SAR 18#6

2014 Firearms Directory
OR
TX
WI
WI
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AZ
CLASS 2 MANUFACTURER
CLASS 3 DEALER
dealer from transacting with Alvarez
face-to-face and thwarted application
of the federal firearm’s law requirements.
Alvarez however underwent a
background check with a dealer in his
home state.
Abramski noted that until 1995,
the ATF took the view that a straw purchaser’s
misrepresentation counted
as material only if the true buyer could
not legally possess a gun. The majority
of the court disregarded this point,
noting that only the voice of Congress
mattered and nothing Congress did
has supported Abramski’s view that
straw purchasing for a non-prohibited
person was legal.
The Dissent
In the dissent, Justice Scalia
joined with chief justice Roberts, and
justices Thomas and Alito to note that
under §922(a)(6), it is a crime to make
a “false...statement” to a licensed gun
dealer about a “fact material to the
lawfulness of” a firearms sale. While
Abramski made a false statement
when he claimed to be the gun’s “actual
transferee/buyer” as Form 4473
defined that term, that false statement
was not “material to the lawfulness
of the sale” since the truth – that
Abramski was buying the gun for his
uncle with his uncle’s money – would
not have made the sale unlawful.
The dissenters also wrote that
no provision of the Gun Control Act
prohibits a person who is eligible to
possess firearms from buying a gun
for another person who is eligible to
possess firearms, even at the other’s
request and with the other’s money.
The justices found the government’s
contention that Abramski’s
false statement was material to the
lawfulness of the sale depends on a
strained interpretation of provisions
that mention the “person” to whom a
dealer “sells” a gun. The government
contended that Abramski’s uncle was
the person the dealer sold the gun to
and that Abramski prevented the dealer
from running the background check
on the real buyer, checking his ID,
etc., though this was later done.
The dissenters found that the uncle
was not the person who bought
the gun, but that it was Abramski who
fulfilled all federal requirements albeit
providing a false answer to question
11.a. They note that a vendor sells
an item of merchandise to the person
who physically appears in his
store, selects the item, pays for it, and
takes possession.
The dissenters also rejected the
heart of the majority’s argument in its
claim that unless Abramski’s uncle is
deemed the “person” to whom the gun
was “sold,” and that the Gun Control
Act’s identification, background-check
and recordkeeping requirements
would be “rendered meaningless”
as an overstatement. They opined
that the purpose of crime prevention
might be served more effectively if
the requirements at issue looked past
the “man at the counter” to the person
“getting the gun,” to ensure he is
eligible to possess firearms.
The dissenting justices also listed
SAR Vol. 18, No. 6 104 Nov., Dec. 2014