The Russian Challenge

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The Russian Challenge Russian Foreign Policy Towards the West and Western Responses terms and relative to its own ambitions. Therefore, Moscow’s cooperation with Europe cannot and will not proceed further in the medium term. Moscow’s ambition is for two unions – West European and East European (Russian) – which balance each other and compete. This aspiration puts Russia definitively outside Europe and its core institutions for at least the next 10 years. 168 The West will have to accept that dealing with Moscow will remain difficult; but the richer, more resilient part of the world, which can project power outside its own region and is arguably home to the dominant global ideology, ought to be able to do more than react. A form of suzerainty by Moscow over Ukraine, if well disguised, might work. But it may also encourage the Russian leadership to embark on further adventures in pursuit of what it sees as its interests. The danger is that the status quo is quietly accepted and that the West is left acquiescing to Putin’s adversarial view of the world. If the tendency of some Western countries towards de facto appeasement were to become European policy, it would only exacerbate matters. There are no guarantees of success, but to push back against Putin’s ambitions, the West first needs to acknowledge them. The inclination, for new Western leaders in particular, is to give the Kremlin the benefit of the doubt or attempt a Nixon-in-China-like breakthrough, which continually inhibits progressive understanding of and learning from the relationship. The facts show that Russia’s leadership has unleashed hackers on Estonia; 169 invaded and annexed part of Georgia; and cut off gas to, invaded and annexed part of Ukraine. Trust has been lost and the Helsinki Accords are in shreds. Moscow’s word is now worth nothing, and there are no longer grounds to give it the benefit of the doubt. Further Kremlin miscalculation has the potential to cause further destabilization, intended or not. The continued nearneglect on the part of the West suggests there will be no diminution of conflict. Russia has dwindling resources, but it does still possess political skills and resolve. It holds the initiative and decides which moves to make: to scale up or down. To a certain extent, the West will have to accept that dealing with Moscow will remain difficult; but the richer, more resilient part of the world, which can project power outside its own region and is arguably home to the dominant global ideology, ought to be able to do more than react. Every signal before and after the Ukraine crisis has indicated a reluctance by the West to act to defend its own interests against Russia’s encroachment. The West has been too timid. Conclusion So Western resolve is being tested. The sanctions-based policy is not directly aimed at provoking regime change in Russia; nor is it expected to make the Russian president alter direction. But in the face of Putin’s intransigence, it has become an attempt to put pressure on him from above and below in the full knowledge that this might eventually lead to his downfall. If he continues along this path, he faces economic ruin. If he retreats, he could well face internal regime change. Russia may have the greater interest in Ukraine. But the West has an even bigger interest in preserving the post-Cold War environment. If that is dismantled, it is conceivable that NATO and the EU could collapse too. The West has already paid a high price for the prevarications of the last five years. It has failed to track Russia’s foreign policy course in spite of its evident continuity. Unchallenged, this course will not change. But the fact that Russia’s foreign policy ambitions are clearer than ever suggests that the West now has an opportunity to counter them and ultimately improve the situation. 168 Well expressed and explained in Vitaly Tretyakov, ‘Inflated European Union’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2 June 2005 http://www.rg.ru/2005/06/02/evrosoyuz.html. 169 ‘Estonia hit by “Moscow cyber war’’’, BBC, 17 May 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6665145.stm. Chatham House | 39
6. Russia’s Toolkit Keir Giles We are forced to defend our legitimate interests unilaterally. 170 A shock to the system The annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked the second time in six years that Russia had used military force to seize control of part of a neighbouring country. As with the example of Georgia in 2008, this provided a lively demonstration of Moscow’s willingness to resort to measures against its neighbours which in the 21st century the rest of Europe finds unthinkable in advance and unpalatable after the fact. But states bordering Russia have long been aware that military force was simply the most direct of a wide range of tools and levers Moscow employs in its neighbourhood with hostile intent. Both the tools of influence that were used in the early 1990s, such as energy cut-offs, and those that have become evident more recently, such as offensive cyber activity, have been practised, developed and made more precise in their implementation. 