a-BntJsh Guiana Boundary Arbitrati on of J 899· . · . 1<br />
,. C .<br />
Studies, (X, 4). · an appraisa , aribbean<br />
Naipaul, V.S. (1973) The Last of El Dorado (London : Penguin) .<br />
Schoenrich. Otto (19 49) "The Venezuela - Briti sh Guiana Border Dispute .. , The American <strong>Journal</strong> of lnterna<br />
tional Law, 43.<br />
"The Times" Ti mes New spaper, London .<br />
Thurston, Herbert (18 96 ) "The Venezuelan Border Qu estion" The Month , ,June.<br />
US. Report of the United S tates Commi s.5ion on the Boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana (US<br />
Com .) (1899) (Washington) . 4 Vo ls.<br />
Venezuela, lnf orme Que Los Exporto s Venezolanos Para la Question De Limites Con Guayana Britanica<br />
Prescntan Al Gobiem o Nacional (1967), (Caracas: Mini stry of Extern al Relations).<br />
Veneiuela, Manifesto to the World by the Conf ederation of Venezuela in Soutf, America (1811) (Caracas:<br />
Venezuelan Go vernm ent) .<br />
Venezuela, The Affair of the Boundaries between Venezuela and British Guiana (1965) (Caracas: Venezuelan<br />
Covernm~nt).<br />
Williams, [ rlc (197 5) "The Threat to the Caribbcc,n Comm unity" (Port -of Spain: People's National Movement).<br />
67
NOTES AND DOCUMENTS<br />
BOOKS<br />
A BmUOGRAPHY OF WORKS BY MARY NOEL MENEzES~<br />
by<br />
Hazel Woolford<br />
British Policy towards the Amerindians in British Guiana, 1803-18 73<br />
(Q -~ ~<br />
Clarendon Press, 1977). ·<br />
Goodall's Sketches of Amerindian Tribes, 1841-1843 (London : BritL \<br />
Publications, 1977).<br />
-..<br />
A Guide to <strong>Historical</strong> Research (Georgetown : University of <strong>Guyana</strong>. 19 8).<br />
Editor, William Hilhouse, Indian Notices (1825) (Georgetown: National C ~..P.i=~sion<br />
for the Recovery and Acquisition of Research Material on <strong>Guyana</strong>. 19- _<br />
The Amerindians in <strong>Guyana</strong>, 1803-1873. A Documentary History (Londo : Fran.I\<br />
Cass & Co., 1979):-- - --<br />
The Ameri-ndians and the Europeans (Glasgow: Collins , 1982).<br />
Amerindian Life in <strong>Guyana</strong> (Georgetown: Ministry of Education Soc·a1 Deve<br />
ment and Culture, 1983) - reprinted in <strong>1992</strong>.<br />
&enes from the History of the Portuguese in <strong>Guyana</strong> (London: Sister M.N. lenezes<br />
R.S.M., 1986). ·<br />
How to do Better Research (Georgetown: Demerara Publishers Ltd., 1990).<br />
ARTICLES/REVIEWS<br />
"The Dutch and British Policy of Indian Subsidy: A Syst~m of Annual and Tri<br />
68
\ Presents", Caribbean Studies, XIII, 3 (October, 1973), 64-88.<br />
Review Article: Gabriel Stedman 's Narrative of a five years Expedition against the<br />
Revolted Negroes of Surinam in Guiana. <strong>Journal</strong> of Latin American Studies , VI,<br />
2 (November, 1973), 341-2.<br />
"The Christianised Amerindian : Who Is He?", Kaie, (July, 1979), 55-64 .<br />
"Amerindian Captains and Constables : A System of Alliance for Security and Control,"<br />
Release , 6 & 7 (October, 1979), 55-67.<br />
"Quest for Peace and Truth : Gandhi's Message of Non-violence," Indian and Foreign<br />
Review (1-14 February , 1982), 13-15 .<br />
"From Protection to Integration: The Amerindians of <strong>Guyana</strong> vis-a-vis the Government,<br />
1803-1973, " in Caribbean Societies, I, Collected Seminar Papers , 29 (London:<br />
University of London, Institution of Commonwealth Studies, 1982) , <strong>93</strong>-112.<br />
"Some Preliminary thoughts on Portuguese Emigration from Madeira to British<br />
Guiana," Kyk-Over-Al, 30 (December, 1984), 43-46 .<br />
"<strong>Guyana</strong>" Research Guide to Central America and the Caribbean (Wisconsin:<br />
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 360-363 .<br />
"The Three Guianas {British, French and Dutch) from . . . . . 1800 to the Present,"<br />
The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America and the Caribbean (Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press, 1985).<br />
"Amerindian Jurisdiction and the Venezuela-<strong>Guyana</strong> Boundary Issue in the 18th and<br />
19th Centuries, " A Selection of Papers presented at the Twelfth Conference of<br />
the Association of Caribbean Historians (1980). Edited by K.O. Laurence (St.<br />
Augustine, Trinidad: Association of Caribbean Historians, 1985).<br />
'-'The Coming of the Portuguese: From Canefield to Counter," The Sunday Chronicle,<br />
28 April , 12, 19 May 1985.<br />
"The Intellectual Legacies of Elsa Goveia" in Proceedings of a Commemorative<br />
Symposium in honour of Professor Elsa Goueia and Professor Walter Rodney<br />
{Turkeyen: Department of History, University of <strong>Guyana</strong>, 1985), pp . 16-21.<br />
69
70<br />
R ' View Article, Peter Riviere's Individual and Society in Guiana (Cambrid .<br />
bridge University Press, 1984) and Jacques Ligol's Tales of the Yanoma~~ -· Ca~<br />
Life in the Venezuelan Forest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, {·9~~'!Y<br />
Hispanic American <strong>Historical</strong> Review, 66 (November, 1986), 806 -808. ) 1 n<br />
"The Portuguese Benevolent Society in British Guiana, 1872-1888 ," A tlant·<br />
<strong>Journal</strong> of Madeiran History (1987).<br />
ico-<br />
"The Madeiran Portuguese and the Establishment of the Catholic Church in B . .<br />
d M . ·t·<br />
Guiana, 1835-98," Immigrants an znon ,es,<br />
S<br />
pecia<br />
· I I<br />
ssue,<br />
7<br />
,<br />
1<br />
, (March, 198B<br />
ntish<br />
57-78. ),<br />
"The Amerindians of <strong>Guyana</strong>: Original Lords of the Soil," America lnd igena, XLVII!<br />
2 (April-June, 1988), 353-376. '<br />
"Music in Portuguese Life in British Guiana," Kyk-Ouer-Al, 39 (December, 1 988 ),<br />
65-75.<br />
"The Apprenticeship System 1834-1838: A Leap in the Dark, " History Gazette, 2<br />
(furkeyen, November 1988), 20 pp.<br />
"Portuguese Drama in Nineteenth Century British Guiana, " Kyk-Over -A/ , 40 (December,<br />
1989), 66-71.<br />
"The Winged Impulse: The Madeiran Portuguese in <strong>Guyana</strong>. An Economic, Socio<br />
Cultural Perspective," <strong>Guyana</strong> <strong>Historical</strong> <strong>Journal</strong>, 1 (1989), 17-36.<br />
"The Legend of Arthur James Seymour," Joint Issue of BIM, 19, 73 and Kyk-Over <br />
AI, 41 (June, 1990), 80-82.<br />
"The Background to the Venezuela-<strong>Guyana</strong> Boundary Dispute ," History Gazette,<br />
21 (Turkeyen, June 1990).<br />
"The three Guianas (British, French and Dutch) from c. 1800 to the Present," Revised<br />
article for the second edition of The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America<br />
and the Caribbean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1991).<br />
MONOGRAPHS<br />
Guyanese Documents in U.K. Archives (f urkeyen : Department of History, Univer -
•<br />
sity of <strong>Guyana</strong>, 1978).<br />
Annotated List of Colonial Office Documents - C.O. 111/1, Governors ' Dispatches ,<br />
British Guiana. Selected Years 1781 -1871 - C.O. 111/384 and C.O. 884/ 1-19<br />
(Turkeyen: Department of History, University of <strong>Guyana</strong>, 1978).<br />
The State of Research in <strong>Guyana</strong> (Turkeyen: University of <strong>Guyana</strong>, 1981) .<br />
THESES<br />
"A Comparative Study of the French and Spanish Negro Slave Policy in Colonial<br />
Louisiana, 1700-1803 " (M.A., Georgetown University, 1965).<br />
"British Policy Towards the Amerindians in British Guiana," (Ph.D., University of<br />
London, 1973).<br />
UNPUBLISHED PAPERS<br />
"Relations between the Vatican and the Third Reich, 1<strong>93</strong>3-1<strong>93</strong>9 ," (May, 1965).<br />
"The Syncretism between the Aztec and Christian Religions."<br />
"Juarez and His Role in Mexican History ."<br />
"The Role of the Church in Education in Sixteenth Century Mexico."<br />
"University of <strong>Guyana</strong>, 1963-1970."<br />
"The First Twenty-Five Years of Madeiran Emigration to British_Guiana, 1835-1860 .''<br />
"A Brief Survey of the <strong>Historical</strong> Background to the Venezuela-<strong>Guyana</strong> Border Dispute,"<br />
(1971).<br />
