The Meme Machine

CHAPTER 9
The limits of sociobiology
I have proposed two new theories – memetic theories – to account for human
brain size and the origins of language. They both depend on the replicator
power of the meme, and introduce some new principles into the way memes and
genes interact – the processes I have called ‘meme-gene coevolution’ and
‘memetic driving’. I want now to set this memetic approach in context; to see
how it compares with other theories and explain why theories based purely on
biological advantage must fail. By exploring the different ways in which memes
and genes can interact we will come up against the limits of sociobiology.
First, theories of ‘coevolution’ are not new. As I explained in Chapter 3
there have been many, including those of Boyd and Richerson (1985), Deacon
(1997), Donald (1991), Durham (1991) and Lumsden and Wilson (198l). What
makes the present theory of meme-gene coevolution different is that both halves
– the memes and the genes – are replicators in their own right, with equivalent
status. Certainly, the two replicators are different. They differ in how they
work, how they are copied, and the timescales over which they operate. There is
also an important asymmetry between them in that memes can operate only by
using the brains created by genes, whereas genes can (and do) operate perfectly
well without memes. Nevertheless, both memes and genes have replicator
power. They are essentially only out for themselves and if they can get copied
they will – the rest follows from there.
Dawkins complained that his colleagues always wanted to go back to
biological advantage. This theory does not go back only to biological
advantage, but to memetic advantage as well. With two replicators working
together things can get complicated, but not impossibly so, and with a bit of
simplification we can tease out the three major types of interaction: gene-gene
interactions, gene-meme interactions, and meme-meme interactions.