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PDF: 2962 pages, 5.2 MB - Bay Area Council Economic Institute

PDF: 2962 pages, 5.2 MB - Bay Area Council Economic Institute

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Global Reach<br />

Which model—the Chinese or the Indian—ultimately produces the greatest economic benefit<br />

remains to be seen: one manages from the top down in a way that is arguably more efficient but<br />

is largely driven by state policy objectives, strategic guidance and resource allocation; the other<br />

manages more haphazardly, from the ground up, and with the state often an obstacle, struggling<br />

to keep pace with changing conditions. In the long term, India’s slower, more democratic processes<br />

may prove a source of either competitive weakness or strength.<br />

A partial answer rests with India’s focus on software and information technology (IT) services,<br />

rather than manufacturing—a logical development in a country with a deep intellectual tradition<br />

but unreliable water and power supplies, and poor infrastructure for physically getting<br />

goods to market.<br />

The reach of India’s engineers and programmers into core business processes across all sectors—<br />

energy, health care, transportation, urban planning, financial services, telecommunications, retailing—provides<br />

a competitive advantage in industrialized and emerging markets alike. This positions<br />

India as a potential strategic partner and competitor in much broader ways in years to come.<br />

1991: An <strong>Economic</strong> Sea Change<br />

Pre-1991, India’s economy was centrally planned and regulated. Heavy industry was comprised<br />

of state monopolies. Private industry was subject to strict industrial licensing, with certain sectors,<br />

such as apparel, reserved for small-scale enterprises.<br />

More than 7 in 10 import categories were subject to licensing restrictions or were banned outright.<br />

Most tariffs were in the 110–150% range, and nearly all exceeded 60%. Capital account and current<br />

account transactions were subject to exchange controls. Foreign investment was limited to 40%<br />

equity ownership except in technology or export industries. Foreign direct investment (FDI) hovered<br />

at a low $100–200 million annually. India’s foreign exchange reserves totaled $1 billion.<br />

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the first Gulf War that followed, proved a tipping point for economic<br />

reform in India as oil prices rose, export markets in Kuwait and Iraq dried up, and remittances<br />

from Indian workers in the Gulf—which offset half to two-thirds of India’s global<br />

trade deficit—slowed as workers fled home. An initial credit tranche from the International<br />

Monetary Fund (IMF) failed to take hold, amid political instability.<br />

A second IMF package imposed tougher conditions, beginning with an 18% rupee devaluation,<br />

an end to import licensing (although import quotas continued until 2001), cuts in export subsidies,<br />

and reduced public lending to state industries. Foreign investment rules were eased, more<br />

than 60 industries were initially removed from the list reserved for small-scale enterprises, and<br />

the number of industries reserved for the public sector was scaled back from 18 sectors to<br />

four—minerals, railroads, munitions and nuclear power. In 2002, the maximum duty rate was<br />

lowered to 30%. India saw an immediate jump to 6.7% average annual GDP (gross domestic<br />

product) growth in the first 5 post-reform years.<br />

16

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