"The Role of the Churches in the Civilization of the Amerindians in British Guiana ,<br />
1803-1873," (197 4).<br />
"The <strong>Historical</strong> Background to the _ Venezuela-<strong>Guyana</strong> Border Issue - A Case in Diplomacy<br />
1841-1981."<br />
• ..<br />
~<br />
71
.,..,<br />
~~::~s<br />
1<br />
798.<br />
MADE DURING A RESIDENCE AT STABROEK RIO<br />
RY (IAT. 6.10 N) IN THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR<br />
.<br />
This document is an account by an American visitor, Thomas Pierronet, of<br />
his experience in the colony of Demerara , especially in its c;apital, Stabroe~ (renamed<br />
Georgetown in 1811). It is one of the earliest accounts in English of the<br />
colony, especially after the British occupation in 1796. A manuscript version exists<br />
in the holdings of the John Carter Brown Library in Providence, Rhode Island, in the<br />
United States of America. The first publication of the document appeared in the<br />
Collections of the Massachusetts <strong>Historical</strong> Society, 1st series, <strong>Vol</strong>ume VI, Boston,<br />
1800. It is the earliest known published account of Demerara by an American.<br />
DOCUMENT<br />
A traveller finds himseif in an awkward situation, in journeying in this country,<br />
to find that , in every house, it is expected that he shod [should] furnish his own<br />
hammock for the night. This principle is so extensive, that no one expects to provide<br />
spare beds, or even hammocks, any farther than one absolutely necessary for<br />
the use of his own family; and every inhabitant , whose business may call him out,<br />
always carries one in his pegall.<br />
Ants<br />
The Ants here are exceedingly troublesome; they are very small and do not<br />
sting, but are the most rapacious vermin in the colony. They are remarkably fond of<br />
Sugar, which can hardly be placed out of their reach. The only method , yet discovered,<br />
of evading their visits, is by suspending it to a cord, round wh. lich] a tuft of<br />
cotton being tied, presents them an obstacle their dexterity cannot surmount.<br />
These insects infest every part of the house alike, the ground and attic stories<br />
being equally the objects of research; and no method has as yet been discovered to<br />
extirpate them.<br />
. ~he sting of the merribunter, or wild bee is very pain£ ul. An immediate<br />
application of any oleaginous substance has been found the most efficacious<br />
remedy .<br />
The common fly abounds in some houses and scarcely ever visits others .
The bat inf e ts old houses in flocks and by their screaming and croaking are<br />
very trouble ome and disagreeable during the night.<br />
The Mosquito is the most venomous insect in <strong>Guyana</strong> to strangers who<br />
uffer very severely by their stings· many have suffered amputation, and even the loss<br />
of life, by means of large ulcers which have been caused originally by their bite. But<br />
per on used to the colony are scarcely ever bitten by them· and when they are, they<br />
feel no inconvenience from their attack.<br />
The centipede is rare the cockroach very numerous. The firefly which emits<br />
a brilliant light in the evening , abounds in the environs of Stabroek. The Bug frequently<br />
extinguishes candles by flying against the wick.<br />
The frog , whose croaking is remarkably loud and hoarse , abounds in the<br />
trenches and dykes.<br />
The land-crab, which, by continually perforating the dams, causes vast trouble<br />
to the planters ; and by letting the water flow into the plantations through a thousand<br />
almost invisible sluices.<br />
Some snakes are of an enormous size; they have been met with from twentyfive<br />
to thirty feet in length; they have been known to attack and kill an ox, and are<br />
not penetrable by a ball, except in the head, their scales completely defending their<br />
bodies.<br />
The soil agrees with the greater part of the vegetable tribe; it assimilates<br />
particularly with the spice trees. Cayenne has lately exported a considerable quantity<br />
of doves, nutmegs and cinnamon.<br />
The bread fruit tree flourishes in different parts of the colony. Cinnamon. of<br />
a superior quality, has been produced in the garden of Mr. Grenet and nutmegs from<br />
that of Mr. St. Ursel; but the Dutch Government has always prohibited their increase ,<br />
other than as an object of curiosity<br />
Pineapples are plenty in sandy beaches and tracts. Plantains, the banana<br />
and coconut trees thrive very much.<br />
Town<br />
A Stranger from the Northward sees, with surprise, a town without chimney,<br />
73
uni , it b one h re and there erected in a Dutch Kitchen. The common ~<br />
ooking is to make a fire on the ground, in an outhouse, and let the smoke shift for<br />
it-elf.<br />
It ha been observed by the Barbadian Emigrants, that the Dutch colonists<br />
hav built their privies as near the house , and the Kitchen as far distant, as possible.<br />
Their oppon ents report that the places alluded to, one infinitely cleaner and less<br />
offen ive than a Barbad~s kitchen. They have truth, at least, on their side.<br />
Scarcely a single glass window is in the : own· Their place is supplied by<br />
shutters and among those of higher rank. by Bhnds, nevertheless, the houses are<br />
infinite!~ su;rior in point of appearance, to those of Barbados . A scantiness of<br />
furniture is very ~sible in the large rooms. Magnificence, and even elegance, are<br />
very little known in Demerary ...<br />
The burying ground of Stabroek and the adjoining dependencies of New<br />
Town La Bourgade, and Bridgetown, contains 16 acres, in the centre of which a<br />
church is to be built at some future period.<br />
The Town of Stabroek consists of abt [about] 250 houses, whose rents are<br />
from 3000 to 1200 guilders. It consists of a main street, and two others , parallel to<br />
the dams, which all meet the river at right angles. The two dams are called North<br />
and South in respect to their situation to the Town and bound two Canals, or Trenches,<br />
that are of great use in boating heavy articles before every house. They have likewise<br />
a trench, over which is thrown a wooden bridge, besides a number of smaller ones,<br />
cut in various directions. The sickly season commences when those ditches stagnate<br />
in the dry season , they being out of reach of common tides and continues during the<br />
months of July, August, September, October, and sometimes pt [part] of November,<br />
when the rains setting in again diminish the Mortality; but of late years the seasons<br />
have been very precarious , the rain failing by intervals the whole of the time ...<br />
. The rain here, in common with other tropical countries, generally descends<br />
m torrents , and diminishes gradually to the end of the storm .<br />
Wells and pumps are not used. The muddiness of the soil and brackishness<br />
of the water preclude the use of them, altho' you meet with water generally at two<br />
feet beneath the surface.<br />
The roads , which are of stiff clay, have been formed by the soil thrown out of<br />
th<br />
' wea er are very good; but on the least shower, they become ,<br />
t h e dams and in dry<br />
74
from their slipperiness and adhesive quality, almost impassable. They are obliged to<br />
batten their wooden bridges on this account, which otherwise would prove excessively<br />
dangerous. They have, however, this good quality, that an hour 's sun will dry<br />
them, even after the most violent storm.<br />
The only paving to be met with, is a Brick path, that runs the length of the<br />
Town, from 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile, which was laid by Mrs. Espinasse, a former<br />
Governor's Wife. It contains several hundred thousand Bricks. No one can roll a<br />
Barrel or ride a horse over it, without incurring a penalty, it being the only walkable<br />
path in wet weather. Since the British have held the place , it has been suffered to run<br />
to ruin in many places.<br />
The value of the houses , ..... are in no proportion to their rents. The very<br />
