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18 Hajnal line The Hanjal line is one of the oldest demographic divides in Europe. In the 17th to 18th century, the so-called Malthusian marriage, with its relatively late age (average age of women at marriage was over 23, often 25–26 years) and high percentage of never-marrying (over 10% of the generation, often 15%–20%), emerged in the areas west of the line. To the east of the Hajnal line, the traditional early (average age at marriage 18–20 years) and universal (2%–5% never-marrying) marriage persisted. The emergence of the Malthusian marriage pattern was driven by the reduction in mortality and accelerating population growth, which started in the areas west of the Hanjal Line. The Malthusian marriage can be seen as response of the demographic system to amounting pressures of over-population, mediated by the neo-local family formation that had prevailed in these areas (neo-local family formation assumed that the married couple would establish a separate household). Because of the described causal chain, which started from the reduction in mortality, the development of the Malthusian marriage has sometimes been considered as the onset of the demographic transition in Europe. Although the Malthusian marriage, as well as the Hajnal line, ceased to exist after World War II, its long-term legacy is still visible in contemporary demographic patterns (Puur et al. 2012). Finns St. Peterburg Estonians Russians Latvians Lithuanians Poles Belarusians Germans Ukrainians Chechs Slovaks Austrians Magyars Croats Romanians Trieste Serbs Italians Bulgarians Albanians Sources: Hajnal (1965); Plakans, Wetherell (2005). Estonian Human Development Report 2012/2013 occurred in all the regions of Europe, although, as was the case with the preceding decline, it turned out to be somewhat more dynamic in Estonia. As a result, the total rate emerged from the “extremely low” fertility zone (1.3 or less children per woman), and from 2007 to 2010, reached slightly more than 1.6 children (78% to 79% of the recovery level). During the first decade of the 21 st century, the fertility rate in Estonia was the highest among the eastern Member Countries of the European Union. On the fertility map of contemporary Europe – with a fertility rate that was 10% to 15% lower than the recovery level in Northern and Western Europe, on one hand, and with a deficiency of 30% to 35% in relation to the average in Southern and Eastern Europe, on the other —in 2004–2008, Estonia moved toward the first group (Figure 1.2.1). Unfortunately, the most recent correction in the fertility trend, after 2008, halted this movement. Although among Estonians, the total fertility rate achieved a local maximum in the period of economic recession (1.76 children per woman in 2010), the last few years have seen a reduction in fertility. In 2011, the total fertility rate was 8% lower than in 2008 and 2012 will bring an additional decline. In a comparison with the EU’s Eastern European members, this has meant that Estonia no longer features the highest fertility rate, but has fallen to third place (table 1.2.2). The factors shaping the contemporary fertility trends in Estonia, as well as in the other countries of Europe, are complex, and providing a comprehensive overview of them would require a more extensive a consultation of specialised literature. However, one simple, but very influential factor – the timing of childbearing – cannot be ignored even in a cursory approach (Billari et al. 2006). In the case of the contemporary family model, with fewer children, the moment for becoming parents can vary within relatively a long age span. This is illustrated by Figure 1.2.2, which shows that, after World War II, the timing of childbearing in Europe has undergone two distinct development stages. In the regions west of the Hajnal line (see the map), the period of the Malthusian marriage model came to an end in the 1950s and 1960s. The improvement of the “availability” of marriage opened the way for earlier childbearing and for a significant reduction in childlessness. Together, these two developments explain to a significant degree the high fertility, observed during the baby boom period in Northern and Western Europe. In the early 1970s, the shift towards ever earlier timing of childbearing was replaced, in both mentioned regions, by a contrary trend. By the end of the 1970s, the Southern European countries arrived at a similar turning point. In the majority of the Eastern European countries, the trend towards delayed childbearing began in the early 1990s. Against the background of the universal shift from fertility advancement to fertility postponement, Estonia stands out with a quite unique trajectory. Similarly to the other countries located to the west of the Hajnal line, in the sphere of influence of the Malthusian marriage model, a shift towards earlier marriage and childbearing prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. In
