Estonian Human Development Report

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olds considered themselves to be part of the Estonian people, 57% of the 15–29-year-old respondents answered this question in the affirmative. At the same time, having citizenship does not have a greater than average impact on the attitudes of the young people – similarly to all Estonian citizens with Russian-speaking backgrounds, every third young Estonian citizen whose native language is Russian does not consider him- or herself to be part of the Estonian nation 23 . Therefore the society should pay more attention to attitudinal barriers that do not allow people who were born and have grown up in Estonia feel that they really belong here. Evaluations of Estonia’s citizenship policies also vary dramatically by ethnic group. The findings of the 2008 survey show that two-thirds of Estonians feel that Estonia’s current citizenship policies are “normal and correspond to international standards”, while 15% feel that the citizenship policies are too lenient and damage the interests of the Estonian people. On the other hand, 77% of the Russian-speaking population believe that the current citizenship laws are unjustly strict and restrict human rights. However, there are almost twice as many people in the younger Russian age group (15–29) compared to the 50–74-year-old group who feel that Estonian citizenship policies conform to international standards (20% and 11.5% respectively). In sum, the data shows that despite progress in naturalization, the political community in Estonia continues to be ethnically split. Support for democracy as a form of government Based on survey findings, the citizens of “old” democracies feel almost unanimously that democracy is the best possible form of government (Klingemann 1999). The positions of the populations in post-Communist transition countries regarding this question have been notably more diverse. Painful social changes created nostalgia among certain segments of the population for the old order or the desire for a strong leader who would set the house in order. The findings of the New Baltic Barometer survey series (Rose 2005) show that during the transition decades a significant part of the Estonian population preferred an authoritarian order to a democratic one. For instance, in 2004 only 46% of Estonians and 39% of the local Russian-speaking population were convinced that democracy is preferable to other forms of government. Of Estonians, 18% and of Russians, 29% think that in certain cases an authoritarian order could be better. A quarter of the respondents were indifferent about this issue. According to the findings of the same survey, a quarter of Estonians and more than a third of the Russian-speaking population agreed with the following statement: “is it best to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader who can quickly decide everything.” Among the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Lithuania, the yearning for “strongman rule” has been even greater, as the statement was approved by almost half of the respondents in some years (Ehin 2007). Questions about how attached the Estonian population is to the principles of democracy are also important today. The enlargement of the European Union and NATO did not bring about a liberal-democratic “end of history”. The deepening conflict of values between the West and Russia is manifested in a political and ideological contestation over the meaning of democracy. The Kremlin’s doctrine of “sovereign democracy” assigns content to the concept of democracy that has very little in common with the definition used in the West. The existence of different information fields for the Estonians and the Russian-speaking population (Estonian Human Development Report 2007, Chapter 3.7) creates a fertile ground for the emergence and acceptance of multiple, competing definitions of democracy in Estonia. Satisfaction with regime performance Comparative studies have shown that satisfaction with the functioning of the political regime has continually decreased in the democratic societies of the developed Western countries during the last half-century. It seems that improved educational opportunities, greater awareness and political information have led to an erosion of the traditional deferential attitude toward power and rulers, which has been replaced by a notably more critical and cynical attitude (Dalton 2004). One cannot speak about similar declining trends in the post-Communist countries. During the transition years, the satisfaction of Eastern Europeans with state authority followed a U-shaped curve (Munro 2002). The euphoria of the Velvet Revolution era subsided quickly and gave way to dissatisfaction that was fed by the deterioration in living standards, unemployment, inflation, an increase in crime and other painful consequences caused by the restructuring of the economy and political reforms. Along with improvements in living standards and the growth of political stability, satisfaction with the regime also started to increase again. A similar U-shaped trend is also apparent in the Baltic countries. Overall, the Estonian population has been considerably more satisfied with their political regime during the entire transition period than the populations of Latvia or Lithuania. At the same time, ethnic Estonians and Latvians assess the performance of their political systems much more positively than the Russian-speakers in these countries (also see the previous subchapter of the Human Development Report). Large gaps between the regime assessments of various ethnic groups are also noticeable now. A survey study conducted in the spring of 2008 (State Chancellery 2008b) show that 62% of ethnic Estonians trust or tend to trust the Estonian state while only 23% of the Russian-speaking population does (Table 4.4.2.). There are no significant age-related differences in the evaluations of the Russian-speaking population regarding the trustworthiness of the Estonian state, although the 15–29-year-old respondents seem to be somewhat more