best may be obtained at 10 years purchase, while others will not bring in above one<br />
third of that value. The supposed cause of this depreciation is the great repairs<br />
which are here always necessary, arising from a principle of decay inherent to the<br />
climate, and to the great value of money in a country where speculation knows no<br />
bounds.<br />
The Troops now in Stabroek may be estimated as follows:<br />
The remains of (the] 39th Regt., 200<br />
The Black corps, formerly an assessment<br />
of every 50th slave on all plantations<br />
possessing more than that number 7 00<br />
The Militia, composed of all the King's<br />
natural born subjects 200<br />
The Dutch Troops 150<br />
1250<br />
The Duty of a Burgher is simply the defence of the Town, in case of a Negro<br />
insurrection. They are obliged to furnish themselves with a musket, bayonet, sabre,<br />
and 40 rounds of Ammunition. They are composed of those Hollanders who refuse<br />
joining the militia, Germans, French, Swiss, ..... and a few Americans. This corps<br />
are not obliged to take arms on any occasion, except the forementioned one, even<br />
were a French fleet to ascend the river.<br />
No other water is made use of but rain water, preserved in Casks, and sometimes,<br />
altho' rarely, in cisterns. A continual supply of rain is, therefore, necessa~ for<br />
the Inhabitants who suffer extremely during the dry season, when they are obliged<br />
'<br />
75
to obtain their water many miles up the river, at an expensive price.<br />
The insects are very destructive of Lumber, whi_ch_ is the ~eason that a Lumber<br />
yard<br />
.<br />
has not yet been established in the Colony. It 1s 1mposs1ble to guard aga·<br />
inst<br />
their ravages while the boards lay on the ground .<br />
Rio Demerary , from being a small stream , has incre~sed to a mile in breadth,<br />
one half of which, however, is shoal. In conseque~ce of this encroachment, several<br />
Estates have been entirely washed away, the vestiges of whose works may yet be<br />
seen at low water, and others are daily decaying. It is with the greatest difficulty the<br />
preserve the foundations of the fort. This river is navigable far above the Loo Pia;<br />
tation , which lays 100 miles up ; and it has been said, that at the height of 500 miles<br />
it takes its source from a lake.<br />
Others assert , that the whole province of <strong>Guyana</strong> is formed by the junction of<br />
the Amazons with the Orinoco ; but with what truth, I cannot determine ...<br />
Rio Essequibo is 60 miles wide at the mouth, and contains nearly 300 Islands<br />
Its Banks are rocky; it abounds in subjects of natural History; its forest is superior to<br />
that of Demerary , and its Sugar Plantations of a far better quality ...<br />
The quantity of Mud is astonishing, as well as the extent of it. On the coast,<br />
you strike soundings in mud banks in 5 fathoms, out of sighfo(-the Land. It continues<br />
increasing until it forms vast shoals, which are · intersec _ted·by the mouths of the<br />
rivers. Of these, Poumaron. [Pomer6 -6nJ, -Essequibo~ Derrierary, Berbice, Quarantin<br />
[CorentyneJ, Surinam and Cayenne are fhe 'mosftonsiderable; ·'the lesser ones are<br />
called creeks, and are frequently · of an extreme depth ~ and ri~rro; ·_ - Many of these<br />
are pellucid, whereas the others are replete with muddy particles ...<br />
The Number of Plantations<br />
East Coast .<br />
From the Fort in Demerary to Mahaica Creek 80<br />
From [lvtahaica Creek) to Mahaicona [Mahaicony] 30<br />
- Mahaicona to Abary Creek . 13<br />
· - Abary to Rio Berbice 90<br />
212<br />
. 76
W• t<br />
fr 1n Ith l W. P int f Rio D m r ry to<br />
Bon i rr in Ri ·s quibo 45<br />
From Sup n n1 r k Rio I quibo] to<br />
Ri P urn r n [Porn roon] 2<br />
165<br />
I land in Es equibo<br />
L gun<br />
Wak nam , 40 . Tiger Island 5<br />
In the oth er islands, 20<br />
45<br />
110<br />
In all. 487 Plantation s, which , at 3 Whites, the average Number in each, are<br />
equal to 1461 White Inhabitants, exclusive of those on the River Plants [Plantations]<br />
and those contained in the Towns.<br />
The Number of Coloured People are upwards of 250,000.<br />
Great quantities of different ores are discovered among the rocks and mountains.<br />
A shaft was sunk at Piera, belonging to Mr. Haslin, from which some ore was<br />
extracted, which was pronounced to be gold; but, for some reasons of the government,<br />
it was discontinued . Minerals are very abundant, particularly the red and<br />
yellow ochres . Farther back are large hills, which from the description of their<br />
brilliancy must be composed of talc. or pe.rhaps spar, intermixed with quartz.<br />
No European flowers will flourish in the rank soil of Demerary not even a<br />
colly flower - the soil is so rank that they exhaust themselves before the time of<br />
blossom.<br />
There are scarcely any flowering plants peculiar to the country but of shrubs<br />
the greate st variety and of the most elegant kinds which are planted in what they call<br />
the gardens altho ' Horticulture be here in its most uncouth form .<br />
The interior will probably never be brought to a state of cultivation owing to<br />
the want of drainage or at least the tract sixty miles from the sea which is a vast<br />
drowned swamp . All the improvements have been hitherto made on the Sea Coast<br />
77
and on the banks of the rivers and very rarely has a plantation been carried farther<br />
back - the labour in for ming a new plantation is immense and can only be estimated<br />
by those who have been spectators thereof .<br />
..,_<br />
The produce of these settlements are Coffee , Cotton and Sugar - of these<br />
Cotton is supposed to be the most precarious crop . Too much rain rots it and a<br />
succession of dry weather causes it to blast. Coffee on the contrary has nothing to<br />
fear except from too much wet. Several Estates make a good revenue from their<br />
plantain walks a bunch of which previous to the importation of 60,000 slaves by the<br />
English into the Colony was sold for 2 1 /z Stivers now fetches 121/2.<br />
Many Persons make a great deal of money by pr~c~ring ti_mber for the colony<br />
but the Jabour used to obtain it must be immense when 1t 1s considered that a square<br />
foot of some kinds weighs frequently 100 lbs. - they take a gang of negroes from 12<br />
to 20 and sometimes more and go up a river until they meet with the species they are<br />
in quest of _ they then land; the head of the gang strikes into the woods and marks<br />
the trees as nearly in line as possible until he has provided a sufficient number to<br />
make his raft - in the meanwhile the slaves are busy in constructing huts and making<br />
their little arrangements by the time the master returns which sometimes happens<br />
after he has penetrated from 2 to 3 miles in the for est - they then immediately begin<br />
failing the trees which are often of a great thickness . This thickness is reduced by<br />
squaring until it be reduced to a size proportioned to the strength of the crew who<br />
are to remove the log.<br />
When they have squared the Whole they then begin opening a road - for this<br />
purpose they cut down all the growth between the farthest stick and the stream to<br />
the breadth of 3 or 4 Yards taking care to throw the trunks across the road that they<br />
~ay answer the purpose of rollers . The then affix a rope to the several pieces of<br />
timber and by main strength haul it to the river 's side.<br />
. D~ring this time a boat is perpetually employed in fetching plantain~ etc . for<br />
their subsistence and is generally 5 Days on its voyage .<br />
d<br />
?wn<br />
After the raft is prepared it is slung over the sides of a large punt and towed<br />
the stream where a part is sawed up into boards which are sold from 5 to 6<br />
shvers per superficial foot and the block in proportion .<br />
h !he most. valuable woods are the Determa, Wallaba Crab Wood Greeneart,<br />
S1sseree, Sirrabaillee, Callibaillie etc. , '<br />
78 .
