The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in 2025

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9. Aaron L. Friedberg, Contest for Supremacy. China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2011; Hugh White, “The China Choice” book review by Andrew Nathan, Foreign Affairs January-February 2013, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138661/hugh-white/thechina-choice-why-america-should-share-power. 10. See the treatment, among others, in Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. See also treatment of Chinese constraints in Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, pp. 275-286; and Robert Sutter, “China and America: The Great Divergence?” Orbis, Vol. 58, No. 3, Summer 2014, pp. 1-18. 11. Stephen Roach, “China’s Policy Disharmony,” Project Syndicate, December 31, 2013, available from www.projectsyndicate.org. 12. Robert Sutter, “China and U.S. Security and Economic Interests: Opportunities and Challenges,” Robert Ross and Oystein Tunsjo, eds., U.S.-China-EU Relations: Managing The New World Order, London, UK: Routledge, 2010, pp. 143-163; James Shinn, Weaving the Net, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1996. 13. Phillip Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, June 4, 2006, pp. 8–9. 14. This section summarizes findings in Robert Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013, pp. 1-26, 311-327. 15. Ibid., p. 315. 16. John Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993. 17. Gilbert Rozman, East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013. 368
18. James Przystup, “Japan-China Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 3, January 2013, pp. 109-117. 19. Lawrence Saez and Crystal Chang, “China and South Asia: Strategic Implications and Economic Imperatives,” Lowell Dittmer and George Yu. eds., China, The Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010, pp. 83- 108; John Garver and Fei-ling Wang, “China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle,” Asian Security, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2010, pp. 238-263; Satu Limaye, “India-US Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 15, No. 3, January 2014, pp 137-143. 20. Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: Guns and Games of August: Tales of Two Strategic Partners,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 10, No. 3, October 2008, pp. 131–38; Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 15, No. 3, January 2014, pp. 121–133. 21. Richard Bush, Unchartered Strait, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2013. 22. Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 15, No. 3, January 2014, pp. 87-94. 23. Linda Jacobson, “Australia-China Ties: In Search of Political Trust,” Policy Brief, Lowy Institute, June 2012. 24. Sutter, Foreign Relations of the PRC, p. 319. 25. Yu Yongding, “A Different Road Forward,” China Daily, December 23, 2010, p. 9. 26. Pu Zhendong, “Singapore Supports Strengthened Free-Trade Agreement with Beijing,” China Daily, August 30, 2013, available from usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-08/30/ content_16932418.htm. 27. Jonathan Pollack, “Why Does China Coddle North Korea? The New York Times, January 12, 2014, available from www.nytimes. org; Scott Snyder, “China’s Post-Kim Jong Il Debate,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012, pp. 107-114. 369
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The Chinese People’s Liberation A
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Str
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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Alternative Futures for the People
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Relations. The analysis provides an
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Roy Kamphaus
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military officials and potential ri
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centric military to a more balanced
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Then President Xi Jinping gave a ke
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intentions or capabilities, it is p
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should be viewed as occurring in is
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for the last decade, placed greater
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In addition to these external drive
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and orientation of the PLA. Authors
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propensity to use force, as well as
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In Chapter 9, Michael McDevitt exam
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tion. Saunders also contends that C
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the two powers could possibly form
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it becomes also necessary to assess
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CHAPTER 2 WHITHER CHINA? ALTERNATIV
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• Globalization and a liberal glo
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mand, Control, Communications, Comp
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PLA documents make clear that the
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If nothing changes, the most likely
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• The approach Chinese leaders ad
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30 force development may exhibit mo
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approach to relations with its neig
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Drivers Part 3: Non-Drivers. Finall
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Alternative Future 1: A PLA Focused
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2 1. See, for ex
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16. U.S. Office of the Secretary of
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DOMESTIC, EXTERNAL, AND TECHNOLOGIC
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and proactively ( 积极的 ) get
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down the Qin dynasty in 209 BCE. 4
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Whereas rural taxes were not suppos
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and opening was accompanied—for t
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of people who post highly nationali
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law, and the party itself must act
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In his first term, Hu Jintao was ra
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others that are not as visible. How
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Why did the Soviet Union disintegra
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adopted, the current dynamic suppor
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Chinese politics over the next deca
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18. Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Ti
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CHAPTER 4 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARM
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PERIPHERAL VS. WIDER REGIONAL CAPAB
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the PLA has begun to place greater
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this new depth would be limited unl
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political and military issues relat
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helicopters and designed primarily
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etween vessels, protests, and riots
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2013 Defense Budget (in billions$)
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By almost any measure, U.S. power r
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military strategy and force posture
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China might also seek, on balance,
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esponsibilities commensurate with i
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Zambia (2012). 30 Riots in Vietnam,
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Two things could increase the relat
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Source: Arms Transfer Database, Sto
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In general, closer strategic relati
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in particular types of skills and s
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it were accompanied by additional U
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military operations could drain res
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spread mistrust between the Japanes
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Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert and Ge