critical toward the state than those who are middle-aged or older. Surprisingly, Russian citizens tend to trust the Estonian state more than those Russian-speakers who are Estonian citizens (see Table 4.4.2.). This can be explained by reference to age differences of the corresponding citizen groups: while younger and middle-aged people dominate among Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship, the majority of Russian citizens are pensioners who are apparently satisfied with the social security provided to them by the Estonian state (see Lauristin 2008). Earlier studies have shown that among minorities, satisfaction with regime performance is more strongly 23 On the other hand, among the middle-aged group, citizenship brings about stronger idetnfification with the Estonian people – 72% of Russian speakers aged 40–49 with Estonian citizenship define themselves as members of the political commmunity. | 92
elated to economic factors than among the indigenous population. In light of this, the current economic crisis is likely to add momentum to the spread of distrust among the Russian-speaking population. Trust in institutions In young Eastern European democracies, democratically elected institutions, or those that directly represent the people, such as the parliament and the political parties, are generally trusted the least. At the same time, institutions and power structures that are removed from the fray of everyday politics and play a greater representative and symbolic role (such as the president and the military), enjoy a notably higher level of trust. The results of the New Baltic Barometer surveys from 1993–2004 show that in the Baltic countries, trust in political parties was already very low (around 10–15 per cent) in 1993. However, trust in the parliament has decreased with time – about half the population in the Baltic countries trusted the parliament in 1993, while less than 20% did so in 2004 (Ehin 2007). In 2008, the Riigikogu continued to be the least trusted institution in the eyes of the Estonian public. In the spring of 2008, only a quarter of ethnic Estonians trusted the parliament; at the same time, 67 per cent trusted the president and 37 per cent trusted the government (Figure 4.4.1.). The attitudes of the Russian-speaking population are characterized by extremely low trust in the principal state institutions: in the spring of 2008, the Riigikogu was trusted by only a tenth of the Russian-speakers; and only 13% of the respondents considered the government and the president to be trustworthy. However, among Russian-speaking young people (aged 15–29), the perceived trustworthiness of the parliament, government and president is almost twice as high as among older people (aged 50–74). Political participation Democracy cannot survive without the readiness of the citizens to participate in politics. Voter turnout at elections has decreased during the independence period both here and in the neighbouring countries. In the first parliamentary elections after the restoration of independence 68% of voters in Estonia, 90% in Latvia, and 75% in Lithuania participated, while during the most recent elections the participation rate was only 62% in Estonia, 61% in Latvia and 49% in Lithuania. A comparison with other European Union countries shows that voter turnout in parliamentary elections in Estonia is significantly lower than the European Union average (70.4%), but is generally at the same level as in the other Eastern European democracies (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2008). Political parties play in important role in representative democracy, linking the people and the decision-makers. A low level of trust in political parties and the lack of stable partisan preferences are typical of Estonia (and post- Communist democracies in general). According to the findings of the 2008 study (State Chancellery 2008b), 36% of Estonians do not feel close to any political party; among the Russian-speaking population, half of the respondents (49.5%) are of the same opinion. Although Estonia has, relative to the population, a larger number of nongovernmental organizations than other post-Communist countries, participation in the activities of nongovernmental organizations is significantly more widespread among Estonians Table 4.4.2. Trust in the Estonian state Stateless Russianspeaking population: Estonians: All Citizenship Estonian Russian Age 15–29 30–49 50–74 trusts 23 23 27 20 24 22 22 does not trust 39 40 33 43 45 38 38 trusts 61 * * * 71 60 53 does not trust 11 * * * 6 6 11 Source: Integration of Estonian Society: Monitoring 2008 Figure 4.4.1. Trust in institutions in Estonia Riigikogu Church Government Local government Judicial system Banks Police President 10 13 13 13 25 27 31 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 37 37 Russian-speaking population Source: Integration of Estonian Society: Monitoring 2008 45 46 48 50 56 62 Estonians than among the Russian-speaking population (Estonian Human Development Report 2007 Chapter 2.2.). People whose native language is Russian believe that they have far more limited opportunities than ethnic Estonians to be engaged in politics, to influence local-level decision-making and to participate in the activities of nongovernmental organizations. Among Russian-speaking respondents, 90% considered Estonians to have considerably greater opportunities for political activity compared to members of ethnic minorities, and half of the respondents found that it is easier for Estonians to participate in the work of nongovernmental organizations. Ethnic differences are also evident in people’s assessment of their political efficacy. As many as 42% of ethnic Estonians, but only 25% of Russian-speakers agree with the statement: “The course of events in the country depends on the choices of the people, including myself and people like me”. There are no significant differences in the self-assessed political competence of different ethnic groups. Of Estonians, 28%, and of the Russian-speaking population, 26% agree with the statement: “I think that I am sufficiently competent in political matters that my positions could be of interest to others.” Greater political confidence is evident among Russian-speaking Estonian citizens and younger age groups (Table 4.4.3.). In examining how people assess the various channels of influencing society and politics, it is useful to distinguish respondents by ethnicity, citizenship and age (Table 4.4.4.). Estonians place considerably more importance on voting and participating in the activities of nongovernmen- 67 93 |