J<br />
•<br />
Animal labour is totally excluded unless it be that of the horse when used for<br />
the saddle or chair - this is not so much to be wondered at when it is considered that<br />
the low country does not provide even a pebble. A team of Oxen or horses with a<br />
heavy draught would destroy the best road in Demerary in the rainy season. As for<br />
the interior the soil is so swampy that an animal of burthen would sink to its belly at<br />
every step. However, the colonists contrive to intersect the country with such a<br />
multitude of canals that the heaviest articles are delivered them at a very cheap rate.<br />
The cutting of grass is very laborious and tiresome and as it is the only herbaceous<br />
food of the horses it is necessary to secure great quantities of it. The only way<br />
used here to obtain it is by sending out the neg roes with a knife who by this tedious<br />
operation at length collects a bundle which may weigh 80 lbs. which he binds like a<br />
wheat sheaf and carries off - it is remarkable that the scythe sickle flail plough waggon<br />
or even hand barrow are absolutely unknown in the Colony.<br />
The grants of Plantations allow them to run 7 50 rods back; if a Planter would<br />
push farther , he was obliged to make an application to the grand Council in Holland<br />
who rarely ref use his request.<br />
Negroes<br />
The negroes are subsisted at a very easy rate; a bunch of plantains, which will<br />
last them a week , and a little salt fish, form their delicacies. As for their cloathing<br />
[sic], the far greater part of them have only a narrow strip of bunting to bind round<br />
their middle, while many of the younger classes have not even this ornament. However,<br />
in some families they are comfortably cloathed [sic], and fed with scraps which<br />
have reached the second day - their lodgings are , however , on the bare floor where<br />
they generally lay promiscuously.<br />
They are punished very severely; altho ' it depends very much on the disposition<br />
of their owners , whether they go thro' a constant whipping, or whether they<br />
experience a milder fate. Theft and desertion are generally left to the fiscal, whose<br />
agents apply from two to five hundred lashes (according to their sentence) with a<br />
long whip which lacerates them horribly . These lashes are always applied on the<br />
bare breech , and the culprit prevented sitting thereon for three months .<br />
Crimes of greater magnitude are extenuated by the rack and subsequent<br />
decapitation .<br />
The Negroes are allowed the priviledge {sic} of ~e Sunday, when they come<br />
79
. L ,<br />
into the Town 'th t . ,,..<br />
, e1 · er o work m deaning out the trenches etc. or Withal d<br />
or vegetabl<br />
. es,<br />
h · h h . ' ' oa of f ·<br />
W 1c t ey dispose of for their own emolument. After the rtut<br />
receiv~d the amount of their perquisite, they either lay out the money in pr Y h~ve<br />
~ome httle necessaries , or otherwise in drinking, gambling, and dancing; and ~~~~g<br />
is generally concluded by one or more battles.<br />
Y<br />
A negro funeral is conducted with a mock solemnity which is truly farcical<br />
While the funeral service is performing , a number of t~em form a dance, in whi~h<br />
they are joined. after the internment, by those who assisted thereat.<br />
Bucks<br />
The Bucks or native Indians are wandering Tribes. They seldom stay ve<br />
Jong in a settlement or at most until the Death of one of their tribe when th~<br />
immediately decamp.<br />
Their huts are open at the sides and covered at the top with Trulee leaves·<br />
they light fire in the area in the evening previous to their sleeping in their hammocks'.<br />
the smoke of which greatly conduces to keep off the insects.<br />
They are exceedingly phlegmatic and cannot be easily provoked unless by<br />
taking liberties with their women.<br />
They are generally short and thick but by no means muscular and destitute of<br />
the energy and vivacity of the North American tribes.<br />
These people are under the protection of the Dutch Government who find<br />
them the only barrier against the desertion of their Negroes who are frequently<br />
apprehended by the Bucks.<br />
i<br />
• •<br />
Their ingenuity is tolerably dis plaid in the manufacture of lines, twine and<br />
hammocks of the bark of a tree besides very fine cotton hammocks extremely well<br />
spun and wove (which sometimes sell as high as 80 Dollars). Pegals which are<br />
double baskets of a square form and impenetrable to the rain being made of cane<br />
and stuffed with plantain leaves: Cassava sieves, Baskets - Brick Pots etc .<br />
. -t •<br />
Several of them are domiciliated with the whites and make good servants -<br />
they likewise will often work in clearing Plantations for-a 'trifling recompense.<br />
They have a favourite practice of painting themselves red with the juice of a<br />
80
.., .<br />
plant called rocou. They go entirely naked having only a small strip of cloth round<br />
their middle. The women wear a small apron curiously wrought with beads. Some<br />
of these tribes are named as follows: Waraous, Capissahns, Cabissees, Pariahnes ,<br />
Quapissans , Tigres , Arawcas or Arouacs.<br />
It appears that the Bucks, who were the principal means of suppressing two<br />
insurrections , were defrauded of the reward promised them for bringing in the right<br />
hands of the bush or maroon negroes , for which they were to receive 300 florins<br />
each. Whereas on bringing in one hundred of these hands , they were presented with<br />
a few dollars only. The consequence has been that they have declared themselves<br />
neutrals on every future occasion of that kind, which may be productive of fatal<br />
consequences to the colony on some future day.<br />
The Bucks and Buckines frequently hold an intercourse with the negroes ; the<br />
children produced thereby are called Caribogres and are generally an active and<br />
intelligent race .<br />
The increase of rice here is astonishing ; 5,000 pounds per acre have been<br />
gathered from some of the uncultivated islands in Essequibo, which are covered at<br />
every spring tide ; yet notwithstanding this fertility, its culture is very little attended to,<br />
although it sometimes fetches five stivers per pound .<br />
\ ,. -:~<br />
81 . .<br />
;. ..
