ARCTIC OBITER

16 | ARCTIC OBITER
information (the pay stubs) generated
by the employer to determine the
employee’s regular rate of pay.
STATUTES CITED
Employment’s Standards Act, SNWT, 2007, c 13
Labour Standards Act, RSNWT 1988, c L-1
CASES CITED
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9
Johnson v Yanke, 2009 NWTSC 17
Carter v Ger-Mac Contracting Ltd., 2000 NWTSC
58
Abil-Mona v Northwest Territories (Labour
Standards Board), 2004 NWTSC 76
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING –
RESIST ARREST
R v Tinqui
2011 NWTSC 48 (CanLII) | September 19, 2011
Presiding: Justice J. Vertes
For the Crown: A. Paquin
For the Defendant: L. Stevens, QC
The 43 year old offender pleaded guilty
to resisting arrest.
He had a lengthy
criminal record. The offender had been
detained in custody on this and other
charges for seven months.
Offender
sentenced to 60 days’ imprisonment,
deemed to have been served by the time
already spent in custody.
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –
RULES 303 AND 304 OF THE RULES
OF THE SUPREME COURT – SETTING
DOWN POINTS OF LAW FOR
DETERMINATION PRIOR TO TRIAL
Inuvik v Shattler
2011 NWTSC 49 | September 26, 2011
Presiding: Justice J. Vertes
For the Applicant: P. Smith
For the Respondent: G. Phillips
The test for whether a point of law
should be set down for determination
prior to trial is a restrictive one. The
concern is to avoid unnecessary delays
and costs by splitting off issues. The
determination of the proposed points of
law in this case would not resolve the
litigation. A trial will still be necessary
to determine the main point.
While
there may be merit in having some
issues determined prior to the trail, that
is something best left to the trial judge
to decide.
CASES CITED
Reece et al v City of Edmonton, 2010 ABQB 538
Reece et al v City of Edmonton, 2011 ABCA 238
BHP Billiton Diamonds Inc. v Northwest Territories,
2007 NWTSC 10
Oil Sands Hotel (1975) Ltd. v Alberta, [2002] AJ No
1444 (QL) (QB)
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS – DUTY TO
CONSULT – FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDINGS – ORDER
CONFIRMING SALE
NWT BDIC v 892622 NWT Ltd.
2011 NWTSC 50 (CanLII) | September 27, 2011
Presiding: Justice L. Charbonneau
For the Plaintiff: D. McNiven
The Defendants: C.J. Burke
For C. Paulette, J. Emile: M. Unka
BDIC applied for an order confirming
the sale of two properties.
The sales
were the result of foreclosure after the
defendants defaulted on a loan.
An
order nisi, made in 2009, provided for
sale by tender. The decision granting
the order
nisi was never appealed.
Tenders were received by BDIC for the
properties and BDIC therefore asked the
court to confirm the sales.
The
defendants objected on the basis of
moral and social considerations. Two
non-party individuals also objected.
One on the basis of his trapping rights
on the land. The other being the Chief
of the Smith’s Landing First Nation, on
the basis that because BDIC is a Crown
corporation, it had an obligation to
consult before taking any action with
respect to the lands.
Application allowed - It is not within
the jurisdiction of the court to revisit the
order nisi issued over two years ago.
Moral and social considerations
presented by the defendants do not give
the court a basis for refusing BDIC’s
application. The objections of the nonparties
relate to the validity of the
original lease and the consequences of it
being transferred.
This may raise
complex aboriginal rights issues that
have nothing to do with the foreclosure
proceedings between BDIC and the
defendants.
The non-parties must
initiate their own proceedings, and
cannot simply bring a collateral attack
on the lease as part of the foreclosure
proceedings.
If the lease was
improperly granted from the start, the
flaw will follow the lease, no matter
who the leaseholder is.
CASES CITED
Northwest Territories Business Development and
Investment Corporation v 892622 NWT Ltd., 2009
NWTSC 47
FAMILY LAW – CHILD AND
SPOUSAL SUPPORT – APPLICATION
TO VARY
Westergreen v Westergreen
2011 NWTSC 52 (CanLII) | October 11, 2011
Presiding: Justice J.E. Richard
The Petitioner: Self-Represented
For the Respondent: M. Nightingale
On the basis of a consent order, the
petitioner was required to pay both
child and spousal support for a
specified time period. He now applies
to suspend payments indefinitely. Since