PROVOCĂRI LA ADRESA SECURITĂŢII ŞI STRATEGIEI LA ÎNCEPUTUL SECOLULUI XXI
provocări la adresa securităţii şi strategiei la începutul secolului xxi provocări la adresa securităţii şi strategiei la începutul secolului xxi
meetings with the leaders of Georgia's three separatist regions, and in Russia's dispute with Ukraine over Tuzla island. [15] In this regard, the United States notes that Russia has significant influence with the Transnistrian leadership, which Moscow should use to expedite the withdrawal of its forces and a political settlement. [16] That's why Mr. Rumsfeld's visit was important: He stressed the commitment of the United States to "a reintegrated, sovereign Moldova" and said "it remains the position of all of those [NATO] countries that they will require that the Russians fulfill their obligations with respect to the removal of troops." The Bush administration has been saying that “Mr. Putin should meet his commitment to withdraw the troops; along with other NATO governments, it has held up ratification of a new agreement on the deployment of military forces in Europe until Russia complies”. But the message has sometimes been mixed. That position ought to be a key element of the Bush administration’s reaction to Mr. Putin's growing imperial ambitions. A Stop in Moldova, The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Jul 4, 2004. pg. B.06. [17] According to the commitments made through the Timetable for Completion of Reforms, document that was submitted to NATO in March 2003, Romania “intends to participate fully in NATO’s military structure and collective defense planning process and is willing to commit forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions”. [18] Romania provides 116 troops for KFOR, 119 troops for SFOR, one infantry battalion as a SFOR/KFOR reserve, 49 military personnel and one transport aircraft C-130 B for ISAF, one infantry battalion (405 military personnel) for the operation Enduring Freedom, 804 military personnel to the Operational International Force in Iraq (one infantry battalion one engineer detachment one military police company one NBC company one special detachment). Also, there are military observers and monitors in the UN or OSCE missions. [19] Arthur Chilingarov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC, Statement by National Delegation to Bucharest Session, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IV, 1998, p.40. [20] Vasile Sandru, New Trends in Conflict Prevention and Resolution; Approaches in the Black Sea Area, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IV, 1998, p.41. [21] Secretary Powell, while emphasizing that “we favour deepening our partnership with Russia, raised these concerns with Russian leaders at the end of January. He emphasized that our preference was to cooperate, not to compete, with Russia in the former Soviet space. Our policies and programs in Eurasia aim to promote economic, political and military reform, to encourage the development of democracy, and civil society, and to help the people of the region become prosperous and stable partners. This is a goal, we believe, that is as much in Russia's interest as it is in ours”. [22] “The United States recognizes that Russia has legitimate interests in Eurasia based on geography, economics and history. We support good relations between Russia and its neighbors, and we have no desire to compete with Russia in a modern version of the ‘Great Game'. ... But we also look to Russia to respect the sovereignty and independence of the other former Soviet states." [23] Many in Russia appear to continue to believe that increased contacts and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia's neighbors are a zero-sum game, that American influence comes at Russia's expense and is even a threat to Russia's security. [24] Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Head of States and Government, 21 November 2002, North Atlantic Council Summit Meeting, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IV, 1998, p.32. [25] Ercan Ozer, The Black Sea Economic Co-operation and the EU, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. II, 1997, p.113-114. [26] This option would help Ukraine integrate into European energy structures and to diversify its own supply of oil. As we have told the Ukrainian government, reversing the flow of the pipeline to facilitate export of Urals crude through the Black Sea, as some have proposed, could undercut Ukraine's interests. Even a "temporary" reversal would lead shippers to develop other land-based routes from the Caspian to Europe, essentially shutting Ukraine out of this potentially profitable transport business. It is our understanding that U.S. oil companies are interested in using Odesa-Brody, and we have urged the Ukrainians to try to negotiate a transparent commercial agreement with potential suppliers, customers, and transit countries. Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, DC, May 12, 2004. [27] "Therefore, as we greet this ten-year mark, we can look back at a record of success. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership has been a catalyst of domestic transformation and of international security co-operation on a historically unprecedented scale," said NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, opening his first meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, on 14 January, and referring to the occasion of the anniversary. [28] NATO press release on the PfP anniversary and de Hoop Scheffer's statement, Brussels, 10 January 2004. This practical program was to complement the political dialogue between NATO and Partners launched 299 300