ii7W<br />
BOOK REVIEWS<br />
Colin Baber and Henry B. Jeffrey, <strong>Guyana</strong>: Politics, Econorn.<br />
and Society (London: Frances Pinter (Publishers}, 1986), xvii, 203 P~~s<br />
The editor of this multi-disciplinary series about 'Marxist Regimes' hailed th·<br />
volume as ' ... the first comprehensive boo k on G uyanese po I 1bcs, . . economics and<br />
lS<br />
society'. The series, he wrote, was envisaged as 'textbooks ' and each volume deals<br />
with a separate country and was prepared by scholars who had first-hand knowledg<br />
of the country concerned. Its aim was to show that, depending on a wide variety 0 ~<br />
national factors, the pursuit of Marxism has produced different forms.<br />
The authors of this book set thernselves the task of studying the political<br />
transformation which took place in <strong>Guyana</strong> up to 1985. Research for this book<br />
seems to have concluded in August 1985, the same month as the death of President<br />
Forbes Burnham . This event gave the authors the unique opportunity to evaluate<br />
the foregoing twenty years of Burnham ' s tenure of off ice and to speculate about the<br />
future under his successor, Desmond Hoyte .<br />
In many respects, the central focus of the book is Forbes Burnham himself<br />
who , the authors argued:<br />
'... believed that fortune had placed him in a unique historical situation<br />
which would allow him to construct socialism, even radical socialism,<br />
on the American continent. ' (p.2).<br />
Hence, from a methodological point of view, the authors adopted from the start,<br />
various levels of analysis - national, institutional and individual - in their approach to<br />
this subject. The task they faced was made lighter by a very sensible organization of<br />
the book. It is well-served by an explanatory series' editor 's preface, authors ' introduction<br />
and sufficient supplementary material - political map, statistical tables, data<br />
charts - to satisfy the average reader. The chapters are logically arranged, starting<br />
with the geographical and historical setting and continuing with discussions of the<br />
background political and social issues. The main body of the book is taken up with<br />
the People 's National Congress - the ruling party - the constitution, central and local<br />
government, mass organizations and political dissent, the economy, and domestic<br />
82
and foreign policies. The final chapter looks at '<strong>Guyana</strong>; Beyond Burnham'.<br />
On the surface, this arrangement accounts for the most important aspects of<br />
the study but, on closer reading , it becomes clearer that the book neither analyses<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> from a Marxist perspective as the editor promised, nor covers the subject of<br />
the country's politics, economics and society comprehensively. The former deficiency<br />
is understanable since , in spite of the series title, 'Marxist Regimes' , it would<br />
be futile to persist in using a Marxist measuring rod on a regime that was not Marxist<br />
at all. The latter deficiency , however, is unforgivable in a would-be textbook.<br />
In place of a textbook study of <strong>Guyana</strong> , the authors have produced what<br />
amounts to an inquiry into the People 's National Congress (PNC) regime, simpliciter.<br />
One entire chapter (Chapter 4), for example , is devoted to that Party's structure and<br />
operations, which are described in rather tedious and unnecessary detail. The book<br />
ignores the dozen or so other political parties, and numerous mass and non-governmental<br />
organizations which sprang up during this period. These were never controlled<br />
by the PNC , but surely must have played a part in the evolving polity in that<br />
period. Similarly, very little mention is made of ethnic groups other than the East<br />
Indians and Africans and of their place in the society or economy and the roles of<br />
their socio-cultural organizations. As a result of these shortcomings , the direction<br />
taken by the authors diverged markedly from the objectives described by the series'<br />
editor.<br />
A striking weakness of this book arises from the different styles of writing and<br />
use of language by the authors. Two chapters, in particular - Chapter 5 'Constitutional<br />
Arrangements ' and Chapter 8 'The Guyanese Economy ' - are coherent and<br />
well-structured with short sentences written in lucid language; they are broad in scope,<br />
well-argued and apply to <strong>Guyana</strong> as a whole . By and large, the other chapters are<br />
poorly written ; sentences are long, stringing together a variety of ideas clumsily<br />
connected by conjunctions. Compared with the crisp style of the previously mentioned<br />
chapters, the language is loose, bordering on the colloquial, and the meaning<br />
is often vague.<br />
This uneven treatment of the subject has affected the coherence of the book<br />
as a whole. As the PNC is the main focus, it is impossible for the reader to form a<br />
truly comprehensive picture of <strong>Guyana</strong>'s 'politics, ·economi~ and society'. Part of<br />
the problem may have arisen out of the slender source matenal used. R~ferenc~ to<br />
local newspapers and party publications are Sijrprisingly ~ant , conveying the 1m-<br />
83
pr n that some of the conclusions were arrived at by hunches or insider kn<br />
dg_ . -~!though this lends a refreshing tone of authenticity, it also heightenso;~<br />
subJ chvity and bias so evident throughout the book.<br />
~<br />
The ambitious promise to provide a comprehensive account of <strong>Guyana</strong> .<br />
' I rt ·t lS,<br />
t h er~ f or , . unfulfilled. Like Mr. Jones s egg, some pa s are qui e excellent', but<br />
alas. bias, poor presentation and unconvincing arguments, weaken this book. It'<br />
usefulness lies in its attempts to account for the causes of the crisis in Guy,ma unde~<br />
Forbes Burnham and to predict the course of development under his successor<br />
Desmond Hoyte. In this regard, it has made a modest contribution to the writing of<br />
the contemporary political history of a particularly diffic~lt ~ericx:l by penetrating the<br />
political apparatus of the PNC more than any other pubhcahon heretofore has done.<br />
In this respect, therefore , the book is timely and well-conceived. And, even if<br />
the authors' execution has fallen short of the editor 's ambitions and the readers'<br />
expectations , it has succeeded in throwing some light on the dark processes which<br />
brought Guyanese politics, economics and society to the state they were in by August<br />
1985.<br />
David Granger<br />
MADAN GOPAL: POLITICS, RACE AND YOUTH IN GUYANA<br />
Mellen Research University Press, San Francisco, <strong>1992</strong>.<br />
Having come to political power through a coalition with the small, businessoriented<br />
United Force in l 964 ~ and having led the colony to political 'independence'<br />
in 1966 (with the : complicity. of Anglo-American imperialism in a series of political<br />
events quite richly documented in Dr. Cheddi Jagan 's The West on Tria~, the<br />
People 's National Congress (PNC) came to rely heavily on a combined strategy of<br />
fraudulent elections and political repression to maintain control of the Guyanese<br />
state. After generai elections in 1968, the fairness of which were widely disputed,<br />
the party was able to discard its coalition partner through the individual claim to<br />
55.6o/i) of the national votes (as compared to 40% in the previous national elections<br />
in 1964). ·In local government elections held in 1970 the PNC was again able to<br />
gain ascendancy through corrupt electoral practices, and through a consequent boy-<br />
84
- .<br />
cott by its main political rival, the People 's Progressive Party (PPP), in the final<br />
stages. By 197 4 the PNC was advocating its own paramountcy over the institutions<br />
of the state, and in a series of nationalizations in 1971, 1975, and 1976, brought<br />
under its control the bauxite and sugar industries, the two major earners of foreign<br />
currency, which were up to the time of their nationalization in the hands of local<br />
subsidiaries of multinational companies located in Canada, the United States, and<br />
Britain. During the 1970s private schools were abolished and education brought<br />
under the full control of government. The media too (radio stations and national<br />
newspaper) were placed under government control. The dominance of African<br />
Guyanese (the traditional support base of the PNC) in the armed forces as well as in<br />
the Civil Service (now Public Service) tended to facilitate the PNC' s movements towards<br />
full control of the society.<br />
General elections ("selections") in 1973, 1980, and 1985, assured the PNC<br />
not merely of a simple majority, but of more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament.<br />
The situation that emerged made a farce of parliamentary democracy, and<br />
the PNC's control by 1976 of more than eighty per cent of the Guyanese economy<br />
and of the public media created a situation that came close to approximating the<br />
