PROVOCĂRI LA ADRESA SECURITĂŢII ŞI STRATEGIEI LA ÎNCEPUTUL SECOLULUI XXI

meetings with the leaders of Georgia's three separatist regions, and in
Russia's dispute with Ukraine over Tuzla island.
[15] In this regard, the United States notes that Russia has significant
influence with the Transnistrian leadership, which Moscow should use to
expedite the withdrawal of its forces and a political settlement.
[16] That's why Mr. Rumsfeld's visit was important: He stressed the
commitment of the United States to "a reintegrated, sovereign Moldova"
and said "it remains the position of all of those [NATO] countries that they
will require that the Russians fulfill their obligations with respect to the
removal of troops." The Bush administration has been saying that “Mr.
Putin should meet his commitment to withdraw the troops; along with other
NATO governments, it has held up ratification of a new agreement on the
deployment of military forces in Europe until Russia complies”. But the
message has sometimes been mixed. That position ought to be a key element
of the Bush administration’s reaction to Mr. Putin's growing imperial
ambitions. A Stop in Moldova, The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Jul
4, 2004. pg. B.06.
[17] According to the commitments made through the Timetable for
Completion of Reforms, document that was submitted to NATO in March
2003, Romania “intends to participate fully in NATO’s military structure
and collective defense planning process and is willing to commit forces and
capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions”.
[18] Romania provides 116 troops for KFOR, 119 troops for SFOR,
one infantry battalion as a SFOR/KFOR reserve, 49 military personnel and
one transport aircraft C-130 B for ISAF, one infantry battalion (405 military
personnel) for the operation Enduring Freedom, 804 military personnel to
the Operational International Force in Iraq (one infantry battalion one
engineer detachment one military police company one NBC company one
special detachment). Also, there are military observers and monitors in the
UN or OSCE missions.
[19] Arthur Chilingarov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the
Russian Federation, Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC, Statement by
National Delegation to Bucharest Session, Romanian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. IV, 1998, p.40.
[20] Vasile Sandru, New Trends in Conflict Prevention and
Resolution; Approaches in the Black Sea Area, Romanian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. IV, 1998, p.41.
[21] Secretary Powell, while emphasizing that “we favour deepening
our partnership with Russia, raised these concerns with Russian leaders at
the end of January. He emphasized that our preference was to cooperate,
not to compete, with Russia in the former Soviet space. Our policies and
programs in Eurasia aim to promote economic, political and military
reform, to encourage the development of democracy, and civil society, and
to help the people of the region become prosperous and stable partners.
This is a goal, we believe, that is as much in Russia's interest as it is in
ours”.
[22] “The United States recognizes that Russia has legitimate
interests in Eurasia based on geography, economics and history. We
support good relations between Russia and its neighbors, and we have no
desire to compete with Russia in a modern version of the ‘Great Game'. ...
But we also look to Russia to respect the sovereignty and independence of
the other former Soviet states."
[23] Many in Russia appear to continue to believe that increased
contacts and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia's neighbors are a
zero-sum game, that American influence comes at Russia's expense and is
even a threat to Russia's security.
[24] Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Head of States and
Government, 21 November 2002, North Atlantic Council Summit Meeting,
Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IV, 1998, p.32.
[25] Ercan Ozer, The Black Sea Economic Co-operation and the EU,
Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. II, 1997, p.113-114.
[26] This option would help Ukraine integrate into European energy
structures and to diversify its own supply of oil. As we have told the
Ukrainian government, reversing the flow of the pipeline to facilitate export
of Urals crude through the Black Sea, as some have proposed, could
undercut Ukraine's interests. Even a "temporary" reversal would lead
shippers to develop other land-based routes from the Caspian to Europe,
essentially shutting Ukraine out of this potentially profitable transport
business. It is our understanding that U.S. oil companies are interested in
using Odesa-Brody, and we have urged the Ukrainians to try to negotiate a
transparent commercial agreement with potential suppliers, customers, and
transit countries. Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs, Washington, DC, May 12, 2004.
[27] "Therefore, as we greet this ten-year mark, we can look back at
a record of success. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership has been a catalyst of
domestic transformation and of international security co-operation on a
historically unprecedented scale," said NATO Secretary General Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer, opening his first meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council, on 14 January, and referring to the occasion of the anniversary.
[28] NATO press release on the PfP anniversary and de Hoop
Scheffer's statement, Brussels, 10 January 2004. This practical program was
to complement the political dialogue between NATO and Partners launched
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