Marina Krotofil

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TradiConal IT hacking • 1 0day • 1 Clueless user • Repeat unCl done • No security • Move freely Exploit pack • AnCVirus and patch management • Database links • Backup systems
Modern IT hacking q Select a vulnerability from the list of ICS-CERT advisories q Scan Internet to locate vulnerable devices q Exploit • E. Levere:, R. Wightman. Vulnerability Inheritance in Programmable Logic Controllers (GreHack‘13)
Page 1 and 2: Rocking the Pocket Book: Hacking Ch
Page 3 and 4: Industrial Control Systems aka SCAD
Page 5 and 6: The world is not the same anymore P
Page 7 and 8: Control systems security
Page 9 and 10: ICS-CERT recommendaCon ICSA-13-274-
Page 11 and 12: TCP/IP based communicaCon Industria
Page 13 and 14: Timing of the DoS aQack 2820 Reacto
Page 15 and 16: Process control
Page 17 and 18: Control loop Actuators Physical pro
Page 19 and 20: Process interdependencies %mol 0.07
Page 21 and 22: Plant floor Sensors Actuators
Page 23 and 24: PLC internals Sensors 1. Copy data
Page 25 and 26: Interlocks q Process safety increas
Page 27 and 28: PID control q PID: proporConal, int
Page 29 and 30: Process control vulnerability 11.2
Page 31 and 32: Operator is not almighty Sanity che
Page 33 and 34: Why to hack SCADA
Page 35 and 36: Why to aQack ICS Industry means big
Page 37 and 38: What can be done to the process Equ
Page 39 and 40: ProducCon damage aQack AQack goal:
Page 41 and 42: Plants for sale From LinkedIn More
Page 43 and 44: Stages of cyber-physical aQacks
Page 45 and 46: Stages of SCADA aQack Access Cleanu
Page 47: Access
Page 51 and 52: Know the equipment Stripping column
Page 53 and 54: Espionage q Industrial espionage ha
Page 55 and 56: Max economic damage? ReacCon Refine
Page 57 and 58: Control loop configuraCon
Page 59 and 60: Understanding points and logic Prog
Page 61 and 62: Control Every acCon has a reacCon
Page 63 and 64: Process interdependencies %mol 0.07
Page 65 and 66: Understanding process response •
Page 67 and 68: Process control challenges q Proces
Page 69 and 70: Outcome of the control stage I am 1
Page 71 and 72: Alarm propagaCon To persist we shal
Page 73 and 74: Jason Larsen at S4x15: new triangle
Page 75 and 76: How to break things? AQacker needs
Page 77 and 78: Catalyst killers q Hot spots above
Page 79 and 80: Measuring the process Chemical comp
Page 81 and 82: Technician answer Usage of proxy se
Page 83 and 84: Engineering answer 160.5 Reactor Ex
Page 85 and 86: Outcome of the damage stage Product
Page 87 and 88: Socio-technical system Operator •
Page 89 and 90: CreaCng forensics footprint 1. Pick
Page 91 and 92: DefeaCng chemical forensics q If re
Page 93 and 94: ICCP Regulatory reporCng Just-in-Cm
Page 95 and 96: State-of-the-art of ICS security TC
Page 97: Thank you marina.krotofil@tuhh.de @

Marina Krotofil

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