The Russian Challenge

Summary of Recommendations
The root cause of the challenge posed to the West by Russia
lies in the country’s internal development, and its failure
to find a satisfactory pattern of development following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin and his circle are
not the same as Russia and its people, and their interests do
not necessarily coincide. The West has neither the wish nor
the means to promote, or for that matter to prevent, regime
change in Russia. But Western countries need to consider the
possible consequences of a chaotic end to the Putin system.
The West needs to develop and implement a clear and
coherent strategy towards Russia. As far as possible, this
strategy must be based on a common transatlantic and
European assessment of Russian realities. In particular,
policy should draw on the evidence of Russia’s behaviour,
not on convenient or fashionable narratives.
As outlined in more detail in the Executive Summary at the
beginning of this report, the West’s strategy needs to include
the following clear goals, and establish the near-term means
and longer-term capabilities for achieving them:
Strategic goals for the West
• To deter and constrain coercion by Russia against its
European neighbours, for as long as is needed, but
not to draw fixed dividing lines. The door should be
kept open for re-engagement when circumstances
change. This cannot be expected with any confidence
under Putin.
• To restore the integrity of a European security system
based on sovereignty, territorial integrity and the
right of states to determine their own destinies.
• To find better ways to communicate to the Russian
regime and people that it is in their long-term
national interest to be a part of a rules-based Europe,
not an isolated regional hegemon.
• To explain Western policies consistently and regularly
in discussions with China, and to all former Soviet
states, most of which have reason to be concerned
about Russian policies, whether or not they admit it.
• To prepare for the complications and opportunities
that will inevitably be presented by an eventual
change of leadership in Russia.
• Not to isolate the Russian people. It is not in the
Western interest to help Putin cut them off from
the outside world.
Specific policy objectives
• The reconstruction of Ukraine as an effective
sovereign state, capable of standing up for itself, is
crucial. This requires the input of much greater effort
than has been the case up to now.
• The EU’s Eastern Partnership needs to be transformed
into an instrument that reinforces the sovereignty and
economies of partner countries that have proved willing
to undertake serious political and economic reform.
• The effectiveness of sanctions against Russia depends
on their duration as well as severity. Until the issue
of the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity is
fully addressed, sanctions should remain in place.
It is self-defeating to link the lifting of sanctions to
implementation of the poorly crafted and inherently
fragile Minsk accords.
• The West should not return to ‘business as usual’
in broader relations with the Russian authorities
until there is an acceptable settlement of the
Ukrainian conflict and compliance by Russia with its
international legal obligations.
• EU energy policy should aim to deprive Russia of
political leverage in energy markets, rather than to
remove Russia from the European supply mix.
• Western states need to invest in defensive strategic
communications and media support in order to
counter the Kremlin’s false narratives.
• NATO must retain its credibility as a deterrent
to Russian aggression. In particular, it needs to
demonstrate that limited war is impossible and that
the response to ‘ambiguous’ or ‘hybrid’ war will
be robust.
• Conventional deterrent capability must be restored
as a matter of urgency and convincingly conveyed, to
avoid presenting Russia with inviting targets.
• Individual EU member states and the EU as a
whole need to regenerate their ability to analyse
and understand what is going on in Russia and
neighbouring states. This understanding must then
be used as a basis for the formation of policy.
58 | Chatham House