state of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty Four. As Orwell found his hope in the<br />
"proles", so did the hope for Guyanese emit from a determined opposition, led by<br />
the PPP and the Working People's Alliance (WPA) and including a few hardy unions,<br />
the Anglican and Catholic Churches, and some dedicated individuals attached to<br />
these and other institutions, like the <strong>Guyana</strong> Human Rights Association (GHRA). As<br />
the economic crisis of the late nineteen seventies and of the ninety eighties took root<br />
in the Guyanese society, the response of the PNC state to heightened forms of<br />
popular dissent became an increasing spiral of political repression. The most dramatic<br />
manifestation of this repression was the assassination of world-renowned scholar<br />
and co-leader of the WPA, Dr. Walter Rodney, on 13 June 1980. Other politicallyinspired<br />
killings during this period included Edward Dublin and Ohene Koama (both<br />
of the WPA) and Father Bernard Darke, a Catholic priest.<br />
The state media played a very persistent role in the state's ideological penetration<br />
of the society. Espousing a philosophy of Cooperative Socialism in 197 0,<br />
the PNC moved towards a more Stalinist position in 1974. Not only did the Party<br />
now profess an ideology of Marxism-Leninism, but also the PNC government proceeded<br />
to establish diplomatic and trade relations with the socialist bloc of the day·<br />
In 197 6 the PPP under what is widely believed to be "encouragement" from the<br />
USSR, adopted a' policy of critical support for the PNC government, and during the<br />
next year the Cuban government granted the Prime Minister and leader of the PNC,<br />
85
then on a state visit to Cuba , its highest national honour , the Jose Marti a<br />
1980. following the referendum of 1978 which was as contrived as gene;al ;ar~ . In<br />
had become , the PNC ··won·· the approval that allowed it to frame a new c~cti~ns<br />
tion for the nation . An outstanding feature of this new constitution was th nstituextensive<br />
powers vested upon the new office of Executive President. This offi: very<br />
of course taken up by the leader of the PNC and then Prime Minister of the co~n~~~<br />
Madan Gopal's Politics,<br />
Race and Yuth in _ G_uyana captures With<br />
great sensitivity the oppressiveness of the PNC d1~tatorsh1p m the e~rly 1980s. In<br />
the very selection of his sample of respondents , for instance, Gopal points out that·<br />
spite of his deliberate attempt to ~void the inclusi~n of young people who we~:<br />
known to be excessively critical of tne Government, 1t turned out that all the participants<br />
in the study were very strongly opposed to it. Gopal himself became the object<br />
of suspicion and distrust as he attempted to recruit a sample for his study by himself.<br />
While there are criticisms to be made about the sample in question, the early attitudes<br />
of suspicion. fear, distrust and rejection of the government were very widespread<br />
in the Guyanese society at that point in time .<br />
The oppr essiveness of the Guyanese society was reflected in suspicion and<br />
distrust arising not only out of the fear of victimization by the PNC state , but also out<br />
of the related breakdown of Jaw and order as weU as of social values. Gopal cites<br />
sources like the Catholic Standard newspaper and the <strong>Guyana</strong> Human Rights Association<br />
Reports to show the erosion of basic rights and privileges. widespread corruption<br />
, lack of accountability in the use of public finances , fatal shootings of suspects<br />
by the police , and the increase of crime in the society. Added to the scarcity in<br />
drugs and foodstuff , and the very high cost of living, it becomes understandable that<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> should develop , according to one commentator , the highest rate of emigration<br />
per capita , of any country in the world (save those countries involved in civil<br />
disturbances) . With this background , in which Gopal's work itself is rich, it becomes<br />
possible to explore the study in a fuller way .<br />
Politics, Race and Youth in <strong>Guyana</strong> attempts to discern the perceptions of a<br />
group of East Indian adolescents from a working-class background about the nature<br />
of inter-ethnic relations as these relations respond to the entrenchment of political<br />
dictatorship in <strong>Guyana</strong> . Interviews of these adolescents are : conducted very informally<br />
and the conversational style popularly known as the gyaff is used with great<br />
effect. In the course the attitudes of the respondents themselves on the question are<br />
inve tigated. In selected instances probing continued in comparative depth.<br />
86
The adole cents are given a fair amount of scope t d f· t t · · ·<br />
. . . o e me s ra egic pnon -<br />
ties, which are then made the basis of m-depth investigation. All the adolescents<br />
aspire to "~oing fo~ard " and to ''betterment'', (concepts which the researcher duly<br />
explores with the mform~nts) . ~he "coming together " (another concept similarly<br />
explored) of the ~o ma~?r ~thrnc grou.?s , East Indians and African-Guyanese, is<br />
seen as a prere~u1s1te for gomg forward and for 'betterment·. "Coming together '<br />
does not end with a focus on the masses , but should in the judgement of the participants<br />
inform the approach of the main opposition parties of the day - the WPA and<br />
the PPP.<br />
Gopal's findings cohere with the visible evidence of the period. The traditional<br />
constituency of African-Guyanese masses was becoming alienated from the<br />
ruling PNC, and the WPA in particular was developing a large multi-ethnic following,<br />
which at one time seemed to be infringing upon the PPP 's traditional constituency<br />
among East Indian sugar workers.<br />
The integration of the perceptions of the youth within the larger framework<br />
of the political struggle of the day consolidates what is known of the period and what<br />
Gopal himself surmises . This in itself is a very useful achievement of Gopal' s study.<br />
It is not unrealistic for the reader of Politics, Race and Youth in <strong>Guyana</strong> to<br />
expect new insights into the problem, however. The main reason why these are not<br />
forthcoming has to do with deficiencies in Gopal ' s methodology which will now be<br />
examined. In chapter one of his book Gopal states that:<br />
The aim of this study is to examine the consciousness of a small<br />
group of working class adolescents in <strong>Guyana</strong>. A qualitative approach<br />
is used and the orientation is inter-disciplinary. One particular ethnic<br />
group, East Indians, is selected for the conduct of this inquiry and a<br />
specific sector of consciousness is identified for study: that concerned<br />
with inter-ethnic relations.<br />
To specify further the boundaries of the study i~ is ~ecess~ry to point<br />
to the strategy adopted for pursuing the investigation. It involves an<br />
1nd1rect · · approac h : et h n1c · re l a ti ons ar e examined by focussing on the<br />
l·t· l In other words through an examination of adolescent<br />
po 11ca scene. , ·tful sought<br />
consciousness of political events in <strong>Guyana</strong>, frui answers are. f<br />
to issues normally conceptua 11ze . d as fall" 1<br />
ng within the province o<br />
race relations. (Gopal, p. l). ·<br />
87
The fieldwork for the study, according to Gopal , was done in Guyan . ~<br />
1982 during the four months between May and September . It consisted of sev a in<br />
seven unstructured interviews with twenty East Indian adolescents, all aged be;:,ntysixtee~<br />
and eighteen years at the inception of the fieldwork. . Six of these res;~~<br />
dents/ mfor.mants were girls and fourteen boys. Most of the interviews were ta _<br />
recorded , according to Gopal, "usually in the privacy of the participants' horn!~<br />
(Gopal, p. I 07). Originally twenty-two students were recruited to participate in th~<br />
study, but "2 of the girls dropped out after the first meeting , despite their initial<br />
enthusiasm . It was later learnt that their parents did not wish them to undertake the<br />
risks involved '. (Gopal, p. 111).<br />
The interviews fell into two major sections of fieldwork. In the first there<br />
were twenty-seven interviews in which all twenty respondents took part . "They were<br />
conducted in an informal and casual manner and were designed to gauge the main<br />
emphases the interviewees put upon their experience ". (Gopal, p. 107). In the<br />
second part of the fieldwork there were fifty additional interviews, which though as<br />
informal as the first set, "were characterized by more probing by way of questioning.<br />
They were intended to explore in greater depth the basic emphases discovered in the<br />
first part". (Gopal, p. 107) : Only six participants :w-ere chosen in order to facilitate<br />
this process of probing. Gopal makes the point that:<br />
East Indians were chosen for several reasons ~ To begin with, the<br />
study was designed to involve an in-depth, fairly comprehensive exploration<br />
