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entry into the stage of receding cardiovascular mortality,<br />
which is one of the main factors that have driven the<br />
increase life expectancy in the Western countries since<br />
the 1970s. Estonia preceded its Baltic neighbours in entering<br />
this new stage, and in regard to women, has caught<br />
up with the most successful countries in Eastern Europe.<br />
Although the views of demographers regarding the<br />
future population trends became more optimistic during<br />
the last decade (Morgan 2003; Goldstein, Sobotka, Jasilioniene<br />
2009; Bongaarts, Sobotka 2012), the international<br />
comparisons reveal the persistence of regional differences<br />
that developed in Europe in the 1980s and the 1990s.<br />
This contemporary regional variation primarily stems<br />
from fertility, Northern and Western Europe feature<br />
fertility rates close to the replacement whereas Southern<br />
and Eastern Europe, along with the German-speaking<br />
countries, are characterised by lower demographic zones.<br />
Thus, the long-term demographic outlook for Estonia<br />
depends to an important extent on the zone towards<br />
which Estonia will drift.<br />
Notwithstanding the long-term course, we must<br />
be prepared, in the shorter term, for the fact that the<br />
decrease in fertility that occurred in the 1990s will<br />
increasingly affect Estonia’s contemporary demographic<br />
profile. During the current decade, the small generations<br />
born in the 1990s will reach parenting age, which will<br />
inevitably and noticeably decrease the number of births,<br />
and shift the natural increase to further to negative side.<br />
This also implies that population decrease and ageing will<br />
persist, and carefully planned efforts for the adaptation<br />
of societal institutions to demographic changes will be<br />
required. According to medium and constant fertility<br />
scenarios of the United Nations population projections,<br />
by 2050, the percentage of the elderly (65+) will increase<br />
from the current 18% to 25%-26% in Estonia (United<br />
Nations 2011). The old-age dependency ratio (ratio of the<br />
age group 65+ to age group 20-65) will increase from 28<br />
to 47-49 during the same period.<br />
Despite the extent of the projected changes, it<br />
would be a misconception to assume that such trends are<br />
something unique to Estonia. According to the United<br />
Nations projections, the forecasted increase in the proportion<br />
of elderly and the old-age dependency ratio in<br />
Estonia appear similar to those projected for the Northern<br />
European countries. In the latter region, the proportion<br />
of the elderly is projected to increase from 17% to 25%,<br />
and the old-age dependency ratio from 28 to 47 in 2050.<br />
For Western Europe, the UN predicts that the proportion<br />
of the aged will reach 27%–28%, and the old-age<br />
dependency ratio 52–53. For Eastern Europe, the corresponding<br />
figures are 27%– 33% and 52–55 respectively.<br />
In case the demographic trends will test the limits of<br />
the adaptability of European societies, this will probably<br />
happen in the Mediterranean countries. As a combined<br />
result of high life expectancy and very low fertility during<br />
almost three decades, this region can expect the elderly<br />
to make up one-third of the population (32%-34%), and<br />
the old-age dependency ratio to reach 66–69. A similar<br />
future awaits the Asian industrial countries (e.g. South<br />
Korea, Singapore) which underwent an exceptionally<br />
rapid demographic transition in the second half of the<br />
20 th century. The UN projects that the proportion of the<br />
elderly will reach 33%–36% in the South Korea and the<br />
old-age dependency ratio 63–67 by 2050. In the three<br />
South American countries, discussed in this report, the<br />
old-age dependency ratio will reach 37-42 by 2050, while<br />
the population ageing will continue and peak in the second<br />
half of the 21 st century. The small variances across<br />
project scenarios shows the accuracy of the projections,<br />
which results from the fact that those who will be the<br />
elderly in the middle of the 21 st century, are all present in<br />
the contemporary populations, as do the majority of those<br />
who will provide for their maintenance after 35–40 years.<br />
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that,<br />
although the population projections provide useful<br />
insights into the demographic trends across one or two<br />
generations, they do not determine the future. Therefore,<br />
the future course of Estonia’s demographic development<br />
is not limited to the narrow numerical intervals<br />
of the projections cited above, which in comparison to<br />
some other countries, may even instil a deceptive sense<br />
of security. As a small and open society, Estonia will<br />
remain demographically more dynamic and influenceable<br />
than larger nations. This is proven by Estonia’s<br />
position at the extreme positions, or nearby, in several<br />
international rankings. The concluding message of this<br />
chapter could be that in the contemporary demographic<br />
scene, possibilities exist for both positive and negative<br />
developments. It is definitely not impossible to take<br />
advantage of these possibilities and turn the positive<br />
into reality, but this will require trust within society,<br />
and a quest for smart solutions.<br />
The authors thank Liili Abuladze, Asta Põldma and Jaak Valge for<br />
their valuable comments and recommendations in the course of<br />
preparing this chapter.<br />
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