Impact strategic nr.6-7 - Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare şi ...

SECURITATE ŞI STRATEGIE MILITARĂ
asigurarea dinamicii progresului permanent. Acest
lucru presupune participarea cu o „cotizaţie” de 10-15
milioane de dolari anual la programe navale de cooperare
internaţională, care sunt în curs de desfăşurare pe plan
european, în strânsă legătură cu noii aliaţi, ceea ce ar însemna
un total de peste 300 milioane de dolari în 25 de ani,
rezonabil şi realizabil, permiţând în mod justificat accesul
la tehnologiile cele mai moderne şi implicarea economiei
naţionale în domenii până acum inaccesibile.
„Viziunea” pe termen lung este cu atât mai necesară
cu cât, în viitorul apropiat, ca membră NATO, România
poate fi ţinta atacurilor cu rachete realizate în zone instabile
sau cu potenţial de instabilitate, sau poate fi victima
atacurilor asupra altor ţări europene. În ultima perioadă
se discută despre realizarea Apărării Europene contra
rachetelor balistice (EBDM), ţările din sud-estul Europei
(Grecia, Bulgaria, România) fiind deja văzute ca priorităţi
pe termen scurt. Pe măsură ce devine realizabilă producţia
Bibliografie:
de rachete cu rază mai mare de acţiune, apărarea se va
extinde spre ţările central europene şi nordice. Chiar în
situaţia în care nu România este ţinta unui atac, poate fi
victima unor resturi sau chiar focoase lovite sau deviate
de apărarea antirachetă a unei alte ţări. Apărută ca o
problemă nouă a securităţii, în cadrul iniţiativelor aliate,
România va trebui în curând să opteze pentru desfăşurarea
unor elemente ale apărării contra rachetelor balistice, fie
pe teritoriul naţional, fie pe mare, pe direcţia cea mai
ameninţată, hotărând ce trebuie şi ce poate apăra: oraşe,
obiective militare sau fiecare metru pătrat.
Soluţia cea mai transparentă pare a fi o participare
pragmatică şi lucidă la integrare, pe baze raţionale, pornind
de la ideea asigurării supravieţuirii şi progresului naţiunii,
fie pe calea abordării prudente, fie pe calea „imersiunii
totale”.
- JDW, 18 dec. 2002, 11 dec. 2002, 4 dec. 2002, 29 ian. 2003, 11 sept. 2002
- RUSI, dec. 2001
- JFQ, Summer 2001
- Cuadernos de Estrategia, Spania, 2001-2002
- www. conferences.janes.com, jdw.janes.com
- Richard B Lovelock, The Evolution Peace Operations Doctrine
- Tom Mockaitis, Peace Operations and interstate conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch
- Robert M. Antis, Claudia H. Clarke, Creating a New Path for Joint Education
- NATO AJP 3.4.1 Standard
Looking to the future conflicts and wars from these days, to the next 25 to 30 years, until the middle of this century, this material
is an attempt to demonstrate the evolution of Sea Power approach, on basis of „Joint Vision 2020” concept.
The main challenge for the eve of this Century seems to be a turning point in the thinking, in order to remove the Sea Power
concept from „War at Sea” to „War from Sea”.
The use of Sea Power will have an increasing importance because of the obvious advantages in this matter, more and more restrictive
times requiring hard negotiations with foreign governments required by deployment of ground forces.
Some of the main advantages of „War from Sea” are:
- forbids opponent the possibility to take action by its own, in order to harras, attack by surprise or make diplomatic pressures;
more than that, on sea, even strong armed forces countries have limited capabilities;
- increase the capacity to maintain presence in the area long time g enough to fulfill the aims;
- avoids protests and costly arrangements required by massive deployments in possible hostile territories and rehearsals inconvenient;
- allows cleaner operations, reducing own casualties in the force built up stage;
- assures the force security and reduces significantly the infrastructure in a foreign territory expenses;
- realizes a better public perception; the media access can be reduced;
- allows easier use of force against non state enemies, quick and silently, at long distance, in different areas in the same time.
Primary zones of Sea Power
In a reasonable estimation, such as from 25 to 30 years, the „Sea Power XXI” will comply its mainstream concept by three primary
zones:
- Sea Strike, a long distance offensive force, far from own homeland;
- Sea Shield, a forward defense force against major threats;
- Sea Basing, the newest concept, involving the deployment on sea of necessary forces for Land Attack, everywhere in the
World.
Sea Strike has its roots in the Global Maritime Control, on Cooperative Engagement Capacity concept basis (CEC), with an aircraft
carrier group and land attack capabilities hardcore. The necessary number of this type seems to be around 15, only 8 being available.
In future, “the good forces” need the increasing participation of other Navies than today, like UK, France, Spain, Italy and others. The
key elements of new technologies will be UAVs, UCAVs, UUCVs, hypersonic missiles, electromagnetic rail guns, and multi spectral
imagery, in a high integrated system.
Sea Shield is designed to provide defense against access strategies, ballistic and cruise missiles, smart mines, fast attack boats and
classic submarines basis. A Surface Action Group (SAG), including anti aircraft cruisers (CG(X)) fitted by interceptors including high energy
lasers, allows to combat fast and slow targets at least 200 nautical miles radius. Moreover, Sea Control to Land Attack will be effective
due to Land Control Ship, like DD21 Zumwalt, fitted by ALAM system and high ranking artillery, able to operate in brown waters.
Sea Basing intends to avoid the increasing limits imposed by sovereignty problems and to reduce te importance of littoral bases,
in order to increase the action freedom. The core of this concept is the Maritime Prepositioning Force Ship (MPF (F)), large in off to
host on the deck helicopters, MV 22 Osprey and F35 JSF aircrafts, to be a forward HQ for JTF, to allow the deployment to a MEB, and
enhanced by logistic and C2 capabilities to be finally a Mobile Operational Base (MOB).
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