Marina Krotofil

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Control equipment vulnerabiliCes ICSA-15-099-01A: Siemens SIMATIC HMI Devices VulnerabiliCes (Update A) ICSA-13-274-01: Schneider Electric Telvent SAGE RTU DNP3 Improper Input ValidaCon Vulnerability ICSA-11-307-01: Schneider Electric Vijeo Historian Web Server MulCple VulnerabiliCes ICSA-13-274-01: Siemens SCALANCE X-200 AuthenCcaCon Bypass Vulnerability ICSA-15-111-01: Emerson AMS Device Manager SQL InjecCon Vulnerability ICSA-12-320-01 : ABB AC500 PLC Webserver CoDeSys Vulnerability ICS-ALERT-14-323-01: Advantech EKI-6340 Command InjecCon ICSA-15-048-03: Yokogawa HART Device DTM Vulnerability
ICS-CERT recommendaCon ICSA-13-274-01: Siemens SCALANCE X-200 AuthenCcaCon Bypass Vulnerability IMPACT Successful exploita1on of this vulnerability may allow a:ackers to perform administra1ve opera1ons over the network without authen1ca1on. Impact to individual organiza2ons depends on many factors that are unique to each organiza2on. ICSCERT recommends that organiza2ons evaluate the impact of this vulnerability based on their opera2onal environment, architecture, and product implementa2on.
Page 1 and 2: Rocking the Pocket Book: Hacking Ch
Page 3 and 4: Industrial Control Systems aka SCAD
Page 5 and 6: The world is not the same anymore P
Page 7: Control systems security
Page 11 and 12: TCP/IP based communicaCon Industria
Page 13 and 14: Timing of the DoS aQack 2820 Reacto
Page 15 and 16: Process control
Page 17 and 18: Control loop Actuators Physical pro
Page 19 and 20: Process interdependencies %mol 0.07
Page 21 and 22: Plant floor Sensors Actuators
Page 23 and 24: PLC internals Sensors 1. Copy data
Page 25 and 26: Interlocks q Process safety increas
Page 27 and 28: PID control q PID: proporConal, int
Page 29 and 30: Process control vulnerability 11.2
Page 31 and 32: Operator is not almighty Sanity che
Page 33 and 34: Why to hack SCADA
Page 35 and 36: Why to aQack ICS Industry means big
Page 37 and 38: What can be done to the process Equ
Page 39 and 40: ProducCon damage aQack AQack goal:
Page 41 and 42: Plants for sale From LinkedIn More
Page 43 and 44: Stages of cyber-physical aQacks
Page 45 and 46: Stages of SCADA aQack Access Cleanu
Page 47 and 48: Access
Page 49 and 50: Modern IT hacking q Select a vulner
Page 51 and 52: Know the equipment Stripping column
Page 53 and 54: Espionage q Industrial espionage ha
Page 55 and 56: Max economic damage? ReacCon Refine
Page 57 and 58: Control loop configuraCon
Page 59 and 60:
Understanding points and logic Prog
Page 61 and 62:
Control Every acCon has a reacCon
Page 63 and 64:
Process interdependencies %mol 0.07
Page 65 and 66:
Understanding process response •
Page 67 and 68:
Process control challenges q Proces
Page 69 and 70:
Outcome of the control stage I am 1
Page 71 and 72:
Alarm propagaCon To persist we shal
Page 73 and 74:
Jason Larsen at S4x15: new triangle
Page 75 and 76:
How to break things? AQacker needs
Page 77 and 78:
Catalyst killers q Hot spots above
Page 79 and 80:
Measuring the process Chemical comp
Page 81 and 82:
Technician answer Usage of proxy se
Page 83 and 84:
Engineering answer 160.5 Reactor Ex
Page 85 and 86:
Outcome of the damage stage Product
Page 87 and 88:
Socio-technical system Operator •
Page 89 and 90:
CreaCng forensics footprint 1. Pick
Page 91 and 92:
DefeaCng chemical forensics q If re
Page 93 and 94:
ICCP Regulatory reporCng Just-in-Cm
Page 95 and 96:
State-of-the-art of ICS security TC
Page 97:
Thank you marina.krotofil@tuhh.de @
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Marina Krotofil

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