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of Estonia, and the other post-Communist countries.<br />

Although the low private contributions in the post-Communist<br />

cases have path-dependent historical consequences,<br />

it is still the lowest in Estonia (private voluntary and<br />

mandatory contributions in Estonia are 0.02%; 0.04% in<br />

Poland; 0.2% in Hungary; 0.9% in Slovakia; and 1.2%<br />

of GDP in Slovenia). As an illustration, Figure 3.1.6 also<br />

includes some liberal, or Anglo-American, welfare regimes,<br />

in order to emphasize the differences from the continental<br />

European model. In Japan, Canada, England, but especially<br />

the U.S., the private social spending comprises a large part<br />

of the total social expenditures (4%, 5%, 6% and 11% of<br />

GDP, respectively). Despite of the differences in private contributions<br />

Estonia and the Anglo-American countries are<br />

similar in terms of total expenditures – which stay below<br />

20% of the GDP. Acknowledging the fact that the Estonian<br />

social policy simultaneously has low public and still<br />

non-existent current private contributions leads us to the<br />

conceptualising of welfare regimes typologies for realising<br />

future social policy alternatives. Although, during the last<br />

decade, social policy has been directed at increasing private<br />

share in social spending, moving toward Anglo-American<br />

social model has not been transparent and publicly recognized<br />

policy agenda.<br />

3.1.3<br />

Types of welfare states and their future<br />

The fundamental dilemma of a welfare state is the<br />

relationship between the market and the state. Public<br />

assistance and insurance are not the only objectives of<br />

the welfare state – it is rather the trade-off between efficiency<br />

and equity that is at the heart of many discussions<br />

addressing the attempts to classify welfare states. There<br />

is no single theoretical framework that gives justification<br />

to state intervention and its dimensions. . Without being<br />

exhaustive, one explanation for this is the concept of<br />

Table 3.1.2<br />

Classification of welfare states<br />

Commodification<br />

Stratification<br />

Reference<br />

countries<br />

Liberal<br />

Conservative<br />

High Medium Low<br />

Dual:<br />

policies<br />

targeted at<br />

supporting<br />

markets<br />

USA,<br />

Great Britain,<br />

New Zealand,<br />

Ireland<br />

High:<br />

opportunities<br />

depend on<br />

status<br />

Germany,<br />

Switzerland,<br />

France,<br />

Austria<br />

Social<br />

Democratic<br />

Low:<br />

policies<br />

targeted<br />

at equality<br />

Sweden,<br />

Finland,<br />

Norway,<br />

Denmark<br />

Source: Table constructed by the authors, based on Esping-Andersen<br />

1990<br />

Figure 3.1.7<br />

Esping-Andersen’s typology and the post-Communist<br />

welfare states<br />

Commodification index (USA=100)<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

LVA<br />

POL<br />

SLO<br />

LTU<br />

EST<br />

GRC<br />

USA<br />

ESP<br />

IRL<br />

HUN<br />

ITA<br />

PRT<br />

CZE<br />

social traps, i.e. a situation in which a group of people act<br />

to obtain short-term individual gains, which in the long<br />

run leads to a loss for the individual as well as for the<br />

group as a whole. The term “social traps” is the common<br />

generalised term for market failures. These failures are<br />

related to information traps (e.g. people underestimate<br />

the probability of becoming unemployed), externalities<br />

(e.g. the investments into the social and human capital of<br />

children, as future taxpayers, also benefit the childless)<br />

or the problem of “free riders”, where individuals lack the<br />

incentives to contribute to the provision of public goods.<br />

Since individual choices generally do not take social welfare<br />

into account, private spending in the markets with<br />

negative externalities is not efficient. However, these different<br />

arguments are not sufficient for government intervention,<br />

it has to be confirmed that the correction itself is<br />

not going to produce even worse outcomes.<br />

Therefore, the intervention of the state can be better<br />

justified by the social contract. It can be a Rawlsian veil of<br />

ignorance type of agreement – that relies on equality and<br />

justice as fairness principles. According to Rawls (1971),<br />

people would prefer the Difference Principle to regulate<br />

inequalities, which only permits inequalities that work<br />

to the advantage of the worst-off. Based on similar arguments,<br />

Dworkin’s (2000) justification for redistribution<br />

and egalitarianism is nested in the idea of an envy-free<br />

society (distribution of resources), which was briefly discussed<br />

above. In both cases, the interventions are justified,<br />

not only by lending a helping hand to the markets<br />

(protection of property rights, provision of law and order,<br />

correction of market failures), but also by the redistribu-<br />

GBR<br />

FRA<br />

DEU<br />

AUT<br />

BEL<br />

FIN<br />

NOR<br />

DEN<br />

SWE<br />

30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100<br />

Social protection index (SWE=100)<br />

Comments: the first two principal components have been used to<br />

compile indices from 16 different indicators that characterise welfare<br />

states. Pre-financial crisis data from 2000-2008, 22 countries.<br />

Source: Põder and Kerem 2011.<br />

110<br />

Estonian Human Development Report 2012/2013

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