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Estonian Human Development Report
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Estonian Human Development Report T
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4.2. Ethnic differentiations in sat
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Preface This year, the Estonian Hum
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CHAPTER 1 Estonian Human Developmen
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Figure 1.1.3. Life expectancy in co
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Figure 1.2.2. Life expectancy at bi
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to reality. The greatest inaccuracy
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Figure 1.2.9. Internal migration ev
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12. Marksoo, A. 1992. “Dynamics o
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Table 1.3.1. PISA 2006 study result
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Table 1.3.2. Number of students in
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1.4. The gross domestic product and
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Figure 1.4.3. Estonian GDP (right a
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1.5. Changes in the Estonian Human
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2.2. Health of Estonian residents i
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Table 2.2.4. Differences in life ex
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Figure 2.4.1. Healthy life years of
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Figure 2.4.4. Various accidents, tr
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2.5. Lifestyle and behaviour as a s
Page 44 and 45: Figure 2.5.5. Smoking in Estonia in
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Page 48 and 49: Table 2.6.2. Use of specialized med
Page 50 and 51: dren. The majority of services are
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Page 56 and 57: CHAPTER 3 Quality of life and life
Page 58 and 59: Table 3.2.1. Characteristics of liv
Page 60 and 61: Table 3.2.4. An assessment of the e
Page 62 and 63: Figure 3.2.4. Difference in the job
Page 64 and 65: Table 3.2.6. Agreement with stateme
Page 66 and 67: Figure 3.3.1. Satisfaction with lif
Page 68 and 69: Figure 3.3.4. Percentage of people
Page 70 and 71: Figure 3.4.1. Types of quality of l
Page 72 and 73: Figure 3.5.1. Percentage of teenage
Page 74 and 75: Figure 3.5.4. Percentage of respond
Page 76 and 77: Arieh A., Conti C., Kutsar D., Nicg
Page 78 and 79: Figure 3.6.2. Subjective quality of
Page 80 and 81: Pieper, A. Sixsmith, Care related q
Page 82 and 83: Figure 3.7.1. The placement of Euro
Page 84 and 85: Figure 4.2.1. Life satisfaction by
Page 86 and 87: Table 4.2.1. Factors forming genera
Page 88 and 89: Annexes Annex 4.2.1. Socio-demograp
Page 90 and 91: Figure 4.3.1. Changes in the assess
Page 92 and 93: Figure 4.3.4. Attitudes of the Esto
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Page 100 and 101: Figure 4.5.4. Certainty of Estonian
Page 102 and 103: mote equal opportunities. At the (e
Page 104 and 105: CHAPTER 5 Quality of life in a cons
Page 106 and 107: Figure 5.2.1. GDP and AIC per capit
Page 108 and 109: Figure 5.2.3. Distribution of consu
Page 110 and 111: Figure 5.2.4. Indexes of environmen
Page 112 and 113: Table 5.3.1. Comparison of countrie
Page 114 and 115: Figure 5.3.3. Comparison of types o
Page 116 and 117: Table 5.3.5. Connections between po
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Page 120 and 121: Table 5.4.3. Young people’s asses
Page 122 and 123: Figure 5.4.6. Time spent on the con
Page 124 and 125: Table 5.4.6. The perception of prob
Page 126 and 127: 5.6. Summary To briefly summarize t
Page 128 and 129: Table 6.2.1. Objective and subjecti
Page 130 and 131: Figure 6.2.4. Relationship between
Page 132 and 133: Figure 6.2.7. Difference between th
Page 134 and 135: Figure 6.3.1. GDP, government secto
Page 136 and 137: Figure 6.3.3. Employed 15-74-year-o
Page 138 and 139: Figure 6.3.8. Percentage of social
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Figure 6.4.3. Creations of jobs ind
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Figure 6.4.5. Public expenditures o
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Figure 6.4.6. Ratio of the particip
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6.5. Cities as development engines
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Table 6.5.2. Existence of developme
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have been underfinanced or are not
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Table 7.1. Factors that favour and
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Table 7.2. Potential economic devel
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Authors Chapter 1 Ene-Margit Tiit,
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Margit Keller (PhD) is a Senior Res
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Special prizes Estonian Human Devel
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Estonian Human Development Report H
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Estonian Human Development Report H
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Honorable mentions Estonian Human D
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Estonian Human Development Report P
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Estonian Human Development Report A
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