SAR 18#6

according to the form’s clear definition,
he was not. He also signed
the certification acknowledging his
understanding that a false answer to
Question 11.a. is a federal crime. After
clearing the background check, the
dealer sold him the Glock. Abramski
then deposited the $400 check in
his bank account, transferred the gun
to Alvarez, and got back a receipt.
Federal agents found that receipt
while executing a search warrant at
Abramski’s home after he became a
suspect in a different crime. A grand
jury later indicted Abramski.
Abramski then moved to dismiss
the charges by arguing that his misrepresentation
on Question 11.a. was
not “material to the lawfulness of the
sale” under §922(a)(6) because Alvarez
was legally eligible to own a gun.
And he claimed that the false statement
did not violate §924(a)(1)(A)
because a buyer’s response to Question
11.a. is not “required ...to be kept
in the records” of a gun dealer. The
District Court denied those motions.
Abramski then entered a conditional
guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge
the rulings. He was sentenced
to five years probation.
The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
But it also noted that of the three
courts to have addressed the issue,
one agreed with Abramski that a
misrepresentation on Question 11.a.
is immaterial if “the true purchaser
(here Alvarez) can lawfully purchase
a firearm directly.” The U.S. Supreme
Court decided to review the
case principally to resolve the Circuit
split about §922(a)(6).
The Supreme Court looked at
Abramski’s original claim, that a false
answer to Question 11.a. is immaterial
if the true buyer is legally eligible
to purchase a firearm. (The National
Rifle Association and a group of 26
states joined Abramski as amici in
making this argument).
Additionally, Abramski made a
new and more ambitious argument,
which he concedes no court has previously
accepted – in that, he alleges
that a false response to Question
11.a. is never material to a gun sale’s
legality, whether or not the actual
buyer is eligible to own a gun. (The
NRA and the 26 states did not join
Abramski on this argument).
On his first point, Abramski argued
that the dealer could have sold
him the gun even if he had truthfully
answered Question 11.a. by disclosing
that he was a straw buyer, because
all federal firearms law cares
about is whether the individual standing
at the dealer’s counter meets the
requirements to buy a gun. This argument
is based on the federal regulation
of licensed dealers’ transactions
with “persons” or “transferees,”
without specifically referencing straw
purchasers. Dealers are prohibited,
for example, from selling firearms
to persons in certain categories,
such as felons, the mentally ill, drug
addicts, etc. Abramski thus argued
that since Congress (when drafting
the regulations) did not make mention
of “straw purchasers” or “actual
buyers,” it “is not illegal to buy a gun
for someone else.”
In its opinion the court declared
that Abramski’s reading would undermine
and virtually repeal the federal
gun law’s core provisions. Thus
criminals could employ strawmen
with impunity. The record-keeping
provisions as well would serve little
purpose if they did not reveal the real
buyers’ of firearms.
The court also found that by
concealing that Alvarez was the actual
buyer, Abramski prevented the
CLASS 2 MANUFACTURER
AZ
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2014 Firearms Directory
www.smallarmsreview.com 103 SAR Vol. 18, No. 6