Figure 1.2.3 Life expectancy. Estonia and the European regions 1960–2011 Northern Europe Southern Europe Western Europe Eastern Europe Estonia 84 84 82 Men 82 Women 80 80 78 78 76 76 74 74 72 72 70 70 68 68 66 66 64 64 62 60 62 60 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Age, years Age, years that period, fertility timing in Estonia was quite similar to Western Europe. However, during the next decades, this similarity disappeared, and by the 1980s, Estonia had completely switched to the characteristic of Eastern Europe. This pattern of early childbearing was prevalent in Estonia until a new, sudden change in the 1990s, which reflects the removal of the mechanisms that had stimulated early childbearing during the state socialism (Katus, et al. 2007). Compared to the early 1990s, the mean age of childbearing has increased by almost four years (26.4 years in 2011). The extensive postponement of childbearing has introduced a systematic downward bias into all the standard measures of fertility level, including the total fertility rate (Bongaarts, Sobotka 2012). To illustrate the effect of fertility postponement, Table 1.2.2 compares the usual (observed) and the tempo-adjusted fertility rates. According to the calculations performed by the Vienna Institute of Demography, the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate in Estonia exceeded the observed measure by 18%, and reached 1.9 children (2008). This adjusted fertility rate reflects Estonia’s fertility level on the eve of the economic recession, in the absence of the reducing effect of fertility postponement. The reliability of the given estimate is confirmed by the results of cohort analysis. Based on the latter, the women born in the first half of the 1970s – these are the first generations whose reproductive period occurred mostly under the new societal conditions – will have, on average, 1.80 to 1.85 children per woman, for the total population, and slightly more among the Estonians (Puur, Rahnu 2011). The ultimate confirmation of the validity of these estimates is provided by the 2011 census. However, unfortunately, the census data on cohort fertility will not be published until after this report has already appeared. While the aspects of fertility that have been dealt with are essential for the sustainability of population development, in international comparisons, Estonia also attracts attention for the high proportion of children that are born outside of registered marriage (Table 1.2.2). During the last years, this measure has stabilised at close to 60% for the total population (65% to 66% for Estonians). In Europe, Estonia ranks second only to Iceland (65%). Since the overwhelming majority of children born out of wedlock are not born to single parents, but rather to cohabiting couples, the high percentage of out-of-wedlock births suggests that the family model based on cohabitation is popular and widely accepted in Estonian society. According to the theory of the second demographic transition, the observed disconnection of childbearing from registered marriage is a universal trend in modern societies. It does not necessarily harbinger the disappearance of family values, but is just indicative of another new stage in the long-term evolution of family institutions (Kertzer, Barbagli 2003; Nazio 2008). In Europe, the Nordic countries have progressed furthest along on this path, and in the light of the evidence discussed above, Estonia can be included among the trendsetters. Estonian Human Development Report 2012/2013 19
Page 1: ESTONIAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2
Page 4 and 5: Table of Contents 1 Human Capital /
Page 6 and 7: Dear Reader Since the moment when E
Page 9 and 10: 1Human Capital Estonian Human Devel
Page 11 and 12: the HDI’s content has also been h
Page 13 and 14: Figure 1.1.1 The human development
Page 15 and 16: Figure 1.1.7 The income sub-index:
Page 17 and 18: The results of the Princeton Projec
Page 19: the hypothetical generation. The to
Page 23 and 24: Table 1.2.2 also presents the most
Page 25 and 26: The new trends that are appearing i
Page 27 and 28: Figure 1.2.8 Components of populati
Page 29 and 30: New features were introduced into E
Page 31 and 32: Initiation of Voluntary Birth Contr
Page 33 and 34: Table 1.3.1 Best-known educational
Page 35 and 36: (OECD 2012b). Therefore a certain r
Page 37 and 38: The reciprocal dependence of the pr
Page 39 and 40: Figure 1.3.8 Percentage of students
Page 41 and 42: Table 1.3.4 The quality of educatio
Page 43 and 44: 1.4 Health Raul-Allan Kiivet Change
Page 45 and 46: Table 1.4.1 Usage of prescription m
Page 47 and 48: allude to the fact that approximate
Page 49 and 50: promote healthy lifestyles among th
Page 51 and 52: Figure 1.5.1 The World Values Surve
Page 53 and 54: Table 1.5.2 Estonia’s participati
Page 55 and 56: Figure 1.5.3 The percentage of the
Page 57 and 58: Figure 1.5.5 Percentage of the Esto
Page 59 and 60: The fact that Estonia’s position
Page 61 and 62: Summary Mati Heidmets The global vi
Page 63 and 64: 2People and Society Estonian Human
Page 65 and 66: Table 2.1.1 Structure of the Bertel
Page 67 and 68: tioning market economies (15 states
Page 69 and 70: 2.2 Freedom and democracy Martin M
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Table 2.2.1 Democracy indicators Po
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Figure 2.2.2 The distribution of th
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would be something that none of the
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political participation are general
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strongest, while a very small perce
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is concerned, Estonia is one of the
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Figure 2.4.2 Average circulation of
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2.5 Corruption Jüri Saar In accord
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Lithuania, 61%; and in Russia, 69%.
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2.6.2 Intentional homicides in Esto
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crime. And thirdly, there was a wis
