The Russian Challenge

The Russian Challenge
Executive Summary and Recommendations
space’, and to make Europe accept that ‘there can be no
security without Russia’.
For the Kremlin, war is a clash of wills as much as resources.
In the absence of constraints on Russian military power, the
risk is not that Russia could impose a military solution, but
that it might enforce a political one that would damage the
West’s interests and nullify its efforts. A solution based on
terms dictated by today’s Russia would not last.
Russia’s foreign policy towards the West
There has been no sudden change in direction in Russia’s
foreign policy or values since the beginning of the crisis
over Ukraine. Russian ambitions and intentions had been
telegraphed for well over a decade, but the West found it easier
at the time to disregard them and indulge in the fantasy that
Russia was progressing towards a liberal-democratic model
with which the West felt comfortable. The war in Ukraine is, in
part, the result of the West’s laissez-faire approach to Russia.
The West views former Soviet states as fully sovereign
countries. As a result, Putin’s determination to re-establish
Russian primacy in its former dependencies is the crux of
the ‘Russian challenge’ to Europe. But additional challenges
are created by Russia’s illegitimate activities in the European
Union, such as market monopolization and the co-option of
elites, its desperate quest for equality with the United States,
and its pursuit of what it sees as its own interests regardless
of the implications for itself and others.
Russia’s toolkit
The Russian government has pursued its interests by
means of a wide range of hostile measures against its
neighbours, none of which are compatible with European
notions of cooperative international relations. In addition
to well-publicized instances of energy cut-offs and trade
embargoes, other tools include subversive use of Russian
minorities, malicious cyber activity of various forms, and
the co-option of business and political elites. One of the
most distinctive ways in which the Kremlin sustains leverage
over its neighbours is by keeping long-running disputes
alive or frozen for potential future use.
Two specific levers that have developed rapidly since the
armed conflict with Georgia in 2008 are Russia’s armed
forces and its information warfare capabilities. Both
have been employed to great effect during the crisis over
Ukraine; and both can be expected to be used elsewhere
in the future. Continued intensive investment in military
capability, despite Russia’s economic difficulties, is intended
to narrow the capability gap with Western militaries led by
the United States, and thereby to reduce further the risk
inherent in Russia’s possible future military interventions.
Russian and Western expectations
The root cause of the Ukraine crisis lies in Russia’s
internal development, and its failure to find a satisfactory
pattern of development following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Putin and his circle are not the same
as Russia and its people, and their interests do not
necessarily coincide.
The West has neither the wish nor the means to promote,
or for that matter to prevent, regime change in Russia.
But Western countries need to consider the possible
consequences of a chaotic end to the Putin system.
Recommendations
Western policy-makers will continue to differ in their
assessments of the extent of the Russian challenge and the
best ways to respond to it. But the consensus is emerging
that Russia cannot be integrated into the sort of rulesbased
international order in Europe that all European
states subscribe to, unless and until there is a fundamental
change of direction in Moscow. It is a change that must
come from within.
The West therefore needs to develop and implement a clear
and coherent strategy towards Russia. As far as possible this
must be based on a common transatlantic and European
assessment of Russian realities. In particular, policy must
be based on the evidence of Russia’s behaviour, not on
convenient or fashionable narratives.
Overall Western cohesion is critical for success. The
main actors, at least, need to be aligned and working
closely together. This Western strategy needs to include the
following clear goals, and establish the near-term means
and longer-term capabilities to achieve them.
Strategic goals for the West
• To deter and constrain coercion by Russia against its
European neighbours, for as long as is needed, but
not to draw fixed dividing lines. The door should be
kept open for re-engagement when circumstances
change. This cannot be expected with any confidence
under Putin, and it cannot be predicted what the
next regime will look like. But there is a reasonable
possibility that the decline of the Russian economy,
the costs of confrontation and the rise of China will
incline a future Russian leadership to want to reengage
with the West.
• To restore the integrity of a European security system
based on sovereignty, territorial integrity and the
right of states to determine their own destinies.
Chatham House | vii