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though impossible to quantify due t
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47. “Indonesia and China Move Clo
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cal innovations, with MMIs further
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ilities”—input and infrastructu
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asic if endemic problems facing the
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pull” type—that is, driven by P
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military-industrial complex and civ
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ity areas: laser technology, space,
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of at least five geostationary and
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ites, propulsion technologies, bio-
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na’s defense industrial base is b
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Tayho), which commenced production
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military systems. As long as the de
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earliest stages of conflict may be
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Ultimately, the PLA hopes to turn i
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7. Andrew Ross, “On Military Inno
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2011, pp. 7-8; and Richard A. Bitzi
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43. Jon Grevatt, “China Outlines
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ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE PEOPLE
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The first encompasses the Yellow, E
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China will not be determined by eco
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Chinese government and perhaps comm
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we must make major progress in mode
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Two important challenges confront t
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force or country, or by the threat
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NEO. The Libyan NEO in 2012, when 4
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will decrease for the PLA in the ne
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The South China Sea disputes are mo
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eral advantages in reduced procurem
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and loaded onboard, these missiles
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Future developments are likely to f
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short-duration, high-ntensity regio
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Joffe once said there was no reason
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into coherent, increasingly compete
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9. Border disputes with India remai
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19. Dennis Blasko reminded me about
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32. See, for instance, Glen Mohamme
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considered disparaging to the army.
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culated Weakness,” China’s Near
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66. Nan Li, quoted in John Garnaut,
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This has inspired the Chinese milit
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ing, HADR, and stability operations
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strikes conducted by the PLA, PLAN
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Chinese writings suggest that the P
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delivery of four IL-78/MIDAS tanker
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amphibious landings and assaults. C
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China’s reluctance to get involve
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how fast the next available cargo t
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simultaneously. China currently con
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Stability and Balance of Power. Eve
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5. DoD China Report 2013. 6. “Div
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26. China is starting to do this, b
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48. Andrew N. D. Yang and Colonel M
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68. “PLA’s New Tank Deployed in
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in budgeting and force employment t
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about an economic slowdown, inhibit
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Lastly, the goal of “maintaining
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tions due to the diverse missions a
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internal security responses for whi
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perceptions of overly aggressive an
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humanitarian assistance and disaste
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half with corresponding cuts to ass
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The long-term transition of the PLA
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evise its “No First Use” (NFU)
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The SAF’s experience with road-mo
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dent, Beijing’s self-perception a
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7. Cui Yafeng ( 崔亚峰 ) ed;
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19. “Full Text: the Diversified E
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35. “The Military Balance, 2014,
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION, WORLD,
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power with its neighbors, depending
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Finally, when forecasting the respo
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line between the two countries in t
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Clearly, a PLA that in 2025 has con
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sort of Indo-Pacific multilateral r
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Association of Southeast Asian Nati
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ally in Singapore. This gives the U
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Manila encourages or facilitates an
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surveillance and command and contro
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United States has reasserted its co
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decided to establish an 80,000-man
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view of its territory. 41 As its po
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Further afield, an expeditionary PL
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10. See for example, Clay Blair, Jr
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No. 3, December 2013, pp. 353-356,
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42. This is not to say there have n
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international rules and norms. The
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States, Russia, China, and major Eu
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tioning. 5 U.S. allies in Europe an
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facilitate or obstruct Chinese goal
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power, which gives Beijing a degree
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argue that the BRICS countries 22 o
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will be domestic pressure for China
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make further multilateral trade lib
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Page 345 and 346: CHAPTER 11 IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CH
Page 347 and 348: In 2012, growing Chinese-U.S. compe
Page 349 and 350: Looking out, few foresee the Obama
Page 351 and 352: There are forecasts of inevitable c
Page 353 and 354: The Chinese leadership set forth in
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Page 381 and 382: ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS RICHARD A. B
Page 383 and 384: DANIEL GEARIN is a China military c
Page 385 and 386: engineering and Chinese from the U.
Page 387 and 388: tionally, she has worked on China p
Page 389 and 390: ROBERT SUTTER is Professor of Pract
Page 391: FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VI
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