171 Furthermore the last decade has seen growing assertiveness and confidence in their deployment. At each stage, Moscow has been encouraged by weak and unconvincing responses from the European Union, NATO and the West 172 – despite expert assessments predicting precisely this outcome. 173 Finally, Russia learned from the Georgian ceasefire that in certain circumstances, use of military force for foreign policy aims will be rewarded. Seizure of Crimea and intervention in mainland Ukraine, though dramatic, should therefore not be considered in isolation. As laid out by James Nixey in Chapter 5 on foreign policy, this does not represent any new trajectory in Russia’s attitude to its neighbours. Assertive intervention in Ukraine was simply the latest and most blatant implementation of Russia’s persistent view of international relations. Whether Russia’s motivations are aggressive and imperialist, or founded in genuine notions of defending key Russian interests from perceived Western expansionism, is important but not the subject of this chapter, which reviews instead the levers and instruments – old and new – that Russia uses in relations with and against its neighbours. Plus ça change Official Russian attitudes towards smaller powers in Europe have remained consistent since 1991. This is despite changes of leadership in the Kremlin, wild fluctuations in Russia’s perceived and actual strength, and the brief period of optimism in relations with the West as a whole at the beginning of the last decade, as described in Chapter 2 by Roderic Lyne. The key difference in 2014 was that with the assistance of a clear and consistent leadership stance, and a decade of high oil prices, Russia’s capabilities had developed to match its intentions more closely. These intentions are more discernible now simply because they are more likely to be translated into action while that leadership feels both relatively strong and, apparently, threatened. Put another way, Russia’s view of the outside world was not different before the arrival in power of Vladimir Putin; ‘rather, it “hibernated” during a period of diminished pressure from outside and weakness on the inside’. 174 In the early post-Soviet period, this view manifested itself as an explicit aspiration to reunite the newly independent republics in some new form. 175 Throughout the 1990s, senior Russians such as Yevgeny Primakov, in his various roles as intelligence chief, foreign minister and prime minister, maintained that efforts by the West to stand in the way of reintegration of the former Soviet republics were ‘dangerous and should be reconsidered’. 176 This aim was slowly tempered, but never to the extent of challenging the implicit assumption that Russia is by right the suzerain of the ‘near abroad’, and the senior partner in relations further afield. 177 Routine confrontations with Ukraine over the extent of the latter’s sovereignty were one inevitable result. This included discussion of the status of Crimea, despite Russian assurances that ‘Russia does not dispute the fact that Crimea is a component part of Ukraine’. 178 Thus in the last seven years, perceived, if not actual, challenges to Russian security interests have twice led directly to the use of Russian military force abroad in a way not seen since the early 1990s. Russian intervention in Crimea caused widespread surprise in early 2014; but this was due entirely to collective Western amnesia of a kind not suffered in Moscow. The immediate aftermath of 170 Vladimir Putin, presidential address to the Federal Assembly, 4 December 2014, available at http://kremlin.ru/news/47173. 171 Jakob Hedenskog and Robert Larsson, Russian Leverage on the CIS and the Baltic States, FOI report FOI-R-2280-SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), June 2007, foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_2280.pdf. 172 ‘Russia – Future Directions’, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, 1 October 2008, https://sakpol.files. wordpress.com/2014/03/20081001-russia_future_directions.pdf. 173 For an easily accessible example, see James Sherr, ‘Russia and the West: A Reassessment’, Shrivenham Papers No. 6, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2007. 174 Norbert Eitelhuber, ‘The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and What It Implies for the West’, Connections, Winter 2009, p. 9. 175 James Sherr, Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia’s Influence Abroad (London: Chatham House, 2013), pp. 49–53. 176 John Goshko, ‘Yeltsin Claims Russian Sphere of Influence, Regional Peacekeeping Role Asserted’, Washington Post, 27 September 1994. 177 See, for instance, Leonid Velekhov: ‘A New “Warsaw Pact”: To Be or Not To Be?’, Segodnya, 21 September 1995, p. 9. 178 ‘Speech by A. V. Kozyrev’, Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, No. 5, May 1995, pp. 52–54. 40 | Chatham House
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The Russian Challenge

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