already in 1991 and conducted in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and then, since 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). [29]Jeffrey Simon, PfP: Charting a course for a new era. [30] Together with Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey — NATO’s three Black Sea allies with a rich experience in SEDM and SEEBRIG — the U.S. presence could be beneficial in fostering wider Black Sea stability and cooperation under a revived PfP program. [31] NATO Press Release, 31 March 2004. [32] Chairman’s statement of the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Summit level Istanbul, Turkey. [33] It is time to build further upon SEDM’s successes to deal with the new risk environment and broadened it to include civil emergency planning and interior and intelligence ministers, creating an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial (SEDIIM). Jeffrey Simon, PfP: Charting a course for a new era. [34] Nicolae Ecobescu, Nicolae Micu, Black Sea Multilateralism Cooperation: New Stages, Wider Opportunities, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IX, 2-3, 2003, p.254. [35] Adrian Năstase, Romania and the Southern Dimension of the Alliance, Monitorul Oficial, 2002, p.181. [36] For a revival to succeed, the program will need to be tailored to the needs of NATO’s remaining 20 partners and two PfP aspirants who fall into the following eight distinct groups with very diverse needs, interests, and capacities: • Five “advanced” partners — Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, and Switzerland — with no interest yet in joining the Alliance. • The three Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners — Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia — who do aspire to membership and for whom NATO must keep its Open Door credible. • Ukraine, who claims to be an aspirant with an Action Plan, and aspires to join the MAP. • Russia, who does not aspire to membership but maintains a special relationship in the NATO Russia Council. • Two relatively inactive partners — Moldova and Belarus. • Three Caucasus partners — Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, • Five Central Asia partners — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; and • Two Balkan PfP aspirants — Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia- Montenegro. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURING POLICY IS A NEW DIVIDING LINE OR A FUTURE EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP? Dr. Paul DUŢĂ * Studiul prezintă, într-o viziune unitară, sintagmele de „Europă extinsă” şi „Politica de vecinătate europeană” după lărgirea Uniunii Europene din 4 mai 2004; de reţinut că, deşi România şi Bulgaria vor deveni membre ale Uniunii Europene în 2007, cele două state sunt tratate ca şi făcând parte din această structură europeană, ceea ce justifică prezentul demers. România va deveni un vector important al politicii de vecinătate europeană, dată fiind suprapunerea graniţei Uniunii Europene cu graniţa nord-estică a României. Atât conceptul de „Europă extinsă” cât şi „Politica de vecinătate europeană” propun un parteneriat care să suplinească absenţa perspectivei de a deveni state membre ale Uniunii Europene dar şi pentru evitarea unei noi linii de împărţire a continentului european. „Politica de vecinătatea europeană” se adresează atât spaţiului mediteranean (care nu face obiectul prezentului studiu) cât şi estului continentului. Statele vecine de la est se structurează în cadrul acestor politici în trei categorii – Federaţia Rusă, noile state occidentale independente (Ucraina, Moldova şi Belarus), şi statele din Caucazul de sud (Armenia, Azerbaidjan şi Georgia). On 1 May 2004, the enlargement of the European Union took place with the accession of ten new Member States. It has brought changes to the EU’s political geography offering new opportunities to deepen existing relations between the Union and its neighbours to the East and to the South. The Union is determined to further develop partnerships with its neighbours to mutual benefit, promoting security as well as stability and prosperity. It reaffirmed that enlargement will serve: - to strengthen relations with Russia, - to call for enhanced relations with: Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus - at a later stage, it could consider including the countries of the Southern Caucasus; * Dr. Paul Duţă is a Senior Researcher with Romanian Institute of International Studies. 301 302
