Estonian Human Development Report
Estonian Human Development Report - Eesti Koostöö Kogu
Estonian Human Development Report - Eesti Koostöö Kogu
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olds considered themselves to be part of the <strong>Estonian</strong> people,<br />
57% of the 15–29-year-old respondents answered this question<br />
in the affirmative. At the same time, having citizenship<br />
does not have a greater than average impact on the attitudes<br />
of the young people – similarly to all <strong>Estonian</strong> citizens with<br />
Russian-speaking backgrounds, every third young <strong>Estonian</strong><br />
citizen whose native language is Russian does not consider<br />
him- or herself to be part of the <strong>Estonian</strong> nation 23 . Therefore<br />
the society should pay more attention to attitudinal barriers<br />
that do not allow people who were born and have grown up<br />
in Estonia feel that they really belong here.<br />
Evaluations of Estonia’s citizenship policies also vary<br />
dramatically by ethnic group. The findings of the 2008 survey<br />
show that two-thirds of <strong>Estonian</strong>s feel that Estonia’s<br />
current citizenship policies are “normal and correspond to<br />
international standards”, while 15% feel that the citizenship<br />
policies are too lenient and damage the interests of the <strong>Estonian</strong><br />
people. On the other hand, 77% of the Russian-speaking<br />
population believe that the current citizenship laws are<br />
unjustly strict and restrict human rights. However, there<br />
are almost twice as many people in the younger Russian age<br />
group (15–29) compared to the 50–74-year-old group who<br />
feel that <strong>Estonian</strong> citizenship policies conform to international<br />
standards (20% and 11.5% respectively).<br />
In sum, the data shows that despite progress in naturalization,<br />
the political community in Estonia continues<br />
to be ethnically split.<br />
Support for democracy<br />
as a form of government<br />
Based on survey findings, the citizens of “old” democracies<br />
feel almost unanimously that democracy is the best possible<br />
form of government (Klingemann 1999). The positions<br />
of the populations in post-Communist transition countries<br />
regarding this question have been notably more diverse.<br />
Painful social changes created nostalgia among certain segments<br />
of the population for the old order or the desire for a<br />
strong leader who would set the house in order.<br />
The findings of the New Baltic Barometer survey series<br />
(Rose 2005) show that during the transition decades a significant<br />
part of the <strong>Estonian</strong> population preferred an authoritarian<br />
order to a democratic one. For instance, in 2004 only<br />
46% of <strong>Estonian</strong>s and 39% of the local Russian-speaking<br />
population were convinced that democracy is preferable to<br />
other forms of government. Of <strong>Estonian</strong>s, 18% and of Russians,<br />
29% think that in certain cases an authoritarian order<br />
could be better. A quarter of the respondents were indifferent<br />
about this issue. According to the findings of the same<br />
survey, a quarter of <strong>Estonian</strong>s and more than a third of the<br />
Russian-speaking population agreed with the following<br />
statement: “is it best to get rid of parliament and elections<br />
and have a strong leader who can quickly decide everything.”<br />
Among the Russian-speaking population in Latvia<br />
and Lithuania, the yearning for “strongman rule” has been<br />
even greater, as the statement was approved by almost half<br />
of the respondents in some years (Ehin 2007).<br />
Questions about how attached the <strong>Estonian</strong> population<br />
is to the principles of democracy are also important today.<br />
The enlargement of the European Union and NATO did<br />
not bring about a liberal-democratic “end of history”. The<br />
deepening conflict of values between the West and Russia is<br />
manifested in a political and ideological contestation over<br />
the meaning of democracy. The Kremlin’s doctrine of “sovereign<br />
democracy” assigns content to the concept of democracy<br />
that has very little in common with the definition used<br />
in the West. The existence of different information fields for<br />
the <strong>Estonian</strong>s and the Russian-speaking population (<strong>Estonian</strong><br />
<strong>Human</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Report</strong> 2007, Chapter 3.7) creates<br />
a fertile ground for the emergence and acceptance of<br />
multiple, competing definitions of democracy in Estonia.<br />
Satisfaction with regime performance<br />
Comparative studies have shown that satisfaction with the<br />
functioning of the political regime has continually decreased<br />
in the democratic societies of the developed Western countries<br />
during the last half-century. It seems that improved educational<br />
opportunities, greater awareness and political information<br />
have led to an erosion of the traditional deferential<br />
attitude toward power and rulers, which has been replaced by<br />
a notably more critical and cynical attitude (Dalton 2004).<br />
One cannot speak about similar declining trends in the<br />
post-Communist countries. During the transition years, the<br />
satisfaction of Eastern Europeans with state authority followed<br />
a U-shaped curve (Munro 2002). The euphoria of the<br />
Velvet Revolution era subsided quickly and gave way to dissatisfaction<br />
that was fed by the deterioration in living standards,<br />
unemployment, inflation, an increase in crime and<br />
other painful consequences caused by the restructuring of<br />
the economy and political reforms. Along with improvements<br />
in living standards and the growth of political stability,<br />
satisfaction with the regime also started to increase again.<br />
A similar U-shaped trend is also apparent in the Baltic countries.<br />
Overall, the <strong>Estonian</strong> population has been considerably<br />
more satisfied with their political regime during the entire<br />
transition period than the populations of Latvia or Lithuania.<br />
At the same time, ethnic <strong>Estonian</strong>s and Latvians assess the<br />
performance of their political systems much more positively<br />
than the Russian-speakers in these countries (also see the<br />
previous subchapter of the <strong>Human</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Report</strong>).<br />
Large gaps between the regime assessments of various<br />
ethnic groups are also noticeable now. A survey study conducted<br />
in the spring of 2008 (State Chancellery 2008b) show<br />
that 62% of ethnic <strong>Estonian</strong>s trust or tend to trust the <strong>Estonian</strong><br />
state while only 23% of the Russian-speaking population<br />
does (Table 4.4.2.). There are no significant age-related<br />
differences in the evaluations of the Russian-speaking population<br />
regarding the trustworthiness of the <strong>Estonian</strong> state,<br />
although the 15–29-year-old respondents seem to be somewhat<br />
more critical toward the state than those who are middle-aged<br />
or older. Surprisingly, Russian citizens tend to<br />
trust the <strong>Estonian</strong> state more than those Russian-speakers<br />
who are <strong>Estonian</strong> citizens (see Table 4.4.2.). This can be<br />
explained by reference to age differences of the corresponding<br />
citizen groups: while younger and middle-aged people<br />
dominate among Russian-speakers with <strong>Estonian</strong> citizenship,<br />
the majority of Russian citizens are pensioners who<br />
are apparently satisfied with the social security provided to<br />
them by the <strong>Estonian</strong> state (see Lauristin 2008).<br />
Earlier studies have shown that among minorities,<br />
satisfaction with regime performance is more strongly<br />
23<br />
On the other hand, among the middle-aged group, citizenship brings about stronger idetnfification with the <strong>Estonian</strong> people – 72% of<br />
Russian speakers aged 40–49 with <strong>Estonian</strong> citizenship define themselves as members of the political commmunity.<br />
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