The Meme Machine
TheMemeMachine1999
TheMemeMachine1999
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22 THE MEME MACHINE<br />
congested communications networks leaving trails that provide information<br />
about the best and worst areas of congestion, or to mimic human users in games<br />
and virtual environments. Might such simple creatures gang up together to<br />
create powerful groups just as genes have done?<br />
<strong>The</strong>se ideas seem to stretch the analogy with biological viruses a bit far (and<br />
we must be very careful of-such analogies), but they do remind us that<br />
replicators vary in their usefulness. We tend to call something a virus when it is<br />
clearly acting mainly for its own replication by stealing the replicating resources<br />
of some other system – and especially when it does harm to that system. We<br />
usually give it a different name when it is useful to us.<br />
Just the same can be seen in the world of the mind. Dawkins (1993) coined<br />
the term ‘viruses of the mind’ to apply to such memeplexes as religions and<br />
cults – which spread themselves through vast populations of people by using all<br />
kinds of clever copying tricks, and can have disastrous consequences for those<br />
infected. Children’s games and crazes spread like infections (Marsden 1998a),<br />
and Dawkins suggested that children are vulnerable to ‘mental infections’ that<br />
more sophisticated adults can easily reject. He tried to distinguish useful<br />
memeplexes, such as science, from viral ones – an issue to which we will return.<br />
This theme has been taken up in popular books on memetics, such as Richard<br />
Brodie’s Virus of the Mind (1996) and Aaron Lynch’s Thought Contagion<br />
(1996), both of which provide many examples of how memes spread through<br />
society and both of which emphasise the more dangerous and pernicious kinds<br />
of memes. We can now see that the idea of a virus is applicable in all three<br />
worlds – of biology, of computer programs and of human minds. <strong>The</strong> reason is<br />
that all three systems involve replicators and we call particularly useless and<br />
self-serving replicating ‘viruses’.<br />
But if the theory of memetics is right, viruses are not the only memes, and<br />
memetics should not become a science of mind viruses. Indeed, the vast<br />
majority of memes (like the vast majority- of genes) cannot be considered as<br />
viral at all – they are the very stuff of our minds. Our memes is who we are.<br />
According to Dennett, our minds and selves are created by the interplay of<br />
the memes. Not only are memes replicating like genes (and fit his evolutionary<br />
algorithm perfectly) but human consciousness itself is a product of memes. He<br />
has shown how the competition between memes to get into our brains has made<br />
us the kinds of creatures we are. As he puts it ‘<strong>The</strong> haven all memes depend on<br />
reaching is the human mind, but a human mind is itself an artefact created when<br />
memes restructure a human brain in order to make it a better habitat for memes’<br />
(Dennett 1991, p. 207).