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18<br />

Hajnal line<br />

The Hanjal line is one of the oldest demographic divides<br />

in Europe. In the 17th to 18th century, the so-called Malthusian<br />

marriage, with its relatively late age (average age<br />

of women at marriage was over 23, often 25–26 years)<br />

and high percentage of never-marrying (over 10% of the<br />

generation, often 15%–20%), emerged in the areas west<br />

of the line. To the east of the Hajnal line, the traditional<br />

early (average age at marriage 18–20 years) and universal<br />

(2%–5% never-marrying) marriage persisted. The emergence<br />

of the Malthusian marriage pattern was driven by<br />

the reduction in mortality and accelerating population<br />

growth, which started in the areas west of the Hanjal Line.<br />

The Malthusian marriage can be seen as response of the<br />

demographic system to amounting pressures of over-population,<br />

mediated by the neo-local family formation that<br />

had prevailed in these areas (neo-local family formation<br />

assumed that the married couple would establish a separate<br />

household). Because of the described causal chain,<br />

which started from the reduction in mortality, the development<br />

of the Malthusian marriage has sometimes been<br />

considered as the onset of the demographic transition in<br />

Europe. Although the Malthusian marriage, as well as the<br />

Hajnal line, ceased to exist after World War II, its long-term<br />

legacy is still visible in contemporary demographic patterns<br />

(Puur et al. 2012).<br />

Finns<br />

St. Peterburg<br />

Estonians<br />

Russians<br />

Latvians<br />

Lithuanians<br />

Poles<br />

Belarusians<br />

Germans<br />

Ukrainians<br />

Chechs<br />

Slovaks<br />

Austrians<br />

Magyars<br />

Croats<br />

Romanians<br />

Trieste<br />

Serbs<br />

Italians<br />

Bulgarians<br />

Albanians<br />

Sources: Hajnal (1965); Plakans, Wetherell (2005).<br />

Estonian Human Development Report 2012/2013 occurred in all the regions of Europe, although, as was<br />

the case with the preceding decline, it turned out to be<br />

somewhat more dynamic in Estonia. As a result, the<br />

total rate emerged from the “extremely low” fertility<br />

zone (1.3 or less children per woman), and from 2007<br />

to 2010, reached slightly more than 1.6 children (78% to<br />

79% of the recovery level). During the first decade of the<br />

21 st century, the fertility rate in Estonia was the highest<br />

among the eastern Member Countries of the European<br />

Union.<br />

On the fertility map of contemporary Europe – with<br />

a fertility rate that was 10% to 15% lower than the recovery<br />

level in Northern and Western Europe, on one hand,<br />

and with a deficiency of 30% to 35% in relation to the<br />

average in Southern and Eastern Europe, on the other<br />

—in 2004–2008, Estonia moved toward the first group<br />

(Figure 1.2.1). Unfortunately, the most recent correction<br />

in the fertility trend, after 2008, halted this movement.<br />

Although among Estonians, the total fertility rate achieved<br />

a local maximum in the period of economic recession<br />

(1.76 children per woman in 2010), the last few years<br />

have seen a reduction in fertility. In 2011, the total fertility<br />

rate was 8% lower than in 2008 and 2012 will bring an<br />

additional decline. In a comparison with the EU’s Eastern<br />

European members, this has meant that Estonia no longer<br />

features the highest fertility rate, but has fallen to third<br />

place (table 1.2.2).<br />

The factors shaping the contemporary fertility<br />

trends in Estonia, as well as in the other countries of<br />

Europe, are complex, and providing a comprehensive<br />

overview of them would require a more extensive a<br />

consultation of specialised literature. However, one<br />

simple, but very influential factor – the timing of childbearing<br />

– cannot be ignored even in a cursory approach<br />

(Billari et al. 2006). In the case of the contemporary<br />

family model, with fewer children, the moment for<br />

becoming parents can vary within relatively a long age<br />

span. This is illustrated by Figure 1.2.2, which shows<br />

that, after World War II, the timing of childbearing in<br />

Europe has undergone two distinct development stages.<br />

In the regions west of the Hajnal line (see the map),<br />

the period of the Malthusian marriage model came to<br />

an end in the 1950s and 1960s. The improvement of<br />

the “availability” of marriage opened the way for earlier<br />

childbearing and for a significant reduction in childlessness.<br />

Together, these two developments explain to<br />

a significant degree the high fertility, observed during<br />

the baby boom period in Northern and Western<br />

Europe.<br />

In the early 1970s, the shift towards ever earlier<br />

timing of childbearing was replaced, in both mentioned<br />

regions, by a contrary trend. By the end of the 1970s,<br />

the Southern European countries arrived at a similar<br />

turning point. In the majority of the Eastern European<br />

countries, the trend towards delayed childbearing began<br />

in the early 1990s. Against the background of the universal<br />

shift from fertility advancement to fertility postponement,<br />

Estonia stands out with a quite unique trajectory.<br />

Similarly to the other countries located to the west<br />

of the Hajnal line, in the sphere of influence of the Malthusian<br />

marriage model, a shift towards earlier marriage<br />

and childbearing prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. In

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