of consciousness . Though concentration on idiosyncratic<br />
particulars was not a primary aim, contact with them and assessment<br />
of their import (as constituents of the phenomenal world) were prerequisites<br />
for the selection of typical emphases; a small sample chosen<br />
from the researcher 's own ethnic group was ideally suited for this<br />
purpose . The advantages of such a choice included a drastic reduction<br />
in the complications posed by the ethnic factor, relative ease in<br />
establishing and maintaining genuine rapport and an increased assurance<br />
of effective communication based on competence in, and personal<br />
knowledge (Polanyi, 1962)* of a host of linguistic, social and<br />
cultural norms peculiar to the group in question. In view of the limited<br />
time available for fieldwork, its subjective orientation, and the delicate<br />
nature of the issues (race and politics} and the potential for disruption<br />
(and worse) in a politically repressive enviroment these are no inconsiderable<br />
benefits. The fact that scholarly studie~ of the Indo-Carib-<br />
88
ean population are few and that work on the youth of this group is<br />
non-existent also influenced the selection of this sample. (Gopal, pp.<br />
107-109) .<br />
In considering the fieldwork , serious questions arise about the representativeness<br />
of the sample Gopal uses. Even if one were to accept Gopal's justification for<br />
choosing participants from exclusively one ethnic group (and this will be discussed<br />
later in the review), the sampling technique he uses is one clearly given to bias, that<br />
is, over and above whatever bias is legitimately a part of any measure of "subjective<br />
attitudes" of the type that Gopal is attempting. For example, in the small sample of<br />
the restricted class of East Indian youth that Gopal is studying, women are quite<br />
clearly under-represented. Yet Gopal boldly asserts that: "Difference on the basis of<br />
gender was not noteworthy in the adolescents ' outlook". (Gopal, p.206). While this<br />
may be the case in Gopal's sample, one is very uncertain as to how valid this statement<br />
is for youth (even only East Indian youth) in <strong>Guyana</strong>.<br />
A second example that brings out the inadequacy of Gopal's sample concerns<br />
its geographical restrictiveness. Gopal states about the participants\respondents<br />
of his study: "Four of these resided in Georgetown. Most of the others resided<br />
within a distance of 14 miles from the city. Three lived much further away in the<br />
rural setting on the East Coast of Demerara". (Gopal, p.111). One has to view quite<br />
sceptically the capacity for such a sample to speak validly for the national population.<br />
Indeed, even in Gopal 's geographically restricted sample, he discerned variations in<br />
responses that cannot be ignored, and that hold implications for the study as a<br />
whole. About his informants for instance he states:<br />
Two of those who lived in or near Georgetown seemed to be a bit<br />
more sympathetic towards blacks. In part, this was probably due to<br />
their being able, on account of their residential location, to observe<br />
more closely their hardships. They also often overheard their condemnation<br />
of the Government. (Gopal, p.206).<br />
The reader of Politics, Race and Youth in <strong>Guyana</strong> can only guess about the<br />
variations in the attitudes among the youth of the East Indian population in a more<br />
representative national sample.<br />
Thirdly, there is absolutely no attempt to justify the sample on scientific<br />
grounds. All that the reader is told is that "the researcher had originally intended to<br />
89
~ecruit at least some of the participants on his own initiative" (Gopal, p.109) .<br />
mg encountered difficulties in so doing:<br />
Hav-<br />
He sought the help and cooperation of four experienced , senior teachers<br />
, employed at three different secondary schools locat~d within a<br />
radius of forty miles from Georgetown . He depended on them exclusively<br />
for his sample and abandoned all further attempts at personally<br />
initiating contact with potential participants . (Gopal , p .110).<br />
Paradoxically , Gopal does show awareness of the potential for bias in his sample.<br />
He explains that "in order to guard against bias, all teachers were requested to use<br />
their judgement and experience in eliminating from their choice students who were<br />
known to be excessivelly critical of the Government "· (Gopal , p.110). Obviously this<br />
does not go far enough.<br />
Yet another important example of the lack of scientific rigour in the study<br />
derives out of the use of a very shaky and contradictory conceptualization of the<br />
whole data coHection process. In fact, the writer could well be accused of tautology.<br />
In chapter ~ight c;;f the book he asks: "To what extent can a sample of twenty<br />
inf or man ts, subsequently· reduced to six, be considered a sound basis for generalization?"<br />
(Gopal, p.243) . In answer to his own question he states:<br />
The subjective outlook of the small group was not intended to be used<br />
uncritically as the sole basis for drawing inferences about the larger<br />
macro-enviroment. The fieldwork was in fact aimed at refining and<br />
extending a prior understanding of the latter derived from historical<br />
and sociological analysis ... (Gopal , pp. 243-244).<br />
. .<br />
The writ~r cites "his own experience and observation during the field research in the<br />
setting " and his "personal knowledge" as means by which prior understanding is<br />
achieved .<br />
: ' : ..._ ; I ,. . ,<br />
. This pa;tb is.<br />
, of course ~ J~ded with pitfalls . The co~h"~is ~pon.<br />
the writer's<br />
own misperce?!ions that should mandatorily direct the testing of hypotheses empirically,<br />
are sacnf1ced on the altar of the assumption that his "sociological analyses ",<br />
"?bserv~tion" and "personal .knowledge" . abom the myriad issues that affect the soc1aJ<br />
relationships of grou J t t h d · · d d<br />
ps re evan o t e stu · y are beyond reproach and can m ee<br />
90
e as a methodological complement to the actual e . .<br />
serv . d 1<br />
1<br />
1 h· mptnca work done Gopal' s<br />
restncte samp e en arges t ts domain of specul ti d . ·<br />
sJ11a d I d d a on an undermines the val·d·ty<br />
of the stu y. n ee one may suggest that if the writ \ h . . .<br />
I J h d h d t d er researc er s ms1ghts are<br />
so deep, w y oes e con uc a stu yin the first place?<br />
In fact, what comes through to the reader of Pol"t· R<br />
· h · · ,<br />
1<br />
res, ace and Youth<br />
·n <strong>Guyana</strong> 1st e 1mpress1on that Gopal s methodology is th t·<br />
' . . h . e ra 1ona 112ahon . . made<br />
of the i~prov1satton(s t e ~ 1ter. was forced to make to the study because of constraints<br />
m resources espec1a 1 y time) and because of the absenc<br />
e o<br />
f<br />
a we<br />
ll<br />
-conceived<br />
.<br />
plan.<br />
As a final . comment . on Gopal 's methodology , in part1·cul ar h· 1s samp l e, one<br />
has to challenge ht'~ exclusive fo~us o~ East Indian youth as participants\ informants.<br />
Gopal does ~elat~ a long term 1nterd1sci~linary interest in the society and culture of<br />
the overse~s Indians on an aspe_ct ~f which, namely the subjective immigrant experience,<br />
he 1s currently concentrating · (Gopal, p.xi). In another passage quoted above<br />
Gopal alludes to the advantages of "a small sample chosen from the researcher's<br />
own ethnic group ". While this need Go pal identifies for studies that analyse the East<br />
Indian experience in the Caribbean does legitimately exist, it is noteworthy that there<br />
is a growing body of work on this subject . (See , for instance , Dabydeen, D. and<br />
Samaroo, B., eds. , 1987; and Klass, M., 1961 and 1991). There seems relatively<br />
little to be gained for this particular study, in spite of Gopal's assertions, by the<br />
exclusiveness of the sample. In fact, the "drastic reduction in complications posed by<br />
the ethnic factor '' that Gopal sees as a benefit from the ethnic exclusiveness of the<br />
sample is very likely to be off-set by a limiting of insights into the problem as a whole.<br />
Why settle for the perceptions of one of two major groups when the complementary<br />
perceptions of African -Guyanese youth would give a more accurate representation<br />
of the true picture at the time with respect to the state of race and class relations as<br />
they affected the political question? Indeed, quite often, Gopal 's<br />
informants\ respondents are made to speculate about the very attitudes of African<br />
Guyanese on que stions of race and politics. He himself observed that in the 1970s<br />
there emerged a new -found consciousness among African -Guyanese who "have been<br />
making overtures to their East Indian counterparts"(Gopal,<br />
p .102). It is unfortunate<br />
that Gopal did not find it necessary or possible to explore the parallel attitude of<br />
African-Guyanese youth . Executing this might have necessitated the use of re~earch<br />
