Impact strategic nr.6-7 - Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare şi ...

PUNCTE DE VEDERE
2
Buzan, Barry, “Popoarele, statele şi teama. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internaţională în epoca de după Războiul Rece”, Editura
Cartier, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 34.
3
ibid., p. 31.
4
ibid., p. 31.
5
Staş, Marian şi Păun, Vasile, “Coordonate manageriale şi tehnologice în spaţiul de conflict informaţional”, Editura Pro Humanitate,
Bucureşti, 1998, p. 18.
6
Giddens, Anthony, “A treia cale şi criticii ei”, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2001, p. 72.
7
Centrul de Studii Strategice de Securitate, “Integrarea euroatlantică. Priorităţi post-Praga”, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare,
Bucureşti, 2002, p. 74.
8
ibid., p. 34.
9
Pentru acest paradox, vezi şi paradigma alegerii raţionale din cadrul ştiinţelor politice, ca abordare analitică ce exprimă un comportament
politic al grupurilor cu referire la decizii politice conştiente făcute de indivizi care caută câştiguri maxime şi pierderi minime. Modelele de
alegere raţională devin preţioase ca instrumente analitice în măsura în care presupunerile lor de raţionalitate aproximează realitatea.
10
Schelling,Thomas C., “Strategia conflictului”, Editura Integral, Bucureşti, 2000.
11
Pentru Thomas C. Schelling, conceptul de strategie este cel preluat din teoria jocurilor şi este folosit pentru a sublinia interdependenţa
deciziilor luate de competitori şi a aşteptărilor lor referitoare la reacţiile celorlalţi.
12
ibid., pp. 14-15.
13
Onişor, C., Vasile Ozunu, M., Oprea, G., “Elemente de artă strategică românească”, Fundaţia Colegiului Naţional de Apărare, Bucureşti,
2001, p. 36.
14
Buzan, Barry, op. cit., p. 21.
15
Teoria jocurilor reprezintă un ansamblu de gândire preocupat de strategiile unei decizii raţionale în situaţii de conflict şi de competiţie,
The debates upon the security sources and their potential - which generate a certain kind of “superiority” sense - as well as
discussions on the security area which involve various actors (states, corporations, social groups, individuals) willing to get in touch,
are nowadays at a turning point.
The actual security structures still preserve the state as a main actor for the exercise of the political authority. On the other hand,
no state can function in a medium of isolation.
On the contrary, state structures can only be functional through their active relations with other states, other actors on the
international arena (NGOs, international organisations and institutions, corporations etc.), so that their relationships would gain a
tantamount importance for the international security architecture.
In the potential analysis framework, it is necessary to pay attention to the security background characteristics that affect the
actors’options. The risks, threats and vulnerabilities analysis may point out some vectors of the power management and distribution
(that is the power potential) which generate a series of relationships within the security area. In a way or another, some of the
security threats origins are the power based authorities conflicts. Therefore we can say the present security environment promotes
competitive attitudes and actions.
The coexistence of this power based authorities can be perceived, meantime, as a security source and an insecurity one as well.
Thus, the potential of the power balance may represent either a peace pillar or a conflict generator and in this way appears the
polarity of two concepts: “security potential” - “insecurity potential”.
Previous questions referring to the relation between security or insecurity potential and the balance types in the international
security architecture framework seem to regain their importance. Thus, we can talk about a bipolar or a multipolar equilibrium.
However, within any type of security equilibrium, any actor that is part of the international arena “power game”, either loses or
gains some “advantages” for its potential, may damage the existent balance.
184 IMPACT STRATEGIC nr. 1-2/2003