The Russian Challenge
20150605RussianChallengeGilesHansonLyneNixeySherrWoodUpdate
20150605RussianChallengeGilesHansonLyneNixeySherrWoodUpdate
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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Russian</strong> <strong>Challenge</strong><br />
<strong>Russian</strong> Foreign Policy Towards the West and Western Responses<br />
of misdemeanour was continually ignored because it did not<br />
fit the narrative of a developing partnership.<br />
<strong>The</strong> crisis in Ukraine is a European war, and if things go<br />
wrong it will be Europe that pays the price. It is also a<br />
wake-up call for something even more serious: Europe<br />
needs a new approach if it is to be an effective force to<br />
its east. But it is probably at the limit of its unity. Only if<br />
European economies continue to bounce back and <strong>Russian</strong><br />
foreign policy behaviour deteriorates still further will<br />
that unity be fortified.<br />
<strong>The</strong> US benchmark<br />
Although his core policy has not changed, it is apparent<br />
that Putin’s dislike of America has intensified since his<br />
titular return to the Kremlin in 2012. Whatever its cause<br />
– a sense of betrayal over mission creep in Libya, belief<br />
that the United States was behind the colour revolutions,<br />
or simple jealousy over its continued pre-eminence in the<br />
world – the <strong>Russian</strong> president’s vitriol towards the US<br />
administration is now manifest in most of his foreign policy<br />
speeches. 164 Moscow portrays itself as anti-American – antihegemonism<br />
– yet it continues to regard the United States<br />
as the geopolitical status benchmark against which it judges<br />
its own success or failure. 165 Emulation is not the aim; the<br />
Kremlin does, however, shout loudly for respect and for<br />
‘equal status’, which it sees as one and the same thing.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Middle East factor<br />
<strong>The</strong> majority view among the <strong>Russian</strong> elite is that the<br />
United States has a weak president who does not believe<br />
in American power but rather is committed to managing<br />
American decline – a man who had voted against the<br />
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and who in 2013 failed to respect<br />
his own ‘red line’ over the use of chemical weapons in<br />
Syria (even though Congress bore more responsibility for<br />
this decision). Putin could not fully protect Syria from the<br />
non-military Western response, but he did make Barack<br />
Obama look weak while also saving him from unpopular<br />
military action against Bashar al-Assad through a Kremlinbrokered<br />
deal. This was a key turning point in Moscow’s<br />
attitude. Having faced down the United States and<br />
prevented regime change in Damascus, it then felt able<br />
to act more confidently.<br />
Obama has tended to look for quick fixes such as the ‘Reset’,<br />
and he has tried to avoid tough decisions and strategic<br />
responses to Russia – preferring approaches couched in<br />
doctrinal terms such as ‘strategic patience’. 166 He sees<br />
Russia as a troublesome regional power distracting him<br />
from his focus on domestic rejuvenation, and he does not<br />
want another foreign adventure after Afghanistan, Iraq and<br />
Libya. Washington’s approach is therefore instrumental: the<br />
predominant American stance has been that Russia is needed<br />
in the Middle East, although it is not clear what benefit that<br />
has brought, and Putin has taken advantage of the situation.<br />
America the tough?<br />
Yet as shown in its push on sanctions, Washington does<br />
have a more robust approach to Moscow than most of<br />
Europe. This can be attributed to a combination of being a<br />
unitary actor, pressure from the Republican Party and, to a<br />
lesser extent, the vestiges of a Cold War mentality. Much,<br />
too, has been made of America’s economic independence<br />
from Russia, particularly in the energy sphere; it does<br />
15 times less business with Russia than with the EU. 167<br />
Administration officials are concerned about the rift with<br />
the EU over sanctions on Russia, but the tougher American<br />
line ultimately owes more to politics than trade. Obama has<br />
been let down by Putin too many times and, like Merkel, has<br />
become disillusioned. <strong>The</strong> biggest failing, however, has been<br />
the self-delusion of expectations. Too much was invested<br />
in the ‘Reset’ and there was no contingency plan. That was<br />
a crude and ignorant attempt to seduce President Dmitry<br />
Medvedev away from Putin’s influence. Obama spent more<br />
time with Medvedev during the latter’s nominal presidency<br />
than with any other major world leader, but the ‘Reset’ had<br />
failed even before the end of his first term.<br />
Prospects<br />
<strong>The</strong> West had hoped time would be a healer for Russia and<br />
its leaders, but instead Vladimir Putin sees his country as<br />
facing a weakening Western adversary. He will try to break<br />
apart Western unity, such as it is, especially if he does not<br />
achieve his goals in the former Soviet space, and he will<br />
continue to interpret Western approval for democratic<br />
transformation in former Soviet states as a threat.<br />
Moreover, Putin’s strategy towards the West will continue<br />
to reflect a drive for greater <strong>Russian</strong> political and military<br />
assertiveness. Russia’s perception of itself as more than a<br />
European country – as a power with regional and global<br />
interests – will become further entrenched, even though<br />
its position in the world is declining both in comparative<br />
164<br />
See, for example, the transcript of Vladimir Putin’s 18 December 2014 news conference with relevant parts highlighted: http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23406#s.<br />
165<br />
Previously, the benchmark for economic success was to achieve the standard of living of the poorer EU members, such as Portugal.<br />
166<br />
US National Security Strategy, February 2015, http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf. See President Obama’s two-page preface.<br />
167<br />
‘Russia’s trade ties with Europe’, BBC, 4 March 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26436291.<br />
38 | Chatham House