assistants but there is no doubt that the study as a whole would have been ennched.<br />
J.B. Land,is s study of 1973 comparing racial attitudes of Africans and East Indians in<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> is instructive in this re spect.<br />
91
Although the whole of the Guyanese working class became marginalized<br />
under the PNC regime (see Khemraj Rai, 1983), the focus on . youth does have<br />
advantages beyond increasing the manageability of the study. Gopal refers to the<br />
dearth of studies on East Indian youth in particular, and to this justification might be<br />
added the fact that it is in the the attitudes of the youth that much of the potential for<br />
social progress at the present and in the future rests. _This _w~s as true in 1982 as it<br />
is now. Yet the restriction of his sample to just East Indians hmits an understanding of<br />
the process of class formation that Gopal explores as a central theme in his notion of<br />
"Coming Together For Betterment" .<br />
An important consequence of Gopal 's specification, especially at the level of<br />
ethnicity, is that it is impossible now to extend the p~rameters that he has established<br />
in his work. The simple fact is that Guyanese society has begun so fundamental a<br />
change since October <strong>1992</strong> that the whole framework in which Gopal conducted his<br />
1982 study has become changed . The publication of the 1982 study a decade later<br />
has consequently severely hampered the possibility for an extension of Go pal, s work.<br />
' I<br />
I<br />
I<br />
I<br />
I<br />
I<br />
I<br />
I<br />
In spite of the criticisms that will be made below of its .p)ace in Gopal's overall<br />
methodological treatment of the problem he investigates , the background material<br />
the writer presents is indeed. impressive and goes a Jong way in establishing the work<br />
as important. This background is not merely of .':1 general historical nature , but is<br />
extended to consider the history of race relations in <strong>Guyana</strong> . Most impressive is the<br />
tapestry of relevant scholarship that the writer weaves into . the study as _a whole.<br />
There can be no doubt that such background treatment can easily sustain a much<br />
more substantial study, and this fact helps to uphold the suspicion -that if only in<br />
scope , the actual study·.upon ·which Gopal embarks is a convenient adaptation of a<br />
more elaborate idea. · ·<br />
. . Included in his background work are important conceptual efforts. Gopal,<br />
!or instance, discusses both the theories of social and cultural pluralism, and of Marxis~.<br />
He ~ro~oses in his study to give equal weight to ethnicity as to social class as<br />
vanables m his analysis. It is noteworthy that leading Caribbean intellectuals like<br />
C._L.R. James , who like Gopal reject the Marxian orthodoxy that race is<br />
epiphenomena] , tend overall to give more significance to class as a social force than<br />
to race . In so doing, however , James manages to maintain an accommodation of<br />
race that establishes him as a leading Pan-Africanist. .<br />
Unfortunately there is the tendency for Gopal's backgr~und ·work to pver -<br />
92
whelm the study as a whole. Too many sections of his study are overrun by introductory<br />
and exp!anatory remarks and justificatory comments . There is also the deliberate<br />
introduction . and development . of many key concepts central t o G op~ l' s purpose:<br />
congruence, mco~gruen~e , 1ntermediat~ .i~congruence, extreme incongruence, coming<br />
together, p~rtial coming together , vis1b11ity, blockage , threat, retrogressive movement,<br />
progressive movement and so on . The certain effect of this approach upon<br />
the advanced student of Guyanese politics (and for that matter an advanced student<br />
of the social sciences) is the feeling of tedium , and often of the belabouring of the<br />
obvious. The scores of typographical errors in the work also do not help Gopal's<br />
cause.<br />
One urgent and necessary task of social and political analysis of <strong>Guyana</strong> of<br />
the 1970s and the 1980s is to help the victims of the PNC dictatorship to understand<br />
and appreciate the nature of the tragedy that befell them and to, over time,<br />
exonerate themselves of its effects on their lives as they recommit themselves to the<br />
task of building a truly human society . Interdisciplinary scholarship of Gopal's type<br />
is indeed specially suited to this objective. Gopal, however, does not really advance<br />
our understanding of the period, even though he does reinforce what is known of it.<br />
As a consequence he provides a work which seems to be specially suited to the needs<br />
of the undergraduate student , particularly if he or she has a limited exposure to the<br />
Guyanese reality. The choice of his sample itself tends to invite an empathy from the<br />
young reader. The slow and crucial details of the perceived "coming together " of<br />
different ethnic or racial groups in the struggle against a common oppression, his<br />
notion of a "reduced gap " between the two major sections of the Guyanese working<br />
class, an "intermediate incongruence", does constitute a very basic lesson in the<br />
formation of classes . The simple kinds of generalizations provided in Politics,<br />
Race and Youth will certainly not satisfy the more advanced student.<br />
Gopal' s stated intention "to preserve a balance between the micro-psychological<br />
and macro -social levels" of social life (Gopal, p. xii) in his study, reflects an<br />
approach of serious intellectual depth and training . The restrictiveness of hi~ sample<br />
does not allow for this realization . While one has to contemplate soberly Gopars<br />
concern about the "potential for disruption (or worse) in a poli~,ically. r~pres~ive<br />
enviroment' ' in which he conducted his study, it is also clear that the hm1ted time<br />
available for fieldwork" made its full impact upon the study. The consequence of<br />
these circumstances is that the great promise of Politics, Race and Youth in<br />
<strong>Guyana</strong> has not been fulfilled.<br />
Joseph Theo Morris<br />
<strong>93</strong>
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
0 byd n, David and amaroo , B. (eds.) fnd,·a ,·~ the Caribbean (Hertford : Hans ·b Pub1· h<br />
I IS ing ltd .' } 987)<br />
I lo . Morton East Indians in the Caribbean: A Study of Cultural Persistence (New York- C 1<br />
Univ r 11 Pr s . 196 J ). · 0 urnbia<br />
l{la s. Morton Singing with Sai Baba: The Politics of Revitalization in Trinidad (Oxford : Westv· p<br />
199 1). iew ress,<br />
Lan di . J B . .. Racial Attitudes of Africans a nd Indians in <strong>Guyana</strong> ··, Social and Economic Studies, 22( 4<br />
) Dec.<br />
I 973. pp .427-439 .<br />
Rai. K. · Periph eralizing the Guyanese Working Class ·· Transition , Issue 8, 1983, pp . 25 -36 .<br />
Thomas, C Y. ··State Capitalism in Guya na : An Asse ssmen t of Burnh am ·s Cooperative<br />
and H Cohen Crisis in the Caribbean (London : Hein emann, 1983), pp . 27-48 .<br />
Republic " in FA b<br />
· rn ursley<br />
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~<br />
~~<br />
94
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____,./<br />
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Denominational Ed .<br />
uca<br />
No.27 , FM . Drakes, The Development of Political Organization in <strong>Guyana</strong> up to 1953 .<br />
No.28 , &sd eo Mangru, Crossing Kala Pani: Mortality on Emigrant<br />
teenth Century .<br />
Ships to the Caribbean in the Nine<br />
"No.29 , lneke Velzing, The Berbice Slave Revolt-of 27th February, J 763 .<br />
"No.30 , Anna J. Benjamin , The Origins of the Berbice Slave Revolt, 1763 .<br />
No.31 , Anand James , The Emigration of Liberated Africans to British Guiana, 1841-1852 .<br />
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No.33 , Basdeo Mangru, Imperial Trusteeship and East Indian Indentured Labour in British Guiana .<br />
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No.35 , Reuben J . Kartick, Joseph Beaumont: Chief Justice of British Guiana 1863 -1868 .<br />
No.36 , Francis M. Drakes , The People 's Association, 1903 -1921 .<br />
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of 1876 .<br />
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No.44 , Caesar N. Gravesande , Amerindian Jurisdiction in the Guiana Region in the Seventeenth and<br />
Eighteenth Centuries .<br />
No.4S , Eirene O 'Jon , Slave Society in Early Nineteenth Century Berbice .<br />
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No.48 , Lesley M. Potter , Indian and African-Guianese Village Settlement Patterns and inter-Group Relationships,<br />
1871-1921 .<br />
No.49 , Roberta Walker-Kilkenny , Women in Social and Political Struggle in British Guiana, 1946-1953 .<br />
No.SO. Harold A. Lutchman , Constitutional Developments in British Guiana during the Second World<br />
War.<br />
., 8<br />
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No.SI , Hugh W. Payne, The Expulsion of the People's Progressive Party from the Government OJ nt1s<br />
Guiana in 1953 .<br />
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