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already in 1991 and conducted in the framework of the North Atlantic<br />
Cooperation Council (NACC), and then, since 1997, the Euro-Atlantic<br />
Partnership Council (EAPC).<br />
[29]Jeffrey Simon, PfP: Charting a course for a new era.<br />
[30] Together with Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey — NATO’s three<br />
Black Sea allies with a rich experience in SEDM and SEEBRIG — the U.S.<br />
presence could be beneficial in fostering wider Black Sea stability and<br />
cooperation under a revived PfP program.<br />
[31] NATO Press Release, 31 March 2004.<br />
[32] Chairman’s statement of the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic<br />
Partnership Council at Summit level Istanbul, Turkey.<br />
[33] It is time to build further upon SEDM’s successes to deal with<br />
the new risk environment and broadened it to include civil emergency<br />
planning and interior and intelligence ministers, creating an annual<br />
Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial<br />
(SEDIIM). Jeffrey Simon, PfP: Charting a course for a new era.<br />
[34] Nicolae Ecobescu, Nicolae Micu, Black Sea Multilateralism<br />
Cooperation: New Stages, Wider Opportunities, Romanian Journal of<br />
International Affairs, Vol. IX, 2-3, 2003, p.254.<br />
[35] Adrian Năstase, Romania and the Southern Dimension of the<br />
Alliance, Monitorul Oficial, 2002, p.181.<br />
[36] For a revival to succeed, the program will need to be tailored to<br />
the needs of NATO’s remaining 20 partners and two PfP aspirants who fall<br />
into the following eight distinct groups with very diverse needs, interests,<br />
and capacities:<br />
• Five “advanced” partners — Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Austria,<br />
and Switzerland — with no interest yet in joining the Alliance.<br />
• The three Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners — Albania,<br />
Macedonia, and Croatia — who do aspire to membership and for whom<br />
NATO must keep its Open Door credible.<br />
• Ukraine, who claims to be an aspirant with an Action Plan, and<br />
aspires to join the MAP.<br />
• Russia, who does not aspire to membership but maintains a special<br />
relationship in the NATO Russia Council.<br />
• Two relatively inactive partners — Moldova and Belarus.<br />
• Three Caucasus partners — Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,<br />
• Five Central Asia partners — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,<br />
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; and<br />
• Two Balkan PfP aspirants — Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-<br />
Montenegro.<br />
EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURING POLICY IS A NEW DIVIDING LINE<br />
OR A FUTURE EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP?<br />
Dr. Paul DUŢĂ *<br />
Studiul prezintă, într-o viziune unitară, sintagmele de „Europă<br />
extinsă” şi „Politica de vecinătate europeană” după lărgirea Uniunii<br />
Europene din 4 mai 2004; de reţinut că, deşi România şi Bulgaria vor<br />
deveni membre ale Uniunii Europene în 2007, cele două state sunt tratate<br />
ca şi făcând parte din această structură europeană, ceea ce justifică<br />
prezentul demers.<br />
România va deveni un vector important al politicii de vecinătate<br />
europeană, dată fiind suprapunerea graniţei Uniunii Europene cu graniţa<br />
nord-estică a României.<br />
Atât conceptul de „Europă extinsă” cât şi „Politica de vecinătate<br />
europeană” propun un parteneriat care să suplinească absenţa<br />
perspectivei de a deveni state membre ale Uniunii Europene dar şi pentru<br />
evitarea unei noi linii de împărţire a continentului european.<br />
„Politica de vecinătatea europeană” se adresează atât spaţiului<br />
mediteranean (care nu face obiectul prezentului studiu) cât şi estului<br />
continentului. Statele vecine de la est se structurează în cadrul acestor<br />
politici în trei categorii – Federaţia Rusă, noile state occidentale<br />
independente (Ucraina, Moldova şi Belarus), şi statele din Caucazul de sud<br />
(Armenia, Azerbaidjan şi Georgia).<br />
On 1 May 2004, the enlargement of the European Union took place<br />
with the accession of ten new Member States. It has brought changes to the<br />
EU’s political geography offering new opportunities to deepen existing<br />
relations between the Union and its neighbours to the East and to the South.<br />
The Union is determined to further develop partnerships with its neighbours<br />
to mutual benefit, promoting security as well as stability and prosperity. It<br />
reaffirmed that enlargement will serve:<br />
- to strengthen relations with Russia,<br />
- to call for enhanced relations with: Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus<br />
- at a later stage, it could consider including the countries of the<br />
Southern Caucasus;<br />
* Dr. Paul Duţă is a Senior Researcher with Romanian Institute of International Studies.<br />
301<br />
302