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References 1. Ahven, A. & Tabur, L.
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states included in the EU Kids Onli
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2.8 Public assessments of the state
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Figure 2.8.4 Changes releated to tr
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of the state’s development are en
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Table 2.9.1 The positions of Estoni
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3. IEP (2011). Structures of Peace.
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3Welfare and the Quality of Life Es
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choices made, not what people say t
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Figure 3.1.5 Public social spending
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tion agreed upon the social contrac
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References 1. Aidukaite, J. (2006).
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hand, to the “inequality of acces
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and explanations of the extent of i
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5- much more than I deserve. Some d
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people in Estonia consider the inco
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Table 3.3.1 Experienced Well-Being
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at about 70%. In Latvia and Lithuan
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sign. It seems that the usual view
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3.4 Quality of life Anu Toots 3.4.1
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a uniform composite indicator has n
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3.4.6 The components of life qualit
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Figure 3.4.4c Perceived quality of
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Figure 3.4.5 Changes in the depriva
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3.5 Environment dimension of well-b
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Figure 3.5.1.b Estonia’s position
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3.5.4 Energy intensity The energy i
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productivity, which is defined as t
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perceive themselves as worse off th
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4The Economy Estonian Human Develop
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vide a valuable connection for maki
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Figure 4.1.3 Components of economic
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ule of law, the sub-indicators for
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References 1. Acemoglu, D.; Robinso
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Development Report employs generali
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and pasture land, and this was capi
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Basing the total and net savings re
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4.3 Labour market Reelika Leetmaa,
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The problems include the very limit
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• Expenditures for active labour
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who lose their jobs. These ensure i
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4.4 Productivity and the economic s
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labour costs at the company level r
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Table 4.4.4 Comparison of the produ
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Figure 4.4.1 Annual average increas
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4.5 Innovation Erik Terk, Katrin M
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Table 4.5.2 Comparison of innovatio
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Table 4.5.4 Comparison of the indic
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in order to make the R&D potential
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It is characteristic of the South K
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mechanisms for increasing their sta
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Globalisation and Policy Patterns 5
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When Estonia regained its independe
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5.2 The impacts of globalisation an
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Table 5.2.2 Support of the differen
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5.3 Development policies Erik Terk,
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• C -the “Estonia-centred” su
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Figure 5.4.1 Support for the possib
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Summary Erik Terk Estonia is part o
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ehavioural patterns. Therefore, it
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EDR 2012/2013 authors Clemens Buche
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EDR 2012/2013 authors Alari Purju i
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Editor-in-Chief: Mati Heidmets Prod
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