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The Chinese People’s Liberation A
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Str
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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Alternative Futures for the People
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Relations. The analysis provides an
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Roy Kamphaus
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military officials and potential ri
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centric military to a more balanced
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Then President Xi Jinping gave a ke
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intentions or capabilities, it is p
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should be viewed as occurring in is
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for the last decade, placed greater
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In addition to these external drive
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and orientation of the PLA. Authors
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propensity to use force, as well as
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In Chapter 9, Michael McDevitt exam
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tion. Saunders also contends that C
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the two powers could possibly form
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it becomes also necessary to assess
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CHAPTER 2 WHITHER CHINA? ALTERNATIV
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• Globalization and a liberal glo
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mand, Control, Communications, Comp
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PLA documents make clear that the
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If nothing changes, the most likely
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• The approach Chinese leaders ad
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30 force development may exhibit mo
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approach to relations with its neig
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Drivers Part 3: Non-Drivers. Finall
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Alternative Future 1: A PLA Focused
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2 1. See, for ex
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16. U.S. Office of the Secretary of
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DOMESTIC, EXTERNAL, AND TECHNOLOGIC
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and proactively ( 积 极 的 ) get
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down the Qin dynasty in 209 BCE. 4
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Whereas rural taxes were not suppos
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and opening was accompanied—for t
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of people who post highly nationali
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law, and the party itself must act
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In his first term, Hu Jintao was ra
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others that are not as visible. How
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Why did the Soviet Union disintegra
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adopted, the current dynamic suppor
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Chinese politics over the next deca
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18. Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Ti
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CHAPTER 4 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARM
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PERIPHERAL VS. WIDER REGIONAL CAPAB
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the PLA has begun to place greater
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this new depth would be limited unl
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political and military issues relat
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helicopters and designed primarily
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etween vessels, protests, and riots
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2013 Defense Budget (in billions$)
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By almost any measure, U.S. power r
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military strategy and force posture
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China might also seek, on balance,
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esponsibilities commensurate with i
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Zambia (2012). 30 Riots in Vietnam,
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Two things could increase the relat
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Source: Arms Transfer Database, Sto
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In general, closer strategic relati
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in particular types of skills and s
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it were accompanied by additional U
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military operations could drain res
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spread mistrust between the Japanes
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Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert and Ge
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though impossible to quantify due t
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47. “Indonesia and China Move Clo
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cal innovations, with MMIs further
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ilities”—input and infrastructu
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asic if endemic problems facing the
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pull” type—that is, driven by P
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military-industrial complex and civ
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ity areas: laser technology, space,
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of at least five geostationary and
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ites, propulsion technologies, bio-
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na’s defense industrial base is b
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Tayho), which commenced production
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military systems. As long as the de
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earliest stages of conflict may be
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Ultimately, the PLA hopes to turn i
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7. Andrew Ross, “On Military Inno
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2011, pp. 7-8; and Richard A. Bitzi
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43. Jon Grevatt, “China Outlines
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ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE PEOPLE
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The first encompasses the Yellow, E
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China will not be determined by eco
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Chinese government and perhaps comm
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we must make major progress in mode
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Two important challenges confront t
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force or country, or by the threat
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NEO. The Libyan NEO in 2012, when 4
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- Page 208 and 209: 19. Dennis Blasko reminded me about
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Association of Southeast Asian Nati
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ally in Singapore. This gives the U
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Manila encourages or facilitates an
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surveillance and command and contro
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United States has reasserted its co
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decided to establish an 80,000-man
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view of its territory. 41 As its po
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Further afield, an expeditionary PL
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10. See for example, Clay Blair, Jr
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No. 3, December 2013, pp. 353-356,
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42. This is not to say there have n
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international rules and norms. The
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States, Russia, China, and major Eu
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tioning. 5 U.S. allies in Europe an
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facilitate or obstruct Chinese goal
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power, which gives Beijing a degree
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argue that the BRICS countries 22 o
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will be domestic pressure for China
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make further multilateral trade lib
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lomatic means to pursue its interes
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status and prestige at both the reg
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to intervene to resolve civil wars
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primarily on maintaining domestic c
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China to fail, but this suspicion w
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and the importance of domestic and
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Contemporary International Relation
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28. See Mathieu Duchatel, Oliver Br
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CHAPTER 11 IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CH
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In 2012, growing Chinese-U.S. compe
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Looking out, few foresee the Obama
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There are forecasts of inevitable c
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The Chinese leadership set forth in
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the past to apply pressure on one a
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dealing with disputes and differenc
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trade is conducted by foreign inves
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not to trust each other. As a resul
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as resisting many aspects of Americ
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cal antipathy regarding China’s C
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2. The growing impact of economic g
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At present and for the foreseeable
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extraordinary pressure on Japan for
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and unwilling to engage in serious
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vor after having successfully conso
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The United States also could be exp
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18. James Przystup, “Japan-China
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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS RICHARD A. B
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DANIEL GEARIN is a China military c
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engineering and Chinese from the U.
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tionally, she has worked on China p
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ROBERT SUTTER is Professor of Pract
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FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VI